An Indirect Argument for Strategic Voting

abstract   A common bit of public political wisdom advises that in certain three-way elections, one should cast a strategic vote for one of the top two candidates rather than a conscience-driven vote for a third candidate, since doing otherwise amounts to 'throwing one's vote away'. In this paper, I examine the possible justifications for this pragmatic advice to vote strategically. I argue that the most direct argument behind such advice fails to motivate strategic voting in large-scale elections, since there is no significant chance that one's own vote will alter the outcome of the election, even in plausible close-call cases. In short, the lack of probable pragmatic effect undermines the pragmatic motivation for altering one's baseline voting behavior. However, an indirect argument succeeds in motivating strategic voting in some scenarios. Such an indirect argument relies on the possibility of one acquiring an obligation to engage in public strategic campaigning for one of the top two candidates. In many cases in which one strategically campaigns, one will, indirectly, acquire an obligation to vote strategically in accord with one's prior public campaign activities. Thus, the common bit of political wisdom about strategic voting can be justified, though only indirectly.     

Intelligent-Design Theory: An Argument for Biotic Laws

A central thesis of intelligent‐design theorists is that physical and chemical laws and chance are insufficient to account for irreducibly complex biological structures and that intelligent design is necessary to account for such phenomena. This assertion, however, still implies a reductionist ontology. We need to recognize that reality displays multiple modes of being beyond simply chemical and physical modes of being, each of which is governed by laws for that mode of being. This essay argues for an alternate framework for understanding life phenomena that is neither philosophical materialism nor intelligent‐design theory.     

The Model Theoretic Argument, Indirect Realism, and the Causal Theory of Reference Objection

Abstract: Hilary Putnam has reformulated his model-theoretic argument as an argument against indirect realism in the philosophy of perception. This new argument is reviewed and defended. Putnam's new focus on philosophical theories of perception (instead of metaphysical realism) makes better sense of his previous responses to the objection from the causal theory of reference. It is argued that the model-theoretic argument can also be construed as an argument that holders of a causal theory of reference should adopt direct realism in the philosophy of perception.     

An Accuracy Argument in Favor of Ranking Theory

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Fitelson and McCarthy (2014) have proposed an accuracy measure for confidence orders which favors probability measures and Dempster-Shafer belief functions as...     

An Indirect Paper-and-Pencil Measure of Prejudice: A German Version of the Racial Argument Scale

Prejudices against minorities are still a cause of inter-ethnic conflict and violence, although their expression has changed from blatant to more subtle forms. There has been a shortage of valid and reliable German-language scales for the measurement of contemporary racial prejudices. The Racial Argument Scale (RAS; Saucier & Miller Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 35:433–450, 2003) measures contemporary prejudice indirectly by asking respondents to judge how well given arguments support a conclusion. This scale was adapted to the German context with Turks as the target group. A validation study using a diverse sample of German adults (N = 194) attests to the reliability and construct validity of the German RAS (RAS-G). The adapted instrument is thus suitable for the indirect measurement of prejudice in German-speaking samples.     

An Epistemic Argument for Conservatism

‘Epistemic’ arguments for conservatism typically claim that given the limits of human reason, we are better off accepting some particular social practice or institution rather than trying to consciously improve it. I critically examine and defend here one such argument, claiming that there are some domains of social life in which, given the limits of our knowledge and the complexity of the social world, we ought to defer to those institutions that have robustly endured in a wide variety of circumstances in the past while not being correlated with intolerable outcomes. These are domains of social life in which our ignorance of optimal institutions is radical, and there is uncertainty (rather than quantifiable risk) about the costs of error. This is an argument for the preservation of particular institutions, not particular policies or outcomes, and it specifically identifies these with the institutions that John Rawls called ‘the basic structure of society.’ The argument further implies that to the extent that there is any reason to change these institutions, changes should be calculated as far as possible to increase their ‘epistemic power.’     

A Brief Argument For Consciousness Without Access

This paper proposes a new argument in favour of the claim that phenomenal consciousness overflows – that is, has a far higher capacity than – cognitive access. It shows that opponents of overflow implicate a necessary role for visual imagery in the change detection paradigm. However, empirical evidence suggests that there is no correlation between visual imagery abilities and performance in this paradigm. Since the use of imagery is not implicated in the performance strategy of subjects, we find a new argument for consciousness without access.     

An Argument for Intrinsic Value Monism

Philosophia - In this paper I argue that there is only one intrinsic value (i.e. intrinsic value monism). I start by examining three aspects of values that are often taken to count against this...     

An Anti-Molinist Argument

Philosophical Studies -     

The Port-Royal Logic's Theory of Argument

This is a critical examination of Antoine Arnauld's Logic or the Art of Thinking (1662), commonly known as the Port-Royal Logic. Rather than reading this work from the viewpoint of post-Fregean formal logic or the viewpoint of seventeenth-century intellectual history, I approach it with the aim of exploring its relationship to that contemporary field which may be labeled informal logic and/or argumentation theory. It turns out that the Port-Royal Logic is a precursor of this current field, or conversely, that this field may be said to be in the same tradition.     

An Epistemic Argument for Enduring Human Persons

A typical human person has privileged epistemic access to its identity over time in virtue of having a first-person point of view. In explaining this phenomenon in terms of an intimate relation of self-attribution or the like, I infer that a typical human person has direct consciousness of itself through inner awareness or personal memory. Direct consciousness of oneself is consciousness of oneself, but not by consciousness of something else . Yet, a perduring human person, S_p , i.e., a human person with temporal parts, is identical with the complete series of its temporal parts. I argue that because S_p is diverse from any incomplete series of its S_p cannot be conscious of all of its temporal parts through inner awareness or personal memory, S_p cannot have direct consciousness of itself. I conclude that a human person endures , i.e., wholly exists at each of the times it exists.     

The Sequential Dominance Argument for the Independence Axiom of Expected Utility Theory

Independence is the condition that, if X is preferred to Y, then a lottery between X and Z is preferred to a lottery between Y and Z given the same probability of Z. Is it rationally required that one’s preferences conform to Independence? The main objection to this requirement is that it would rule out the alleged rationality of Allais and Ellsberg Preferences. In this paper, I put forward a sequential dominance argument with fairly weak assumptions for a variant of Independence (called Independence for Constant Prospects), which shows that Allais and Ellsberg Preferences are irrational. Hence this influential objection (that is, the alleged rationality of Allais and Ellsberg Preferences) can be rebutted. I also put forward a number of sequential dominance arguments that various versions of Independence are requirements of rationality. One of these arguments is based on very minimal assumptions, but the arguments for the versions of Independence which are strong enough to serve in the standard axiomatization of Expected Utility Theory need notably stronger assumptions.