Equality, Priority and Social Justice

The moral principle of giving greater priority to benefiting people, the less well off they are, has been thought by some to share the plausibility of egalitarianism whilst avoiding the less plausible implications of the latter. This paper argues that the 'priority' principle does have an authentic place in our moral thinking, and that it is distinct from the idea of 'equality', but that the latter also has an indispensible role to play. The idea of 'priority'has its place as the expression of the moral standpoint of benevolent and sympathetic concern. 'Equality', in contrast, functions as a conception of social justice, from which it cannot be displaced by the idea of 'priority'.     

Criteria of Justice: Desert,Needs and Equality

The conception of social justice as equality is defended in this paper by examining what may appear to be two inegalitarian conceptions of justice, as distribution according to desert and as distribution according to need. It is argued that claims of just entitlement arise within a context of reciprocal co-operation for mutual benefit. Within such a context there are special cases where it can be said that those who contribute more deserve more, and that those who need more should get more, but those claims themselves presuppose a norm of equal contribution and equal benefit. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Security,Profiling and Equality

How, exactly, must we strike the balance between security and equality? Must we insist, out of respect for the equality of persons, that the police refrain from using ethnic profiling and opt for some other strategy in their pursuit of terrorists, or must we allow the police to continue with this policy, which seems to sacrifice equality for the sake of security? This paper assesses the ethical status of ethnic profiling from the perspective of the ideal of equality. The paper shows how the ethical status of ethnic profiling changes depending on how exactly we specify the egalitarian ideal. Furthermore, it argues that on a plausible interpretation of the ideal of equality, ethnic profiling is not in principle objectionable.     

Equality, Envy, and the Sense of Injustice

This paper attempts to defend the value of equality against the accusation that it is an expression of irrational and disreputable feelings of envy of those who are better off. It draws on Rawls' account of the sense of justice to suggest that resentment of inequalities may be a proper resentment of injustice. The case of resentment of 'free riders' is taken as one plausible example of a justified resentment of those who benefit unfairly from a scheme of cooperation. Further examples then link the case of the free rider to other cases of unjust inequalities which are the appropriate objects of resentment and indignation.     

正义感及其进化论解释——从罗尔斯的正义感思想谈起

正义感是有助于人类合作的道德情感,但它并不是一种单一性的概念,而是复合性的,它至少包含了感激、愤恨、负罪与义愤,这些情感具有不同的进化机制,因此,对正义感起源的解释也就并非某种单一的进化论模式可以应付,不同的道德情感可能适用于不同的进化论解释模式,这才是理解正义感起源的科学态度.     

Equality, Justice, and Paternalism: Recentreing Debate about Physician-Assisted Suicide

abstract   Debate about physician-assisted suicide has typically focused on the values of autonomy and patient wellbeing. This is understandable, even reasonable, given the import-ance of these values in bioethics. However, these are not the only moral values there are. The purpose of this paper is to examine physician-assisted suicide on the basis of the values of equality and justice. In particular, I will evaluate two arguments that invoke equality, one in favour of physician-assisted suicide, one against it, and I will eventually argue that a convincing equality-based argument in support of physician-assisted suicide is available. I will conclude by showing how an equality-based perspective transforms some secondary features of debate about this issue.     

The Sense and Sensibility of Equality

The idea of equality in political thought is often approached from a distributive perspective that entails a rethinking of institutional arrangements. In this paper I present an approach to conceived as a complement to the common institutional approach in liberal theory. The foundational claim is that blacks do not come into view for a wide range of people as worthy of full human recognition, that is, persons in possession of human vulnerabilities that require responses and in possession of warrants to rights that demand respect. The central argument is that this problem of diminished social value can be addressed by imagination and that imagination is crucially important to bridge the experiential divide between white and black Americans. I deploy two ideas I claim are essential for leveraging imagination: attentiveness and skill. When we are attentive we provide the imagination range to sense the more difficult aspects of others’ lives under inequality; when we are skilled we deploy a finer sensibility in taking the proper ethical stance towards others’ experiential difficulties under a regime of racial inequality. To achieve this, I provide a schematic of three pairs of concepts that provide a foundation though not full accounting of the necessary skills in response to ethical challenges: narrative/receptivity, reasons/responsibility, affect/compassion.     

论积极守法

长期以来,人们一直将守法等同于服从,实际上这只是守法的消极层面,守法更深层次的意义还包括维护法律、积极行使法定权利,信仰和尊重法律,即积极守法.然而当今社会守法行为普遍流于消极,最主要的原因就是正义感在守法者方面的日益沦落.法律若想获得有效实现,必须依赖正义感来表达和支撑.     

Making Attentive Citizens: The Ethics of Democratic Engagement,Political Equality,and Social Justice

Much discussion of the ethics of participation focuses on electoral participation and whether citizens are obligated or can be coerced to vote. Yet these debates have ignored that citizens must first pay attention to politics and make up their minds about where they stand before they can engage in any form of participation. This article considers the importance for liberal democracy of citizens paying attention to politics, or attentive citizenship. It argues that the democratic state has an obligation to cultivate interest in politics and that this obligation authorizes means up to and including some forms of coercion. The argument is that when citizens are inattentive to politics, it undermines political equality and social justice because it undermines what John Rawls called the fair value of the political liberties. The importance of these ends for liberal democratic states requires them to take steps to promote attentive citizenship.     

Citizens' Sense of Justice and the Legal System

When an actor commits a wrong action, citizens have perceptions of the kind of responsibility the actor incurs, the degree to which the act was mitigated or justified, and the appropriate punishment for the actor. The legislatively mandated law of criminal courts, statutes, and criminal codes deals with the same issues. Experimental evidence shows that there are important discrepancies between the principles that people and legal codes use to assign responsibility. That is, the moral retributive-justice principles that people use are sometimes in conflict with the directions in which modern code drafters are taking criminal law. These discrepancies may cause citizens to feel alienated from authority, and to reduce their voluntary compliance with legal codes.     

Friendship, Justice, and Aristotle: Some Reasons to Be Sceptical

It is sometimes held that modern institutionally-focussed conceptions of social justice are lacking in one essential respect: they ignore the importance of civic friendship or solidarity. It is also, typically simultaneously, held that Aristotle’s thought provides a fertile ground for elucidating an account of civic friendship. I argue, first, that Aristotle is no help on this score: he has no conception of distinctively civic friendship. I then go on to argue that the Kantian distinction between perfect and imperfect duties is more useful than talk of civic friendship in capturing the non-institutional demands of social justice.     

A Meaningful Intercourse: Some Thoughts about Thinking

This article traces the development of ideas about consciousness, symbolisation, thinking and affects in the works of Freud, Bion, Meltzer and Stern. Consciousness is viewed as a special quality of psychic functions and therefore related to the complexity of the world of experience, to its different dimensions as Meltzer describes them. Freud's initial idea about direct and reproductive thinking and a compulsion to associate returns in Bions development of an epistemological instinct and are referred to by Stern as an ongoing, omnipresent milieu of thoughts in which instinctual life takes place. Bion develops Freud's thinking of unpleasure, primary and secondary processes, when he formulates the difference between pain and suffering, which also makes it possible for him to develop Freud's views on symbol formation. Bion's grid describes the relation between different forms of symbols and makes it possible to understand the importance of the reverie of the mother and how a feeling of meaning unfolds, when symbol formation takes place in a process in which the individual is in contact with the underlying structure. These ideas are in its turn developed in another direction by Stern in his theories of a pre-narrative envelope. Freud's ideas about perceptual identity and thought identity as a criteria for the release of motor activity are looked upon as a criteria for truth, which returns in Bion's ideas about the relation between truth and the development of the capacity to think. Meltzer takes up this thread when he claims that truth is beauty and beauty truth.