Whenis category learning holistic?

Ward and Scott (1987) recently provided evidence consistent with the idea that category learning can occur analytically whether that learning takes place under intentional or incidental conditions and whether the learner is an adult or a young child. Kemler Nelson (1988) raised concerns about Ward and Scott’s conclusions as well as about the logic of some of their arguments. Kemler Nelson also attempted to strengthen the argument that incidental learning conditions induce a less strategic approach to tasks, which necessarily results in a holistic mode of processing. The present paper answers Kemler Nelson’s concerns. It also presents arguments in favor of the idea that incidental learning is neither necessarily holistic nor necessarily analytic. It is argued that tasks, whether intentional or incidental, encourage the participant to process particular types of information. If the task encourages or demands the processing of separate features, then that type of information will be stored whether or not the participant was explicitly asked to learn the category membership of presented items. There are varieties of both intentional and incidental category learning, and what the learner does with the presented material is more important than his/her intent to learn. Furthermore, it is argued that the apparently discrepant results discussed by Kemler Nelson and Ward and Scott are all interpretable as specific cases within a more general episodic trace model of processing.     

Inhibition of irrelevant category–response mappings

When switching tasks, performance tends to be worse for n – 2 repetitions than with n – 2 switches. This n – 2 repetition cost has been hypothesized to reflect task-set inhibition: specifically, inhibition of irrelevant category–response mappings involved in response selection. This hypothesis leads to divergent predictions for situations in which all tasks involve the same stimulus categories: An n – 2 repetition cost is predicted when response sets differ across tasks, but not when the response set stays the same. The authors tested these predictions by having subjects perform relative judgements with different reference points. In Experiment 1, the stimulus categories were the same across reference points, but the response set either differed or stayed the same (the multiple- and single-mapping conditions, respectively). An n – 2 repetition cost was found in the multiple-mapping condition but not in the single-mapping condition. Experiment 2 provided evidence against the possibility that these divergent effects reflected differences in memory load. These findings confirm predictions that link n – 2 repetition costs to inhibition of irrelevant category–response mappings.     

Does category labeling lead to forgetting?

What effect does labeling an object as a member of a familiar category have on memory for that object? Recent studies suggest that recognition memory can be negatively impacted by categorizing objects during encoding. This paper examines the “representational shift hypothesis” which argues that categorizing an object impairs recognition memory by altering the trace of the encoded memory to be more similar to the category prototype. Previous evidence for this idea comes from experiments in which a basic-level category labeling task was compared to a non-category labeling incidental encoding task, usually a preference judgment (e.g., “Do you like this item?”). In two experiments, we examine alternative tasks that attempt to control for processing demands and the degree to which category information is explicitly recruited at the time of study. Contrary to the predictions of the representational shift hypothesis, we find no evidence that memory is selectively impaired by category labeling. Overall, the pattern of results across both studies appears consistent with well-established variables known to influence memory such as encoding specificity and distinctiveness effects.     

Is ‘human action’ A category?

It seems to have been taken for granted that we all know what a human action is. However in attempting to draw from what philosophers have said about actions the necessary clues as to their distinguishing features, one finds little to discourage the idea that there is no way of distinguishing one category of occurrences, human actions, from the complex of different sorts of things which happen. From this I am tempted to conclude that there is no category of human action. But before drawing such a conclusion an ancient but terrible question must be faced: What sorts of things happen in the world ? This ancient question is faced but not answered. It is brought up because the failure to find a satisfactory answer to the question, Is human action a category? is a failure even to find a satisfactory assumption about what kind of reference the term ‘human action’ is supposed to have.     

Are there representational shifts during category learning?

Early theories of categorization assumed that either rules, or prototypes, or exemplars were exclusively used to mentally represent categories of objects. More recently, hybrid theories of categorization have been proposed that variously combine these different forms of category representation. Our research addressed the question of whether there are representational shifts during category learning. We report a series of experiments that tracked how individual subjects generalized their acquired category knowledge to classifying new critical transfer items as a function of learning. Individual differences were observed in the generalization patterns exhibited by subjects, and those generalizations changed systematically with experience. Early in learning, subjects generalized on the basis of single diagnostic dimensions, consistent with the use of simple categorization rules. Later in learning, subjects generalized in a manner consistent with the use of similarity-based exemplar retrieval, attending to multiple stimulus dimensions. Theoretical modeling was used to formally corroborate these empirical observations by comparing fits of rule, prototype, and exemplar models to the observed categorization data. Although we provide strong evidence for shifts in the kind of information used to classify objects as a function of categorization experience, interpreting these results in terms of shifts in representational systems underlying perceptual categorization is a far thornier issue. We provide a discussion of the challenges of making claims about category representation, making reference to a wide body of literature suggesting different kinds of representational systems in perceptual categorization and related domains of human cognition.     

Two pathways to stimulus encoding in category learning?

Category learning theorists tacitly assume that stimuli are encoded by a single pathway. Motivated by theories of object recognition, we evaluated a dual-pathway account of stimulus encoding. The part-based pathway establishes mappings between sensory input and symbols that encode discrete stimulus features, whereas the image-based pathway applies holistic templates to sensory input. Our experiments used rule-plus-exception structures, in which one exception item in each category violates a salient regularity and must be distinguished from other items. In Experiment 1, we found discrete representations to be crucial for recognition of exceptions following brief training. Experiments 2 and 3 involved multisession training regimens designed to encourage either part- or image-based encoding. We found that both pathways are able to support exception encoding, but have unique characteristics. We speculate that one advantage of the part-based pathway is the ability to generalize across domains, whereas the image-based pathway provides faster and more effortless recognition.     

Information–integration category learning and the human uncertainty response

The human response to uncertainty has been well studied in tasks requiring attention and declarative memory systems. However, uncertainty monitoring and control have not been studied in multi-dimensional, information-integration categorization tasks that rely on non-declarative procedural memory. Three experiments are described that investigated the human uncertainty response in such tasks. Experiment 1 showed that following standard categorization training, uncertainty responding was similar in information-integration tasks and rule-based tasks requiring declarative memory. In Experiment 2, however, uncertainty responding in untrained information-integration tasks impaired the ability of many participants to master those tasks. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that the deficit observed in Experiment 2 was not because of the uncertainty response option per se, but rather because the uncertainty response provided participants a mechanism via which to eliminate stimuli that were inconsistent with a simple declarative response strategy. These results are considered in the light of recent models of category learning and metacognition.     

Inflated and contradictory category naming deficits in Alzheimer's disease?

Although some studies have documented category-specific deficits in patients with Alzheimer's disease, others have not. One possible reason is that where control groups have been used in previous studies, they have performed at ceiling; and this may spuriously affect the incidence and type of deficit reported (especially with common statistical techniques such as z-scores). We examined this issue in 18 Alzheimer's patients and 26 elderly controls, who named two picture sets: a simple set that typically produces ceiling effects (Set 1) and one that produces a normal distribution in controls (Set 2). Sets 1 and 2 produced inconsistent and even contradictory deficits in the same patients. The results also show that ceiling effects may inflate the number of living thing deficits and hence, distort the reported ratio of living to nonliving cases.     

How semantic category modulates preschool children’s visual memory

The dynamic interplay between perception and memory has been explored in preschool children by presenting filtered stimuli regarding animals and artifacts. The identification of filtered images was markedly influenced by both prior exposure and the semantic nature of the stimuli. The identification of animals required less physical information than artifacts did. Our results corroborate the notion that the human attention system evolves to reliably develop definite category-specific selection criteria by which living entities are monitored in different ways.     

Abusive relationships: Is a new category for traumatization needed?

The concept of a spectrum of posttraumatic disorders has been postulated by a variety of major contributors to the field of psychotraumatology. Although Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is one trauma-based mental health disorder, there are other posttraumatic illnesses that do not qualify for PTSD, nor are they accurately described by other diagnostic categories in the DSM-IV. The present paper proposes and delineates a new syndrome, entitled Posttraumatic Relationship Syndrome (PTRS), which is a function of the experience of trauma in the context of an emotionally intimate relationship. It differs from PTSD in four fundamental ways: (1) the nature of the Stressor criterion; (2) the response to the Stressor; (3) the inclusion of a category of relational symptoms; and (4) the way of coping with the trauma (i.e., it lacks the emotional numbing and avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma). The latter is the most salient difference as it involves a qualitatively different experience of the “world of trauma”-a primarily conscious experience in PTRS and an often unconscious experience in PTSD.     

What does it take to implicitly prime low-frequency category exemplars?

Prominent views of implicit priming agree that repetition of category exemplars should increase the probability of the exemplar coming to mind on a category production test. This prediction has been borne out in the data of numerous experiments that have used relatively high-frequency exemplars, but experiments that have used lower frequency exemplars have reported reduced or no priming on category production tests. Frameworks of memory disagree on why frequency would affect priming. The authors report 3 experiments, the first of which shows no priming of low-frequency exemplars under circumstances that yield priming of higher frequency instances. The second 2 experiments show that low-frequency instances can be primed, but the prior experience must bias the comprehension of the category label, not the exemplar.     

Abusive relationships: Is a new category for traumatization needed?

The concept of a spectrum of posttraumatic disorders has been postulated by a variety of major contributors to the field of psychotraumatology. Although Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is one trauma-based mental health disorder, there are other posttraumatic illnesses that do not qualify for PTSD, nor are they accurately described by other diagnostic categories in the DSM-IV. The present paper proposes and delineates a new syndrome, entitled Posttraumatic Relationship Syndrome (PTRS), which is a function of the experience of trauma in the context of an emotionally intimate relationship. It differs from PTSD in four fundamental ways: (1) the nature of the Stressor criterion; (2) the response to the Stressor; (3) the inclusion of a category of relational symptoms; and (4) the way of coping with the trauma (i.e., it lacks the emotional numbing and avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma). The latter is the most salient difference as it involves a qualitatively different experience of the “world of trauma”-a primarily conscious experience in PTRS and an often unconscious experience in PTSD.     

BatMon II: Children’s category norms for 33 categories

Four hundred forty-eight children 3–12 years of age generated category exemplars for 33 distinct categories. The percentage of the participants reporting each exemplar, the percentage of the participants reporting each exemplar first, the percentage of the participants reporting each exemplar across age groups (3–5 years, 6–8 years, and 9–12 years), and the mean rank of each exemplar are presented. A full version of the 29 category norms may be downloaded from www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

On the “absoluteness” of category and magnitude scales of pain

The concept of “absolute scaling” (Zwislocki & Goodman, 1980) implies that direct judgments of sensory magnitude not only reflect the relative positions of the stimuli being judged, but also permit us to assess level differences in sensation. In order to explore this notion for different scaling methods, in the present investigation we compared magnitude estimation with category partitioning, a verbally anchored categorization procedure, in scaling painful pressure stimuli covering different intensity ranges. The results indicate that when the same stimulus range was presented after 1 week, both methods appeared to be highly reliable, with category partitioning faring somewhat better than magnitude estimation. When the stimulus range was unobtrusively changed between sessions, both methods reflected the within-subjects shift in absolute level. When two different sets of subjects judged the slightly different stimulus ranges, both methods resulted in scale values consistent with absolute scaling, though only category partitioning was sensitive enough to differentiate the two stimulus ranges. The results are discussed in the context of different possibilities of anchoring direct scaling methods in order to obtain “absolute” level information.     

The development of category learning strategies: What makes the difference?

Category learning can be achieved by identifying common features among category members, distinctive features among non-members, or both. These processes are psychologically and computationally distinct, and may have implications for the acquisition of categories at different hierarchical levels. The present study examines an account of children’s difficulty in acquiring categories at the subordinate level grounded on these distinct comparison processes. Adults and children performed category learning tasks in which they were exposed either to pairs of objects from the same novel category or pairs of objects from different categories. The objects were designed so that for each category learning task, two features determined category membership whereas two other features were task irrelevant. In the learning stage participants compared pairs of objects noted to be either from the same category or from different categories. Object pairs were chosen so that the objective amount of information provided to the participants was identical in the two learning conditions. We found that when presented only with object pairs noted to be from the same category, young children (6 ? YO ? 9.5) learned the novel categories just as well as older children (10 ? YO ? 14) and adults. However, when presented only with object pairs known to be from different categories, unlike older children and adults, young children failed to learn the novel categories. We discuss cognitive and computational factors that may give rise to this comparison bias, as well as its expected outcomes.     

Five-year-olds’ beliefs about the discreteness of category boundaries for animals and artifacts

Research on adult concepts indicates that category structure varies by domain; adults view membership in animal categories as absolute but membership in artifact categories as graded. In this study, we examined domain differences in beliefs about category boundaries among young children (5-year-olds). The results indicated that young children, like adults, were less likely to endorse graded category membership for animal than for artifact categories. These domain differences could not be attributed to domain differences in typicality. Implications for conceptual development and for models of domain specificity in adult cognition are discussed.     

Induction with uncertain categories: When do people consider the category alternatives?

These three experiments examined how people make property inferences about exemplars whose category membership is uncertain. Participants were shown two categories and a novel exemplar with a feature that indicated that the exemplar was more likely to belong to one category (target) than to the other (nontarget). Participants then made categorization decisions and property inferences about the novel exemplar. In some conditions, property inferences could be made only by considering both target and nontarget categories. In other conditions, predictions could be based on both categories or on the target category alone. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Murphy & Ross, 1994, 2005), we found that many people made predictions based only on consideration of the target category. However, the prevalence of such single-category reasoning was greatly reduced by highlighting the costs of neglecting nontarget alternatives and by asking for inferences before categorization decisions. The results suggest that previous work may have exaggerated the prevalence of single-category reasoning and that people may be more flexible in their use of multiple categories in property inference than has been previously recognized.     

Holistic movement practices – An emerging category of physical activity for exercise psychology

BackgroundExercise psychology has an interest in physical activity behaviour and the psychological dimensions of physical activity delivery and outcomes. Holistic movement practices (HMPs) can be defined as physical practices embedded in holistic philosophies of well-being. As such, they go beyond what is typically offered in exercise contexts to purposefully include mental, emotional, social and/or spiritual components. Traditional Eastern movement practices (e.g., Yoga, Tai Chi, Qigong) are examples of HMPs, but a range of lesser known “Western-born” HMPs (e.g., 5Rhythms, Biodanza) also exist. HMPs have not yet received much structured attention within exercise psychology.ObjectiveTo analyse the nature of HMPs and discuss their relevance to the field of exercise psychology, with a view to raising awareness of HMPs within exercise psychology as well as encouraging and supporting future research.ContentWe discuss what we see as commonalities among HMPs and argue that it is useful to treat HMPs as a category of physical activity for exercise psychology, not only because they are forms of physical activity but also because psychological dimensions are an integral and purposeful part of these practices. We provide a tentative conceptualization of HMP philosophies, with brief examples, and consider how exercise psychology's subfields of participation behaviour, delivery parameters, outcomes, and mechanisms are applicable to the study of HMPs. Last, we briefly explore research issues, including HMPs' multicomponent nature, selected potential mechanisms, and methodologies.ConclusionHMPs are part of the leisure-based physical activities landscape in many modern societies, and deserve attention by exercise psychologists. Their embeddedness in holistic philosophies and multicomponent nature provide unique opportunities and challenges for research in exercise psychology.