Psychology,progress, and the problem of reflexivity: A study in the epistemological foundations of psychology

Buss's thesis that, throughout the history of psychology, psychological theories have alternated between two contradictory models of human nature is examined and supported. One model sees humans as actively constructing themselves; the other model sees humans as constructed from the outside. The thesis that the inherent reflexive quality of psychological inquiry is the cause of this alternation is then examined. Three different hypotheses as to how “reflexivity” might explain this alternation are offered. Finally, brief attention is given to the question of whether psychology can be seen as progressing if it is as philosophically indecisive as the analysis suggests.     

Knowledge of Rules,Causal Systematicity,and the Language of Thought

Martin Davies' criterion for the knowledge of implicit rules, viz. the causal systematicity of cognitive processes, is first exposed. Then the inference from causal systematicity of a process to syntactic properties of the input states is examined. It is argued that Davies' notion of a syntactic property is too weak to bear the conclusion that causal systematicity implies a language of thought as far as the input states are concerned. Next, it is shown that Davies' criterion leads to a counterintuitive consequence: it groups together distributed connectionist systems with look-up tables. To avoid this consequence, a modified construal of causal systematicity is proposed and Davies' argument for the causal systematicity of thought is shown to be question-begging. It is briefly sketched how the modified construal links up with multiple dispositions of the same categorical base. Finally, the question of the causal efficacy of single rules is distinguished from the question of their psychological reality: implicit rules might be psychologically real without being causally efficacious. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The theory of meaning and some related theories of the learning of language

There are two basically different sorts of theory of meaning and the sort of theory one adopts has a great deal to do with the view one takes of the learning of language. Corresponding to the two kinds of theory of meaning two theories of the learning of language are delineated and the issues that are disputed by them clarified. The logical question of whether each theory is intelligible in itself is first discussed, and, it being concluded that both are genuine empirical hypotheses, an examination is made of psychological grounds for preferring one or the other. While no final decision is arrived at, it is argued that there are grounds for preferring one of the theories.     

Children's understanding of the pretence–reality distinction: a review of current theory and evidence

This paper provides an update on the current status of theory and evidence relating to children's understanding of the pretence–reality distinction. The paper starts by highlighting the striking paradox between children's early competence in pretence and their experiences of pretence–reality confusions as late as middle childhood. This is followed by a detailed review of various theories that have been offered to explain this phenomenon. Specifically, theories attributing the paradoxical findings to methodological differences between studies are reviewed and dismissed before considering the transmigration and availability hypotheses ( Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall & Harmer, 1991 ; Johnson & Harris, 1994 ), the role of context and the child's emotional involvement in the pretence, and the pretence continuation account ( Golomb & Galasso, 1995 ). It is argued that none of these theories alone can explain pretence–reality confusions and that these are best explained in terms of the combined influences of cognitive availability, empirical evidence of reality, context, affect and individual differences. Further research is necessary to fully explore the nature, cause and developmental trajectory of individual differences in this domain.     

The ‘romance of teams’: Toward an understanding of its psychological underpinnings and implications

Although advocates of teamwork suggest that teams enhance performance, empirical evidence does not consistently, or robustly, support these claims. Still, a belief in the effectiveness of teams—among managers, employees, and the general lay population—seems very strong. What accounts for this ‘romance of teams’? In this paper, we offer a psychological answer to this question. We review evidence regarding the actual effectiveness of teams, in order to show that teams are not as effective as many believe them to be, and we argue that the romance of teams stems from the psychological benefits of group‐based activity. Specifically, we propose that team members experience both social‐emotional, and competence‐related, benefits, and we review an eclectic mix of research in support of this claim. We argue that these psychological benefits of teams lead people to assume that teams are ‘high performance’, thus, causing the romance of teams. Finally, we discuss potential implications of the romance for organizations, researchers, and employees.     

The Benefits of Benevolence: Basic Psychological Needs,Beneficence, and the Enhancement of Well‐Being

Pro‐social behaviors have been associated with enhanced well‐being, but what psychological mechanisms explain this connection? Some theories suggest that beneficence—the sense of being able to give—inherently improves well‐being, whereas evidence from self‐determination theory (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010) shows that increases in well‐being are mediated by satisfaction of innate psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Here we simultaneously assess these two explanations. Study 1 (N = 335) used a cross‐sectional survey with an Internet sample to develop a measure to assess beneficence satisfaction. The next two cross‐sectional Internet‐sample studies tested mediators between pro‐social behavior and general well‐being (Study 2, N = 332) and situational peak moment well‐being (Study 3, N = 180). A fourth study (N = 85) used a diary method with university students to assess daily fluctuations in well‐being associated with needs and beneficence. It was shown across all studies that both the three psychological needs and beneficence satisfaction mediate the relations between pro‐social actions and well‐being, with all four factors emerging as independent predictors. Together, these studies underscore the role of autonomy, competence, and relatedness in explaining the well‐being benefits of benevolence, and they also point to the independent role of beneficence as a source of human wellness.     

Basic emotions,rationality, and folk theory

Abstract

Answering the question of whether there are basic emotions requires considering the functions of emotions. We propose that just a few emotions are basic and that they have functions in managing action. When no fully rational solution is available for a problem of action, a basic emotion functions to prompt us in a direction that is better than a random choice. We contrast this kind of theory with a componential approach which we argue is either a version of the theory of basic emotions or else leads to the doctrine that emotions are mistaken tenets of folk psychology. We defend the psychological reality of the folk theory of emotions, and we argue that universal basic emotions make it possible to understand people from distant cultures, and to translate emotional terminology from one language to another. Finally, we show how theories of basic emotions can be tested, and indicate the kinds of empirical result that can bear on the issue.     

Divorce and the Multidimensionality of Men and Women’s Mental Health: The Role of Social-Relational and Socio-Economic Conditions

Research consistently reveals that the divorced generally face more mental health problems than the married. Less attention however has been paid to positive mental health indicators. Insight in these however may help policy makers and care providers to see both the broader picture and stimulate active coping. Using data from the European Social Survey (2006–2007), differences in both feelings of depression, and in feelings of self-esteem, autonomy, and competence between the married (N?=?14,072) and divorced (N?=?4,304) are estimated for women and men separately. Drawing on stress and coping theories, we map how specific social-relational and socio-economic conditions relate. Analyses reveal that divorce is related not only to more feelings of depression, but also to lower levels of self-esteem and competence. Difference scores in mental health based on marital status are also found to differ significantly between men and women for competence, with the difference being more pronounced in men. Additionally, social-relational and socio-economic conditions explain much of the gap in depression scores—and to a lesser extent, in self-esteem and competence scores—between the married and divorced. Finally, some interesting gender differences were found in how social-relational and socio-economic conditions relate to mental health when divorced, with women especially seeming to benefit from advantageous socio-economic conditions.     

The Mediational Role of Perceived Competence in Psychological Adjustment to Rheumatoid Arthritis1

Chronic illnesses such as rheumatoid arthritis (RA) have been linked to poor psychological adjustment, although individual differences in this relationship have been observed. This study examines the role of perceived competence as a mediator between RA and adjustment. Persons with RA (N= 208) were surveyed three times at 6-month intervals concerning several potential antecedents of adjustment (pain, psychosocial impairment, social support, and control beliefs), self-perceived level of competence, and level of adjustment (life satisfaction and depressive symptomatology). Within each observational period strong evidence was obtained for perceived competence as a mediator of adjustment. Longitudinally (across the year) the data were consistent with a mediational model, but strong evidence establishing mediation was not obtained. Implications of these findings, and the importance of examining the role of perceived competence in adaptation to chronic illness, are discussed.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Recursive Ontology</Emphasis>: A Systemic Theory of Reality

The article introduces recursive ontology, a general ontology which aims to describe how being is organized and what are the processes that drive it. In order to answer those questions, I use a multidisciplinary approach that combines the theory of levels, philosophy and systems theory. The main claim of recursive ontology is that being is the product of a single recursive process of generation that builds up all of reality in a hierarchical fashion from fundamental physical particles to human societies. To support this assumption, I provide the general laws and the basic principles of recursive ontology as well as a semi-formalised model of the theory based on a recursive generative grammar. Recursive ontology not only actively promotes a multidisciplinary investigation of reality, but also can be used as a general framework to develop future domain-specific theories.     

The Social Construction of Unreality: A Case Study of a Family''s Attribution of Competence to a Severely Retarded Child

Some families develop unusual or extreme versions of reality and sustain them in the face of a torrent of ostensibly discrediting and disconfirming information. Although the psychological dynamics and functions of such shared constructions have been amply considered, little is known about the routine transactions through which these unusual versions of reality are created and maintained. This paper examines the "reality work" of a family that attributed high levels of performance and competence to the severely retarded youngest child. Observation of videotaped interaction between family members and the child revealed practices that presupposed, "documented," and sustained the family's version of the child's competence. The practices are similar to those characteristic of interaction between adults and preverbal children. The implications of this similarity for the analysis of cases of folie à famille are discussed.     

Psychological risk factors in cardiovascular diseases

Recent research has shown that psychological risk factors play an important role in the pathogenesis of cardiovascular diseases. The so-called ‘coronary prone behaviour pattern’ predominates, an important part of which is the ‘Type A behaviour pattern’. This is characterized by a marked ambition, a constant feeling of being under pressure, due to latent aggression and to a striving to dominate. For cerebrovascular diseases the so-called ‘pressured pattern’ as a risk factor has been found to be typical which is comparable to the Type A behaviour. Psychological risk factors and their components are not equally important for different vascular diseases. Besides the explanation of the question as to how far psychological processes really are involved in the development of vascular diseases, the research on psychological risk factors serves as a foundation for psychosomatic theories.     

A Moderate Eclecticism: Ontological and Epistemological Issues

The principle of eclecticism is discussed with the point of departure in a definition of psychology and its subject areas. It is argued that eclecticism constitutes one of the key developmental conditions for science. The argument begins with an analysis of the distinction between real and recognized object and concludes that a scientific object always has an infinite number of aspects and that this fact is not reducible to a question of complexity. Next a differentiation between theoretical levels based on ontological arguments are introduced and it is concluded that it is necessary to accept positive eclectic processes in theories, and that development of theories is due to an eclectic relationship with other theories. A series of examples are given for different versions of the eclectic development of psychological disciplines and concepts, namely phenomenology, psychoanalysis, stress, and cognition.     

Apology in the criminal justice setting: evidence for including apology as an additional component in the legal system

The criminal justice system has reached unprecedented scope in the United States, with over 6.4 million people under some type of supervision. Remedies that have the potential to reduce this number are continually being sought. This article analyzes an innovative strategy currently being reconsidered in criminal justice: the apology. Despite a legal system that only sporadically acknowledges it, evidence for the use of apology is supported by social science research, current criminal justice theories, case law, and empirical studies. Social psychological, sociological and socio-legal studies pinpoint the elements and function of apology, what makes apologies effective, and concerns about apology if it were implemented in the criminal justice system. Theoretical evidence is examined (including restorative justice, therapeutic jurisprudence, crime, shame, and reintegration) to explore the process of apology in the criminal justice context. Attribution theory and social conduct theory are used to explain the apology process specifically for victims and offenders. A brief examination of case law reveals that though apology has no formal place in criminal law, it has surfaced recently under the federal sentencing guidelines. Finally, empirical evidence in criminal justice settings reveals that offenders want to apologize and victims desire an apology. Moreover, by directly addressing the harmful act, apology may be the link to reduced recidivism for offenders, as well as empowerment for victims. This evidence combined suggests that apology is worthy of further study as a potentially valuable addition to the criminal justice process.     

Has Artificial Intelligence Contributed to an Understanding of the Human Mind?: A Critique of Arguments For and Against

This essay examines arguments for and against the proposition that Artificial Intelligence (AI) research makes an important contribution to the understanding of the human mind. A number of recent articles have seemed to question the value of Al ideas in specific domains (e.g., language. mental imagery, problem solving). In the present paper, it is argued that the real disagreement concerns the form of a scientific psychology. The critics of Artificial Intelligence believe that many acceptable psychological theories exist and the important task of the scientist is to show that certain of these theories are true. They criticize AI research because it has not produced theories whose adequacy can be tested by empirical research. The supporters of AI research believe that no adequate psychological theories exist. They claim that the important task is to develop adequate theories and until such theories have been constructed, it is pointless to worry about empirical tests. A number of major arguments attacking and defending AI research are examined in order to illustrate that the real issue is methodological. It is concluded that the present debate is counterproductive since both sides assume that the methodological premise of the other side is wrong without attempting to refute it. A more constructive debate would address directly the more fundamental question of what methods offer the greatest promise of solving the major problems of psychology.     

THE CHARACTER OF VIRTUE: ANSWERING THE SITUATIONIST CHALLENGE TO VIRTUE ETHICS

Neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics makes essential reference to the notion of a stable, robust character‐trait. It also claims to be constrained by at least a minimal degree of psychological realism. Recent developments in empirical psychology have drawn into question the evidence for the existence of such robust traits, arguing that it rests on what has been called a ‘fundamental attribution error’. Virtue ethics has thus seemingly been made vulnerable to criticisms that it is essentially dependent on an erroneous, folk‐psychological, notion of character and, so, must either abandon their characteristic notion of virtue or forego any pretensions to psychological realism. I develop a two‐pronged response to this objection. First, I argue that there is reason to question much of the empirical evidence and that such evidence as does exist can easily be accommodated by virtue ethics. Next, I argue that even if we allow that neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethical theories does sometimes presuppose a stronger conception of character‐traits than is warranted by the evidence, this does not significantly undermine the virtue ethicist's project.     

Examining the role of psychological need satisfaction in sleep: A Self-Determination Theory perspective

Although ample research has shown the satisfaction of the basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness, as defined within Self-Determination Theory, to be related to well-being, the relation with sleep-related functioning has not yet been examined. Hence, the present study explored the association between basic psychological need satisfaction and subjective measures of sleep and daytime dysfunction, as well as the explanatory role of need satisfaction in the relation between mindfulness and financial strain and these outcomes, in an adult sample (N = 215, 61% female; Mean age = 31). The results indicated that low psychological need satisfaction related to poor sleep quality, lower sleep quantity, and more daytime dysfunction. Finally, mindfulness and financial strain related, respectively, negatively and positively to poor sleep quality and daytime dysfunction through need satisfaction, suggesting that need satisfaction represents a critical explanatory mechanism. The role of psychological need satisfaction in the adequate regulation and satisfaction of the physiological need for sleep is discussed.     

Zero-variable theories in the analysis of social phenomena

Are the background and context of complex social behaviour neglected in theory-building? This sweeping question is handled here in a highly specific way. First, the character of the everyday ‘explainer's’ theories is examined, and it is found that the explainer's accounts of social behaviour can go in different directions. These directions, which are regarded here as opposite ends of a continuum, are: (1) the explainer takes into account the manifold personal and contextual factors that bear on psychological accompaniments of behaviour; (2) the person whose behaviour is to be explained is first categorized (e.g. ‘aggressive type’), whereby reference to the category then serves as the explanation. While an optimistic view of progress in psychological theorizing (cf. Lewin, 1931; Wegner and Vallacher, 1977) would lead one to think that the scientific psychologist would steer away from such simplified, ‘aggressive type’ explanations, a glance at widespread, current accounts of complex social behaviour reveals that these modes of explaining are indeed a dominant mode. The primary aspects of this paper are then devoted to several observations on this direction of theorizing, and it is proposed that such theorizing (a) reduces one's theory to a list of behaviours; (b) results in no antecedent, psychological variables; (c) depends on a trivial, circular form of research for support; (d) develops in the direction of trying to claim all of the variation within the behaviour realm being studied; and (e) precludes theoretical integration, in that the criterion of success within such endeavours is the uniqueness of the theorist's own classification system.