Multiple personality and the concept of a person

The phenomenology and psychosocial conditions of the multiple personality syndrome are examined, and the problem that this syndrome seems to raise for the idea of a single self-conscious psychological subject is explored. Tracing the development of the disorder in a disturbed, emotionally repressive, and often violent family background, an explanation for this process is sought in terms of the cognitive effort involved in the achievement of self-identity. It is contended that, far from undermining a strong principle of the self-conscious psychological unity of the individual, this disorder provides a key to the understanding of that unity and the influences to which it is subject.     

Impartial welfarism and the concept of a person

This paper examines some work in welfare economics based upon generalized social welfare function (GSWFs). Impartial welfarism consists in a set of apparently quite weak moral axioms concerning GSWFs. Using that framework, welfare economists have derived both utilitarian and Rawlsian doctrines. These results would seem to be of great importance to moral philosophy. I argue, however, that applying them presupposes a view of persons as mere place holders for preferences, thereby limiting the theorems' appeal for moral philosophers. I propose a more satisfactory view of impartial welfarism by replacing the term person by the more general welfare recipient, but this still fails to make the doctrine available to all moral philosophers.     

The concept of a person in the context of abortion

The paper investigates the significance of the question of the fetus's status as a person for resolving the moral issues of abortion. It considers and evaluates several proposed solutions to this question. It also attempts to explain how different questions about the permissibility of abortion are appropriate to discussions at different levels of decision-making: the pregnant woman, the health professional, and the social policy level. The author's own conclusions to all these questions are offered along with other popular views.     

The concept of the fully functioning person

Conclusion Here then is my theoretical model of the person who emerges from therapy—a person functioning freely in all the fullness of his organismic potentialities; a person who is dependable in being realistic, self-enhancing, socialized and appropriate in his behavior; a creative person, whose specific formings of behavior are not easily predictable; a person who is ever changing, ever developing, always discovering himself and the newness in himself in each succeeding moment of time. This is the person who in an imperfect way actually emerges from the experience of safety and freedom in a therapeutic experience, and this is the person whom I have tried to describe for you in pure form.My purpose has not been to convince you of the correctness of this view. Indeed I would have to confess that I have written this paper primarily for my own satisfaction, to clarify the thoughts which have been stirring in me. But if this presentation causes you to formulate your view of the person who emerges from therapy, or enables you to point out flaws in my own thinking which I have not yet seen, or arouses in you the desire to put to objective test either this picture or one which you paint for yourself, then it will have fully served both its primary and its secondary purpose.Reprinted by permission from Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, Vol. 1, No. 1, August, 1963.     

The concept of the person and the value of life

The concept of the person has come to be intimately connected with questions about the value of life. It is applied to those sorts of beings who have some special value or moral importance and where we need to prioritize the needs or claims of different sorts of individuals. "Person" is a concept designating individuals like us in some important respects, but possibly including individuals who are very unlike us in other respects. What are these respects and why are they important? This paper sets out to answer these questions and to develop a coherent and useful concept of the person.     

Unfolding the concept of person by verbal abuse

Examined the prevalence of an interpersonal device, namely insult types, in a collectivistic and individualistic cultural context as an index of how the concept of person is culturally constructed. Insults were divided into three general categories, individualistic (those that refer directly to a person), relational (those that refer to a person and his/her significant relations) and swear-words. An examination of the insults subjects produced in Catania, southern Italy (collectivistic), Trieste, northern Italy (individualistic) and Bologna, central Italy, partially confirmed the hypothesized differences in types of verbal abuse. In the collectivistic context instances of verbal abuse are significantly more likely to be directed to a person and his/her relations than in the individualistic context. The social psychological implications of these findings are discussed.     

The Confucian relational concept of the person and its modern predicament

The Confucian relational concept of the person has been proposed as an epistemically more cogent and ethically more attractive alternative to that of liberal individualism. Two arguments are raised against this proposal without defending liberal individualism. Ethically, Confucianism is vitiated by certain unattractive features that cannot be removed without reducing the Confucian relational concept of the person to an abstract and not very helpful notion of human relatedness. Epistemically, Confucianism commits the essentialist fallacy of treating its own concept of human relations as reflecting the nature of things. In view of these limitations, the Confucian relational concept of the person does not provide a viable framework for dealing with social issues including bioethics.     

Moral phenomenology and a moral ontology of the human person

Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons’ work implies four criteria that moral phenomenology must be capable of meeting if it is to be a viable field of study that can make a worthwhile contribution to moral philosophy. It must be (a) about a unifed subject matter as well as being, (b) wide, (c) independent, and (d) robust. Contrary to some scepticism about the possibility or usefulness of this field, I suggest that these criteria can be met by elucidating the very foundations of moral experience or what I call a moral ontology of the human person. I attempt to partially outline such an ontology by engaging with Robert Sokolowski's phenomenology of the human person from a moral perspective. My analysis of Sokolowski's thought leads me to five core ideas of a moral ontology of the human person: well-being, virtue, freedom, responsibility, and phronesis. Though I do not by any means boast a complete moral ontology of the human person, I go on to demonstrate how the account I have presented, or something like it, can go a long way to helping moral phenomenology meet the criteria it requires to be a viable and worthwhile pursuit.     

A Good Abortion Is a Tragic Abortion: Fit Motherhood and Disability Stigma

In the context of abortion stigma, most abortion stories remain untold. The stories we do tell of abortion are often told to morally recuperate the status of the woman who has an abortion through a recourse to tragedy. Tragedy frames experiences where every choice produces some suffering, so decisions are geared toward maintaining individual integrity rather than adherence to absolute moral truths. This article argues that one dominant tragic abortion narrative, that of the disabled fetus, works to recuperate the moral status of “fit” mothers while actively constructing disabled lives as unlivable and undesirable. The option to stigmatize disability in recuperating the moral status of the woman who has an abortion relies on eugenic logics that also construct a variety of women (racialized, poor, disabled, and young) as illegitimate reproductive subjects. The article analyzes narratives of Sherri Finkbine's 1962 abortion in relation to contemporary narratives of late‐term abortions involving nonviable fetuses to expose how investment in medical judgments of good births enables particular women to make use of tragic narratives to maintain their status as moral mothers without disturbing broader abortion stigma or eugenic logics.     

How to operationalize a person

The notion of operationally defining a person is absurd, but no more so than other uses of “operationalization”. ‘Persons’ make that absurdity particularly clear because there is no sense in which persons can be directly observed, nor defined in terms of what might be observable, and thereby exposes the emptiness of the idea of operationalization more broadly.On the other hand, persons can be modeled, and their ontology investigated, within frameworks that can address the processes and organizations that actually constitute persons.