共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Timothy John Nulty 《Erkenntnis》2005,62(3):379-393
This paper attempts to motivate skepticism about the reality of mathematical objects. The aim of the paper is not to provide a general critique of mathematical realism, but to demonstrate the insufficiency of the arguments advanced by Michael Resnik. I argue that Resnik’s use of the concept of immanent truth is inconsistent with the treatment of mathematical objects as ontologically and epistemically continuous with the objects posited by the natural sciences. In addition, Resnik’s structuralist program, and his denial of relational properties, is incompatible with a realist metaphysics about mathematical objects. 相似文献
2.
Kai Horsthemke 《Science and engineering ethics》2011,17(2):321-334
In a recent journal article, as well as in a recent book chapter, in which she critiques my position on ‘indigenous knowledge’,
Lesley Green of the Department of Social Anthropology at the University of Cape Town argues that ‘diverse epistemologies ought
to be evaluated not on their capacity to express a strict realism but on their ability to advance understanding’. In order
to examine the implications of Green’s arguments, and of Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin’s work in this regard, I apply
them to a well-known controversy between Native American (or First Nations) creationism and archaeology. I argue that issues
in social justice should be distinguished from issues in epistemology. Moreover, in tightening in this paper the link between
knowledge and truth, I attempt to defend science as a ‘privileged way of seeing the world’. The analysis of truth, and of
related concepts like reality and ‘the way the world is’, will assume a central role here. I contend that, ultimately, the
only coherent and consistent position is a realist view of the pertinent issues and ideas. 相似文献
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Over the past few decades, the work of Georg Simmel (1858–1918) has again become of interest. Its reception, however, has
been fairly one-sided and selective, mostly because Simmel’s philosophy has been bypassed in favor of his sociological contributions.
This article examines Simmel’s explicit reflections on the nature of philosophy. Simmel defines philosophy through three aspects
which, according to him, are common to all philosophical schools. First, philosophical reasoning implies the effort to think
without preconditions. Second, Simmel maintains that in contrast to other sciences, only philosophy is oriented toward constructing
a general view of the world. Third, Simmel claims that philosophical work worthy of the name creates a sphere of a typical way of being in relation to world, a third sphere that is between the personal and the objective. According to Simmel, what has made philosophy’s eminent figures great
is that they have advanced a type of thinking and developed it into a particularly interesting form, and this type can still
correspond with the way we experience the world. It is significant that these three aspects through which Simmel defines philosophical
activity emphasize the forms of questioning, not the contents or objects of thought. Still, he thinks that an interaction
with concrete examples is always required in order to make philosophy a meaningful activity. This stance is reflected in the
wide variety of topics studied by Simmel himself. In his last works Simmel began to emphasize another aspect of philosophy,
its nature as a living movement of thought related to fundamental human limitedness: just as life itself ceaselessly reaches
beyond its present form, so philosophy constantly strives to overcome the preconditions of thinking.
相似文献
Olli Pyyhtinen (Corresponding author)Email: |
5.
Matheson Russell 《Husserl Studies》2011,27(1):41-62
Over four decades, Habermas has put to paper many critical remarks on Husserl’s work as occasion has demanded. These scattered
critical engagements nonetheless do add up to a coherent (if contestable) position regarding the project of transcendental
phenomenology. This essay provides a comprehensive reconstruction of the arguments Habermas makes and offers a critical assessment
of them. With an eye in particular to the theme of intersubjectivity (a theme of fundamental interest to both thinkers), it
is argued that Habermas’s arguments do indeed show up deficiencies in Husserlian phenomenology and yet that they do not succeed
in proving that we must abandon the methods and tasks of phenomenological research. On the contrary, it is argued that phenomenological
methods may well be needed in order to investigate certain philosophical questions that Habermas’s theory of communication
has thus far only partially addressed. 相似文献
6.
Studia Logica - It is shown how Tarski’s 1929 axiomatization of mereology secures the reflexivity of the ‘part of’ relation. This is done with a fusion-abstraction principle that... 相似文献
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Philosophia - In this paper, I offer a systematic account of Quine’s philosophy of mind. In doing so, I respond to an interpretive problem of reconciling Quine’s admission of... 相似文献
8.
Stathis Psillos 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2011,42(2):339-363
This paper aims to cast light on the reasons that explain the shift of opinion—from scepticism to realism—concerning the reality
of atoms and molecules in the beginning of the twentieth century, in light of Jean Perrin’s theoretical and experimental work
on the Brownian movement. The story told has some rather interesting repercussions for the rationality of accepting the reality
of explanatory posits. Section 2 presents the key philosophical debate concerning the role and status of explanatory hypotheses
c. 1900, focusing on the work of Duhem, Stallo, Ostwald, Poincaré and Boltzmann. Section 3 examines in detail Perrin’s theoretical
account of the molecular origins of Brownian motion, reconstructs the structure and explains the strength of Perrin’s argument
for the reality of molecules. Section 4 draws three important lessons for the current debate over scientific realism. 相似文献
9.
Why Does Laudan’s Confutation of Convergent Realism Fail? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Antonio Diéguez-Lucena 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2006,37(2):393-403
In his paper “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”, Larry Laudan offered one of the most powerful criticisms of scientific
realism. I defend here that although Laudan’s criticism is right, this does not refute the realist position. The thesis that
Laudan confutes is a much stronger thesis than realist needs to maintain. As I will exemplify with Salmon’s statistical-relevance
model, a less strict notion of explanation would allow us to claim that (approximate) truth is the best explanation for such
success, even if it is accepted that there can be cases of unsuccessful (approximately) true theories and cases of successful
false theories. 相似文献
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Robert Stalnaker recently proposed a simple theory of propositions using the notion of a set of propositions being consistent, and conjectured that this theory is equivalent to the claim that propositions form a complete atomic Boolean algebra. This paper clarifies and confirms this conjecture. Stalnaker also noted that some of the principles of his theory may be given up, depending on the intended notion of proposition. This paper therefore also investigates weakened constraints on consistency and the corresponding classes of Boolean algebras.
相似文献13.
Bradley Jay Strawser 《Philosophia》2011,39(2):375-391
Realism about material objects faces a variety of epistemological objections. Recently, however, some realists have offered
new accounts in response to these long-standing objections; many of which seem plausible. In this paper, I raise a new objection
against realism vis-à-vis how we could empirically come to know mind-independent essential properties for objects. Traditionally,
realists hold kind-membership and persistence as bound together for purposes of tracing out an object’s essential existence
conditions. But I propose kind-membership and persistence for objects can conceptually come apart and function epistemologically
distinctly from one another—in which case the usual reliance by realists on an assumption of persistence to determine kind-membership
conditions is unjustified. Thus, present realist attempts to explain how empirical detection of mind-independent essential
properties for objects could possibly occur inevitably results in circularity. The charge against the realist is to explain
why we don’t have to first discover persistence conditions for an object before we can ascertain kind-membership conditions
for an object. If no answer is forthcoming, then it seems the weight of the epistemological objection to realism is back in
full force. 相似文献
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John Newson Wright 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(5):603-621
Abstract In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke argues for an extreme form of meaning scepticism. One influential reply to Kripke’s arguments was developed by David Lewis. The reply developed by Lewis makes use of the notion of mind-independent relations of similarity and difference. The aim of the paper is to argue that Lewis’ reply is not satisfactory: the challenge to find a refutation of Kripke’s sceptical arguments remains unmet. 相似文献
17.
Putnam’s internal realism is aimed at reconciling realist and antirealist intuitions about truth and the nature of reality.
A common complaint about internal realism is that it has never been stated with due precision. This paper attempts to render
the position precise by drawing on the literature on conceptual spaces as well as on earlier work of the authors on the notion
of identity. 相似文献
18.
《South African Journal of Philosophy》2013,32(2):63-73
AbstractWhilst this paper was initially part of a larger project tracing the development of Anglo-American thought from the colonial through to the post-colonial era, below it stands alone as reflection on the colonialism of John Stuart Mill read from a post-colonial perspective. It aims to show that Mill’s views on colonial rule were largely informed by his principle of liberty which, in turn, was based on his qualitative utilitarianism. The driving force behind his colonialism, as with his work in general, was his unwavering belief in the importance of human progress and development. Mill never believed, as did many of his contemporaries, that the ‘backward’ societies of the colonies were inherently inferior, but rather that they needed paternal intervention from more civilised, progressive societies in order to stimulate growth in that spontaneous human development was not inevitable. When read in this light Mill’s views on colonial rule, while culturally bigoted and ethnocentric, appear less contradictory to his liberalism as a whole. 相似文献
19.
Philosophia - This paper argues that Peter van Inwagen’s argument for the mysteriousness of metaphysical freedom does not establish its conclusion. Van Inwagen’s argument involves the... 相似文献
20.
Kian Mintz-Woo 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2018,48(5):707-725
Parfit denies that the introduction of reasons into our ontology is costly for his theory. He puts forth two positions to help establish the claim: the Plural Senses View and the Argument from Empty Ontology. I argue that, first, the Plural Senses View for ‘exists’ can be expanded to allow for senses which undermine his ontological claims; second, the Argument from Empty Ontology can be debunked by Platonists. Furthermore, it is difficult to make statements about reasons true unless these statements include reference to objects in reality. These arguments show the instability of Parfit’s claimed metaethical advantages over naturalism. 相似文献