Combining information from sources that vary in credibility

Models describing the role of source credibility in information integration were tested in two experiments. In the first experiment, subjects estimated the value of used cars based on two cues: blue book value and an estimate provided by one of three friends who examined the car. The three sources were described as differing in mechanical expertise. In the second experiment, subjects rated the likeableness of persons described by either one or two adjectives, each adjective contributed by a different source. The sources differed with respect to the length of their acquaintance with the person to be rated. In both experiments, credibility of the source magnified the impact of the information he provided. Further, this multiplicative effect of a source was inversely related to the credibility of the other source, in violation of additive or constant-weight averaging models, but consistent with a relative-weight averaging model.     

When credibility attacks: The reverse impact of source credibility on persuasion

Recent research on the self-validation hypothesis suggests that source credibility identified after message processing can influence the confidence people have in their own thoughts generated in response to persuasive messages (Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004). The present research explored the implications of this effect for the possibility that high credibility sources can be associated with more or less persuasion than low credibility sources. In two experiments, it is demonstrated that when people generate primarily positive thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because the message contains strong arguments) and then learn of the source, high source credibility leads to more favorable attitudes than does low source credibility. When people have primarily negative thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because it contains weak arguments), however, this effect is reversed—that is, high source credibility leads to less favorable attitudes than does low source credibility.     

Cheap talk and credibility: The consequences of confidence and accuracy on advisor credibility and persuasiveness

Is it possible to increase one’s influence simply by behaving more confidently? Prior research presents two competing hypotheses: (1) the confidence heuristic holds that more confidence increases credibility, and (2) the calibration hypothesis asserts that overconfidence will backfire when others find out. Study 1 reveals that, consistent with the calibration hypothesis, while accurate advisors benefit from displaying confidence, confident but inaccurate advisors receive low credibility ratings. However, Study 2 shows that when feedback on advisor accuracy is unavailable or costly, confident advisors hold sway regardless of accuracy. People also made less effort to determine the accuracy of confident advisors; interest in buying advisor performance data decreased as the advisor’s confidence went up. These results add to our understanding of how advisor confidence, accuracy, and calibration influence others.     

The credibility of children's allegations of sexual abuse

Sexual abuse, the fastest growing type of abuse complaint, often raises issues concerning the credibility of individual allegations. This paper discusses historical, developmental, and societal factors affecting children's credibility and recommended assessment methods that maximize a child's capacity to relate his or her experience. Clinical factors leading to false allegations are discussed.     

Communicator credibility and persuasian

Prior research has usually found a positive relationship between a communicator’s perceived credibility and his persuasiveness. An experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that the perceived vested interest of a speaker, the position the speaker advocated, and the social similarity between audience and speaker would influence attributions of credibility and affect the speaker’s persuasiveness. Three variables were manipulated in a 2 by 2 by 2 factorial design. Ss read a speech that either favored (pro) or opposed (con) student voting rights; the speech was attributed to a speaker who was either similar (student) or dissimilar (townie) to the stndent audience and who either had a vested interest (running for elective office) or had no vested interest (merely giving his opinion) :in the position he advocated. As predicted, the similarity of the speaker to the audience, the vested interest of the speaker, and the position advocated in the speech strongly influenced attributions of credibility. However, in contrast to much previous research, persuasion was found to be relatively independent of the variation in the speaker’s perceived credibility. It was suggested that the failure of attributions of credibility to relate to persuasion may have been due to the high degree of ego involvement for the Ss in the topic of student voting rights.     

Creativity insights: The phenomenon of calculated ignorance and credibility

ABSTRACT: When a problem is abandoned, a solution may subsequently and unexpectedly emerge. The intervening period, known as incubation, has sometimes been ascribed to opportunity assimilation. According to this theory, impasses to a problem create failure indexes, which ensure that random clues in the environment are detected and utilized. To assess the notion that failure indexes enhance clue utilization, 50 participants undertook a series of word problems. After this initial attempt, the participants were deceived and told that half the unsolved problems were insoluble. A series of general knowledge questions was then presented; the answers to the original problems were surreptitiously incorporated within this questionnaire. The instruction that certain problems were insoluble was retracted, and the items that had yet to be solved were reinstated. High-ability problem solvers were less likely to correctly answer the items that were designated as insoluble. Low-ability problem solvers, however, generated the reverse pattern. A model that links failure indexes to the forgetting of suboptimal strategies was formulated to accommodate these findings.     

The effect of speed limit credibility on drivers' speed choice

Credibility of speed limits is a key factor affecting drivers’ compliance with speed limits. Two experiments were conducted to investigate how credibility of speed limits affects judgments of appropriate speed. The first experiment aimed to establish speeds deemed appropriate by investigating Malaysians drivers’ judgments of the appropriate speed to drive based on photographs of roads with the speed limit sign erased. Drivers chose speeds which correlated with but were higher than the actual speed limits of the roads. Analysis of road characteristics suggested they based their decisions mainly on features of the road itself rather than of the roadside. The second experiment tested the impact of credibility of speed limit information on the speed drivers judged appropriate. Drivers judged the appropriate speed to drive for the same photographs as in Experiment 1 with speed limit information provided. Four conditions were included: two conditions where the speed limit posted was 10% higher or 10% lower than the appropriate speed established in Experiment 1 (credible speed limits), and two conditions where the posted speed limit was 50% higher or 50% lower than the appropriate speed (non-credible speed limits). Posted speed limits did affect drivers’ judgments about the appropriate speed to drive. Credibility also influenced judgments whereby drivers selected appropriate speeds consistent with the speed limits for the 10% lower condition, but not for speed limits that deviated highly from the appropriate speed judged in Experiment 1.     

Source credibility and syllogistic reasoning

Two experiments examined whether a source credibility effect would be observed for a syllogistic reasoning task. In the experiments, people were given two statements, presented as the results from a survey, followed by a conclusion that was supposedly made by one of two sources. In Experiment 1, one of the sources was described as honest and the other as dishonest, and in Experiment 2, one of the sources was described as an expert and the other as a non-expert. Because a pilot experiment showed that credibility can be overridden by people’s experience with a source, all conclusions in Experiments 1 and 2 were ones that were likely to be accepted (i.e., necessary and possible strong conclusions). Both experiments showed a clear source credibility effect, particularly for the invalid conclusions. These results, along with the belief bias effect and previous research with conditional reasoning, suggest that people can be influenced by extraneous context, such as the honesty or expertise of a source, in a syllogistic reasoning task.     

The gap effect in newborns

In four experiments we investigated the gap effect in infants within the first 3 days of life. Reaction times (RTs) to make a saccade to a peripheral target were measured on gap trials, in which the central fixation stimulus went off 500 ms before target presentation, and on overlap trials, in which the central fixation stimulus remained on. In every experiment the fixation stimulus was a flashing light. The target stimulus was a schematic face in Experiment 1, a flashing light shown at 20° eccentricity in Experiment 2, a flashing light shown at 30° eccentricity in Experiment 3, and an upside-down schematic face in Experiment 4. In Experiments 1–3 a gap effect was found. That is, RT was faster on gap than on overlap trials. In contrast, the gap effect was absent in Experiment 4. These findings are consistent with the view that the superior colliculus plays a major role in producing the gap effect at birth.     

Correcting erroneous inferences in memory: The role of source credibility

People often continue to rely on erroneous information about people and events, even in the face of subsequent counter information. The current study examined whether this information could be effectively corrected by a credible source. We examined two aspects of credibility: trustworthiness and expertise. Experiment 1 showed that receiving a correction from a source high in trustworthiness and expertise reduced participants’ use of original information when making inferences. Experiment 2 showed that source expertise alone was not sufficient to reduce participants’ reliance on the original information. The results from Experiment 3 showed that source trustworthiness alone significantly decreased participants’ use of the original information when making inferences. The results suggest that people may be able to reduce their use of original information if they receive a correction from a person who is deemed to be highly trustworthy. These findings have implications for decision making in politics and other applied areas.     

Knowledge,probability, and credibility

This paper concerns study of the credibility of human sources of evidence and its relation to the inferential value of testimony they provide. From a certain view of 'knowledge' in epistemology comes the suggestion that credibility assessment can be construed as a cascaded inference in which attributes of human source credibility are identified. Scholarship from evidence law in jurisprudence suggests an evidential basis for credibility assessment in terms of these attributes. Applying Bayes' rule to this cascaded inference offers a way of expressing and combining credibility-related beliefs in the process of assessing the inferential value of evidence.     

The credibility of a source influences the rate of unconscious plagiarism

Three experiments were conducted to investigate the relationship between the credibility of information and later unconscious plagiarism of that information. In each experiment, ideas concerning ways to reduce traffic accidents were presented from a more credible source (traffic planners) and a less credible source (college freshmen). After a distractor task, participants were asked to generate novel ways to reduce traffic accidents. In Experiments 1 and 2, unconscious plagiarism of ideas presented from the more credible source was greater than from the less credible source. In neither experiment was explicit memory for ideas from each source different in tests of source monitoring or free recall. However, the difference in unconscious plagiarism was eliminated in Experiment 3 by having participants generate the implications of ideas at study. The results are discussed in terms of the explicit factors that affect the incidence of unconscious plagiarism.     

Repetition-based credibility enhancement of unfamiliar faces

This experiment demonstrated that rating the credibility of nonfamous faces results in a significant increase in rated credibility on a subsequent encounter relative to new nonfamous faces. The degree of credibility enhancement is comparable for both honesty and sincerity ratings and at both short (2-day) and long (14-day) interrating intervals. Furthermore, credibility enhancement was independent of recognition; ratings were significantly higher for repeated faces, regardless of whether they were remembered. Although female faces were rated more credible than male faces, there was no gender difference in the degree of credibility enhancement with repetition. Conditional analyses revealed that actual, rather than perceived, repetition formed the basis of credibility enhancement. Future research should compare repetition effects on both credibility and affect as well as the durability of such effects over time.     

The role of social categorization and perceived source credibility in minority influence

This study was conducted in order to compare the influence of ingroup and outgroup minorities and to assess the role of perceived source credibility in minority influence. The subjects were exposed to the simultaneous majority/minority influence paradigm. Ingroup minorities were more influential than outgroup minorities. Subjects moved toward the minority position in private and toward the majority position in public when the minority was represented by members of the ingroup. On private responses subjects were not affected by outgroup minorities who argued for abortion, and they became more positive toward abortion when outgroup minorities opposed abortion. Final &, ingroup minorities were perceived as more credible than outgroup minorities and greater credibility of minority source was associated with greater attitude change toward the minority position. The superior influence of ingroup minorities held when controlling for source credibility. Overall, the results were highly supportive of social identity theory.     

The explanatory gap is still there

I argue that O'Regan & No?'s (O&N's) theory is in a no better position than any other theory to solve the "hard problem" of consciousness. Getting rid of the explanatory gap by exchanging sensorimotor contingencies for neural representations is an illusion.     

Facial appearance and judgments of credibility: the effects of facial babyishness and age on statement credibility

Researchers have found that facial appearance influences social judgments. For example, evidence has shown that facial babyishness and age affect perceivers' impressions of the stimulus person's veracity. In this experiment, the researchers examined whether these variables also influenced the credibility attributed to written statements purportedly made by these people in addition to several topics of interest in deception-detection research. Undergraduates (N = 270) were presented babyfaced or mature-faced photographs that depicted a child, an adult, or an older individual, in addition to a written truthful or deceptive statement purportedly made by the person in the photograph. Results showed that, as predicted, when the statements were accompanied by babyfaced pictures, participants tended to judge them as truthful, but only if the pictures did not depict children. Also, when the statements were accompanied by childen's pictures, participants tended to judge them as deceptive, but only if the pictures depicted a babyish face. Overall detection accuracy was close to chance and did not correlate with either judgmental confidence or with the respondents' estimated lie-detection accuracy. However, confidence and estimated ability were significantly correlated. Also, more confidence was placed in judgments of truthfulness than in judgments of deceptiveness. Respondents' truth bias and the existence of a veracity effect in the diverse experimental conditions were examined as well.