Cognitive arithmetic: Evidence for right hemispheric mediation in an elementary component stage

Earlier studies involving the lateralization of arithmetic abilities have provided evidence for both right and left hemisphere superiorities. It is argued here that part of this inconsistency could be due to the complexity of the arithmetic computations which have been examined. The present studies examined a subprocess shown to be involved in more complex tasks, such as subtraction. The subprocess is the identification of which of two numbers is greater, and was tested by the flashing of a pair of digits to either the left or right visual field. Errors, reaction-times to make a decision, and examination of hand × visual field interactions all indicated that this subprocess is mediated by the right hemisphere. Correlational analysis was used to identify the operations underlying the observed lateralization of this ability. This analysis indicated that an operation indexed by the spatial order in which the digits were presented was effective in the right hemisphere but not the left hemisphere. Speculations on the nature of these operations were presented.     

Motor programming during practice conditions high and low in contextual interference

Random practice has been reported to demand greater time for movement preparation during acquisition than blocked practice. The present study revealed that this could be attributed to a more complete engagement of the motor programming process during random practice. This cost, however, was localized to the motor programming subprocess that S. T. Klapp (1995) associated with organizing the internal structure of a movement chunk rather than an alternative subprocess responsible for organizing movement chunks into the correct serial order. The more thorough employment of motor programming during acquisition by random practice participants resulted in a more efficient use of this planning operation during retention, as well as more accurate movement reproduction. These data support the claim that practice conditions high in contextual interference support improvements in both movement preparation and memory strength.     

Theory of mind tasks and executive functions: A systematic review of group studies in neurology

A growing number of studies have been addressing the relationship between theory of mind (TOM) and executive functions (EF) in patients with acquired neurological pathology. In order to provide a global overview on the main findings, we conducted a systematic review on group studies where we aimed to (1) evaluate the patterns of impaired and preserved abilities of both TOM and EF in groups of patients with acquired neurological pathology and (2) investigate the existence of particular relations between different EF domains and TOM tasks. The search was conducted in Pubmed/Medline. A total of 24 articles met the inclusion criteria. We considered for analysis classical clinically accepted TOM tasks (first‐ and second‐order false belief stories, the Faux Pas test, Happe's stories, the Mind in the Eyes task, and Cartoon's tasks) and EF domains (updating, shifting, inhibition, and access). The review suggests that (1) EF and TOM appear tightly associated. However, the few dissociations observed suggest they cannot be reduced to a single function; (2) no executive subprocess could be specifically associated with TOM performances; (3) the first‐order false belief task and the Happe's story task seem to be less sensitive to neurological pathologies and less associated to EF. Even though the analysis of the reviewed studies demonstrates a close relationship between TOM and EF in patients with acquired neurological pathology, the nature of this relationship must be further investigated. Studies investigating ecological consequences of TOM and EF deficits, and intervention researches may bring further contributions to this question.     

好奇影响灵感产生的现象与机制:认知与情绪双加工路径

当前我国经济正在从要素驱动,投资驱动转向创新驱动, 如何促进和持续创新的问题引起了学界和企业的广泛关注.现有研究发现好奇和灵感是创新的重要阶段, 灵感具有独立的心理结构和不同的过程, 又受到意识情绪的影响.研究拟从灵感产生的认知和情绪的双加工视角出发, 深入揭示灵感产生现象的本质特点和规律, 阐明好奇影响灵感的行为和脑机制.研究成果不仅可为创新的理论发展提供崭新视角,也可为企业员工和创业者创新能力的培养提供参考.     

Subtask analysis of process data through a predictive model

Response process data collected from human–computer interactive items contain detailed information about respondents' behavioural patterns and cognitive processes. Such data are valuable sources for analysing respondents' problem-solving strategies. However, the irregular data format and the complex structure make standard statistical tools difficult to apply. This article develops a computationally efficient method for exploratory analysis of such process data. The new approach segments a lengthy individual process into a sequence of short subprocesses to achieve complexity reduction, easy clustering and meaningful interpretation. Each subprocess is considered a subtask. The segmentation is based on sequential action predictability using a parsimonious predictive model combined with the Shannon entropy. Simulation studies are conducted to assess the performance of the new method. We use a case study of PIAAC 2012 to demonstrate how exploratory analysis for process data can be carried out with the new approach.     

Sounds change four-dot masking

The temporal occurrence of a flash can be shifted towards a slightly offset sound (temporal ventriloquism). Here we examined whether four-dot masking is affected by this phenomenon. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that there is release from four-dot masking if two sounds - one before the target and one after the mask - are presented at ∼100 ms intervals rather than at ∼0 ms intervals or a silent condition. In Experiment 2, we show that the release from masking originates from an alerting effect of the first sound, and a temporal ventriloquist effect from the first and second sounds that lengthened the perceived interval between target and mask, thereby leaving more time for the target to consolidate. Results thus show that sounds penetrate the visual system at more than one level.     

Infelicitous Cancellation: The Explicit Cancellability Test for Conversational Implicature Revisited

This paper questions the adequacy of the explicit cancellability test for conversational implicature as it is commonly understood. The standard way of understanding this test relies on two assumptions: first, that that one can test whether a certain content is (merely) conversationally implicated, by checking whether that content is cancellable, and second, that a cancellation is successful only if it results in a felicitous utterance. While I accept the first of these assumptions, I reject the second one. I argue that a cancellation can succeed even if it results in an infelicitous utterance, and that unless we take this possibility into account we run the risk of misdiagnosing philosophically significant cases.     

Vagueness,Kant and Topology: a Study of Formal Epistemology

In this paper we propose an approach to vagueness characterised by two features. The first one is philosophical: we move along a Kantian path emphasizing the knowing subject’s conceptual apparatus. The second one is formal: to face vagueness, and our philosophical view on it, we propose to use topology and formal topology. We show that the Kantian and the topological features joined together allow us an atypical, but promising, way of considering vagueness.     

Acting for reasons: Reply to Dancy

This paper argues that we need to distinguish between two different ideas of a reason: first, the idea of a premise or assumption, from which a person’s action or deliberation can proceed; second, the idea of a fact by which a person can be guided, when he modifies his thought or behaviour in some way. It argues further that if we have the first idea in mind, one can act for the reason that p regardless of whether it is the case that p, and regardless of whether one believes that p. But if we have the second idea in mind, one cannot act for the reason that p unless one knows that p. The last part of the paper briefly indicates how the second idea of a reason can contribute to a larger argument, showing that it is better to conceive of knowledge as a kind of ability than as a kind of belief.     

Why it doesn’t matter whether the virtues are truth-conducive

A potential explanation of a fact is a hypothesis such that, if it were true, it would explain the fact in question. Let’s suppose that we become aware of a fact and some potential explanations thereof. Let’s also suppose that we would like to believe the truth. Given this aim, we can ask two questions. First, is it likely that one of these hypotheses is true? Second, given an affirmative answer to the first question, which one is it likely to be? Inference to the best explanation (IBE) offers answers to both questions. To the first, it says ‘Yes’—assuming that at least one of the hypotheses would, if true, provide a satisfactory explanation of the fact under consideration. To the second, it says that the hypothesis most likely to be true is the one that scores best on the explanatory virtues: conservatism, modesty, simplicity, generality, and predictive power. Many philosophers have argued against IBE’s answer to the first question. I am interested in an objection to its answer to the second. Many philosophers seem to think that it is unsustainable: they seem to think that even if we assume that one of the competing hypotheses is true, we should not think that IBE will help us to identify it. Or, more carefully, if these philosophers are doing what they appear to be doing—namely, offering critiques of IBE that don’t depend on assumptions about the field of competing hypotheses—then their claim is that IBE will not help us to identify the truth. I believe that this is mistaken: the argument for believing it assumes a model of IBE that we have no reason to accept.     

A heterodox defense of the actualist higher-order thought theory

I defend the actualist higher-order thought theory against four objections. The first objection contends that the theory is circular. The second one contends that the theory is unable to account for the alleged epistemic position we are in with respect to our own conscious mental states. The third one contends that the theory is unable to account for the evidence we have for the proposition that all conscious mental states are represented. The fourth one contends that the theory does not accommodate the intimacy we have with our own conscious mental states. To some extent, my defense will be heterodox, in the sense that I will show that some objections are satisfactorily answerable even if we concede to the objectors a point that higher-order theorists do not seem to be willing to concede, that is, that the theory is the result of conceptual analysis.

     

Promises beyond assurance

Breaking a promise is generally taken to involve committing a certain kind of moral wrong, but what (if anything) explains this wrong? According to one influential theory that has been championed most recently by Scanlon, the wrong involved in breaking a promise is a matter of violating an obligation that one incurs to a promisee in virtue of giving her assurance that one will perform or refrain from performing certain acts. In this paper, we argue that the “Assurance View”, as we call it, is susceptible to two kinds of counterexamples. The first show that giving assurance is not sufficient for incurring the kind of obligation of fulfillment that one violates in breaking a promise. The second show that giving assurance is not necessary. Having shown that the Assurance View fails in these ways, we then very briefly sketch the outline of what we take to be a better view—a view that we claim is not only attractive in its own right and that avoids the earlier counterexamples, but that also affords us a deeper explanation of why the Assurance View seems initially plausible, yet nonetheless turns out to be ultimately inadequate.     

How long-lasting is the post-conflict slowing after incongruent trials? Evidence from the Stroop,Simon, and flanker tasks

The purpose of the present study was to determine how long-lasting the post-conflict slowing following incongruent stimuli is. In previous research, incongruent stimuli have been used to induce a conflict because they have relevant features for two different response alternatives. So far, the post-conflict slowing following incongruent stimuli has mainly been assessed up to one trial. In the first two experiments, we assessed the persistence of the post-conflict slowing across several trials. To this end, we presented a few incongruent stimuli among non-conflict stimuli. The results showed a consistent slowing for the first few trials immediately following the incongruent trials. In addition, a sporadic slowing was still found on later trials. In two subsequent experiments, we investigated to what extent the infrequency of incongruent trials — rather than their conflict — induced this slowing. To determine this, we used the same design as in the first two experiments, but we presented non-conflict stimuli as infrequent stimuli. The results showed a slowing on one subsequent trial, ruling out the possibility that the post-conflict slowing following incongruent trials was only caused by infrequency. Together, the findings of the present study indicate that the conflict induced by incongruent trials can have a longer lasting impact on subsequent trials than previously thought.     

When Hyperpropositions Meet ...

With each proposition P we associate a set of proposition (a hyperproposition) which determines the order in which one may retreat from accepting P, if one cannot fully hold on to P. We first describe the structure of hyperpropositions. Then we describe two operations on propositions, subtraction and merge, which can be modelled in terms of hyperpropositions. Subtraction is an operation that takes away part of the content of a proposition. Merge is an operation that determines the maximal consistent content of two propositions considered jointly. The merge operation gives rise to an inference relation which is, in a certain sense, optimally paraconsistent.     

Telling Others to Do What You Believe Is Morally Wrong: The Case of Confucius and Zai Wo

Can it ever be morally justifiable to tell others to do what we ourselves believe is morally wrong to do? The common sense answer is no. It seems that we should never tell others to do something if we think it is morally wrong to do that act. My first goal is to argue that in Analects 17.21, Confucius tells his disciple not to observe a ritual even though Confucius himself believes that it is morally wrong that one does not observe the ritual. My second goal is to argue against the common sense answer and explain how Confucius can be justified in telling his disciple to do what Confucius thought was wrong. The first justification has to do with telling someone to do what is second best when the person cannot do what is morally best. The second justification has to do with the role of a moral advisor.     

Idempotent Variations on the Theme of Exclusive Disjunction

Studia Logica - An exclusive disjunction is true when exactly one of the disjuncts is true. In the case of the familiar binary exclusive disjunction, we have a formula occurring as the first...     

Immediate and short memory: Recall of simple auditory stimuli

Experiments were carried out on conditions affecting the successful recall of simple, non-verbalised auditory stimuli. The effectiveness of recall of a given stimulus was measured by the ability to assess the pitch of one stimulus as compared to another stimulus presented after an interval of given length. The results indicate that the storage in memory of a simple auditory stimulus is possible, even in the case of pairs of stimuli separated in time by more than 5 min. In all experiments (stimuli differing by 2 semitones or by one semitone, and equal in intensity, or differing by ± 25 dB) the curve of errors shows a sharp increase when the interval between the two stimuli is 80 sec. It is possible that this sudden deterioration in the effectiveness of recall is connected with same alteration of the mechanism of memory. It is postulated that this alteration is due to a “switch-over” from immediate memory to short-term memory. The analysis of the errors shows that in certain circumstances there is a tendency towards a marked preponderance of errors resulting from underestimation rather than from overestimation of the first stimulus. This preponderance is obtained when we have pairs of equal loudness and it is even more marked when the first stimulus is softer than the second, and it is decreases when the first stimulus is louder than the second. These results suggest that in differentiating pitches of stimuli (in the 700–2000 Hz band) presented one after the other at certain fixed intervals of time, we are to find a phenomenon analogous to the classic time error found in estimations of loudness.     

Amalia X: dialogical sequence analysis as a method in theory-based single case research in psychoanalysis

In this article, Dialogical sequence analysis (DSA) is introduced as a method in theory-based single case research. The structure of article is as follows: first, we will describe briefly the historical background of single case studies and their position as the foundation of psychoanalytic knowledge formation. Secondly, we will describe through Amalia X’s case how one psychoanalytic ‘specimen case’ has been used as a cornerstone for a comprehensive psychoanalytic process research model, the so called ‘Ulm model’. Amalia X is one of the most studied single cases internationally also outside psychoanalytic process study field. Thirdly, we will introduce the central theory and practice of DSA. Fourthly, in the last section of our article, we will show in practice how DSA can be used in the analysis of Amalia’s dream in the session 152.     

Observer‐relative chances and the doomsday argument

Suppose various observers are divided randomly into two groups, a large and a small. Not knowing into which group anyone has been sent, each can have strong grounds for believing in being in the large group, although recognizing that every observer in the other group has equally powerful reasons for thinking of this other group as the large one. Justified belief can therefore be observer‐relative in a rather paradoxical way. Appreciating this allows one to reject an intriguing new objection against Brandon Carter's ‘doomsday argument’. Carter encourages us to doubt that we are among only the first hundredth, say, or first millionth, of all humans who will ever have existed. He thereby reinforces whatever reasons we may have for suspecting that, unless we take great care, the human race will not survive long. Admittedly his argument is weakened if our world is indeterministic, so that there is no suitably guaranteed ‘fact of the matter’ of how many humans will ever have existed. But even then, it can caution us against believing that a lengthy future for humankind ‘is as good as determined’. Of all the objections the argument has yet faced, the new one is the most interesting.     

论德性与独立的实践推理者

德性对于人的兴盛是必不可少的。没有道德德性,我们就不能实现从动物性理智到实践推理的转变,其次不能继续有推理的实践;如果不发展某种程度的德性,我们就不能适当地关怀和教育他人。所以,德性必须首先获得,然后才能维持在推理的实践之中。最后,我们在成为实践推理之后,我们仍然需要他人的维护,这种需要同时也是一种对德性的需要。