Freud's theory of paranoid delusion based on the Schreber case contrasted with related theories

The historic importance of Freud's analysis of the Schreber case is acknowledged, even though the theory it expounds is largely disavowed. The theory ascribes the cause of paranoid delusion to homosexual impulses unresolved in infancy or early childhood. This paper summarizes Freud's monograph on Schreber and contrasts his theory with the views of various revisionists. The writers focus on the Freudian concept of projection, which is intended to explain how much meaning can become reversed under the impetus of stress, and the reversal lead to delusional thinking. Based on their work in family therapy, where they observed one form of pathogenic relating termed learning to be possessed, the writers concluded that this form was also based on a type of projection which could culminate in delusional ideation. A relationship between learning to be possessed and H. S. Sullivan's theory of paranoid transformation is described. A learning factor is present in several of the psychological theories advanced to explain delusion, and the factor is akin to if not identical with Freud's concept of projection.Gerald Zuk, PhD, is in private practice at 25316 Pacy Street, Santa Clarita, California 91321-3343. Carmen Zuk, MD, is a child psychiatrist-partner affiliated with the Southern California Permanente Medical Group at its psychiatric clinic in Van Nuys, California. Both may be reached by telephone at (805) 252-7702.     

The effect of frame figure type and frame size on the line and the circle Ponzo illusions

Abstract:   To examine the determinants of the Ponzo illusion, we compared the perceived size of lines and circles presented within three different frames: two converging lines, two circles, and two squares. Twenty stimulus figures, consisting of two types of objects (lines/circles) × three types of frame figures (Ponzo/circles/squares) × three sizes of lower frames (small/medium/large), and two control figures were presented on a personal computer display. Twelve students performed three measurements (upper-object/lower-object/illusion) for each stimulus figure using the method of adjustment. To analyze the relationship between single object perception and the Ponzo illusion, we compared the calculated values of overestimation magnitude differences between the upper and lower objects with the actual obtained illusion values of the six object-frame conditions. The calculated values of the circle and the square frame figures corresponded to the difference between the upper single object and the lower single object. In contrast, the results of the Ponzo figure need an additional factor to explain the differences between the obtained and the calculated values. These results indicate that two factors are involved in the Ponzo illusion: (a) the framing effect affects the perceived size of the individual single objects, and (b) the comparison factor affects the comparison process of the two objects within the converging lines.     

Interpreting delusions

This paper explores the phenomenology of the Capgras and Cotard delusions. The former is generally characterised as the belief that relatives or friends have been replaced by impostors, and the latter as the conviction that one is dead or has ceased to exist. A commonly reported feature of these delusions is an experienced 'defamiliarisation' or even 'derealisation' of things, which is associated with an absence or distortion of affect. I suggest that the importance attributed to affect by current explanations of delusional experience can serve to make explicit the manner in which we ordinarily experience the world under a taken-for-granted aspect of affective familiarity. This implicit feeling is, I argue, partly constitutive of our sense of reality. However, so-called 'folk psychology,' which is generally adopted by philosophers as an initial interpretive backdrop for delusional beliefs and for beliefs more generally, fails to accommodate it. As a consequence, some pervasive philosophical assumptions concerning the manner in which we experience and understand the world, ourselves, and each other are called into question.     

Intertheory relations from unified theories

The concept of unified theory is defined in logical and abstract semantic terms, and employed in the analysis of relations between empirical scientific theories. The conceptual framework of the approach applies to binary relations such as the reduction or replacement of one theory by another, and to multiple intertheory relations. Historically, unified theories tend to arise within the contexts of scientific conflicts which they may show susceptible of solution even in the most controversial cases of the logical incompatibility or conceptual incommensurability of competing theories. These conclusions are exemplified by the Planck-Einstein quantum theory of thermal radiation. The analysis shows in which sense it can, and in which it cannot, be said that this theory unifies Wien's law and the Rayleigh-Jeans law of black-body radiation.     

NonREM sleep mentation in chronically-treated persons with schizophrenia

This study examined the laboratory dream content reported by 14 patients with schizophrenia and 15 controls, with a focus on reports obtained from NonREM sleep. Both the controls' and patients' frequency of dream recall following awakenings from NonREM and REM sleep were similar to values reported for healthy participants. Patients' NonREM sleep narratives were shorter than those from controls. When compared to their reports from REM sleep, both groups' NonREM sleep reports included significantly fewer words and reportable items. The controls were more likely to report a subjective feeling of bizarreness for their REM sleep reports as compared to their NonREM sleep reports. This difference was not observed in patients with schizophrenia. Taken together, these findings suggest few differences between the NonREM sleep mentation of patients with schizophrenia and of controls and that sleep stage cognitive style is comparable in both groups, with NonREM sleep reports being more thought-like, less elaborate and bizarre than REM sleep reports.     

Memory for Frequency of Bizarre and Common Stimuli: Limitations of the Automaticity Hypothesis

In 2 experiments, the influence of intention to process frequency on accuracy of memory for frequency of bizarre and common sentences was investigated. The results from multiple regression analyses indicated that intentional processing increased the accuracy of frequency judgments when memory for frequency was tested after a 2-min (Experiment 1) and after a 48-hr (Experiment 2) retention interval. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 2 indicated that unintentional processors tended to overestimate frequencies of bizarre relative to common items after a delay. The implications of the results are discussed with regard to L. Hasher and R. T. Zacks's (1984) automaticity hypothesis, human performance, and the accuracy of judgments of frequency of occurrence of unusual events.     

Theory learning as stochastic search in the language of thought

We present an algorithmic model for the development of children's intuitive theories within a hierarchical Bayesian framework, where theories are described as sets of logical laws generated by a probabilistic context-free grammar. We contrast our approach with connectionist and other emergentist approaches to modeling cognitive development. While their subsymbolic representations provide a smooth error surface that supports efficient gradient-based learning, our symbolic representations are better suited to capturing children's intuitive theories but give rise to a harder learning problem, which can only be solved by exploratory search. Our algorithm attempts to discover the theory that best explains a set of observed data by performing stochastic search at two levels of abstraction: an outer loop in the space of theories and an inner loop in the space of explanations or models generated by each theory given a particular dataset. We show that this stochastic search is capable of learning appropriate theories in several everyday domains and discuss its dynamics in the context of empirical studies of children's learning.     

Test of Competing Explanations of the Bizarre Response Bias in Recognition Memory

Recent research has demonstrated that a more liberal response criterion is used when people make judgments about bizarre items than about common items in old-new tests of recognition. The present study was designed to test 2 possible explanations of the bizarre response bias. The bizarre-relations explanation suggests that the bizarre response bias is triggered by the bizarre relations depicted in test items. The target-constituent explanation suggests that the bizarre response bias is the result of a sense of familiarity with constituents of bizarre test items. These explanations were tested by examining the influence of lure manipulations on memory discrimination and response bias for common and bizarre hand-drawn pictures. The results indicated support for the target-constituent explanation by reversing the response bias (obtaining a common response bias) in a recognition test that used common lures containing constituents from bizarre target items and bizarre lures containing constituents from common target items. The results also indicated that increased verbal elaboration enhanced memory discrimination and reduced response bias for both common and bizarre stimuli. The implications of these results are discussed with regard to the false memory controversy.     

Proneness to hallucinations and delusions in a non‐clinical sample: Exploring associations with metacognition and negative affect

Commonly, individuals prone to hallucinations and delusions hold dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs and report higher levels of negative affect, yet, these associations have not been clearly investigated in non‐clinical samples due to the failure to control for high intercorrelations between variables. The aim of the current study was to investigate how hallucination and delusion proneness are associated with dysfunctional metacognitions and negative affect. A cross‐sectional sample of 715 students free from psychiatric diagnoses (M_age = 28.1 years, SD = 10.9, range 18–65) completed the Launay‐Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS‐R); Peters et al. Delusion Inventory (PDI‐21); Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS‐21); and the Metacognition Questionnaire (MCQ‐30). Findings that participants who were prone to both hallucinations and delusions reported elevated levels of negative affect support the need for targeted mental health treatment for individuals who experience psychological distress related to their hallucinatory and delusional experiences. While metacognition beliefs of need to control thoughts and cognitive self‐consciousness, along with the anxiety and stress DASS‐21 subscales appeared as significant cross‐sectional predictors of proneness to hallucinations and delusions, only metacognitions demonstrated any notable predictive value for delusion proneness. This finding questions the role of metacognitions in determining hallucination and delusion proneness in non‐clinical samples.     

Is the label ‘conspiracy theory’ a cause or a consequence of disbelief in alternative narratives?

Using the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is widely perceived to be a way of discrediting wild ideas and unsubstantiated claims. However, prior research suggests that labelling statements as conspiracy theories does not reduce people's belief in them. In four studies, we probed this effect further, and tested the alternative hypothesis that the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is a consequence rather than a cause of (dis)belief in conspiracy-related statements. Replicating prior research, Study 1 (N = 170) yielded no evidence that the label ‘conspiracy theory’ affects belief in statements. In Study 2 (N = 199), we discovered that the less people believed in statements, the more they favoured labelling them as ‘conspiracy theories’. In Studies 3 and 4 (Ns = 150 and 151), we manipulated the relative believability of statements and found that participants preferred the label ‘conspiracy theory’ for relatively less believable versus more believable statements. The current research therefore supports the hypothesis that prior (dis)agreement with a statement affects the use of the label ‘conspiracy theory’ more than the other way around.     

Why do we need perceptual content?

Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis (2004 Travis, C. (2004). The silence of the senses. Mind, 113, 57–94.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.     

A Bayesian psychophysical model for angular variables

Bayesian theories of perception provide a link between observed response distributions and theoretical constructs from Bayesian decision theory. Using Bayesian psychophysics we derive response distributions for two cases, one based on a normal distribution and one on a von Mises distribution for angular variables. Interestingly, where the theoretical response distribution is always unimodal in the case of normal distributions, it can become bimodal in the angular setting in the case when prior and likelihood are about equally strong.