Discriminating utopian from dystopian literature: Why is walden two considered a dystopia?

Skinner thought of Walden Two as a utopia, but many literary critics consider it a dystopia. The present paper examines works by several authors of utopian literature in an effort to determine what elements lead critics to classify works as "dystopian." Common elements seem to include (a) suspicion of scientific social planning, (b) the unhappiness of the characters portrayed, (c) suspicion of sources of control of behavior outside the individual, (d) violation of a presumed inherent need to struggle, and (e) suspicion of behavioral methods of governance. The elements Walden Two shares with other utopias and dystopias are examined, and the conclusion is offered that Walden Two could not be considered a dystopia for any of the traditional reasons. Instead, the negative view of Walden Two seems to be an outgrowth of literary devices and general negative reactions to behavioral determinism.     

B. F. Skinner's Utopian Vision: Behind and Beyond Walden Two

This paper addresses B. F. Skinner's utopian vision for enhancing social justice and human well-being in his 1948 novel, Walden Two. In the first part, we situate the book in its historical, intellectual, and social context of the utopian genre, address critiques of the book's premises and practices, and discuss the fate of intentional communities patterned on the book. The central point here is that Skinner's utopian vision was not any of Walden Two's practices, except one: the use of empirical methods to search for and discover practices that worked. In the second part, we describe practices in Skinner's book that advance social justice and human well-being under the themes of health, wealth, and wisdom, and then show how the subsequent literature in applied behavior analysis supports Skinner's prescience. Applied behavior analysis is a measure of the success of Skinner's utopian vision: to experiment.     

Realism,Utopianism, and Radical Values

One of the more debated topics in the recent realist literature concerns the compatibility of realism and utopianism. Perhaps the greatest challenge to utopian political thought comes from Bernard Williams' realism, which argues, among other things, that political values should be subject to what he calls the ‘realism constraint’, which rules out utopian arguments based on values which cannot be offered by the state as unrealistic and therefore inadmissible. This article challenges that conclusion in two ways. First, it argues that the rationale for accepting Williams' original argument for the ‘realism constraint’ fails. Secondly, it argues that there is at least one genuinely political value of liberty available which is both compatible with realism and something that cannot be offered by the state, namely that of the political anarchist. This opens the way for far more ambitious and utopian forms of realist political thought and implies that the arguments of what we call political anarchists must be met by (realist) political argumentation, not simply ruled out by methodological stipulation.     

Is health-care delivery by partially trained professionals ever morally justified?

...teaching institutions should establish policies for all aspects of care provided by residents-in-training (not just for the acquisition of informed consent to treatment) and establish mechanisms to monitor how these policies are implemented and their effect on the quality of patient care and patient satisfaction with care. Clear policy on which treatments are provided by junior residents and which treatments and aspects of care are provided by senior residents is necessary for patients and their families to have control over what happens to them in the health-care institution....Teaching institutions should regularly assess whether residents are being asked to take on more responsibilities in patient care than they are prepared to do. The reasons to do this are not solely related to protecting the patient from harm. Protecting the residents-in-training from overwhelming guilt, fear, and providing them with a more humane approach to medical education should be a minimal expectation for the training of those who will be expected to provide humane care to others....     

From Metaphysical to Substantive Naturalism: A Case Study

This paper addresses two related questions. First, what is involved in giving a distinctively realist and naturalist construal of an area of discourse, that is, in so much as stating a distinctively realist and naturalist position about, for example, content or value? I defend a condition that guarantees the realism and naturalism of any position satisfying it, at least in the case of positions on content, but perhaps in other cases as well. Second, what sorts of considerations render a distinctively realist and naturalist position more plausible than its irrealist and non-naturalist rivals? The answer here focuses again on theories of content and is wholly negative. I argue that the standard array of arguments offered in support of realist and naturalist theories in fact provide equal support for a host of irrealist and non-naturalist ones. Taken together, these considerations reveal an important gap in the recent philosophical literature on content. The challenge to proponents of putatively realist and naturalist theories is to insure that those theories so much as state distinctively realist and naturalist positions and then to identify arguments that support what is distinctively realist and naturalist about them.

... the deepest motivation for intentional irrealism derives ... from a certain ontological intuition: that there is no place for intentional categories in a physicalistic view of the world; that the intentional can't be naturalized.'' Fodor (1987, p. 97).

``Realists about representational states ... must ... have some view about what it is for a state to be representational ....

Well, what would it be like to have a serious theory of representation? Here there is some consensus to work from. The worry about representation is above all that the semantic (and/or intentional) will prove permanently recalcitrant to integration in the natural order ... ''Fodor (1990, p. 32).

     

What is the moral basis of the authority of family members to act as surrogates for incompetent patients?

...The authority of family members should be understood as presumptive; that is, there is a moral presumption that a close family member should serve as surrogate for an incompetent patient. That presumption can be overcome or rebutted in a particular case, either when there is sufficient evidence that the usual reasons supporting this presumption do not hold or when the surrogate's decision exceeds appropriate limits of surrogates' decision-making discretion. In order to clarify these hard cases and appropriate public policy, we need a much deeper and more complex analysis than either the conventional view, or the alternative account that Pearlman and colleagues provide. I have sought here only to point toward some of the other grounds that a full account of family members' authority as surrogates would have to develop and explore in much more detail....     

Modal reasoning, models, and Manktelow and Over.

Manktelow and Over (1991) argue that their studies of Wason's selection task favor explanations of deontic reasoning based on mental models, but that such theories need to incorporate utilities. This theoretical note proposes a simpler explanation of the phenomena: subjects in the selection task consider only those cards that are explicitly represented in their models of the conditional, and so insight into the task depends on constructing fully explicit models. Such models for modal conditionals of the form, If p occurs then q may occur are: [formula: see text] Each line denotes a separate model, and the models represent either what is possible, or, in the deontic interpretation, what is permissible. A deontic rule is accordingly violated by the contingency: [symbol: see text] p and q, for example the rule, "If you spend more than 100 pounds, then you may take a free gift" is violated by taking the free gift (q) but not spending more than 100 pounds ([symbol: see text] p). If the rule is interpreted as a bi-conditional, then the second of the models, p and [symbol: see text] q, is also now a violation, for example spending more than 100 pounds (p) but not getting the free gift ([symbol: see text] q). Manktelow and Over's instructions lead subjects to focus on one or other of the two sorts of violations of the rule. There is accordingly no need to introduce utilities into models in order to explain the phenomena.     

Inadequacies with the ACOG and AAP statements on managing ethical conflict during the intrapartum period

[The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists] takes the view that respect for the autonomy of the pregnant woman should be almost absolute and [the American Academy of Pediatrics] takes the view that respect for the autonomy of the pregnant woman should be limited or prima facie in character. ACOG's reading of this central bioethical principle admits of virtually no exceptions, while AAP's reading does allow exceptions....A complete account of obstetric ethics that would apply in clinical practice during the intrapartum period must take into account both negative and positive autonomy-based rights of the pregnant woman and beneficence-based obligations to the at-term fetus -- and to the pregnant woman, as well. Such an account will be, we believe, more clinically applicable than the accounts offered by ACOG and AAP.     

H. G. Wells and B. F. Skinner on the superorganism

In Skinner's Walden Two, the central character Frazier refers to the superorganism and how to build it, but without elaboration. An examination of some parallels between the work of H. G. Wells and B. F. Skinner, however, casts light on that reference and other aspects of Skinner's views, such as multiple selves. Both Wells and Skinner wrote in similar ways about what the composition of such a superorganism would be and the conditions for its development. In particular, attention is directed to the ways in which their forecasts of the conditions for producing the superorganism changed over time, from determinism-based conditions to more evolutionary or selection-based conditions.     

Robert Waelder on psychoanalytic technique: five lectures

Biographical information regarding Robert Waelder is readily available (Guttman, 1986), and this is not the place for it. The following is a rare and direct example of his "old-fashioned" teaching. "Old-fashioned" and "conservative" are criticisms often leveled at Waelder these days. Yet, "Old-fashioned is not precisely the word for Waelder.... He was a conservative in the best sense, as his later writings continued to prove, one who would not relinquish what is good for the sake of the supposed 'ideal' situation imagined by those restless for change. This was his ethic, and his conservatism was entirely humanitarian. He refused to idealize 'human nature' and tried to preserve the realism of his clinical sense in matters beyond the clinic" (Lewin, 1968, p. 9).     

MALEBRANCHE'S DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM / CONSENT AND THE INCOMPLETENESS OF GOD'S VOLITIONS

‘God needs no instruments to act’, Malebranche writes in Search 6.2.3; ‘it suffices that He wills in order that a thing be, because it is a contradiction that He should will and that what He wills should not happen. Therefore, His power is His will’ (450). After nearly identical language in Treatise 1.12, Malebranche writes that ‘[God's] wills are necessarily efficacious... [H]is power differs not at all from [H]is will’ (116). God's causal power, here, clearly traces only to His volitions - not merely to the fact that He wills, but specifically to the content of His volitions (‘“what” He wills’). Yet despite the obviously key role the ordinary notion of volitional content plays for Malebranche, recent writers have paid surprisingly little attention either to it or its exegetical implications. I hope to rectify this situation here. The plan of this paper is this: first, to borrow current work in the philosophy of mind to sketch the notion of an incomplete volition, i.e. one whose content is ‘incomplete’ in a sense to be explained; second, to show that Malebranche clearly allows and uses something like this notion; third, to apply the notion to Malebranche's doctrine of human freedom. In so doing, I believe, we can understand this doctrine in a new way, and one which: (i) is clearly consistent with his texts, and (ii) unlike other interpretations makes coherent sense out of the conflicting streams in his heroic attempt to reconcile his occasionalism - the doctrine that no finite substances have genuine causal powers - with our freedom; fourth, Contrast my interpretation with those of two recent writers: Sleigh et al. (1998) and Schmaltz (1996); and Fifth, Summarize the major results.     

The pretense of psychology as science: The myth of mental illness in Statu Nascendi

If I was profoundly shocked by the Varieties [of Religious Experience, by William James], that was not because some of the facts described in it were such as I would rather not hear about. They were, on the whole, amusing. Nor was it because I thought James was doing his work clumsily. I thought he did it very well. It was because the whole thing was a fraud.... Psychology... regarded as the science of the mind, is not a science. It is what “phrenology” was in the early nineteenth century, and astrology and alchemy in the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century: the fashionable scientific fraud of the age.... There were, I held, no merely moral actions, no merely political actions, and no merely economic actions. Every action was moral, political, and economic.     

The pretense of psychology as science: The myth of mental illness in Statu Nascendi

If I was profoundly shocked by the Varieties [of Religious Experience, by William James], that was not because some of the facts described in it were such as I would rather not hear about. They were, on the whole, amusing. Nor was it because I thought James was doing his work clumsily. I thought he did it very well. It was because the whole thing was a fraud.... Psychology... regarded as the science of the mind, is not a science. It is what “phrenology” was in the early nineteenth century, and astrology and alchemy in the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century: the fashionable scientific fraud of the age.... There were, I held, no merely moral actions, no merely political actions, and no merely economic actions. Every action was moral, political, and economic.     

The Narrative Architecture of Political Forgiveness

Although there is widespread agreement with the argument that Hannah Arendt made more than half a century ago, that forgiveness is “one of the human faculties that make social change possible” (Misztal, 2011, p. 201), beyond this, there is little consensus of what it means. Applying a narrative structure to this discussion, there is a lack of clarity around questions of who, what, where, when, and why to forgive. This article will explore the politics of forgiveness in East Germany, where these issues have been hotly contested for more than 25 years. The data examined in this article suggest that the fraught process of forgiveness embodies not consensus but contest, as people disagree on key questions such as who has the right to forgive whom, for what, how long the window for the opportunity of forgiveness stays open, and even why these questions matter, not only for individuals but for the whole of society.     

Some problems with cost-benefit analysis in health care

...Arnold's article is very ambitious. He suggests rules that could be followed in order to decide whether health care should be rationed. He notes that explicit assessments of costs and benefits using the same monetary unit are rarely used. The main reason, it seems to me, is that the method of cost-benefit analysis is relatively difficult to apply in the context of health care. Arnold does not address the difficulties that are related to his approach. Thus, my impression is that the interest of his provocative article lies more in its ability to foster a useful debate than in the methodology itself. In this brief commentary, I will merely list some of the theoretical problems that occurred to me while reading this article....     

Investigating looking and social looking measures as an index of infant violation of expectation

Accumulated looking time has been widely used to index violation of expectation (VoE) response in young infants. But there is controversy concerning the validity of this measure, with some interpreting infant looking behaviour in terms of perceptual preferences (Cohen & Marks, 2002 ; Haith, 1998 ). The current study aimed to compare the use of looking time with a recently used measure of social looking (Walden et al., 2007 ) in distinguishing between 6‐month‐old infants’ response to novelty/familiarity and a condition in which the object was covertly switched for a different object. Following habituation, infants showed more social looking in response to the object‐switch condition than the novel object change, whereas the more commonly used accumulated looking time measure did not distinguish between the two, showing an increase for both. Thus, social looking is a more valid measure of infant VoE than looking time.     

The Metaphysics of Degrees

Degree‐sentences, i.e. sentences that seem to refer to things that allow of degrees, are widely used both inside and outside of philosophy, even though the metaphysics of degrees is much of an untrodden field. This paper aims to fill this lacuna by addressing the following four questions: [A] Is there some one thing, such that it is degree sensitive? [B] Are there things x, y, and z that stand in a certain relation to each other, viz. the relation that x has more y than z? [C] In those cases in which degree sentences do not refer to phenomena that are degree sensitive, what is responsible for their prima facie seeming to do so? [D] If there are degree sensitive things, to which ontological categories do they belong? We answer each of these questions by arguing that there are, metaphysically speaking, different phenomena that degree sentences refer to: some refer to determinates that emanate from a certain determinable, others to tokens that are instantiations of a certain type, and yet others to what we call ‘complex, resultant properties that are constituted by stereotypical properties’. Finally, we show the relevance of our answers by applying them to the notions of freedom and belief.     

Beyond Existence and Non-Existence

Abstract

When Husserl speaks of the so-called ‘transcendental reduction’ or ‘phenomenological epochē’ many believe that he is eschewing the question of truth or existence. Two reasons are given for this: First, Husserl explicitly states that when we perform the reduction, we should no longer naively ‘accept [the world] as it presents itself to me as factually existing’ (Id I §30, p. 53) and should suspend our judgement with regard to ‘the positing of its actual being’ (Id I §88, p. 182). Second, Husserl seems to have no problem in referring to an ‘object’ of thought even when we refer to non-existent, hallucinatory or indeed impossible objects. This seems to suggest that he is not interested in the question whether or not there is a corresponding ‘ordinary’ object. The paper seeks to question this and will show that his inquiry never loses sight of the questions of truth and existence but rather brings them into the foreground.     

Suszko’s Thesis,Inferential Many-valuedness,and the Notion of a Logical System

According to Suszko’s Thesis, there are but two logical values, true and false. In this paper, R. Suszko’s, G. Malinowski’s, and M. Tsuji’s analyses of logical twovaluedness are critically discussed. Another analysis is presented, which favors a notion of a logical system as encompassing possibly more than one consequence relation.

[13, p. 281]

Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

Ethics is everybody's business, especially in regard to confidentiality

...Every hospital needs a policy statement devoted to confidentiality. This task is a good assignment for a hospital ethics committee. In drafting such a statement, one area that should not be overlooked is respect for confidentiality in cases used for teaching, patient conferences, and interdisciplinary meetings, including the teaching of clinical ethics! The University of Virginia's (UVA) Hospital Ethics Committee is considering a new policy statement on confidentiality....