Liberal Neutrality and Moderate Perfectionism

This article defends a moderate version of state perfectionism by using Gerald Gaus’s argument for liberal neutrality as a starting point of discussion. Many liberal neutralists reject perfectionism on the grounds of respect for persons, but Gaus has explained more clearly than most neutralists how respect for persons justifies neutrality. Against neutralists, I first argue that the state may promote the good life by appealing to what can be called “the qualified judgments about the good life,” which have not been considered by liberal perfectionists including Joseph Chan and Steven Wall. Then I clear up several possible misunderstandings of these judgments, and argue that: (a) moderate perfectionism does not rely on controversial rankings of values and is committed to promoting different valuable ways of life by pluralistic promotion; and (b) moderate perfectionism requires only an indirect form of coercion in using tax money to support certain moderate perfectionist measures, which is justifiable on the grounds of citizens’ welfare. Thus, I maintain that moderate perfectionism does not disrespect citizens, and is not necessarily unfair to any particular group of people. It is, in fact, plausible and morally important. The defence of moderate perfectionism has practical implications for the state’s policies regarding art development, drug abuse, public education, and so on.     

Why Liberal Neutralists Should Accept Educational Neutrality

Educational neutrality states that decisions about school curricula and instruction should be made independently of particular comprehensive doctrines. Many political philosophers of education reject this view in favor of some non-neutral alternative. Contrary to what one might expect, some prominent liberal neutralists have also rejected this view in parts of their work. This paper has two purposes. The first part of the paper concerns the relationship between liberal neutrality and educational neutrality. I examine arguments by Rawls and Nagel and argue that some of the same arguments they use to justify liberal neutrality also justify educational neutrality; thus, if we accept these arguments for liberal neutrality, we should also accept educational neutrality. The second part of the paper defends educational neutrality against objections that it is impossible and objections that it is undesirable.     

The Limits of Liberal Cosmopolitanism

Res Publica - The essay critically reviews two recent contributions to the debate on global justice made by Darrel Moellendorf and Thomas Pogge respectively. Given both authors’...     

亲子教育缺失与"留守儿童"人格、学绩及行为问题

以“留守儿童”为被试,考察其家庭环境因素、人格、学绩、行为问题之间的关系,发现“留守儿童”处在相对不良的家庭环境中;不良的家庭环境因素与不良人格特质、行为问题、学业不良高相关,且后三者密切关联,相互加剧。讨论指出：对“留守儿童”问题的干预不仅要进行行为矫治和心理辅导,而且要整合社区、学校、家庭的力量,改善其家庭环境和心理氛围,为“留守儿童”建构有效的支持系统。     

Neutrality in the analysis of action-prone adolescents

An adolescent patient's action during analysis reflects both neurotic conflicts and the developmentally determined task of establishing an integrated self-representation. Concern for the consequences of the action often provokes the analyst to respond, covertly, with interventions intended to change the action through influence rather than understanding. This can lead to a distortion of the analytic process which, in itself, may be an enactment of the developmental conflict. Examination of such interventions reveals a lack of analytic neutrality and an unconscious participation in the patient's neurotic and developmental conflicts. Clinical material from the analyses of two fourteen-year-old girls and a sixteen-year-old boy is presented to illustrate and support this hypothesis.