Aesthetics of Surrender: Levinas and the Disruption of Agency in Moral Education

Education has long been charged with the taskof forming and shaping subjectivity andidentity. However, the prevailing view ofeducation as a project of producing rationalautonomous subjects has been challenged bypostmodern and poststructuralist critiques ofsubstantial subjectivity. In a similar vein,Emmanuel Levinas inverts the traditionalconception of subjectivity, claiming that weare constituted as subjects only in respondingto the other. In other words, subjectivity isderivative of an existentially priorresponsibility to and for the other. Hisconception of ethical responsibility is thusalso a radical departure from the prevailingview of what it means to be a responsible moralagent. In this paper, I use jazz improvisationas a metaphor to focus on three interrelatedaspects of ethical responsibility on Levinas'saccount: passivity, heteronomy, andinescapability. I then point toward some waysin which reframing responsibility andsubjectivity along this line might offer newpossibilities for conceiving subjectivity andmoral agency in education.     

Levinas and the euthanasia debate

The philosophers' tendency to characterize euthanasia interms of either the right or the responsibility to die is, in some ways, problematic. Stepping outside of the analytic framework, the author draws out the implications of the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas for the euthanasia debate, tracing the way Levinas's position differs not only from the philosophical consensus but also from the theological one. The article shows that, according to Levinas, there is no ethical case for suicide or assisted suicide. Death cannot be assumed or chosen—not only because suicide is a logically and metaphysically contradictory concept but also because in the choice of death ethical responsibility turns into irresponsibility. However, since Levinas holds that one must be responsible to the point of expiation, he can be said to approve certain actions that may have the consequence of hastening death.     

Karol Wojtyla and Emmanuel Levinas on the Embodied Self: the Forming of the Other as Moral Self-disclosure

The 'other' has taken on an increased theological significance for the Church in the advent of post-modern reflection, resulting in a myriad of possibilities for those who would reflect on the significance of the other in relation to the 'self', largely in connection with various theories of embodiment. Following Karol Wojtyla's (John Paul II) emphasis on the given-ness of the body I wish to illustrate a way in which the other might be understood theologically, informed by the insights of the continental philosophical tradition, specifically Emmanuel Levinas' phenomenological outline of the other as a key locus of ethical reflection. Bringing Levinas' continental philosophy into dialogue with Wojtyla's philosophical theology, it will be argued that the other must be re-approached in terms of their subjective self-disclosure, centring upon the en-fleshed and bodily form of the human person, who confronts us as a reflection of both that which is most other to ourselves (the divine) and paradoxically that which most resembles ourselves (the human). The other is always an en-fleshed subject and in their action, their subjective identity is disclosed on the relational level.     

Autonomy,Reciprocity, and Responsibility: Darwall and Levinas on the Second Person

Abstract

Stephen Darwall’s The Second‐Person Standpoint converges with Emmanuel Levinas’s concern about the role of the second‐person relationship in ethics. This paper contrasts their methodologies (regressive analysis of presuppositions versus phenomenology) to explain Darwall’s narrower view of ethical experience in terms of expressed reactive attitudes. It delineates Darwall’s overall justificatory strategy and the centrality of autonomy and reciprocity within it, in contrast to Levinas’s emphasis on the experience of responsibility. Asymmetrical responsibility plays a more foundational role as a critical counterpoint to ‘mean‐spirited’ reciprocity than Darwall’s laudable distinction between accountability and revenge, and responsibility even founds this distinction. The experience of being summoned to asymmetrical responsibility amplifies the meaning of ‘authority’, which is a presupposition for Darwall. Finally, asymmetrical responsibility helps develop decentred reasoning, invites risk beyond the boundaries of reciprocity at moments when autonomy appears endangered, reconciles respect and care at the experiential level, and presses to extend the scope of moral obligation.     

The Non-Existent God: Transcendence, Humanity, and Ethics in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas

This paper considers three essential gestures in Levinas’s theology, highlighting in each case how Levinas’s thinking allows him to either incorporate or sidestep some of the fiercest modern criticisms of traditional theism. First, we present Levinas’s vision of divine transcendence, outlining his ontological atheism and explaining how this obviates proving the existence of God and avoids the tangles of traditional theodicy. Second, we describe Levinas’s idea of the trace, showing how a non-existent God still leaves its mark in the face of the other person and explaining how this vision of divine immanence accords with the agendas of thinkers such as Feuerbach and Nietzsche, who criticized theology that elevated God while debasing humanity. Third, we present Levinas’s insistence on the philosophical primacy of ethics, showing how he infuses his ethical philosophy with religious themes, elevating moral philosophy to the level of ultimate concern in a way that even atheist social theorists such as Marx or Freud could appreciate. We close by briefly considering limitations of Levinas’s model, discussing problems with its practical applicability and suggesting that its scope might be too narrow: both for its failure to acknowledge potential ethical demands manifest by non-human animals and the natural world and for its inability to recognize solitary or aesthetic experiences as religiously significant. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

帛书《衷》篇新释八则

帛书《衷》篇"天地相率,气味相取,阴阳流形,刚柔成[卦]"言八卦、六十四卦的形成;"用六贛也,用九盈也"言《坤》卦空虚之象,《乾》卦实满之象;"盈而刚,故《易》曰‘直方大,不习,吉’也。因‘不习’而备,故《易》曰‘见群龙无首,吉’也",其中《坤》六二爻辞乃言龙之象;"《无孟》之卦有罪?死,无功而赏",?""当为"不"之误,"有罪不死,无功而赏",才符合《无妄》卦无所期望而有得之义;"武之义保功而恒死,文之义保安而恒穷"之"恒"字,当读为"极",极至之义;"‘见龙在田’也者,德也","德"当训为升闻;"‘夕沂若,厉,无咎’,息也","沂"当训为终止休息之义;"‘飞龙[在天]’,□而上也",缺字可补为"亲"。     

Hineni and Transference: The Remembering and Forgetting of the Other

Emmanuel Levinas proposed a philosophical critique that worked to unsettle and decenter generalizing, totalizing, and thematizing attempts to define the self. However, on the other hand, Levinas provides the space for the formation of a configuration of the self that has been conditioned by ethical relation and even points to some of the ingredients for (or shape of) such a self. Throughout Levinas’ work, the concept of hineni (“Here I am”) is used to illustrate the moral event that best characterizes the “psyche.” In the following paper, we consider how to apply the notion of hineni to modern psychological constructs of the human self. In the first section, we flesh out the characteristics of a self lived as hineni. We argue that such a self is “shaped” or oriented morally toward the outside and is radically exposed to the Other (not merely a bearer of moral consciousness or moral attributes). It is a remembering of the preoriginal and primordial ethical relation. In the second section, we use the psychoanalytic concept of transference to illustrate how the moral shape of the self can be forgotten, and how the self enters a state of “mineness” wherein the Other is reduced to one’s own history (Levinas 1990). In this state of forgetfulness, we argue that a “concreteness of egoism” (Levinas 1969) is maintained and a self lived toward the outside remains untenable. Transference, we argue, is an impoverished relation and a forgetting of and violence to the Other. Its proper use, however, in the therapeutic alliance allows for the possibility of a remembering of the Other and a calling beyond oneself.

管仲与李觏功利主义思想比较初探

管仲与李觏均以自然人性论为基础．主张以“循公而不私”、“义利并行”为价值原则．倡导富国富民之社会功利;管仲开社会功利思想之先河·佐桓公九合诸侯而一匡天下,李觏则始倡有宋一代之功利主义思潮。推进社会变革,“匡国济民”,成为“北宋的一个大思想家”,两人思想影响深远。通过对管仲与李觏功利主义思想的比较研究,揭示出功利主义思想的历史联系及社会作用,于今天社会生活具有重要的启迪作用。     

早期归隐现象与管晏的隐逸观

我国古代的隐逸发生很早,至迟在商周之际就有不少可信的例子,到春秋时期成为一种普遍社会现象。对于隐逸,管、晏进行了具体分析,给予隐士客观评价,并主张国家积极征召隐士。管、晏的隐逸观与他们自身经历有关,也是其“举贤授能”人才思想的一部分。管、晏招隐士的主张,对于当时诸侯笼络人才、赢取民心、稳定社会具有积极作用。     

论明代史学家王世贞对管仲的评价

明代著名史学家王世贞对春秋时期杰出的政治家管仲,曾给予全面且较高的评价。王世贞关注管仲,与当时朱明王朝取代蒙元政权关系密切,还与王世贞曾在青州任职有关。王世贞的治史思想,还不可避免地受到明中后期阳明心学的影响。通过分析王世贞对管仲的评价,可以明晰王世贞的治史特点,并为分析明代的时代特征和社会变迁提供佐证。     

论责任心的类型与层级

责任心的类型多种多样,并且,自个体步入前习俗水千开始,其责任心就既不再是有与无的关系,也不是一个平面关系,而是一个呈金字塔形的层级关系。就正确责任心而言,将“他律型责任心”与“自律型责任心”、“硬角色责任心”与“软角色责任心”进行排列组合,并考虑到量的差异,就生出了发展水平高低不同的多层次责任心：其中,拥有他律型硬角色责任心,是做个有责任心之人的底线。拥有第二层次的责任心有两种典型做法：一是拥有一般水平的自律型硬角色责任心;二是拥有他律型软角色责任心。个体二旦拥有一般水平的自律型软角色责任心,其责任心就达到了第三层次。拥有第四层次的责任心有两种典型做法：拥有高水平的自律型硬角色责任心,或拥有舍小我成大我且自律型软角色责任心。拥有高水平自律型软角色责任心,是做一个有责任心之人的最高境界。     

试论帛书《衷》的篇名和字数

论文通过对帛书易传三件残片的缀合和考释,认为所谓的帛书《易之义》原篇题当为《衷》,是孔子后学按照阴阳和衷共济的主题所选定的孔子沦《易》言沦的汇编,编者以为这些言沦是最为适当的论《易》之语,故名其为《衷》;而原记字数“二千”当为“四千”之误;同时进一步考定帛书《要》的篇首当为今本《系辞》的第十章。     

读马王堆汉墓帛书《衷》篇札记

文章疏通了帛书《衷》篇的若干处文意,并试图从思想史的角度分析其内涵。如《衷》篇认为《周易》是巫史和文王共同完成的作品,巫史完成其数术部分,文王加入卦爻辞部分,这是对《周易》成书过程的较早表述之一;《衷》篇透露出先秦易学中关于人性的讨论与孟子、荀子都有极大不同,它将文人、武人作为两种人格来讨论也是传世文献中少见的;《衷》篇很多句子可与其它帛书《易传》的篇章合读,它们都很重视阐发《周易》中的德义。此篇帛书中有些句子的思想接近思孟学派,这说明其中有些内容不会早于战国中期。