Inhibiting doping in sports: deterrence is necessary,but not sufficient

The use of performance-enhancing drugs is a significant problem in sport. It cheats clean athletes of their hard-earned rewards from perfecting their skills though dedication and hard work. It defrauds fans by substituting a distorted playing field for a true competition. Anti-doping agencies have been charged with enforcing drug policies, primarily through the use of drug testing programs. We propose that drug testing, while important, is not sufficient to achieve deterrence. Engaging the principles of perceptual deterrence and development of a moral community of athletes can greatly enhance compliance with rules.     

Fairness,Care, and Abortion

Only women can bear the burdens of gestating fetuses. That fact, I suggest, bears on the morality of abortion. To illustrate and explain this point, I frame my discussion around Judith Jarvis Thomson's classic defense of abortion and Gina Schouten's recent feminist challenge to Thomson's defense. Thomson argued that, even assuming that fetuses are morally equivalent to persons, abortions are typically morally permissible. According to Schouten's feminist challenge to Thomson, however, if fetuses are morally equivalent to persons, then abortions are typically morally impermissible because there is a collective moral obligation to care for the vulnerable. The consideration that is my topic, however, poses a problem for that feminist challenge to Thomson. There is reason to believe, I argue, that it is unfair that only women can bear the burdens of gestating fetuses. And, if that is unfair, it would undermine that feminist challenge to Thomson. I show, in other words, that there is a plausible and well-motivated basis for believing that, even if fetuses are morally equivalent to persons and there is a collective obligation to care for the vulnerable, then abortions are nevertheless typically morally permissible. That is how fairness bears on the morality of abortion.     

Abortion,Property, and Liberty

In “Abortion and Ownership” John Martin Fischer argues that in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist case you have a moral obligation not to unplug yourself from the violinist. Fischer comes to this conclusion by comparing the case with Joel Feinberg’s cabin case, in which he contends a stranger is justified in using your cabin to stay alive. I argue that the relevant difference between these cases is that while the stranger’s right to life trumps your right to property in the cabin case, the violinist’s right to life does not trump your right to liberty in the violinist case.     

Gender,Employment Status,and Abortion: A Longitudinal Analysis

Building upon extant literature, we examine the influence gender and employment status exert on abortion attitudes among the mass public. Specifically, we assess if men, employed women, and homemaker women view the abortion issue differently and if the same factors account for variation in each group's attitudes toward abortion. Analysis of General Social Survey data from 1973 to 2000 indicates that although homemaker women tend to be more pro-life than do men or working women, the attitudes of all 3 groups exhibit similar changes over time. In addition, our results suggest that the same variables account for variation in abortion attitudes for all 3 groups. Our results suggest that the causes and effects of abortion attitudes do not appear to be gender-specific, but rather are relatively uniform across genders and employment statuses.     

If Abortion,then Infanticide

Our contention is that all of the major arguments for abortion are also arguments for permitting infanticide. One cannot distinguish the fetus from the infant in terms of a morally significant intrinsic property, nor are they morally discernible in terms of standing in different relationships to others. The logic of our position is that if such arguments justify abortion, then they also justify infanticide. If we are right that infanticide is not justified, then such arguments will fail to justify abortion. We respond to those philosophers who accept infanticide by putting forth a novel account of how the mindless can be wronged which serves to distinguish morally significant potential from morally irrelevant potential. This allows our account to avoid the standard objection that many entities possess a potential for personhood which we are intuitively under no obligation to further or protect.     

II. On retributivism and deterrence

Alan Wertheimer claims the class of criminals who deserve punishment is identical with the class of criminals who are deferrable (Inquiry, Vol. 20 [1977]). According to Wertheimer this premise implies the conclusion that on ‘the retributive account . . . the guilty are punished because we expect to alter (at least some) criminal behavior’. It is argued that this premise does not imply the conclusion.     

Contrast, induction, facilitation, suppression, and conservation

Ten rats received all of their water in daily 1-hr sessions. Following a baseline phase in which lever and water spout were freely available throughout each session, subjects were trained to press the lever for water on mixed schedules composed of two alternating components. Each component gave access to water for a fixed cumulation of drinking time every time the rat cumulated a fixed amount of lever-pressing time. Changes in one component produced contrast and induction effects, both positive and negative, with respect to both lever pressing and drinking in the unchanged component. All schedules facilitated lever pressing relative to baseline. All schedules suppressed drinking relative to baseline, even though contingency sessions allowed ample time to perform the baseline amount of drinking. The entire pattern of results was predicted in quantitative detail by assuming that the total amount of a dimension apportioned to lever pressing and drinking is conserved between baseline and contingency sessions. Conservation theory was shown to predict several effects produced by simple fixed-ratio schedules, and was compared favorably with probability-differential (Premack, 1971) and response-deprivation (Timberlake and Allison, 1974) theory.