Everybody needs to know?

I propose an amendment to Sosa’s virtue reliabilism. Sosa’s framework assigns a central role to sophisticated, conceptual, motivational states: ‘intentions to affirm aptly’. I argue that the suggestion that ordinary knowers in fact are motivated by such intentions in everyday belief-forming situations is at best problematic, and explore the possibility of an alternative virtue reliabilist framework. In this alternative framework, the role Sosa assigns to ‘intentions to affirm aptly’ is played instead by non-conceptual motivational states, which I call ‘needs’. The first part of the paper sketches Sosa’s framework. The second develops the need-based alternative. I close by comparing the two proposals, concluding that the onus is at least on Sosa to say why his intention-based framework should be preferred.     

What Right to Die?

This letter first discusses two meanings of a "right to die." In the popular sense, the term refers to a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. In the strict sense, the term signifies an affirmative right to obtain death--a right to suicide. The letter then explores the legal implications of a suicide right. This right would extend to competent adults, mature minors, and probably also incompetent persons. Counselors would have to inform clients of the suicide option. Intervention to prevent suicide could trigger civil liability. Suicidal intentions would not justify involuntary commitment. Consent would become a defense to homicide.     

Is age kinder to females than to males?

To investigate possible gender differences in the patterns of age-cognition relations, a meta-analysis was conducted on the data from 25 studies (5,201 participants) by the second author and his collaborators. Gender and age differences consistent with prior reports were found, but there were few measures on which the age × gender interactions were significant. Although the majority of neuroimaging studies investigating gender differences in age-related atrophy and functional decline report greater age-related differences in males, the only significant interactions on the cognitive measures in this study (on measures of speed and reasoning) were in the direction of lesser age-related declines for males than for females.     

Get healthy to marry or marry to get healthy?

This study tested selection and causal effects on the marriage‐health link by analyzing predictors of mortality through body mass index (BMI) and chronic illnesses (CI) on emerging adults (EA; N = 302) who were followed biannually for 8 years from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Results showed EA with unhealthy BMI's are more likely to marry and improve their BMI after marrying, substantiating selection and causal effects. Only the selection effect was substantiated for CI, whereby White EAs with CI were less likely to marry. Marriage appears to benefit overall health for EA, as findings suggest improved health behaviors after marriage. Future research should assess what health behaviors change during marriage for EA and if they help CI management.     

An alternative to thought suppression?

Comments on the original article, "Setting free the bears: Escape from thought suppression," by D. M. Wegner (see record 2011-25622-008). While Wegner supposed that we might have to learn to live with bad thoughts, the present author discusses the use of imagination and guided imagery as an alternative to forced thought suppression. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Is it Safe to Disagree?

This paper offers a new account of the epistemic significance of disagreement which is grounded in two assumptions; (i) that knowledge is the norm of belief and, (ii) that the safety condition is a necessary condition for knowledge. These assumptions motivate a modal definition of epistemic peerhood, which is much easier to operate on than the more traditional definitions of epistemic peerhood. The modal account of the epistemic significance of disagreement yields plausible results regarding cases of disagreement. Furthermore, it is able to tap into the intuitions that have motivated the conformist and the nonconformist positions and it locates a fruitful middle‐ground between these two conflicting positions. It will be shown that the conformist is correct in that cases of real peer disagreement force us to suspend our judgment. The reason for this is that in cases of real peer disagreement our beliefs fail to be safe. The nonconformist, on the other hand, is right in that disagreement in itself does not have any epistemic power. It is only by the grace of nature that we gain knowledge. The fact that someone disagrees with you does not mean that you do not have knowledge.     

A Royal Road to Consequentialism?

To consequentialise a moral theory means to account for moral phenomena usually described in nonconsequentialist terms, such as rights, duties, and virtues, in a consequentialist framework. This paper seeks to show that all moral theories can be consequentialised. The paper distinguishes between different interpretations of the consequentialiser’s thesis, and emphasises the need for a cardinal ranking of acts. The paper also offers a new answer as to why consequentialising moral theories is important: This yields crucial methodological insights about how to pursue ethical inquires.     

What is to be done?

The overriding question in contemporary philosophy is as follows: We now have a reasonably well-established conception of the basic structure of the universe. But it is not at all easy to reconcile the basic facts we have come to know with a certain conception we have of ourselves, derived in part from our cultural inheritance but mostly from our own experience. Various aspects of this question are examined, concerning consciousness, intentionality, language, rationality, free will, society and institutions, politics, and ethics.