Moral Expertise?: Constitutional Narratives and Philosophical Argument

Using the bench trial of Colorado's Amendment 2 as an example, this article focuses on the more general question of expert testimony in moral philosophy. It argues that there is indeed expertise in moral philosophy but argues against admitting such expert testimony in cases dealing with what John Rawls terms "constitutional essentials" and 'matters of basic justice." Developing the idea of public reason inherent in the Rawlsian concept of political liberalism, the article argues that philosophers can and should speak out on public issues, if they do so with due respect for certain restrictions, but that they should not serve as expert witnesses on core constitutional questions, since doing so suggests that they claim a type of authority that would require fellow citizens to defer to their views. Such claims to authority in basic ethical matters threaten the mutual respect for divergent comprehensive doctrines that lies at the core of political liberalism. Philosophers have a duty to serve the public good, and they perform this service in fruitful ways. But they should refuse a public role that appears incompatible with equal respect for the committed ethical searching of their fellow citizens.     

Constitutional causes for technological leadership: Why Europe?

In a paper circulated toward the end of 1997 under the title “Why Europe?,” Gordon Tullock posed a simple question and provided a tentative, yet provocative answer. The question is why the technological takeoff took place in Europe when well into the eighteenth century other areas of the world, notably China, looked much better poised for technological and scholarly leadership than Europe. His tentative answer turns on the constitutional composition of the landscape of political entities in Europe. This essay provides further underpinnings to Gordon Tullock’s preliminary answer.     

Human Rights – Internationally Established Standards as Challenged by Constitutional Policies

Studies in East European Thought -     

The Incoherence of the Patriotic State: A Critique of ‘Constitutional Patriotism’

Habermas proposes a new solution to the problematic relation between republican values and democracy. He asserts that a new model of social cohesion is needed and he suggests that the sense of community in a democratic society should be founded exclusively on the acceptance and support of a system of constitutionally established rules which are the logical result of the historical evolution of constitution-making. He argues that an account of the constitutional process which led to the formation of the modern republican state should provide the criteria for a rational set of norms which will exclude nationalism from the political arena. In this article, I point out the democratic hazards and the internal incoherence of Habermass alternative to the national state and I argue that a theoretical substitute should consider the existence of national identities as one of the aspects of modern pluralistic society.I should like to thank Zenon Bankowski, Bob Brecher, Emilios Christodoulidis, Alasdair Fay, Peter Fitzpatrick, Stefania Morandini, Rick Mohr and Res Publicas anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.