Knowing Other People: A Second‐Person Framework

What does it mean to know another person, and how is such knowledge different from other kinds of knowledge? These questions constitute an important part of what I call ‘second‐person epistemology’ – the study of how we know other people. I claim that knowledge of other people is not only central to our everyday lives, but it is a kind of knowledge that is unlike other kinds of knowledge. In general, I will argue that second‐person knowledge arises from repeated interactions with another person, and that it also requires employment of certain cognitive abilities and a unique kind of second‐order knowledge. This paper provides the framework for a second‐person epistemology by examining some of our ordinary claims about what it means to know another person. I describe four conditions that typically characterize knowing another person. Then I describe the psychological grounds of knowing a person. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about the unique symmetries of second person knowledge and the role of such knowledge in our broader epistemological endeavours.     

Against Second‐Order Reasons*

A normative reason for a person to φ is a consideration which favours φing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person φs. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second‐order normative reasons (not) to φ for or on the basis of certain first‐order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second‐order reasons so understood. I then show that prominent views in contemporary epistemology are committed to the existence of second‐order reasons, specifically, views about the epistemic norms governing practical reasoning and about the role of higher‐order evidence. If there are no second‐order reasons, those views are mistaken.     

First‐Person Shooters and the Third‐Person Effect

A sample of 118 U.S. 6th and 7th graders was used to examine early adolescents’ views of whether video games negatively influence themselves, others of the same age, and younger others. Six specific games ranging in rating from E for Everyone to M for Mature were listed for the early adolescents to respond to, with questions asked about both potential influence and whether young people should be allowed to play the games. Results support a third‐person perception that grew as the rating of the game became more restrictive and as the “other” group in question became younger. The presence of rules set by parents about video game use was a positive predictor of perceptions of influence on self and others.     

Precis: Enactivist Interventions

Philosophical Studies -     

Fallibilism,Contextualism and Second‐Order Skepticism

Fallibilism is ubiquitous in contemporary epistemology. I argue that a paradox about knowledge, generated by considerations of truth, shows that fallibilism can only deliver knowledge in lucky circumstances. Specifically, since it is possible that we are brains‐in‐vats (BIVs), it is possible that all our beliefs are wrong. Thus, the fallibilist can know neither whether or not we have much knowledge about the world nor whether or not we know any specific proposition, and so the warrant of our knowledge‐claims is much reduced and second‐order skepticism is generated. Since this is the case in both skeptical and everyday contexts, contextualism cannot resolve the paradox.     

Motivation and Agency: Precis

Philosophical Studies -     

Two Second‐Personal Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons

In spite of the burgeoning philosophical literature on human dignity, Stephen Darwall's second‐personal account of the dignity of persons has not received the attention it deserves. This article investigates Darwall's account and argues that it faces a dilemma, for it succumbs either to a problem of antecedence or to the wrong kind of reasons problem. But this need not mean one should reject a second‐personal account. Instead, I argue that an alternative second‐personal conception, one I will call relational, promises to solve the dilemma by avoiding both the problem of antecedence and the wrong kind of reasons problem. More generally, distinguishing these two second‐personal conceptions of the dignity of persons is important to enrich the available philosophical accounts of human dignity.     

Addressing two blind spots of commonly used experimental designs: The Highly‐Repeated Within‐Person approach

Two well documented but still neglected blind spots of often‐used study designs limit a researcher's ability to make inferences about psychological phenomenon. First, typical designs focus on effects of conditions at the group level and are not able to assess the extent to which effects characterize each participant in the study. This blind spot can lead to erroneous (or incomplete) conclusions about the effects of manipulations both for a given participant and at the group level. Second, commonly used research designs often use a limited sample of stimuli, constraining conclusions to the particular stimuli. This blind spot can lead to non‐replication when different stimuli are used. We propose that the Highly‐Repeated Within‐Person (HRWP) approach helps mitigate these limitations. Using a study on the effects of anti‐smoking messages, we illustrate how the HRWP approach helps alert researchers when the conclusions at the group level may not apply to all (or any) participant, quantifies the heterogeneity of effects of manipulations across people, and increases confidence regarding the generalizability of the effects. We discuss how the HRWP approach may help conceptualize issues of replicability in a new light.