Information relevance, working memory, and the consideration of alternatives

People routinely focus on one hypothesis and avoid consideration of alternative hypotheses on problems requiring decisions between possible states of the world--for example, on the “pseudodiagnosticity” task (Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney, & Schiavo, 1979). In order to account for behaviour on such “inference” problems, it is proposed that people can hold in working memory, and operate upon, but one alternative at a time, and that they have a bias to test the hypothesis they think true. In addition to being an ex post facto explanation of data selection in inference tasks, this conceptualization predicts that there are situations in which people will consider alternatives. These are:

1. “action” problems, where the alternatives are possible courses of action;

2. “inference” problems, in which evidence favours an alternative hypothesis.

Experiment 1 tested the first prediction. Subjects were given action or inference problems, each with two alternatives and two items of data relevant to each alternative. They received probabilistic information about the relation between one datum and one alternative and picked one value from among the other three possible pairs of such relations. Two findings emerged; (1) a strong tendency to select information about only one alternative with inferences; and (2) a strong tendency, compared to inferences, to select information about both alternatives with actions.

Experiment 2 tested the second prediction. It was predicted that data suggesting that one alternative was incorrect would lead many subjects to consider, and select information about, the other alternative. For actions, it was predicted that this manipulation would have no effect. Again the data were as predicted.     

A further investigation of apparent size and retinal size as determinants of the figural after-effect

A figure which is more distant from the eye than another but subtends the same visual angle is usually seen as the larger. This phenomenon is called perceptual size constancy. Experiments have been reported which show that sometimes the apparent and sometimes the retinal sizes of the stimulus figures determine the direction of the figural after-effect. These experiments are reviewed and two further experiments are reported. In the first experiment two types of stimulus figure (discs and annuli) which subtended a visual angle of 1° 36' resulted in figural after-effects, the direction of which would have been predicted by the retinal sizes of the figures. In the second experiment larger figures were used which subtended a visual angle of about 4° and which were the same as those used by Sutherland (1954). In this experiment the after-effects were generally in a direction which would have been expected if apparent size determined the direction of the after-effect. In the interpretation of the results attention is drawn to the “Central Tendency Effect” which has been observed in size judgements of stimulus figures of varying size. Two hypotheses are suggested; one is that the true figural aftereffect has been obscured by the “Central Tendency Effect” in successive judgements, and the other is that time error in successive judgements of size is essentially a figural aftereffect. Some supportive evidence for the latter hypothesis is reported. It is concluded that apparent size is not a critical determinant of the figural after-effect.     

The perception of a rotating shape

A regularly rotated shape was matched to given shapes set in the frontal parallel plane position, under conditions which yielded practically zero constancy. It was found that increases in the rate of rotation resulted in increases in the angular settings at which the subjects matched the rotating shape to the given standard shapes. Thus Langdon's (1951) experimental results were confirmed. However, since matches to the “real” shape also increased with increases in the rate of rotation, Langdon's interpretation of his experimental results is considered to be incorrect. Further theoretical discussion is advanced in support of this conclusion: namely, that regular rotation of a shape, viewed under conditions which usually yield zero constancy, does not restore constancy.     

Win-stay behaviour in the rat

The Law of Effect dictates that animals will repeat the just-reinforced response “win-stay”, and yet there have been apparent violations of this by rats running for food in mazes, in the form of “win-shift” behaviour. Four experiments analysed the conditions determining win-stay and win-shift behaviour. All the experiments employed a schedule in which reinforcement was distributed across two choices, and in which the probability of reinforcement for the first response after previous reinforcement was equivalent for the two options. Despite this lack of programmed differential reinforcement, rats showed a significant win-stay tendency in Experiment 1, with no spatial bias. Experiments 2 and 3 used respectively a Y-maze and an operant chamber in which responding required a return to a central choice point. In both situations, significant win-shift behaviour resulted initially, at relatively high frequencies of reinforcement, but this win-shift changed to significant win-stay over many sessions, and with intermittent reinforcement. Experiment 4 introduced explicitly non-reinforced trials and demonstrated a “lose-shift” tendency, parallel to win-stay. Possible artefacts underlying win-stay and win-shift behaviour are rejected, and various mechanisms for these effects, including theories of optimal choice and associative learning, are discussed.     

Temporal factors in pattern vision

A sequence of uncorrelated randomly patterned visual stimuli (“visual noise”) is normally seen as a field of particles in “Brownian motion.” When each frame of the sequence is followed by a blank flash superimposed on the same region of the visual field, the apparent structure of the noise field is strikingly altered, its form varying with the time interval between frame and flash. At a critical interval, many dots seem to cohere, to form maggot-like objects.

Some of the factors determining this critical interval have been studied. They include the brightness, repetition frequency and exposure duration of the noise field, and the distance of its retinal image from the fovea.

The critical interval for “perceptual blanking” is quite different from that for the “maggot effect,” but the two show a suggestively similar dependence upon the duty cycle of the noise display.

It is of some neurological interest that the phenomenon is not appreciably visible with dichoptic mixing of noise and blank stimuli.     

The effect of orthographic structure and lexical meaning on “same-different” judgments

Pairs of high frequency English words, orthographically acceptable pseudo-words, and non-word letter strings were presented in a “same”-“different” task. The mean reaction times for “same” judgments were ordered; real words were faster than pseudo-words, and pseudo-words were faster than non-words. The RTs for the “different”, judgments showed no differences among the three types of words, except in the first two days of practice in a blocked presentation condition when the difference between the real words and non-words was marginally significant. These and other results suggest that “same” judgments are based upon a comparison process which efficiently uses higher order semantic and orthographic information in words, whereas “different” judgments are based upon comparison process which performs a self-terminating search of the graphemic information in words. The results were also discussed with reference to hierarchical models of word perception and reading.     

Visual pattern recognition: Size preprocessing re-examined

Template theories of visual pattern recognition assume the operation of preprocessing routines to deal with irrelevancies such as discrepancies in stimulus size. In three experiments where size was an irrelevant dimension, observers classified pairs of forms as either “same” or “different”. In Experiment I, the classification “different” was required when the stimuli shared the same form but a different orientation, and “same” when the stimuli shared the same form and orientation. Under these conditions RT was an increasing function of the magnitude of the size disparity between stimuli with equal slopes for “same” and “different” judgements. In Experiment II, “different” classifications were made to stimuli that had different forms, and “same” to figures with the same form. This stimulus set produced a size disparity function that interacted with response type; “different” responses had a shallower slope. Experiment III consisted of a mixed stimulus set drawn from both Experiment I and II. Stimuli that produced additive effects of size disparity and response type in Experiment I now produced an interaction between these two factors similar to the one observed in Experiment II. The results of these experiments are interpreted as evidence that previous contradictory results reported in the literature stem from differences in the way the stimulus set is constructed, and that size transformations can not be a necessary operation, at least when “different” judgements are made. The results are problematic for the view that size disparity effects in matching tasks are easily interpretable in terms of a primitive size normalization stage that precedes any comparison operations.     

Neural correlates of partial transmission of sensorimotor information in the cerebral cortex

Using single neuron recordings in monkey primary motor (MI) cortex, two series of experiments were conducted in order to know whether response preparation can begin before perceptual processing finishes, thus providing evidence for a temporal overlap of perceptual and motor processes.

In Experiment 1, a “left/right, Go/No-Go” reaction time (RT) task was used. One monkey was trained to perform wrist flexion/extension movements to align a pointer with visual targets. The visual display was organized to provide a two-dimensional stimulus: side (an easy discrimination between left and right targets) which determined movement direction, and distance (a difficult discrimination between distal and proximal targets) which determined whether or not the movement was to be made. Changes in neuronal activity, when they were time-locked to the stimulus, were almost similar in the Go and No-Go trials, and when they were time-locked to movement onset, were markedly reduced in No-Go as compared to Go trials.

In Experiment 2, a stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) task was used. Two monkeys were trained to align a pointer with visual targets, on either left or right. In the spatially “compatible” trials, they had to point at the stimulus position, whereas in the “incompatible” trials, they had to point at the target located in the opposite side. For 12.5% of neurons, changes in activity associated with incompatible trials looked like changes in activity associated with movements performed in the opposite direction during compatible trials, thus suggesting the hypothesis of an automatic activation of the congruent, but incorrect response.

Results of both experiments provide evidence for a partial transmission of information from visual to motor cortical areas: that is, in the No-Go trials of the first task, information about movement direction, before the decision to perform or not this movement was made, and, in the incompatible trials of the SRC task, information about the congruent, but incorrect response, before the incongruent, but correct response was programmed.     

The perception of a changing shape

Under specified conditions a pair of simple shapes are matched by a subject when almost all supplementary textural and space cues of depth vision have been removed. Under such conditions it is found that shape constancy is no longer present. However, the effect of regular rotatory motion of the shape is sufficient to restore constancy in the continued absence of other cues. Degree of perceptual constancy appears to be correlated with rate of change of shape. It is suggested that an explanation of the phenomenon is to be sought along the lines of Michotte's concept of “object creation” rather than in terms of gradient variables.     

Changes in behaviour associated with a nervous system poison (DDT.)

The main purpose of the investigation was to show that behaviour measures can be used to investigate the effects of those toxic drugs which produce “biochemical lesions” in the nervous system although the nature of the lesions still remains undetermined. The advantages of this approach are twofold. First, a psychological study may help to uncover the initial effects of the drug, and thus provide evidence which may lead to the ultimate understanding of the action of the drug. Second, and of value from the practical point of view, such a method may be used to detect toxicity.

In this study D.D.T. was used. Two experiments were performed on one control and four experimental groups of albino rats. Problem solving behaviour, speed and pattern of locomotion, and reaction to stress involving visual stimuli were observed.

Problem solving behaviour was found to be unaffected by the drug; no changes were found in speed of locomotion, but pattern of locomotion revealed that “ataxia” was one of the initial effects of D.D.T. poisioning. The experimental animals were found to be generally less reactive to “stress”; “hyper-irritability” reported in previous studies being explicable in terms of exaggerated motor responses.

The results obtained on “ataxia” showed that the procedure adopted here could be used to detect chronic D.D.T. toxicity in rats.     

Binocular rivalry and stereoscopic depth perception

An investigation was made of stimulus factors causing retinal rivalry or allowing stereoscopic depth perception, given a requisite positional disparity. It is shown that similar colour information can be “filtered” out from both eyes; that stereopsis is not incompatible with rivalry and suppression of one aspect of the stimulus, and that the strongest cue for perception of stereoscopic depth is intensity difference at the boundaries of the figures in the same direction at each eye. Identity of colour can also act as a cue for stereopsis. The brightness of different monocular figures seen in the stereoscope in different combinations was estimated by a matching technique, and it is suggested that the perceived brightness is a compromise between the monocular brightness difference between figure and ground seen in relation to the binocular fused background, and the mean brightness of the figures. The results are discussed in terms of neurophysiological “on,” “off” and continuous response fibres.     

Habit reversal in the turtle

Two groups of mature “painted” turtles were trained in a T-maze. One group had five trials per day, with correct and incorrect turns reversed for each animal whenever it reached the criterion of five errorless trials on a given day. The second group had 10 trials per day, with correct and incorrect turns reversed daily, irrespective of the performance of the animals. Only in the data for the second group did there appear some indication of progressive improvement in habit reversal. The results are considered in relation to those obtained in analogous experiments with other species.     

Phenomenal causation at a distance

The aim of this research was to study the finding by Michotte, that a moving object A can apparently produce movement in a projectile B without making contact with it.

The experiments confirm the existence of a causal impression of “pushing at a distance,” but they demonstrate that the greater the distance the smaller the chance that this impression will occur.

When it does, in fact, occur, it has the same characteristics, and is associated with the same experimental conditions, as the impression of “pushing with contact.”

Temporal continuity must obtain between the stopping of the moving object and the starting of the projectile; this refutes any theory positing that there is a “passage” of movement from one object to the other. The effects of differences in speed of movement, whether absolute or relative, are similar in both instances.

In general, however, it appears that distance slightly accentuates the segregation of the movements and that the temporal and kinematic conditions of integration require to be more favourable in the case of distance, if an impression of pushing is to be given which is as satisfying as that found in the case of direct contact.

The size of the Radius of Action, that is, the extent of the passive phase of the projectile, is of the same order in the two cases.

The results bring out the fundamentally temporal-kinematic nature of the perceptual pattern of pushing. They appear difficult to reconcile with an interpretation based on past experience, but tally with the theory of “Ampliation of Movement” put forward by Michotte. According to this theory the essential point lies in the phenomenal transitory belonging to A (the moving object) of the movement performed by B (the projectile).     

The influence of previous movement and posture on subsequent posture

An experiment with 21 subjects has confirmed the findings of other investigators that previous posture affects subsequent posture—the phenomenon of postural persistence. There seems also to be a tendency for the arm to be judged horizontal when in fact above the horizon, no matter which posture has been previously adopted—a “constant upwards effect.” It has also been found that the direction of previous movement affects subsequent posture. After movement, an overshooting effect adds to a “constant upwards effect.”

Various explanations of the phenomenon are discussed, and persistence is considered as an anomaly of postural recognition.     

Information processing by performers and observers in a paired associate learning task

The effects of two training procedures on learning and performance are compared. Performers select a response alternative for each stimulus on Trial 1 and receive feedback in terms of “Right” or “Wrong”. Observers receive the same information by listening to the experimenter. Experiment I tests the hypothesis that performers and observers are using a different learning strategy when there are only two response alternatives available for each stimulus on Trial 1. A recognition procedure was used on Trial 2; each stimulus was followed by four alternatives, two of them being the same as presented on Trial 1. Subjects have to recognize the two “old” alternatives. Performers are always better at recognizing the chosen alternative, whereas observers are better at recognizing the correct alternative. Experiment II extends the comparison between performers and observers to a task with four response alternatives on Trial 1. There are no longer differences in performance between the two training procedures.     

Motor constancy and the upsizing of handwriting

Although handwriting can vary in size, it remains remarkably similar in form, demonstrating motor constancy (equivalence). A consideration of changes in writing size may indicate: (1) how rescaling is accomplished, and (2) those invariant features that remain constrained under size variation. In the experiment reported here nine participants wrote the word “minimum” (without dotting “i’s”) in cursive text, under three size conditions on a SmartBoard. The standard deviation of stroke slope did not change its relationship to mean stroke slope, but stroke durations and lengths did vary. Kinematic analysis indicated that the number of submovements, their efficiency, and their kinematic structure varied across the three writing size conditions. The results suggested that motor constancy does not merely reflect a simple change in a single parameter of scale.     

A study of the effect of structural information and familiarity in form perception

Two experiments were carried out to investigate the influence of structural information and familiarity on the processing of visual forms. Pairs of “well” structured and nameable and “poorly” structured and non-nameable fragmented forms were employed as stimuli. The effects of structure and familiarity were assessed by manipulating the visual hemifield of presentation and the task. In Experiment 1 stimuli were judged as being either in the same orientation or mirror-reversed, a task that does not require high-level semantic information to be processed. Experiment 2 required physically identical forms to be matched, which may use either physical or name information. In Experiment 1 “same” judgements were equivalent for both types of stimuli, and “different' judgements were longer for the “poorly” structured (non-nameable) forms. In Experiment 2 there was little overall difference between “well” and “poorly” structured forms, though response times to “well” structured (nameable) forms were slowed for right-visual-field presentations. It is suggested that familiarity may not be sufficient to provide a perceptual advantage for nameable forms, as the advantage for nameable stimuli was confined to “same” judgements in Experiment 1 and response times were shorter for non-nameable stimuli in Experiment 2. Rather, performance depends upon factors such as the computation of global shape (due to structural properties of collinearity and closure) and on the use of different kinds or representations (physical versus name) in matching.     

Reconnecting interpretation to reasoning through individual differences

Computational theories of mind assume that participants interpret information and then reason from those interpretations. Research on interpretation in deductive reasoning has claimed to show that subjects' interpretation of single syllogistic premises in an “immediate inference” task is radically different from their interpretation of pairs of the same premises in syllogistic reasoning tasks (Newstead, 1989, 1995; Roberts, Newstead, & Griggs, 2001). Narrow appeal to particular Gricean implicatures in this work fails to bridge the gap. Grice's theory taken as a broad framework for credulous discourse processing in which participants construct speakers' “intended models” of discourses can reconcile these results, purchasing continuity of interpretation through variety of logical treatments. We present exploratory experimental data on immediate inference and subsequent syllogistic reasoning. Systematic patterns of interpretation driven by two factors (whether the subject's model of the discourse is credulous, and their degree of reliance on information packaging) are shown to transcend particular quantifier inferences and to drive systematic differences in subjects' subsequent syllogistic reasoning. We conclude that most participants do not understand deductive tasks as experimenters intend, and just as there is no single logical model of reasoning, so there is no reason to expect a single “fundamental human reasoning mechanism”.     

Driye-leyel and flexibility in paired-associate nonsense-syllable learning

“High-anxiety” and “low-anxiety” subjects, selected for extreme scores on the Taylor Anxiety Scale, learned a list of paired-associate nonsense syllables in the belief that they were undergoing an intelligence test. Both groups were then given a second list of paired associates to learn, the stimulus-items being the same as those of the first list but the responses being changed. Before the presentation of the second list, half the subjects in each group were given anxiety-increasing instructions and the remaining half were given reassuring instructions.

The results verified two predictions made from Hull's behaviour theory, using the concept of fear or anxiety as a secondary drive:—“high anxiety” subjects took more trials to master the second learning task than “low-anxiety” subjects; and there was a significant interaction between initial anxiety-level and type of instructions, such that “high-anxiety” subjects who received drive-increasing instructions had a worse performance in the second part than all other sub-groups. There was no indication that “low-anxiety” subjects were significantly affected by the type of instructions received. The “high-anxiety” group had greater difficulty than the “low-anxiety” group in learning the first list, but the difference was non-significant.