The role of moral commitments in moral judgment

Traditional approaches to moral psychology assumed that moral judgments resulted from the application of explicit commitments, such as those embodied in consequentialist or deontological philosophies. In contrast, recent work suggests that moral judgments often result from unconscious or emotional processes, with explicit commitments generated post hoc. This paper explores the intermediate position that moral commitments mediate moral judgments, but not through their explicit and consistent application in the course of judgment. An experiment with 336 participants finds that individuals vary in the extent to which their moral commitments are consequentialist or deontological, and that this variation is systematically but imperfectly related to the moral judgments elicited by trolley car problems. Consequentialist participants find action in trolley car scenarios more permissible than do deontologists, and only consequentialists moderate their judgments when scenarios that typically elicit different intuitions are presented side by side. The findings emphasize the need for a theory of moral reasoning that can accommodate both the associations and dissociations between moral commitments and moral judgments.     

Crime and punishment: distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment

Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection of an agent to a harmful consequence. Also, selectively for judgments of punishment and blame, people who attempt but fail to cause harm more are judged more leniently if the harm occurs by independent means than if the harm does not occur at all. An account of these phenomena is proposed that distinguishes two processes of moral judgment: one which begins with harmful consequences and seeks a causally responsible agent, and the other which begins with an action and analyzes the mental states responsible for that action.     

基于不公平感的谣言对转基因风险评价的影响

谣言是常见的社会现象,但其传播过程的"心理黑箱"还是缺乏探索的问题。在情绪评价理论的基础上,采用对照实验,通过转基因食品情景模拟来考察不公平谣言及辟谣行为对风险认知评价及情绪的影响。结果表明:(1)转基因风险评价产生的情绪可分为后果型和伦理型;(2)不公平感会导致更强烈的伦理型及后果型情绪,并使得被试倾向于高估转基因风险;(3)辟谣对转基因风险评价能起到一定干预作用,但不能完全抵消谣言对情绪的影响。     

The BIAS map: behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotypes

In the present research, consisting of 2 correlational studies (N = 616) including a representative U.S. sample and 2 experiments (N = 350), the authors investigated how stereotypes and emotions shape behavioral tendencies toward groups, offering convergent support for the behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotypes (BIAS) map framework. Warmth stereotypes determine active behavioral tendencies, attenuating active harm (harassing) and eliciting active facilitation (helping). Competence stereotypes determine passive behavioral tendencies, attenuating passive harm (neglecting) and eliciting passive facilitation (associating). Admired groups (warm, competent) elicit both facilitation tendencies; hated groups (cold, incompetent) elicit both harm tendencies. Envied groups (competent, cold) elicit passive facilitation but active harm; pitied groups (warm, incompetent) elicit active facilitation but passive harm. Emotions predict behavioral tendencies more strongly than stereotypes do and usually mediate stereotype-to-behavioral-tendency links.     

Beyond physical harm: how preference for consequentialism and primary psychopathy relate to decisions on a monetary trolley dilemma

When is it appropriate to harm a single person to help multiple others? Psychologists have investigated this question through the study of hypothetical “trolley” dilemmas involving extreme physical harm life-or-death situations that contrast outcome-focussed, consequentialist moral reasoning with principle-focussed, deontological moral reasoning. The present studies investigate whether participants’ preference for consequentialism generalises across domains. We administered traditional physical harm dilemmas as well as a trolley-type dilemma involving monetary harm. Across four studies (N?=?809), an internal meta-analysis demonstrated that participants’ responses to the traditional dilemmas predicted their responses to the monetary dilemma. Additionally, previous research has uncovered that primary psychopathy predicts consequentialist responses on physical harm dilemmas. The current work uncovers that this association does not generalise to monetary harm dilemmas, suggesting that the association between primary psychopathy and consequentialist reasoning is not related to consequentialist reasoning per se, but to the idiosyncrasies of traditional harm-centric trolley dilemmas instead.     

Age differences in moral judgment: Older adults are more deontological than younger adults

In 2 studies, an older and a younger age group morally evaluated dilemmas contrasting a deontological judgment (do not harm others) against a utilitarian judgment (do what is best for the majority). Previous research suggests that deontological moral judgments are often underpinned by affective reactions and utilitarian moral judgments by deliberative thinking. Separately, research on the psychology of aging has shown that affect plays a more prominent role in the judgments and decision making of older (vs. younger) adults. Yet age remains a largely overlooked factor in moral judgment research. Here, we therefore investigated whether older adults would make more deontological judgments on the basis of experiencing different affective reactions to moral dilemmas as compared with younger adults. Results from 2 experiments indicated that older adults made significantly more deontological moral judgments. Mediation analyses revealed that the relationship between age and making more deontological moral judgments is partly explained by older adults exhibiting significantly more negative affective reactions and having more morally idealistic beliefs as compared with younger adults.     

Influence of deontological versus consequentialist orientations on act choices and framing effects: when principles are more important than consequences

A long tradition in decision making assumes that people usually take a consequentialist perspective, which implies a focus on the outcomes only when making decisions. Such a view largely neglects the existence of a deontological perspective, which implies that people are sensitive to moral duties that require or prohibit certain behaviors, irrespective of the consequences. Similarly, recent research has also suggested that people holding “protected values” (PVs) show increased attention to acts versus omissions and less attention to outcomes. The present research investigates the role of deontological versus consequentialist modes of thought and of PVs on framing effects and act versus omission choices. In a modification of Tversky and Kahneman's ( 1981 ) risky choice framing paradigm, we manipulated the framing of the outcomes (positive, negative), as well as whether the certain outcome was associated with an act or inaction. The main results suggest that act versus omission tendencies are linked to deontological focus and PVs. Framing effects, on the other hand, are driven by a consequentialist focus. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intervening causation and the mitigation of responsibility for harm doing II. The role of limited mental capacities

The present study investigated (i) the conditions under which the proximal cause of an event affects judgments of a distal cause, (ii) the capacities persons need to be held responsible for their actions, and (iii) the relationship between judgments of causation, blame, and restitution. Subjects read about situations in which an initial act, in combination with a later behavior by a second person, produced harm. The age and mental state of the second person were varied. It was found that cause and blame assigned to the initial action was greater when the second person was a child or mentally disturbed, as compared to a sane adult. Causal and moral responsibility were related to the understanding, reasoning capacity, and ability to control behavior of the person judged. Finally, support was obtained for an entailment model of the relations between judgments of causation, blame, and restitution.     

Psychological distance and judgments of causal impact

When assessing causal impact, individuals have to consider two pieces of information: the magnitude of the cause that resulted in an effect, and the magnitude of the resulting effect. In the present research, participants judged the causal impact of cause–effect relationships in which the magnitude of causes and effects varied independently. Participants mainly relied on effect magnitude, rating causal impact to be much higher when strong (vs. weak) effects emerged. When participants took cause magnitude into account (which they did, but to a lesser extent), their judgments reflected a covariation rule (i.e., causal impact being maximal for strong causes generating strong effects) rather than a ratio rule (i.e., causal impact being maximal for weak causes generating strong effects). These distinct views on causal impact were moderated by psychological distance: Effect magnitude dominated judgments of proximal events, whereas cause magnitude had relatively more impact on causal judgments of distal events.     

Time and moral judgment

Do moral judgments hinge on the time available to render them? According to a recent dual-process model of moral judgment, moral dilemmas that engage emotional processes are likely to result in fast deontological gut reactions. In contrast, consequentialist responses that tot up lives saved and lost in response to such dilemmas would require cognitive control to override the initial response. Cognitive control, however, takes time. In two experiments, we manipulated the time available to arrive at moral judgments in two ways: by allotting a fixed short or large amount of time, and by nudging people to answer swiftly or to deliberate thoroughly. We found that faster responses indeed lead to more deontological responses among those moral dilemmas in which the killing of one to save many necessitates manhandling an innocent person and in which this action is depicted as a means to an end. Thus, our results are the first demonstration that inhibiting cognitive control through manipulations of time alters moral judgments.     

Accounting for occurrences: An explanation for some novel tendencies in causal judgment from contingency information

Contingency information is information about empirical associations between possible causes and outcomes. In the present research, it is shown that, under some circumstances, there is a tendency for negative contingencies to lead to positive causal judgments and for positive contingencies to lead to negative causal judgments. If there is a high proportion of instances in which a candidate cause (CC) being judged is present, these tendencies are predicted by weighted averaging models of causal judgment. If the proportion of such instances is low, the predictions of weighted averaging models break down. It is argued that one of the main aims of causal judgment is to account for occurrences of the outcome. Thus, a CC is not given a high causal judgment if there are few or no occurrences of it, regardless of the objective contingency. This argument predicts that, if there is a low proportion of instances in which a CC is present, causal judgments are determined mainly by the number of Cell A instances (i.e., CC present, outcome occurs), and that this explains why weighted averaging models fail to predict judgmental tendencies under these circumstances. Experimental results support this argument.     

Patterns of moral judgment derive from nonmoral psychological representations

Ordinary people often make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical principles and legal distinctions. For example, they judge killing as worse than letting die, and harm caused as a necessary means to a greater good as worse than harm caused as a side‐effect ( Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006 ). Are these patterns of judgment produced by mechanisms specific to the moral domain, or do they derive from other psychological domains? We show that the action/omission and means/side‐effect distinctions affect nonmoral representations and provide evidence that their role in moral judgment is mediated by these nonmoral psychological representations. Specifically, the action/omission distinction affects moral judgment primarily via causal attribution, while the means/side‐effect distinction affects moral judgment via intentional attribution. We suggest that many of the specific patterns evident in our moral judgments in fact derive from nonmoral psychological mechanisms, and especially from the processes of causal and intentional attribution.     

Deontology defended

Empirical research into moral decision-making is often taken to have normative implications. For instance, in his recent book, Greene (2013) relies on empirical findings to establish utilitarianism as a superior normative ethical theory. Kantian ethics, and deontological ethics more generally, is a rival view that Greene attacks. At the heart of Greene’s argument against deontology is the claim that deontological moral judgments are the product of certain emotions and not of reason. Deontological ethics is a mere rationalization of these emotions. Accordingly Greene maintains that deontology should be abandoned. This paper is a defense of deontological ethical theory. It argues that Greene’s argument against deontology needs further support. Greene’s empirical evidence is open to alternative interpretations. In particular, it is not clear that Greene’s characterization of alarm-like emotions that are relative to culture and personal experience is empirically tenable. Moreover, it is implausible that such emotions produce specifically deontological judgments. A rival sentimentalist view, according to which all moral judgments are determined by emotion, is at least as plausible given the empirical evidence and independently supported by philosophical theory. I therefore call for an improvement of Greene’s argument.     

Time and Singular Causation—A Computational Model

Causal queries about singular cases, which inquire whether specific events were causally connected, are prevalent in daily life and important in professional disciplines such as the law, medicine, or engineering. Because causal links cannot be directly observed, singular causation judgments require an assessment of whether a co-occurrence of two events c and e was causal or simply coincidental. How can this decision be made? Building on previous work by Cheng and Novick (2005) and Stephan and Waldmann (2018), we propose a computational model that combines information about the causal strengths of the potential causes with information about their temporal relations to derive answers to singular causation queries. The relative causal strengths of the potential cause factors are relevant because weak causes are more likely to fail to generate effects than strong causes. But even a strong cause factor does not necessarily need to be causal in a singular case because it could have been preempted by an alternative cause. We here show how information about causal strength and about two different temporal parameters, the potential causes' onset times and their causal latencies, can be formalized and integrated into a computational account of singular causation. Four experiments are presented in which we tested the validity of the model. The results showed that people integrate the different types of information as predicted by the new model.     

Group-based emotions as determinants of ingroup identification

Events affecting an ingroup with which one identifies trigger group-based emotions. Thus, identification with a group seems to be a crucial determinant of group-based emotions. However, some theories (e.g., Russell, 2003) suggest bi-directional causal links between components of emotions. The current research examines whether group-based emotions may also influence ingroup identification. In a study, type of emotion (happiness vs. anger) and object of emotion (ingroup vs. outgroup) were manipulated. The results show an interaction effect of type of emotion and object of emotion on change in ingroup identification. Identification increases with happiness towards the ingroup or anger towards the outgroup, whereas identification decreases with anger toward the ingroup and happiness toward the outgroup. Moreover, the intensity of emotions determines the degree of change in identification. The implications for approaches of group-based emotions are discussed.     

Acculturation preferences and behavioural tendencies between majority and minority groups: The mediating role of emotions

The main goal of this research was twofold. First, we aimed at determining how acculturation preferences and emotions were related to specific intergroup behavioural tendencies towards majority and minority groups. Second, we aimed at developing an intergroup behavioural tendencies scale that differentiates between valence (facilitation and harm) and intensity (active and passive). The role of intergroup contact was also examined, as it is a known predictor of intergroup prejudice. In order to fulfil these goals, we carried out two studies. In Study 1 , Spanish participants (N = 279) answered a questionnaire about Moroccans (a devalued group) or Ecuadorians (a valued group) by reporting their acculturation preferences for immigrants, their positive and negative emotions, quantity of contact with them and behavioural tendencies towards them. In Study 2 , Moroccans (N = 92) and Ecuadorians (N = 87) assessed Spaniards on these measures. Results confirmed the structure of the new behavioural tendencies scale across four groups of participants. Overall, findings also showed that acculturation preferences and quantity of contact indirectly predicted behavioural tendencies through positive emotions. This research contributes to knowledge on how the majority and minority's acculturation preferences are related to their emotions and specific dimensions of intergroup behavioural tendencies, confirming the predominant mediating role of positive emotions in this process.     

The Role of Moral Emotions in Predicting Support for Political Actions in Post-War Iraq

A web-based study of 393 undergraduates at a public university in the United States was conducted to examine the relationship between moral emotions (i.e., emotions that motivate prosocial tendencies) and support for political actions to assist Iraqi citizens after the Second Gulf War (2003–2004). Previous work on emotions and prosocial tendencies has focused on empathy. In the context of post-war Iraq, we found that while empathy predicted support for a number of different political actions that have the potential to advance the welfare of the Iraqi people (humanitarian action in particular), guilt over the U.S. invasion was an important predictor of support for reparative actions (i.e., restoring damage created by the U.S. military), and moral outrage toward Saddam Hussein and his regime was the best predictor of support for political actions to prevent future harm to the Iraqi people and to punish the perpetrators. Our findings demonstrate the utility of an emotion-specific framework for understanding why and what type of political actions individuals will support. And in contrast to the traditional view that emotions are an impediment to rationality, our findings suggest that they can serve as a potentially powerful vehicle for motivating political engagement among the citizenry.     

Hot as hell! The self-conscious nature of action regrets

Gilovich, Medvec, and Kahneman (1998) have shown that real-life regrets for actions and inactions correspond to different emotional states. When people regret something they have done they experience painful “hot” emotions such as disgust or guilt, whereas when the regret is about a failure to act they rather experience wistful emotions. In four questionnaire studies, we have tested the hypothesis that regrettable actions elicit a particular subcategory of these hot emotions: the self-conscious emotions (i.e., guilt, shame, embarrassment, remorse, and anger toward oneself). These studies used different methodologies and all converged to show that self-conscious emotions were the only hot emotions to be systematically greater for action regrets than for inaction regrets. A similar pattern was observed for judgments of responsibility and morality. We emphasize the theoretical and methodological implications of these results in the discussion.     

Freeze or flee? Negative stimuli elicit selective responding

Humans preferentially attend to negative stimuli. A consequence of this automatic vigilance for negative valence is that negative words elicit slower responses than neutral or positive words on a host of cognitive tasks. Some researchers have speculated that negative stimuli elicit a general suppression of motor activity, akin to the freezing response exhibited by animals under threat. Alternatively, we suggest that negative stimuli only elicit slowed responding on tasks for which stimulus valence is irrelevant for responding. To discriminate between these motor suppression and response-relevance hypotheses, we elicited both lexical decisions and valence judgments of negative words and positive words. Relative to positive words (e.g., kitten), negative words (e.g., spider) elicited slower lexical decisions but faster valence judgments. Results therefore indicate that negative stimuli do not cause a generalized motor suppression. Rather, negative stimuli elicit selective responding, with faster responses on tasks for which stimulus valence is response-relevant.     

Intergroup emotions: explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context

Three studies tested the idea that when social identity is salient, group-based appraisals elicit specific emotions and action tendencies toward out-groups. Participants' group memberships were made salient and the collective support apparently enjoyed by the in-group was measured or manipulated. The authors then measured anger and fear (Studies 1 and 2) and anger and contempt (Study 3), as well as the desire to move against or away from the out-group. Intergroup anger was distinct from intergroup fear, and the inclination to act against the out-group was distinct from the tendency to move away from it. Participants who perceived the in-group as strong were more likely to experience anger toward the out-group and to desire to take action against it. The effects of perceived in-group strength on offensive action tendencies were mediated by anger.