When distance pays off: The role of construal level in spending predictions

Self predictions are often optimistically biased, even for recurrent events. People could generate more realistic predictions by using information about past experiences, however they tend to disregard this cognitive approach. Drawing on Construal Level Theory, we propose that increases in construal level facilitate the use of information from past experience, and thereby increase prediction accuracy. This proposal was tested in two studies examining predictions of personal spending. Consistent with the hypotheses, individuals induced to construe the prediction target at a higher level of abstraction generated more accurate predictions (Study 1) and the effect of increased construal level on prediction was attributable to a greater reliance on past experience (Studies 1 and 2). The findings indicate that high-level construal can sometimes benefit prediction accuracy.     

Attributions about self and others in commons dilemmas

An experiment was conducted to investigate the effects of self-harvest and resource management outcome on self–other attributions in a simulated commons dilemma. In groups of five or six, participants (n=171) managed a limited, shared, self-regenerating resource. Self-attributions to ignorance, concern for others, fear, and greed were compared to the same attributions made for cooperative and noncooperative others. The attributions were made in two contexts: efficient management and rapid resource depletion. As predicted, self-attributions resembled those made for similar others; heavy harvesters made similar attributions for themselves and noncooperative others, and light harvesters made similar attributions for themselves and the cooperative others. A self-serving bias was evident, especially among heavy harvesters. Attributions were also influenced by the context in which they were made; stronger attributions to ignorance, fear, and greed, and weaker attributions to concern for others were made when the resource pool was rapidly depleted than when it was managed efficiently.     

Intuitions about situational correction in self and others

People's attributional phenomenology is likely to be characterized by effortful situational correction. Drawing on this phenomenology and on people's desire to view themselves more favorably than others, the authors hypothesized that people expect others to engage in less situational correction than themselves and to make more extreme dispositional attributions for constrained actors' behavior. In 2 studies, people expected their peers to make more extreme dispositional inferences than they did themselves for a situationally constrained actor's behavior. People's expectation that they engage in more situational correction than their peers was diminished among Japanese participants, who have less desire to view themselves as superior to their peers (Study 3), and among participants who were led to view dispositional attributions more favorably than situational attributions (Study 4).     

Differentiation in judgements of self and others: The role of self-consciousness

This study investigated the role of individual differences in Private and Public self-consciousness (SC) on differentiation of self and others in judgements of personality. Ss judged themselves and six other familiar persons on personality constructs derived from a modified Rep Grid procedure. Results showed that the judgements of high scorers on Private SC exhibited greater within-self and self-other differentiation than those of low scorers. There was no significant influence of Private SC on differentiation of other stimulus persons. Public SC had no significant influence on any of the measures of differentiation. The findings were discussed in terms of previous research on self-awareness, the specificity of measures of self-consciousness, and Duval and Wicklund's attentional model of self-awareness.     

Understanding others: the face and person construal

The face is a critical stimulus in person perception, yet little research has considered the efficiency of the processing operations through which perceivers glean social knowledge from facial cues. Integrating ideas from work on social cognition and face processing, the current research considered the ease with which invariant aspects of person knowledge can be extracted from faces under different viewing and processing conditions. The results of 2 experiments demonstrated that participants extracted knowledge pertaining to the sex and identity of faces in both upright and inverted orientations, even when the faces were irrelevant to the task at hand. The results of an additional experiment, however, suggested that although the extraction of person knowledge from faces may occur unintentionally, the process is nonetheless contingent on the operation of a semantic processing goal. The authors consider the efficiency of person construal and the processes that support this fundamental facet of social-cognitive functioning.     

Categorizing others: the dynamics of person construal

A fundamental question in social cognition is whether people categorize others on the basis of the social groups to which they belong. Integrating ideas from related work on face processing, the current research explored the emergence and boundary conditions of person categorization. Using speeded responses to facial stimuli as a marker of category activation, the authors showed in 3 experiments that person categorization: (a) occurs only under active-encoding conditions and (b) does not extend to applicable but task-irrelevant categorical dimensions, but (c) is sensitive to overlap in the perceptual features that support multiple categorical construals. The authors consider the implications of these findings for models of social-cognitive functioning and the component processes that support person perception.     

The self and others in the experience of pride

Pride is seen as both a self-conscious emotion as well as a social emotion. These categories are not mutually exclusive, but have brought forth different ideas about pride as either revolving around the self or as revolving around one’s relationship with others. Current measures of pride do not include intrapersonal elements of pride experiences. Social comparisons, which often cause experiences of pride, contain three elements: the self, the relationship between the self and another person, and the other person. From the literature on pride, we distilled three related elements; perceptions and feelings of self-inflation, other-distancing, and other-devaluation. In four studies, we explored whether these elements were present in pride experiences. We did so at an implicit (Experiment 1; N?=?218) and explicit level (Experiment 2; N?=?125), in an academic setting with in vivo (Experiment 3; N?=?203) and imagined pride experiences (Experiment 4; N?=?126). The data consistently revealed that the experience of pride is characterised by self-inflation, not by other-distancing nor other-devaluation.     

Including others in the self

We propose that to some extent, people treat the resources, perspectives, and identities of close others as their own. This proposal is supported by allocation, attribution, response time, and memory experiments. Recently, we have applied this idea to deepening understanding of feeling “too close” (including too much of the other in the self leading to feeling controlled or a loss of identity), the effects of relationship loss (it is distressing to the extent that the former partner was included in the self, liberating to the extent that the former partner was preventing self-expansion), ingroup identification (including ingroup in the self), and the effect of outgroup friendships on outgroup attitudes (including outgroup member in the self entails including outgroup member's identity in the self).     

The effect of construal level on predictions of task duration

Construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010) contends that distance to events leads to higher level processing. In a series of studies, we examined the role of construal level in prediction of the time needed to perform a task. Estimates increased when the tasks were distant rather than close in time (Study 1), were hypothetical rather than real (Study 2), and when participants were primed to adopt an abstract rather than a concrete mindset (Study 3). As a possible explanation, it is suggested that time units are perceived as smaller as people move up in abstraction, so that more time units are needed to cover the same amount of work. In line with this, we found that people who were primed to adopt a higher level processing mode visualized an hour as shorter than those in a lower level mode, as indicated by their distance marks on a time-line (Study 4). Finally, the contraction of time units was shown to mediate the relationship between temporal distance and task duration estimates (Study 5).     

Attributions and other inferences: Processing information about the self versus others

This study focuses on the attributional inferences involved in the comprehension of behaviors and on possible differences between the process of comprehending one's own behaviors and those of another person. Both the content of attributional judgments and the time taken to make the judgments were measured, in a design involving the comprehension of behaviors that were high or low in desirability and distinctiveness and that were understood as the subject's own versus another person's. Results show that the inferential processes in the comprehension of one's own and another's behavior are generally similar. Exceptions are where organized knowledge about the self (a self-schema) is brought into use and where differences in “perspective” between self and other influence processing. Discussion centers on the implications of the results for theories of comprehension and inference, including extensions needed to handle the self/other distinction.     

The effects of feedback about self and others on the recall and judgments of feedback-relevant information

After people have received feedback about the outcome of their behavior, their responses to information bearing on the validity of this feedback may be influenced by their desire to maintain a favorable self-image. This experiment investigated the cognitive mediators of these responses. Subjects who received negative feedback about their performance on an intelligence test disparaged intelligence tests in general and judged a report they had read to be unfavorable to intelligence tests. Nevertheless, they recalled more arguments in the report that were favorable to intelligence tests than did positive feedback recipients. These results contradicted the hypothesis that subjects selectively attend to information that helps them to maintain a positive self-concept in light of negative information about themselves. Rather, they may attempt to refute arguments that support the validity of the negative feedback they receive, and this relatively greater processing may facilitate the recall of these arguments later on. In contrast, there was no evidence that subjects try to refute information that calls the validity of positive feedback into question. Results had implications for two additional issues: first, whether the effect of performance feedback depends on whether it is received before or after information bearing on its validity; second, whether feedback has similar effects on recall and judgments by persons to whom it does not directly pertain.     

Bayesian inferences about the self (and others): A review

Viewing the brain as an organ of approximate Bayesian inference can help us understand how it represents the self. We suggest that inferred representations of the self have a normative function: to predict and optimise the likely outcomes of social interactions. Technically, we cast this predict-and-optimise as maximising the chance of favourable outcomes through active inference. Here the utility of outcomes can be conceptualised as prior beliefs about final states. Actions based on interpersonal representations can therefore be understood as minimising surprise – under the prior belief that one will end up in states with high utility. Interpersonal representations thus serve to render interactions more predictable, while the affective valence of interpersonal inference renders self-perception evaluative. Distortions of self-representation contribute to major psychiatric disorders such as depression, personality disorder and paranoia. The approach we review may therefore operationalise the study of interpersonal representations in pathological states.     

Pride and prejudice: how feelings about the self influence judgments of others

The present research demonstrates that pride has divergent effects on prejudice, exacerbating or attenuating evaluative biases against stigmatized groups, depending on the form of pride experienced. Specifically, three experiments found that hubristic pride--associated with arrogance and self-aggrandizement--promotes prejudice and discrimination, whereas authentic pride--associated with self-confidence and accomplishment--promotes more positive attitudes toward outgroups and stigmatized individuals. Findings generalized to discriminatory judgments (Experiment 2) and were found to be mediated by empathic concern for the evaluative target. Together, these experiments suggest that pride may be a cause of everyday prejudice and discrimination but that these social consequences depend on whether hubristic or authentic pride is experienced, and the degree to which empathic concern is subsequently aroused.     

Depression and pessimism for the future: biased use of statistically relevant information in predictions for self versus others

The cognitive theories of depression emphasize the role of pessimism about the future in the etiology and maintenance of depression. The present research was designed for two reasons: to provide a clear demonstration that depressed individuals' predictions of the likelihood of future outcomes are more pessimistic than those of nondepressed individuals given identical information with which to make forecasts and identical conditions for forecasting, and to test two additional hypotheses regarding possible mechanisms underlying depressives' relative pessimism in forecasting: a social-comparison and a differential attributional-style hypothesis. We used a modification of the cue-use paradigm developed by Ajzen (1977, Experiment 1) and examined depressed and nondepressed people's predictions of the likelihood of future positive and negative outcomes for themselves and for others. The results provided strong support for pessimism on the part of depressed individuals relative to nondepressed individuals in forecasts for both self and others. In addition, whereas nondepressives exhibited a self-enhancing bias in which they overestimated their probability of success and underestimated their probability of failure relative to that of similar others, depressives did not succumb to either positive or negative social comparison biases in prediction. Finally, in line with the attributional-style hypothesis, depressed-nondepressed differences in subjects' cue-use patterns were obtained, especially in forecasts for self. The findings are discussed with respect to the mechanisms underlying predictive optimism and pessimism and the possible functions and implications of these predictive biases.     

Cognitive consequences of affirming the self: The relationship between self-affirmation and object construal

Previous research suggests that affirming one’s important values is a powerful way of protecting one’s general self integrity, allowing non-defensive processing of self-relevant information. In a series of four studies linking self-affirmation with construal level, we find that in addition to any self buffering effect, thinking about one’s values and why they are important more generally shifts cognitive processing towards superordinate and structured thinking. Self-affirmation leads participants to perceive a greater degree of structure within their selves (Study 1), to increasingly identify actions in terms of their end-states (Study 2), to more strongly distinguish between primary and secondary object features (Study 3) and to perform better on tasks requiring abstract, structured thinking than those requiring detail-oriented, concrete thinking. Together, these findings suggest that thinking about important values helps individuals to structure information and focus on the big picture.     

From regulation to projection: Reliance on regulatory mode in predictions about others

Past research showed that people project their goals onto unknown others. The present research investigates whether they also rely on their motivational orientation in terms of regulatory mode (locomotion vs. assessment). In line with work on self-judgments, a stronger chronic personal focus on locomotion over assessment decreased predictions of others' experiences of nostalgia (Study 1) and increased predictions of others' preference for, motivation by, and evaluation of a transformational over a transactional leader (Study 2). Furthermore, an experimentally induced locomotion mode compared to an assessment mode increased peoples' predictions of others' motivation to reconcile after interpersonal conflict (Study 3). We examined process evidence via the Testing-Process-by-Interaction-Strategy: As predicted, effects only emerged under time pressure (vs. ample deliberation; Study 2) and for ingroup (vs. outgroup) members (Study 3). These findings suggest that people's regulatory mode is a basis for predicting others' reactions and preferences. We discuss implications and future research directions.     

Conceptions of the self and others across time

People are full of plans, goals, hopes, and fears-future-oriented thoughts that constitute a significant part of the self-concept. But are representations of others similarly future oriented? Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that the future is seen as a larger component of the self than of another person. Study 2 found that because self-identity is tied to an unrealized future, the self is thought to be less knowable than others in the present. Study 3 indicates that people believe that others need to know who they are striving to be in order to be understood-more so than they believe they need to know others' strivings to understand them. Studies 4a and 4b tested an important implication of these findings, that because so much of who they are is tied to the future, people believe they are further from their ideal selves than others are. Implications for judgment and decision making are discussed.     

Mood-related changes in construing self and others

Two repertory grids were administered to 31 Canadian undergraduates (20 women and 11 men) in which they rated themselves and 10 personal acquaintances on 11 supplied constructs. For the initial (baseline) grid they followed neutral instructions. For the second grid, they rated the same figures while listening to happy music and attempting to recall pleasant memories. The results from both grids closely approximated a set of theoretical predictions derived from a model of interpersonal judgment by Lefebvre, Lefebvre, and Adams-Webber (1986) within the framework of personal construct theory.     

The role of self‐esteem and anxiety in decision making for self versus others in relationships

Previous research has documented a tendency for people to make more risk‐seeking decisions for others than for themselves in relationship scenarios. Two experiments investigated whether this self–other difference is moderated by participants' self‐esteem and anxiety levels. In Experiment 1, lower self‐esteem and higher anxiety levels were associated with more risk‐averse choices for personal decisions but not for decisions for others. Therefore, participants with lower self‐esteem/higher anxiety showed greater self–other differences in comparison to participants with higher self‐esteem/lower anxiety levels. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this effect was largely mediated by participants' expectations of success and feelings about potential negative outcomes. These results are discussed in the context of “threats to the self,” with a central role played by anxiety and self‐esteem threats in personal decision making but not in decision making for others. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.