Combining information from sources that vary in credibility

Models describing the role of source credibility in information integration were tested in two experiments. In the first experiment, subjects estimated the value of used cars based on two cues: blue book value and an estimate provided by one of three friends who examined the car. The three sources were described as differing in mechanical expertise. In the second experiment, subjects rated the likeableness of persons described by either one or two adjectives, each adjective contributed by a different source. The sources differed with respect to the length of their acquaintance with the person to be rated. In both experiments, credibility of the source magnified the impact of the information he provided. Further, this multiplicative effect of a source was inversely related to the credibility of the other source, in violation of additive or constant-weight averaging models, but consistent with a relative-weight averaging model.     

When credibility attacks: The reverse impact of source credibility on persuasion

Recent research on the self-validation hypothesis suggests that source credibility identified after message processing can influence the confidence people have in their own thoughts generated in response to persuasive messages (Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004). The present research explored the implications of this effect for the possibility that high credibility sources can be associated with more or less persuasion than low credibility sources. In two experiments, it is demonstrated that when people generate primarily positive thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because the message contains strong arguments) and then learn of the source, high source credibility leads to more favorable attitudes than does low source credibility. When people have primarily negative thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because it contains weak arguments), however, this effect is reversed—that is, high source credibility leads to less favorable attitudes than does low source credibility.     

The gap that makes us desperate: Paths from language to mental health

Although past research provided some clues about the relation of language use with mental health, the mediatory functions of personality variables in this relationship have been ignored. This research examined the mediatory role of self‐concept clarity in the relationship between language use perceived by individuals and mental health indicators including anxiety, depression, and alexithymia. Based on the theoretical framework suggested by ?im?ek (2010), two studies sought to test two alternative structural equation models in data from university students in the first study (n = 250) and data from other groups in the second study (n = 331). The first model assumed that the relationship of language use with anxiety, depression, and alexithymia was mediated by self‐concept clarity. The second model tested the mediatory role of both anxiety and self‐concept clarity in this relationship. The results of the first study showed that the second model fitted better to the data than the first. Consistent with the first study, the results of the second study confirmed that the second model produced better goodness of fit statistics than the first model.     

Cheap talk and credibility: The consequences of confidence and accuracy on advisor credibility and persuasiveness

Is it possible to increase one’s influence simply by behaving more confidently? Prior research presents two competing hypotheses: (1) the confidence heuristic holds that more confidence increases credibility, and (2) the calibration hypothesis asserts that overconfidence will backfire when others find out. Study 1 reveals that, consistent with the calibration hypothesis, while accurate advisors benefit from displaying confidence, confident but inaccurate advisors receive low credibility ratings. However, Study 2 shows that when feedback on advisor accuracy is unavailable or costly, confident advisors hold sway regardless of accuracy. People also made less effort to determine the accuracy of confident advisors; interest in buying advisor performance data decreased as the advisor’s confidence went up. These results add to our understanding of how advisor confidence, accuracy, and calibration influence others.     

The credibility of children's allegations of sexual abuse

Sexual abuse, the fastest growing type of abuse complaint, often raises issues concerning the credibility of individual allegations. This paper discusses historical, developmental, and societal factors affecting children's credibility and recommended assessment methods that maximize a child's capacity to relate his or her experience. Clinical factors leading to false allegations are discussed.     

The role of the oath in credibility assessment

Based on the adaptive lie detector theory, this study is an examination of whether taking an oath, as context‐general information, increases the credibility of a suspect. The consistency of the testimonies of 6 eyewitnesses was manipulated so that it could be used as individuating information. There were 2 sets of testimonies: one that was consistent and one that was inconsistent. The results supported the adaptive lie detector theory. The participants judged those persons who took an oath to be more credible than those who did not, but this only happened in situations where the testimonies of the eyewitnesses were inconsistent. The theoretical and practical implications of the findings and future directions are then discussed.     

Communicator credibility and persuasian

Prior research has usually found a positive relationship between a communicator’s perceived credibility and his persuasiveness. An experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that the perceived vested interest of a speaker, the position the speaker advocated, and the social similarity between audience and speaker would influence attributions of credibility and affect the speaker’s persuasiveness. Three variables were manipulated in a 2 by 2 by 2 factorial design. Ss read a speech that either favored (pro) or opposed (con) student voting rights; the speech was attributed to a speaker who was either similar (student) or dissimilar (townie) to the stndent audience and who either had a vested interest (running for elective office) or had no vested interest (merely giving his opinion) :in the position he advocated. As predicted, the similarity of the speaker to the audience, the vested interest of the speaker, and the position advocated in the speech strongly influenced attributions of credibility. However, in contrast to much previous research, persuasion was found to be relatively independent of the variation in the speaker’s perceived credibility. It was suggested that the failure of attributions of credibility to relate to persuasion may have been due to the high degree of ego involvement for the Ss in the topic of student voting rights.     

The impact of hedged testimony on judgments of credibility

We tested whether people are attuned to critical memory factors, such as age at the timing of encoding and hedge words when judging the credibility of testimony. In two experiments, participants read a 19‐year‐old's testimony regarding a sexual assault. We manipulated whether participants learned that the assault occurred 4 years ago (when the claimant was 15 years old) or 15 years ago (when the claimant was 4 years old) and whether the claimant used hedge words in her testimony. In Experiment 2, we included a cross‐examination. Without the cross‐examination, participants rated the testimony as more credible when the assault had occurred 15 years ago. However, with the inclusion of a cross‐examination, participants rated the testimony more reliable when the event occurred 4 years ago and the claimant did not use hedge words. We discuss the implications our results have, particularly for historical cases, where memory is a key factor.     

Creativity insights: The phenomenon of calculated ignorance and credibility

ABSTRACT: When a problem is abandoned, a solution may subsequently and unexpectedly emerge. The intervening period, known as incubation, has sometimes been ascribed to opportunity assimilation. According to this theory, impasses to a problem create failure indexes, which ensure that random clues in the environment are detected and utilized. To assess the notion that failure indexes enhance clue utilization, 50 participants undertook a series of word problems. After this initial attempt, the participants were deceived and told that half the unsolved problems were insoluble. A series of general knowledge questions was then presented; the answers to the original problems were surreptitiously incorporated within this questionnaire. The instruction that certain problems were insoluble was retracted, and the items that had yet to be solved were reinstated. High-ability problem solvers were less likely to correctly answer the items that were designated as insoluble. Low-ability problem solvers, however, generated the reverse pattern. A model that links failure indexes to the forgetting of suboptimal strategies was formulated to accommodate these findings.     

The effect of speed limit credibility on drivers' speed choice

Credibility of speed limits is a key factor affecting drivers’ compliance with speed limits. Two experiments were conducted to investigate how credibility of speed limits affects judgments of appropriate speed. The first experiment aimed to establish speeds deemed appropriate by investigating Malaysians drivers’ judgments of the appropriate speed to drive based on photographs of roads with the speed limit sign erased. Drivers chose speeds which correlated with but were higher than the actual speed limits of the roads. Analysis of road characteristics suggested they based their decisions mainly on features of the road itself rather than of the roadside. The second experiment tested the impact of credibility of speed limit information on the speed drivers judged appropriate. Drivers judged the appropriate speed to drive for the same photographs as in Experiment 1 with speed limit information provided. Four conditions were included: two conditions where the speed limit posted was 10% higher or 10% lower than the appropriate speed established in Experiment 1 (credible speed limits), and two conditions where the posted speed limit was 50% higher or 50% lower than the appropriate speed (non-credible speed limits). Posted speed limits did affect drivers’ judgments about the appropriate speed to drive. Credibility also influenced judgments whereby drivers selected appropriate speeds consistent with the speed limits for the 10% lower condition, but not for speed limits that deviated highly from the appropriate speed judged in Experiment 1.     

The gap effect in newborns

In four experiments we investigated the gap effect in infants within the first 3 days of life. Reaction times (RTs) to make a saccade to a peripheral target were measured on gap trials, in which the central fixation stimulus went off 500 ms before target presentation, and on overlap trials, in which the central fixation stimulus remained on. In every experiment the fixation stimulus was a flashing light. The target stimulus was a schematic face in Experiment 1, a flashing light shown at 20° eccentricity in Experiment 2, a flashing light shown at 30° eccentricity in Experiment 3, and an upside-down schematic face in Experiment 4. In Experiments 1–3 a gap effect was found. That is, RT was faster on gap than on overlap trials. In contrast, the gap effect was absent in Experiment 4. These findings are consistent with the view that the superior colliculus plays a major role in producing the gap effect at birth.     

Source credibility and syllogistic reasoning

Two experiments examined whether a source credibility effect would be observed for a syllogistic reasoning task. In the experiments, people were given two statements, presented as the results from a survey, followed by a conclusion that was supposedly made by one of two sources. In Experiment 1, one of the sources was described as honest and the other as dishonest, and in Experiment 2, one of the sources was described as an expert and the other as a non-expert. Because a pilot experiment showed that credibility can be overridden by people’s experience with a source, all conclusions in Experiments 1 and 2 were ones that were likely to be accepted (i.e., necessary and possible strong conclusions). Both experiments showed a clear source credibility effect, particularly for the invalid conclusions. These results, along with the belief bias effect and previous research with conditional reasoning, suggest that people can be influenced by extraneous context, such as the honesty or expertise of a source, in a syllogistic reasoning task.     

Correcting erroneous inferences in memory: The role of source credibility

People often continue to rely on erroneous information about people and events, even in the face of subsequent counter information. The current study examined whether this information could be effectively corrected by a credible source. We examined two aspects of credibility: trustworthiness and expertise. Experiment 1 showed that receiving a correction from a source high in trustworthiness and expertise reduced participants’ use of original information when making inferences. Experiment 2 showed that source expertise alone was not sufficient to reduce participants’ reliance on the original information. The results from Experiment 3 showed that source trustworthiness alone significantly decreased participants’ use of the original information when making inferences. The results suggest that people may be able to reduce their use of original information if they receive a correction from a person who is deemed to be highly trustworthy. These findings have implications for decision making in politics and other applied areas.     

The credibility of a source influences the rate of unconscious plagiarism

Three experiments were conducted to investigate the relationship between the credibility of information and later unconscious plagiarism of that information. In each experiment, ideas concerning ways to reduce traffic accidents were presented from a more credible source (traffic planners) and a less credible source (college freshmen). After a distractor task, participants were asked to generate novel ways to reduce traffic accidents. In Experiments 1 and 2, unconscious plagiarism of ideas presented from the more credible source was greater than from the less credible source. In neither experiment was explicit memory for ideas from each source different in tests of source monitoring or free recall. However, the difference in unconscious plagiarism was eliminated in Experiment 3 by having participants generate the implications of ideas at study. The results are discussed in terms of the explicit factors that affect the incidence of unconscious plagiarism.