Self-consciousness and reactance

Two studies examined the effects of dispositional self-consciousness on reactance. In Experiment 1, men who were high in private self-consciousness displayed greater reactance responses to a coercive communication attempt (as reflected by attitude reversal) than did men lower in private self-consciousness. In contrast, the effect of public self-consciousness in this context was to inhibit the expression of reactance. In Experiment 2, women high in private self-consciousness exhibited greater reactance responses to a self-imposed threat to their freedom of choice (as reflected by equivocation over two choice alternatives) than did women lower in private self-consciousness. The effect of public self-consciousness in this context was negligible. These findings replicate and extend a previous self-awareness and reactance finding; they provide additional evidence that manipulated self-awareness and dispositional self-consciousness converge on the same psychological entity; and they provide additional evidence that there are important differences between the dimensions of private and public self-consciousness.     

Self-consciousness and nonconceptual content

Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think ‘I’-thoughts. Recently, it has been suggested that self-consciousness in this sense can (and should) be accounted for in terms of nonconceptual forms of self-representation. Here, I will argue that while theories of nonconceptual self-consciousness do provide us with important insights regarding the essential genetic and epistemic features of self-conscious thought, they can only deliver part of the full story that is required to understand the phenomenon of self-consciousness. I will provide two arguments to this effect, drawing on insights from the philosophy of language and on structural differences between conceptual and nonconceptual forms of representation. Both arguments rest on the intuition that while self-consciousness requires explicit self-representation, nonconceptual content can at best provide implicit self-related information. I will conclude that in order to explain the emergence of self-conscious thought out of more basic forms of representation one has to explain the transition between implicit self-related information and explicit self-representation.     

Self-consciousness in non-communicative patients

The clinical and para-clinical examination of residual self-consciousness in non-communicative severely brain damaged patients (i.e., coma, vegetative state and minimally conscious state) remains exceptionally challenging. Passive presentation of the patient's own name and own face are known to be effective attention-grabbing stimuli when clinically assessing consciousness at the patient's bedside. Event-related potential and functional neuroimaging studies using such self-referential stimuli are currently being used to disentangle the cognitive hierarchy of self-processing. We here review neuropsychological, neuropathological, electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies using the own name and own face paradigm obtained in conscious waking, sleep, pharmacological coma, pathological coma and related disorders of consciousness. Based on these results we discuss what we currently do and do not know about the functional significance of the neural network involved in "automatic" and "conscious" self-referential processing.     

Self-consciousness and aspects of identity

This study investigated the relationship between public and private self-consciousness and social and personal aspects of identity. As predicted by self-consciousness theory, public self-consciousness correlated significantly more strongly with social than with personal aspects of identity, and private self-consciousness correlated significantly more strongly with personal than with social aspects of identity. Implications for the psychology of identity are discussed.     

哲学研究的理论自觉

一、哲学研究的学术性与现实性的双重自觉面向现实和坚持学术,是当代中国哲学研究积淀的宝贵经验。哲学是思想中所把握到的时代和自己时代精神的精华,面向现实生活是哲学的天命。任何真诚的哲学思考不仅深入自然、     

Self-consciousness, self-awareness, and self-attribution

Self-awareness was either manipulated by a mirror (experimental) or not (control). Subjects were selected for being high or low in private self-consciousness (disposition to attend to one's thoughts, feelings, motives). Private self-consciousness had a stronger effect on self-attributions than did self-awareness. These findings have implications for attribution, self-consciousness, and the relationship between manipulations and dispositions.     

Self-consciousness, self-agency, and schizophrenia

Empirical approaches on topics such as consciousness, self-awareness, or introspective perspective, need a conceptual framework so that the emerging, still unconnected findings can be integrated and put into perspective. We introduce a model of self-consciousness derived from phenomenology, philosophy, the cognitive, and neurosciences. We will then give an overview of research data on one particular aspect of our model, self-agency, trying to link findings from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Finally, we will expand on pathological aspects of self-agency, and in particular on psychosis in schizophrenia. We show, that a deficient self-monitoring system underlies, in part, hallucinations and formal thought (language) disorder in schizophrenia. We argue, that self-consciousness is a valid construct and can be studied with the instruments of cognitive and neuroscience.     

Self-consciousness, outcome expectancy, and persistence

A study investigated persistence as a function of two variables: the disposition to be self-attentive (called private self-consciousness) and outcome feedback on a prior task that was described as closely related to the target task. More specifically, subjects first completed a concealed-figures test and were told that their performances were either very good or very poor. The second test, which ostensibly measured the same abilities, was an insolvable design problem that is commonly used to measure persistence. Feedback concerning prior outcomes had a direct influence on expectancies for the second task, but persistence on that task was a joint function of feedback and self-consciousness. That is, favorable feedback led to greater persistence than did unfavorable feedback, but only among subjects high in self-consciousness. This finding replicates and extends the results of several previous studies. Discussion centers on the relationship between the present research and an earlier experiment which yielded apparently different results.     

青少年自我意识的功能结构及测评的研究

研究者认为自我意识是个体对自己及与周围环境的关系诸方面的认识、体验和调节的多维度、多层次的心理功能系统;并参考国内外相关的自我意识理论和量表,以城市中学生为被试,经过三个步骤,采用《青少年自我意识量表》,对青少年自我意识的心理结构进行了探索性和验证性研究。研究结果表明：青少年自我意识的功能结构基本可以分为三个维度八个因素（即体貌评价、能力评价、品德评价、自尊感、自信感、自觉性、情绪自控、自制力与坚持性）;自编《青少年自我意识量表》包括个人因子共38个项目;该量表的内部一致性信度和分半信度比较高,也具有较好的结构效度。     

Self-consciousness,self-report of aggressiveness,and aggression

Private self-consciousness consists of attending to one's thoughts, feelings, and motives. Public self-consciousness consists of attending to oneself as a social object. The effect of dispositional self-consciousness on the accuracy of self-reports was studied in research on aggression. High- and low-private self-conscious subjects rated their own aggressiveness. Several weeks later their aggressive behavior was objectively measured. The correlation between self-report of aggressiveness and aggressive behavior was significantly higher for high-than for low-private self-conscious subjects. The correlation between self-report and behavior was unaffected by public self-consciousness. The implications of these findings for self-consciousness theory and personality dispositions are discussed.     

Self-consciousness,self-determination,and imagination in Kant

I argue for a basically Sartrean approach to the idea that one's self-concept, and any form of knowledge of oneself as an individual subject, presupposes concepts and knowledge about other things. The necessity stems from a pre-conceptual structure which assures that original self-consciousness is identical with one's consciousness of objects themselves. It is not a distinct accomplishment merely dependent on the latter. The analysis extends the matter/form distinction to concepts. It also requires a distinction between two notions of consciousness: one relates to the employment of already formed concepts, the other to the structures of imaginative apprehension that help to constitute (empirical) concepts from the start. We need to see that (1) so far as objects are only conceptualized appearances, the material through which we apprehend them must be reflected in that apprehension itself; (2) the corresponding material consists of a manifold of pre-conceptually active anticipations and retentions concerning the course of one's own experience. The resultant structure imposes an orientation on the world of appearances that does not derive from a concept of oneself as an individual in it, but that nevertheless provides the only possible basis for such a concept. One's self-concept, at least as empirical subject, is simply that ofwhatever subject is indicated, in an appropriate way, by that orientation.