Hey stud: Race, sex, and sports

This article is an examination of how the intersection of sport and race plays out in the sexualization of the sporting role of African American male athletes. Further, the article is an examination of the multiple roles the media, sport, and race play as these impact the public persona of African American male athletes in high-profile sports. The article concludes with a number of recommendations for ending the negative images of African American male athletes. To the white public, we are athletes, rappers, preachers, singers—and precious little else. We are also robberts, rapists, mentally deficient and sexually well endowed. —Ellis Cose, The Envy of the World: On Being a Black Man in America (2002; New York: Washington Square Press, 3–4) First of all, let me say good after ... good late afternoon. Because of the HIV virus I have attained, I will have to announce my retirement from the Lakers today. I just want to make clear, first of all, that I do not have the AIDS disease, because I know a lot of you want to know that, but the HIV virus. My wife is fine, she’s negative, so no problem with her. I plan on going on, living for a long time, bugging you guys like I always have. So you’ll see me around. I plan on being with the Lakers and the league—hopefully [Commissioner] David [Stern] will have me for a while—and going on with my life. I guess now I get to enjoy some of the other sides of living—that [were missed] because of the season and the long practices and so on. I just want to say that I’m going to miss playing. And I will now become a spokesman for the HIV virus because I want people, young people, to realize they can practice safe sex. And, you know, sometimes you’re a little naive about it and you think it could never happen to you. You only thought it could happen to, you know, other people and so on and on. And it has happened. —Magic Johnson—Press Conference at L.A. Lakers Compound Washington Post, November 9, 1991     

Human and Animal Subjects of Research: The Moral Significance of Respect versus Welfare

Human beings with diminished decision-making capacities are usually thought to require greater protections from the potential harms of research than fully autonomous persons. Animal subjects of research receive lesser protections than any human beings regardless of decision-making capacity. Paradoxically, however, it is precisely animals’ lack of some characteristic human capacities that is commonly invoked to justify using them for human purposes. In other words, for humans lesser capacities correspond to greater protections but for animals the opposite is true. Without explicit justification, it is not clear why or whether this should be the case. Ethics regulations guiding human subject research include principles such as respect for persons—and related duties—that are required as a matter of justice while regulations guiding animal subject research attend only to highly circumscribed considerations of welfare. Further, the regulations guiding research on animals discount any consideration of animal welfare relative to comparable human welfare. This paper explores two of the most promising justifications for these differences␣between the two sets of regulations. The first potential justification points to lesser moral status for animals on the basis of their lesser capacities. The second potential justification relies on a claim about the permissibility of moral partiality as␣found in common morality. While neither potential justification is sufficient to justify the regulatory difference as it stands, there is possible common ground between supporters of some regulatory difference and those rejecting the current difference.     

Mortgaging the future: Dumping ethics with nuclear waste

On August 22, 2005 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued proposed new regulations for radiation releases from the planned permanent U.S. nuclear-waste repository in Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The goal of the new standards is to provide public-health protection for the next million years — even though everyone admits that the radioactive wastes will leak. Regulations now guarantee individual and equal protection against all radiation exposures above the legal limit. Instead E.P.A. recommended different radiation exposure-limits for different time periods. It also recommended using only the arithmetic mean of the dose distribution, to assess regulatory compliance during one time period, but using only the median dose to assess compliance during another period. This piece argues that these two changes — in exposure-limits and in methods of assessing regulatory compliance — have at least four disturbing consequences. The changes would threaten equal protection, ignore the needs of the most vulnerable, allow many fatal exposures, and sanction scientifically flawed dose calculations.     

Activity-Based Accounts of Mechanism and the Threat of Polygenic Effects

Accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised so as to provide an understanding of mechanism and of causation. Ontic accounts differ quite radically in their ontologies, and one of the latest additions to this tradition proposed by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver reintroduces the concept of activity. In this paper I ask whether this influential and activity-based account of mechanisms is viable as an ontic account. I focus on polygenic scenarios—scenarios in which the causal truths depend on more than one cause. The importance of polygenic causation was noticed early on by Mill (1893). It has since been shown to be a problem for both causal-law approaches to causation (Cartwright 1983) and accounts of causation cast in terms of capacities (Dupré 1993; Glennan 1997, pp. 605–626). However, whereas mechanistic accounts seem to be attractive precisely because they promise to handle complicated causal scenarios, polygenic causation needs to be examined more thoroughly in the emerging literature on activity-based mechanisms. The activity-based account proposed in Machamer et al. (2000, pp. 1–25) is problematic as an ontic account, I will argue. It seems necessary to ask, of any ontic account, how well it performs in causal situations where—at the explanandum level of mechanism—no activity occurs. In addition, it should be asked how well the activity-based account performs in situations where there are too few activities around to match the polygenic causal origin of the explanandum. The first situation presents an explanandum-problem and the second situation presents an explanans-problem—I will argue—both of which threaten activity-based frameworks.     

Worlds,Capabilities and Well-Being

Critics suggest that without some “objective” account of well-being we cannot explain why satisfying some preferences is, as we believe, better than satisfying others, why satisfying some preferences may leave us on net worse off or why, in a range of cases, we should reject life-adjustment in favor of life-improvement. I defend a subjective welfarist understanding of well-being against such objections by reconstructing the Amartya Sen’s capability approach as a preferentist account of well-being. According to the proposed account preference satisfaction alone—possible as well as actual—is of value. States of affairs contribute to well-being because and to the extent that they satisfy actual or nearby possible preferences, and are fruitful, that is, compatible with a range states that satisfy further actual or nearby possible preferences. The proposed account solves the problem of adaptive preference. Individuals whose preferences are “deformed” are satisfied with fruitless states of affairs, which constrain their options so that they are incapable of satisfying a wide range of nearby possible preferences—preferences they “could easily have had.” Recognizing the value of capabilities as well as actual attainments allows us to explain why individuals who satisfy “deformed” or perverse preferences may not on net benefit from doing so. More fundamentally, it explains why some states are, as Sen suggests, bad, awful or gruesome while others are good, excellent or superb without appeal to any objective account of value.     

Object-based attention occurs regardless of object awareness

In this study, we investigated whether awareness of objects is necessary for object-based guidance of attention. We used the two-rectangle method (Egly, Driver, & Rafal, 1994) to probe object-based attention and adopted the continuous flash suppression technique (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005) to control for the visibility of the two rectangles. Our results show that object-based attention, as indexed by the same-object advantage—faster response to a target within a cued object than within a noncued object—was obtained regardless of participants’ awareness of the objects. This study provides the first evidence of object-based attention under unconscious conditions by showing that the selection unit of attention can be at an object level even when these objects are invisible—a level higher than the previous evidence for a subliminally cued location. We suggest that object-based attentional guidance plays a fundamental role of binding features in both the conscious and unconscious mind.     

First-Personal Authority and the Normativity of Rationality

In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood as demands of one’s “first-personal standpoint.” Southwood argues that this view can “explain the normativity or reason-giving force” of rationality by showing that they “are the kinds of thing that are, by their very nature, normative.” We argue that the proposal fails on three counts: First, we explain why demands of one’s first-personal standpoint cannot be both reason-giving and resemble requirements of rationality. Second, the proposal runs headlong into the now familiar “bootstrapping” objection that helped illuminate the need to vindicate the normativity of rationality in the first place. Lastly, even if Southwood is right—the demands of rationality just are the demands or our first-personal standpoints—the explanation as to why our standpoints generate reasons will entail that we sometimes have no reason at all to be rational.     

The sense of self-efficacy of aspiring principals: exploration in a dynamic concept

The main purpose of this longitudinal study was to conceptualize the self-efficacy of aspiring principals as a dynamic concept. This study aimed to explore the structure and relations between the components of self-efficacy and to determine the nature and direction of change in the perceived self-efficacy of aspiring principals following a 2-year training program. The study was based on Facet Theory (Gutman, Psychmetrika 33:469–506, 1968), but also included some traditional statistics. The present study was carried out in two stages during 2005–2007. One-hundred and fifty aspiring principals from five academic colleges and universities in Israel who participated in a 2-year training program completed the same self-efficacy questionnaire during the first month of the program (October 2005—stage 1 and during the last month of the program (May 2007—stage 2). The nature as well as the direction of the aspiring principals’ perceived self-efficacy changed following the 2-year training program. The perception of the nature of the principal’s role remained unchanged.     

Evidence that judgments of learning are causally related to study choice

Three experiments investigated whether study choice was directly related to judgments of learning (JOLs) by examining people’s choices in cases in which JOLs were dissociated from recall. In Experiment 1, items were given either three repetitions or one repetition on Trial 1. Items given three repetitions received one on Trial 2, and those given one repetition received three on Trial 2—equating performance at the end of Trial 2, but yielding different immediate Trial 2 JOLs. Study choice followed the “illusory” JOLs. A delayed JOL condition in Experiment 2 did not show this JOL bias and neither did study choice. Finally, using a paradigm (Koriat & Bjork, 2005) in which similar JOLs are given to forward and backward associative pairs, despite much worse performance on the backward pairs, study choice again followed the mistaken JOLs. We concluded that JOLs—what people believe they know—directly influence people’s study choices.     

复杂性理论及其问题

Complexity theories are on the way to establish a new worldview—processes instead of objects, history and uniqueness of everything instead of repetition and lawlikeness are the elements. These theories from deterministic chaos via the dissipative structures, the theory of catastrophes, self organization and synergetics are mathematical models, connected with a new understanding of science. They are characterized by new fundamental commitments of sciences. But at the same time, they are characterized by epistemic boundaries. During my stay as a visiting professor at Dalian University of Technology in September 2006, I had the opportunity to deliver parts of this paper at North-Eastern University at Shenyang and at Beijing Normal University; a first draft has been presented at the IV. Russian Congress of Philosophy, May 2005, Moscow, and published as congress material as Knowledge and Society, edited by Ilya Kassavine, Moscow: Kanon 2005, 178–189.     

Notes on Pavlov written while I was in Russia (1922–1927)

Editors Note—Shortly before Dr. Gantt died, he gave me the following notes that he wrote on Pavlov with the suggestion that I might edit and publish them at some time. Instead of editing them, I think these notes as they are are touching and close to both Gantt and Pavlov. They are reproduced here with only very minor, typographical corrections.—FJM     

Growth in Phonological,Orthographic, and Morphological Awareness in Grades 1 to 6

Growth curve analyses showed that (a) word-level phonological and orthographic awareness show greatest growth during the primary grades but some additional growth thereafter, and (b) three kinds of morphological awareness show greatest growth in the first three or four grades but one—derivation—continues to show substantial growth after fourth grade. Implications of the findings for the role of three kinds of linguistic awareness—phonological, orthographic, and morphological—in learning to read and spell words are discussed. A case is made that phonological awareness, while necessary, is not sufficient for learning to read English—all three kinds of linguistic awareness that are growing during the primary grades need to be coordinated and applied to literacy learning. This finding and a review of the research on linguistic awareness support the conclusion that the recommendations of the National Reading Panel need to be amended so that the research evidence supporting the importance of both orthographic and morphological awareness, and not only phonological awareness, is acknowledged. Moreover, evidence-based strategies for teaching each of these kinds of linguistic awareness and their interrelationships need to be disseminated to educational practitioners.     

Ethical challenges in a technological environment: The perspective of engineers versus managers

In his article ‘Better Communication Between Engineers and Managers: Some Ways to Prevent Many Ethically Hard Choices’¹ Michael Davis analyzes the causes of the disaster in terms of a communications gap between management and engineers. When the communication between (representatives of) both groups breaks down, the organization is in (moral) trouble. Crucial information gets stuck somewhere in the organization prohibiting a careful discussion and weighing of all (moral) arguments. The resulting judgment has therefore little (moral) quality. In this paper I would like to comment on some of Michael Davis’s interesting and thought-provoking insights and ideas. A company which implements Davis’s recommendations at least shows some sensitivity to organizational moral issues. But it might miss the point that moral trouble can also result from a common understanding between managers and engineers. Organizational members sometimes tend to be myopic with regard to safety issues. This paper:

Phenomenological immanence,normativity, and semantic externalism

This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail at referring. The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of ‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for it.     

Teaching and Truthfulness

Some tendencies in modern education—the stress on ‘performativity’, for instance, and ‘celebration of difference’—threaten the value traditionally placed on truthful teaching. In this paper, truthfulness is mainly understood, following Bernard Williams, as a disposition to ‘Accuracy’ and ‘Sincerity’—hence as a virtue. It is to be distinguished from truth (a property of beliefs), and current debates about the nature of truth are not relevant to the issue of the value of truthfulness. This issue devolves into the question of whether truthfulness is a distinctive virtue of teachers, which they have a special obligation to exercise in the face of competing aims. This paper defends the idea of distinctive professional duties and considers two conceptions of teaching which ascribe a central place to truthfulness. The first conceives of teaching as a personal relationship within which trust, and hence, it is claimed, truthfulness, are paramount. This claim is challenged, and the paper concludes by sympathetically considering a second conception of teaching, articulated by Oakeshott and Heidegger. In this conception, teaching is a ‘releasement’ from ‘the daily flux’ of pupils’ lives through a truthful initiation into the alternatives to this ‘daily flux’ found within ‘the civilized inheritance of mankind’.     

A ‘WalMartization’ of Religion? The Ecological Impact of Megachurches on the Local and Extra-Local Religious Economy

This study explores the impact megachurches have on local and extra-local congregations. Arguing that the two commonly held theories concerning the effect of megachurches on local congregations—that they are either harmful because they undercut local competition, or are beneficial because they increase local competition—are under-specified, we add the concept of religious niches to an organizational ecology model to predict how megachurches will differentially impact local congregations of various affiliation. Following new methodological directions charted by Blanchard et al. (Soc Forces 86(4):1591–1620, 2008), we test how the presence of megachurches differentially impacts congregational change rates among Catholics, Mainline Protestants, Conservative Protestants and three disaggregated Conservative Protestant sub-groups—Evangelical, Pentecostal and Fundamentalists, using county-level data from the 1990 and 2000 Churches and Church Membership datasets and megachurch data from the Database of Megachurches in the US. We find support for the variable impact of megachurches on local congregations in differing niches. For local congregations in dissimilar niches the presence of megachurches seems to be beneficial, whereas for local congregations inhabiting similar niches the presence of megachurches seems to be harmful. In addition to the local impact of megachurches, we find that they also have an impact upon the vitality of congregations in neighboring counties.     

Can Contractualism Save Us from Aggregation?

This paper examines the efforts of contractualists to develop an alternative to aggregation to govern our duty not to harm (duty to rescue) others. I conclude that many of the moral principles articulated in the literature seem to reduce to aggregation by a different name. Those that do not are viable only as long as they are limited to a handful of oddball cases at the margins of social life. If extended to run-of-the-mill conduct that accounts for virtually all unintended (in the sense of undesired) harm to others—noncriminal activities that impose some risk of harm on others—they would rule out all action. Moreover, because such conduct poses an irreducible conflict between freedom of action and freedom from expected harm, it can be regulated only by principles that accept the necessity of making precisely the sorts of interpersonal trade-offs that contractualism is foundationally committed to reject: trade-offs in which the numbers count, such that a risk of serious harm to one person can be justified by small benefits to the many.     

Evaluation of drug toxicity in clinical trials

An increasing number of drugs removed from the market because of unacceptable toxicity raises concerns regarding preapproval testing of drug safety. In the present paper it is postulated that the non-inferiority type of trial should be abandoned in favor of the superiority trial with active controls and less stringent (p<0.1, both for efficacy and toxicity) statistics. This approach will increase sensitivity of detection of drug-induced adverse effects at the expense of increasing false positive results regarding the difference in efficacy between the tested and reference drug. Such a move will increase the protection of future patients. In addition, the proposed design is far more acceptable from the clinical (e.g. no need to specify the statistically expected “unimportant” number of deaths) and ethical points of view, as well as being favored by the strong incentive of involved parties. In the second part of this paper arguments are presented in favor of the hypothesis that placebo (still used in some superiority trials) does not induce adverse effects. The assertion that placebo may induce adverse effects is probably biased by the nature of the clinical experiment. Such a conclusion is supported by studies indicating that placebo-induced adverse effects are disease — and treatment — specific. The modification of clinical trials according to the proposed changes may increase the trials’ sensitivity at detecting adverse effects of drugs. A lecture on the subject of this paper was presented at the 6th International Bioethics Conference on the subject of ‘The Responsible Conduct of Basic and Clinical Research’, held in Warsaw, Poland, 3–4 June 2005.     

Hacktivism: Securing the national infrastructure

The foundations of modern society—communications, power, transportation, banking, water supply, and public institutions—depend on interconnected computer systems to operate properly. Hostile groups threaten this “National Infrastructure” by exploiting the strengths and weaknesses intrinsic in its architecture. Activists who utilize networked forms of organization, doctrine, and strategy to protect civil liberties and spread democratic values in cyberspace present an invaluable resource in securing these systems. These “hacktivists,” however, must be provided with the appropriate incentives and protections to encourage coordination with government actors. Facilitating this alliance will require an understanding of the relationships between technology, law, and policy in a democratic, networked society. Mark G. Milone is Associate General Counsel at the New York Mercantile Exchange where he advises on matters relating to technology, intellectual property, electronic commerce, telecommunications, and privacy. Since graduating from Hofstra Law School in 1998, Mark has founded an online business 〈www.virtulaw.com〉, taught “Computers and the Law” at Long Island University, worked in-house with a leading multimedia design agency, and was an associate at Klein, Zelman, Rothermel & Dichter, L.L.P. This article was first published in the American Bar Association’s The Business Lawyer.