Luck,Mystery and Supremacy: D. Z. Phillips Reads Nagel and Williams on Morality

This paper critically examines D. Z. Phillips’ critical examination of Nagel's and Williams's famous exchange about moral luck. It argues that Phillips fails properly to identify the fundamental issues at stake in the exchange – particularly with respect to the role of scepticism, of the picture of the will as an extensionless point, and of the putative supremacy of morality – and so fails to recognise a certain commonality of interest between himself and those he criticises.     

D.Z. Philips (ed.), Religion and Morality

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

`Reference' to D. Z. Phillips

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Theism,metaphysics, and D. Z. Phillips

Section I argues that theistic religions incorporate metaphysical systems and that these systems are explanatory. Section II defends these claims against D. Z. Phillips's objections to the epistemic realism and correspondence theory of truth which they imply. I conclude by raising questions about the status of Phillips's own project.     

D. Z. Phillips and reasonable belief

As an illustration of what Phillips called the “heterogeneity of sense,” this essay concentrates on differences in what is meant by a “reason for belief.” Sometimes saying that a belief is reasonable simply commends the belief’s unquestioned acceptance as a part of what we understand as a sensible outlook. Here the standard picture of justifying truth claims on evidential grounds breaks down; and it also breaks down in cases of fundamental moral and religious disagreement, where the basic beliefs that we hold affect our conception of what counts as a reliable ground of judgment. Phillips accepts the resultant variations in our conceptions of rational judgment as a part of logic, just as Wittgenstein did. All objective means of determining the truth or falsity of an assertion presume some underlying conceptual agreement about what counts as good judgment. This means that the possibility of objective justification is limited. But no pernicious relativism results from this view, for as Wittgenstein said, “After reason comes persuasion.” There is, moreover, a non-objective criterion of sorts in the moral and religious requirement that one be able to live with one’s commitments. In such cases, good judgment is still possible, but it differs markedly from the standard model of making rational inferences.     

D. Z. Phillips and Wittgenstein's On Certainty

I start from Phillips' discussion of Rhees's dissatisfaction with the idea of a language‐game. Then, from a rereading of Moore, I go on to exemplify interconnected uses of the expressions “language‐game,”“recurrent procedure,”“world‐picture,”“formal procedure,”“agreement in judgment,”“genre picture” and “form of life.” The discussion is related to sense perception, our knowledge of time and space, and the picture‐theory. These topics connect with Wittgenstein's earlier treatment of the will – which changed markedly later. The subtext (in footnotes) confronts (i) the sceptical methods of Descartes and Hume with the grammatical methods of Leibniz, Kant and Wittgenstein, and (ii) the realism of Leibniz and the Tractatus with the transcendental idealism of Kant. My conclusion is that, although the method of Wittgenstein's later work remains in a sense grammatical, (i) in its new form it can free us from the conviction that the intellect can and must resolve one way or the other the conflicts that arise in the course of the latter confrontation, and that (ii), although release from such a conviction is to be seen as the aim of philosophical discourse in general, it allows philosophy to retain its overriding significance. A positive element in that lies in the respect the method demands for that in a human life which is transcendental to the activity of scientific theorising: respect, therefore, for the unique perspective of the individual historical agent.     

D.Z. Phillips,Recovering Religious Concepts: Closing Epistemic Divides

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

D. Z. Phillips and Timothy Tessin (eds.), Philosophy of Religion in the 21st Century

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -