The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it,and how to cope with it

Metaethical—or, more generally, metanormative—realism faces a serious epistemological challenge. Realists owe us—very roughly speaking—an account of how it is that we can have epistemic access to the normative truths about which they are realists. This much is, it seems, uncontroversial among metaethicists, myself included. But this is as far as the agreement goes, for it is not clear—nor uncontroversial—how best to understand the challenge, what the best realist way of coping with it is, and how successful this attempt is. In this paper I try, first, to present the challenge in its strongest version, and second, to show how realists—indeed, robust realists—can cope with it. The strongest version of the challenge is, I argue, that of explaining the correlation between our normative beliefs and the independent normative truths. And I suggest an evolutionary explanation (of a pre-established harmony kind) as a way of solving it.     

The puzzle of transparency and how to solve it

ABSTRACT

According to the transparency approach, achievement of self-knowledge is a two-stage process: first, the subject arrives at the judgment ‘p’; second, the subject proceeds to the judgment ‘I believe that p.’ The puzzle of transparency is to understand why the transition from the first to the second judgment is rationally permissible. After revisiting the debate between Byrne and Boyle on this matter, I present a novel solution according to which the transition is rationally permissible in virtue of a justifying argument that begins from a premise referring to the mental utterance that is emitted in the course of judging ‘p.’     

The p-value fallacy and how to avoid it.

Null hypothesis significance tests are commonly used to provide a link between empirical evidence and theoretical interpretation. However, this strategy is prone to the "p-value fallacy" in which effects and interactions are classified as either "noise" or "real" based on whether the associated p value is greater or less than .05. This dichotomous classification can lead to dramatic misconstruals of the evidence provided by an experiment. For example, it is quite possible to have similar patterns of means that lead to entirely different patterns of significance, and one can easily find the same patterns of significance that are associated with completely different patterns of means. Describing data in terms of an inventory of significant and nonsignificant effects can thus completely misrepresent the results. An alternative analytical technique is to identify competing interpretations of the data and then use likelihood ratios to assess which interpretation provides the better account. Several different methods of calculating the likelihood ratios are illustrated. It is argued that this approach satisfies a principle of "graded evidence," according to which similar data should provide similar evidence.     

Programmed instruction: What it is and how to do it

Five behaviorological features of programmed instruction are outlined: behavioral objectives, reinforcement, activity rate: high and relevant, successive approximation, and mastery progression. Each of these topics is explained, and examples are given to illustrate the differences between programmed instruction and the more common transmission model of teaching. A final section provides suggestions on specific techniques of successive approximation.     

Recognition hypermnesia: how to get it

Although recall hypermnesia (enhanced recall) over time with repeated testing has by now become an established empirical fact, its recognition counterpart, recognition hypermnesia, has defied clear-cut laboratory confirmation. In four studies, which relied on the retrieval component of recognition memory, it was shown that recognition memory, indexed by d', reliably improved over three successive recognition tests. The stimuli consisted of 140 cartoons, each comprising a picture and a verbal caption. Recognition memory was tested on transforms or part-forms (parts) of the original stimulus material (pictures only, verbal paraphrases of the pictures, the latent content of the cartoons, or the combination of paraphrases and latent contents). The strongest effects were obtained when the originally presented cartoons were tested on their latent (deep semantic) contents. Recognition hypermnesia for part-forms or transforms of earlier presented stimuli has potentially wide-ranging implications since real-world recognition--of faces, texts, visual scenes--usually involves recognising stimuli that are variants, not exact copies, of the originally encountered materials.     

The structure of working memory and how it relates to intelligence in children

This study explored the structure of working memory, and its relationship with intelligence in 176 typically-developing children in the 4th and 5th grades at school. Different measures of working memory (WM), and intelligence (g) were administered. Confirmatory factor analyses showed that WM involves an attentional control system and storage aspects that rely on domain-specific verbal (STM-V) and visuospatial (STM-VS) resources. The structural equation models showed that WM predicts a large portion (66%) of the variance in g, confirming that the two constructs are separable but closely related in young children. Findings also showed that only WM and STM-VS are significantly related to g, while the contribution of STM-V is moderate. Theoretical implications for the relationship between WM and g are discussed.     

Math anxiety: who has it, why it develops, and how to guard against it

Basic math skills are important for success in school and everyday life. Yet many people experience apprehension and fear when dealing with numerical information, termed math anxiety. Recently, researchers have started to probe the antecedents of math anxiety, revealing some surprising insights into its onset, risk factors, and remediation.     

The burden of benevolent sexism: how it contributes to the maintenance of gender inequalities

This study (N = 235) examines the responses of male and female participants to information about the alleged endorsement of either hostile or benevolent sexist beliefs by a sample of either men or women. We predicted that people endorsing benevolent sexist statements would be less likely to be perceived as sexist than those endorsing hostile sexist views, and examined the judgmental process through which people fail to recognize benevolent sexism as a form of prejudice. We argue that benevolent sexists do not match the mental prototype of sexist perpetrators, because they are seen as likeable. Our results confirm that because benevolent sexists are evaluated more positively than hostile sexists, they are less likely to be seen as sexists. This judgmental process occurs relatively independently of emotional responses to hostile vs. benevolent sexism. These results are discussed in terms of their relevance to the maintenance of gender inequalities. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The problem of relapse in stuttering: Some thoughts on what might cause it and how to deal with it

Bloodstein recently wrote that “the most vital part of science is not accurate measurement or the insistence on empiricism. It is an attitude of inquiry into the how and why of things” [Bloodstein, O. Foreword. In: Maintenance of Fluency (E. Boberg ed.). New York: Elsevier, 1981, p. vii]. In the paper below, I present some unsubstantiated and no doubt controversial thoughts on the how and why of relapse in stuttering. The overall thrust of these thoughts is that stutterers have different propensities to stutter because of the inherent variability in their speech production systems. For this reason, for therapy to have long-range success, stutterers must learn to accept and deal with the inherent variability in their speech production mechanisms.     

The meaning of race in psychology and how to change it: a methodological perspective

The primary purpose of this article was to offer a methodological critique in support of arguments that racial categories should be replaced as explanatory constructs in psychological research and theory. To accomplish this goal, the authors (a) summarized arguments for why racial categories should be replaced; (b) used principles of the scientific method to show that racial categories lack conceptual meaning; (c) identified common errors in researchers' measurement, statistical analyses, and interpretation of racial categories as independent variables; and (d) used hierarchical regression analysis to illustrate a strategy for replacing racial categories in research designs with conceptual variables. Implications for changing the study of race in psychology are discussed.     

The eyes have it: making positive expressions more positive and negative expressions more negative

Facial expressions frequently involve multiple individual facial actions. How do facial actions combine to create emotionally meaningful expressions? Infants produce positive and negative facial expressions at a range of intensities. It may be that a given facial action can index the intensity of both positive (smiles) and negative (cry-face) expressions. Objective, automated measurements of facial action intensity were paired with continuous ratings of emotional valence to investigate this possibility. Degree of eye constriction (the Duchenne marker) and mouth opening were each uniquely associated with smile intensity and, independently, with cry-face intensity. In addition, degree of eye constriction and mouth opening were each unique predictors of emotion valence ratings. Eye constriction and mouth opening index the intensity of both positive and negative infant facial expressions, suggesting parsimony in the early communication of emotion.     

Planning to reach for an object changes how the reacher perceives it

Three experiments assessed the influence of the Ebbinghaus illusion on size judgments that preceded verbal, grasp, or touch responses. Prior studies have found reduced effects of the illusion for the grip-scaling component of grasping, and these findings are commonly interpreted as evidence that different visual systems are employed for perceptual judgment and visually guided action. In the current experiments, the magnitude of the illusion was reduced by comparable amounts for grasping and for judgments that preceded grasping (Experiment 1). A similar effect was obtained prior to reaching to touch the targets (Experiment 2). The effect on verbal responses was apparent even when participants were simply instructed that a target touch task would follow the verbal task. After participants had completed a grasping task, the reduction in the magnitude of the illusion remained for a subsequent verbal-response judgment task (Experiment 3). Overall, the studies demonstrate strong connections between action planning and perception.     

The development of perceptual averaging: learning what to do,not just how to do it

The mature visual system condenses complex scenes into simple summary statistics (e.g., average size, location, orientation, etc.). However, children, often perform poorly on perceptual averaging tasks. Children's difficulties are typically thought to represent the suboptimal implementation of an adult‐like strategy. This paper examines another possibility: that children actually make decisions in a qualitatively different way to adults (optimal implementation of a non‐ideal strategy). Ninety children (6–7, 8–9, 10–11 years) and 30 adults were asked to locate the middle of randomly generated dot‐clouds. Nine plausible decision strategies were formulated, and each was fitted to observers' trial‐by‐trial response data (Reverse Correlation). When the number of visual elements was low (N < 6), children used a qualitatively different decision strategy from adults: appearing to “join up the dots” and locate the gravitational center of the enclosing shape. Given denser displays, both children and adults used an ideal strategy of arithmetically averaging individual points. Accounting for this difference in decision strategy explained 29% of children's lower precision. These findings suggest that children are not simply suboptimal at performing adult‐like computations, but may at times use sensible, but qualitatively different strategies to make perceptual judgments. Learning which strategy is best in which circumstance might be an important driving factor of perceptual development.     

Psychometrics and psychometricians in the 20th and 21st centuries: how it was in the 20th century and how it is now

This article is based largely upon the author's invited address at the 113th annual convention of the American Psychological Convention, Washington, DC, as the 2005 recipient of the Samuel J. Messick Award bestowed by APA Division 5 and the Educational Testing Service. The author summarizes the growth of graduate training in psychometrics and quantitative psychology, in the years prior to and following the end of WWII. He then opines the steady decline in the training of psychometricians and quantitative psychologists beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the 20th century. Likely causes of the decline are inferred and prospects for strengthening the quantitative skills of doctorates are discussed, including recommendations for reversing the downward trend.     

Worker Well-Being: What it Is,and how it Should Be Measured

Applied Research in Quality of Life - Worker well-being is a hot topic in organizations, consultancy and academia. However, too often, the buzz about worker well-being, enthusiasm for new programs...     

The dynamic lexicon in a truth-conditional framework; or how to have Your cake and eat it

A fundamental principle of all truth-conditional approaches to semantics is that the meanings of sentences of natural language can be compositionally specified in terms of truth conditions, where the meanings of the sentences’ parts (words/lexical items) are specified in terms of the contribution they make to such conditions their host sentences possess. Thus, meanings of words fit the meanings of sentences at least to the extent that the stability of what a sentence might mean as specified in a theory is in accord with the stability of what a word might mean as similarly specified. In this paper, I shall be concerned with Ludlow’s (2014) idea that, in fact, there need be no such sympathy between words and sentences. He proposes that we can square what he calls a dynamic lexicon, where word meaning is not stable at all, with a traditional truth-conditional approach of the kind indicated, where sentence meaning is delivered via ‘absolute truth conditions’. I share Ludlow’s aspiration to accommodate dynamic features of word meaning with a truth conditional approach, but not his belief that the marriage is an easy deal. Thus, I shall present a problem for Ludlow’s position and show how resolving this problem leads to an alternative picture of how the meaning of a sentence may be truth-conditionally specified with all relevant dynamic features of the lexicon retained.