Imaginal repositioning in everyday environments: effects of testing method and setting

Two experiments examined spatial knowledge access after imagined perspective switches in everyday environments. Blindfolded volunteers had to point to target objects in a well-known surrounding while imagining being repositioned into different spatial perspectives defined as self-rotations of the observer in the horizontal plane (0 degrees , 45 degrees , and 135 degrees ). Testing was either conducted in the space the target locations had been learned in (actual room testing), or while participants were away from this room, but should imagine being situated there (remote room testing). Experiment 1, in which perspective switches were tested on a trial-to-trial basis, revealed increases in pointing latency and error as a function of the amount of angular disparity between real and imagined perspective under actual and remote room conditions. Experiment 2, in which knowledge access was tested in blocks of multiple trials per perspective, showed increases in pointing latency with angular disparity for actual space testing, and to a much lesser degree for remote space testing. Implications of both findings for theoretical accounts of knowledge access after imaginal perspective switches are discussed, and recommendations for using different testing methods and settings are given.     

Spatial updating in virtual reality: the sufficiency of visual information

Robust and effortless spatial orientation critically relies on "automatic and obligatory spatial updating", a largely automatized and reflex-like process that transforms our mental egocentric representation of the immediate surroundings during ego-motions. A rapid pointing paradigm was used to assess automatic/obligatory spatial updating after visually displayed upright rotations with or without concomitant physical rotations using a motion platform. Visual stimuli displaying a natural, subject-known scene proved sufficient for enabling automatic and obligatory spatial updating, irrespective of concurrent physical motions. This challenges the prevailing notion that visual cues alone are insufficient for enabling such spatial updating of rotations, and that vestibular/proprioceptive cues are both required and sufficient. Displaying optic flow devoid of landmarks during the motion and pointing phase was insufficient for enabling automatic spatial updating, but could not be entirely ignored either. Interestingly, additional physical motion cues hardly improved performance, and were insufficient for affording automatic spatial updating. The results are discussed in the context of the mental transformation hypothesis and the sensorimotor interference hypothesis, which associates difficulties in imagined perspective switches to interference between the sensorimotor and cognitive (to-be-imagined) perspective.     

Object localisation and frames of reference

In this paper, we explore which spatial frames of reference, egocentric or allocentric, are used to locate objects either in relation to ourselves (i.e. subject-to-object localisation) or to other objects (i.e. object-to-object localisation). In particular, we wanted to know whether the same or different frames of reference are used in these two different kinds of localisation after learning the environment in an egocentric way. Egocentric frames of reference are determined by the position of the person in relation to the spatial layout, whereas allocentric frames of reference are centred on the environment or on objects, independent of a persons position. We hypothesised that subject-to-object localisation is based on egocentric spatial representations, whereas object-to-object localisation is based on allocentric spatial representations. Participants were asked to study eight common objects, placed in a circle. Next, half of the participants had to point to an object in relation to their imagined position (egocentric condition) and the other half to an object in relation to another object (allocentric condition). The overall results show no difference between subject-to-object and object-to-object localisation. In both cases, access to positions corresponding to the front/back body axis was facilitated, in terms of both latency and error. Moreover, participants were able to retrieve objects positions better from the perspective from which they had learned the spatial array than from new perspectives. These results support the conclusion that egocentric coordinates, which are selected on the basis of our body-centred experience of the environment, define spatial representations underlying both subject-to-object and object-to-object localisation.     

Role of motor processes in extrinsically encoding mental transformations

Previous research has shown that imagined perspective rotations elicit spatial and low-level cortical motor areas of the brain when participants rely on knowledge of their physical body, or body percept (Wraga, Flynn, Boyle, & Evans, 2010). The current study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate whether recruitment of the body percept would activate low-level cortical motor areas of the brain within other classes of mental transformations. Participants performed imagined object and perspective rotations of three-dimensional Shephard-Metzler (1971) stimuli. For each task, participants used button presses serving as virtual pointers to locate a prescribed portion of the stimuli with respect to their "right" and "left." We found low-level cortical motor activation (M1) for both mental transformations; however, the degree to which such activation related to participants' performance differed, as well as the recruitment of additional nonmotoric strategies. The results are discussed in terms of recent hypotheses regarding the role of the body percept in extrinsically encoded mental transformations.     

Action, verbal response and spatial reasoning

Studies have shown that perception of distance, orientation and size can be dissociated from action tasks. The action system seems to possess more veridical, unbiased information than the perceptual/verbal system. The current study examines the nature of the distinction between action and verbal responses in a spatial reasoning task. Participants imagined themselves facing different orientations and either pointed to where other objects would be, or verbally reported their egocentric directions (e.g., "50 degrees to my left"). When using pointing responses, RT and error increased as a function of the angular disparity between the imagined heading and their actual heading. However, when using verbal responses, performance was not affected by angular disparity, suggesting that participants knew the direction of the targets from the imagined perspective but could not point to them directly. The verbal and action systems have fundamentally different information or processes rather than quantitatively different ones.     

躯体运动促进空间更新的环境依赖效应

Kelly, Avraamides和Loomis (2007)发现被试在新环境中空间更新失败, 而肖承丽和刘传军(2014)发现被试在新环境中可使用想象平移等策略来实现空间更新。为了探索该两项研究的异同, 本研究采用与Kelly等相同的实验范式进行研究。实验1被试在原学习环境中完成实验任务。实验2被试记忆完物体空间位置后, 转移至新环境, 在只依靠离线表征、离线表征与在线表征相协调和离线表征与在线表征相矛盾三种条件下完成相同的实验任务。结果发现, 被试在原环境中通过躯体运动和记忆两种方式促进空间更新, 具有同等有效性, 而在新环境中躯体运动显著差于记忆对空间更新的促进作用; 躯体运动和记忆对空间更新的促进作用在两种环境中均高度相关。研究表明, 躯体运动促进空间更新具有环境依赖效应, 与记忆对空间更新的促进作用相比, 躯体运动对空间更新的促进作用会随着环境的改变而降低。     

对想象环境的空间更新

学界传统上将空间更新定义为个体随着身体运动对其所处真实环境空间表征的自动更新过程, 然而近年来有研究发现个体还可以对想象环境进行空间更新, 但其机制尚不明确。本研究实验1被试站在场景内学习物体空间位置之后, 保持学习朝向直线走到测试位置。其中, 0度组保持学习朝向站立, 180度组原地转动180度, 面对学习朝向的相反方向站立。两组被试均想象自己仍然站在学习位置, 面对学习朝向。然后被试旋转90度, 从3个想象朝向(记忆一致朝向、感觉运动一致朝向和不一致朝向)完成空间判断任务。结果发现0度组记忆一致朝向和感觉运动一致朝向成绩均优于不一致朝向, 而180度组无此优势。实验2被试从学习空间移动到测试空间过程中被迷向, 其他条件与实验1的180度组相同。但是, 实验2被试在记忆一致朝向和感觉运动一致朝向的成绩均优于不一致朝向。结果证明人们可以通过对在线空间表征进行想象平移或将离线记忆与空间更新系统相联结两种方式, 对想象环境进行空间更新。     

A dissociation between object manipulation spatial ability and spatial orientation ability

We developed psychometric tests of spatial orientation ability, in which people are shown a two-dimensional array of objects, imagine taking a perspective within the array, and indicate the direction to a target object from this perspective. Patterns of errors on these tests were consistent with experimental studies of perspective taking. Characteristic errors and verbal protocols supported the validity of the perspective-taking tests, suggesting that people encoded the objects in the display with respect to a body-centered coordinate system when the imagined perspective was more than 90 degrees different from the orientation of the display. By comparing alternative models in a confirmatory factor analysis, we found that the ability to mentally rotate and manipulate an imagined object (as measured by tests of spatial visualization and spatial relations) and the ability to reorient the imagined self (as measured by the perspective-taking tests) are separable spatial abilities.     

基于空间的一级和二级视角转换的行为研究及理论综述

空间视角转换是从他人视角表征空间关系的能力。本文根据Flavell对空间视角转换能力分出的两个水平,把以往研究的研究方法分为6类：考察一级视角转换能力的可见性任务、数量判断,以及考察二级视角转换能力的识别任务、方向判断、地图巡航、数量判断。随后总结出三种相应的空间视角转换研究的加工理论：,并在以往研究的基础上提出了选取适合的实验任务、开展多个物体的视角转换研究、更多采用虚拟现实呈现刺激材料这3点研究展望。     

Facilitated pointing to remembered objects in front: Evidence for egocentric retrieval or for spatial priming?

Recent spatial memory theories propose that long-term spatial memories are retrieved egocentrically. One source of evidence comes from imagined perspective taking, in which participants learn an object layout, later imagine standing at one object and facing a second (orienting) object, and then point to a third (target) object from the imagined perspective. Pointing is faster for target objects in the anterior than in the posterior half of imaginal space. This “front facilitation” is consistent with asymmetric sensory and biomechanical body properties (favoring the anterior half of body space), supporting claims of egocentric retrieval. However, front facilitation might actually result from spatial priming: Proximity differences might cause orienting objects to prime target objects more in the anterior than in the posterior half of imagined space. Using a modified perspectivetaking task that unconfounded front facilitation and spatial priming, two experiments identified separate influences of front facilitation and spatial priming when participants imagined perspectives within the surrounding environment or a remote environment.     

Differentiating explanations of attitude-consistent behavior: the role of perspectives and mode of perspective taking

We examined whether participants could differentiate between explanations of attitude-consistent behavior related to EU membership given from two perspectives (EU supporter and EU opponent) by means of three perspective taking modes (the explainer's own perspective, imagined in-group members' perspective, and imagined out-group members' perspective). Participants were presented with explanations provided from different perspectives and perspective taking modes, and they were asked to judge the extent to which they agreed with each explanation, to guess the attitude of the provider of each explanation, and to rate the quality of each explanation in various respects. Participants could not differentiate between explanations given by in-group members and out-group members who imagined the same perspective. They responded more favorably to explanations given from own perspective than from the imagined perspectives. The results suggest that there exists a shared understanding about how both sides should explain attitude-consistent behavior, but this understanding is measurably different from the actual explanations.     

Lie,truth, lie: the role of task switching in a deception context

A cornerstone of the task switching literature is the finding that task performance is typically slower and more error-prone when the task switches than when it repeats. So far, deception research has largely ignored that such cognitive switch costs should also emerge when switching between truth telling and lying, and may affect the cognitive cost of lying as reflected in higher prefrontal brain activity and slower and less accurate responding compared to truth telling. To get a grasp on the relative size of the switch costs associated with lying and truth telling, the current study had participants perform a reaction time-based deception task, in which they alternated between lying and telling the truth to yes/no questions that were related to activities performed in the lab (Experiment 1) or neutral autobiographical facts (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the error and reaction time switch costs were found to be equally large for switching from truth telling to lying and from lying to truth telling. This symmetry in switch costs can be explained from the hypothesis that lying requires a first step of truth telling, and demonstrates that task switching does not contribute to the cognitive cost of lying when the repetition/switch ratio is balanced. Theoretical and methodological implications are considered.     

不同平面心理旋转的角色效应

本研究采用实验方法,分别在水平面和冠状面内对第一人称角色和第三人称角色心理旋转进行对比性研究。实验结果表明：空间表征转换的角色方式对心理旋转产生显著影响,第三人称角色心理旋转易于第一人称角色心理旋转,即存在心理旋转的角色效应;心理旋转的角色效应并不是在特定旋转条件下才出现的,具有更大的普遍性     

Most adults show opposite-side biases in the imagined holding of infants and objects

Three hundred university undergraduates were asked to imagine holding in their arms first an object (either an "expensive vase" or an "old shoebox") and then a young infant. For all three tasks, side biases were found that were significantly different from chance and from one another: 81% of the subjects reported holding the imagined vase in their right arm, 64% reported holding the imagined shoebox in their right arm, and 66% reported holding the imagined infant in their left arm. These results further support the hypothesis that the left-side bias is unique to infants and, for the first time, establish this through direct comparisons of holding-side biases for infants and objects within subjects. The sex and handedness of the holder as well as the qualities of the imagined object also were found to contribute to the side and strength of the bias.     

Visual perspective in remembering and episodic future thought

According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, remembering and episodic future thinking are supported by a common set of constructive processes. In the present study, we directly addressed this assertion in the context of third-person perspectives that arise during remembering and episodic future thought. Specifically, we examined the frequency with which participants remembered past events or imagined future events from third-person perspectives. We also examined the different viewpoints from which third-person perspective events were remembered or imagined. Although future events were somewhat more likely to be imagined from a third-person perspective, the spatial viewpoint distributions of third-person perspectives characterizing remembered and imagined events were highly similar. These results suggest that a similar constructive mechanism may be at work when people remember events from a perspective that could not have been experienced in the past and when they imagine events from a perspective that could not be experienced in the future. The findings are discussed in terms of their consistency with—and as extensions of—the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis.     

Tests enhance retention and transfer of spatial learning

Many studies have reported that tests are beneficial for learning (e.g., Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a). However, the majority of studies on the testing effect have been limited to a combination of relatively simple verbal tasks and final tests that assessed memory for the same material that had originally been tested. The present study explored whether testing is beneficial for complex spatial memory and whether these benefits hold for both retention and transfer. After encoding a three-dimensional layout of objects presented in a virtual environment, participants completed a judgment-of-relative-direction (JRD) task in which they imagined standing at one object, facing a second object, and pointed to a third object from the imagined perspective. Some participants completed this task by relying on memory for the previously encoded layout (i.e., the test conditions), whereas for others the location of the third object was identified ahead of time, so that retrieval was not required (i.e., the study condition). On a final test assessing their JRD performance, the participants who learned through test outperformed those who learned through study. This was true even when corrective feedback was not provided on the initial JRD task and when the final test assessed memory from vantage points that had never been practiced during the initial JRD.     

Serial attention within working memory

It is proposed that people are limited to attending to just one “object” in working memory (WM) at any one time. Consequently, many cognitive tasks, and much of everyday thought, necessitate switches between WM items. The research to be presented measured the time involved in switching attention between objects in WM and sought to elaborate the processes underlying such switches. Two experiments required subjects to maintain two running counts; the order in which the counts were updated necessitated frequent switches between them. Even after intensive practice, a time cost was incurred when subjects updated the two counts in succession, relative to updating the same count twice. This time cost was interpreted as being due to a distinct switching mechanism that controls an internal focus of attention large enough for just one object (count) at a time. This internal focus of attention is a subset of WM (Cowan, 1988). Alternative visual and conceptual repetition-priming and memory retrieval explanations for the cost involved in switching between items in WM are addressed.     

Updating displays after imagined object and viewer rotations

Six experiments compared spatial updating of an array after imagined rotations of the array versus viewer. Participants responded faster and made fewer errors in viewer tasks than in array tasks while positioned outside (Experiment 1) or inside (Experiment 2) the array. An apparent array advantage for updating objects rather than locations was attributable to participants imagining translations of single objects rather than rotations of the array (Experiment 3). Superior viewer performance persisted when the array was reduced to 1 object (Experiment 4); however, an object with a familiar configuration improved object performance somewhat (Experiment 5). Object performance reached near-viewer levels when rotations included haptic information for the turning object. The researchers discuss these findings in terms of the relative differences in which the human cognitive system transforms the spatial reference frames corresponding to each imagined rotation.