经典诠释与体系建构--中国哲学诠释传统的成熟与特点刍议

中国古代哲学的发展与哲学诠释的传统有密切关系,王弼和郭象代表了中国古代哲学诠释传统的成熟时期,自此以后,以较完整的经典注释的方式阐发思想家的哲学体系就成了中国哲学发展的主流,朱熹、王夫之是古代哲学诠释传统的高峰,牟宗三则是这一传统的现代代表.本文认为,西方诠释学从原则上为中国哲学史上的体系重构提供了很好的解释和论证,但西方诠释学理论并不能充分解释中国哲学的诠释传统,中国的哲学诠释传统的典型形式是以经典诠释的方式进行哲学体系的建构或重构,打破了西方诠释学理论所说的"诠释的循环",从而构成了对西方诠释学的一种挑战,回答这种挑战就可以丰富和发展诠释学理论,并有可能创造出一种新的适合于理解和说明中国哲学传统的诠释学.     

在"理性史"与"理念诗"之间--哲学史上经典之解释与人物之个性的关系问题

本论文所欲讨论者,将主要集中于哲学史上个人之性情、个性对该哲学本文所表达之观念的影响,以及我们对此所应持的诠释态度。对于中国传统哲学而言,经典本文之理解与人物个性之品评当得其有机之结合,方能再现“理性史之纹路”与“理念诗之魅力”,如是,我们也便有相当的理由质疑那种一开始就用某种预设了的、严格的因果对应的方式来图解思想家之思想的努力,同时,我们也可以在相当程度上避免因“过度诠释”所导致的诠释者对本文及其所赖于产生的周围世界的轻忽和放逐。     

当代中国哲学的创造性诠释与体系化创建

当代中国哲学研究中 ,有两个基本发展向度的开发前景令人鼓舞 ,这就是对传统中国哲学的创造性诠释和对未来中国哲学的体系化创建。在诸多哲学研究者进行多方位、不同深度探索之后的今天 ,上述两个基本向度的开发已经呈现出了一种基本稳定的学术研究分布。这种分布不仅充分体现了当代中国哲学研究的空前繁荣局面 ,而且提出了一个更为深刻的时代问题 ,就是当代中国哲学发展所真正需要的 ,究竟是“重新诠释”还是“崭新创建” ?本文从还原性呈现的角度 ,就上述两个基本向度的概括进行简要表述 ,希望能够引起读者进一步的相关思考并提出新论。     

易理诠释与哲学创造：以熊十力为例

创造性的诠释懦家经典特别是《周易》是熊十力建构其“新唯识论”的重要理路。这种与古代经学方法有别的经典诠释,部分地归因于20世纪的历史语境：后经学时代自由解经的空间、对动力式文化精神的哲学追求、近代以来的哲学变革;部分地则归因于熊十力本人将现代观念与传统智慧的创造性结合,并且由此实现了哲学的创造。但其经典诠释方式存在着相对主义与独断论的紧张,“譬喻”说则是为其经学诠释所做的方法论辩护。     

框架诠释学:框架理论的诠释学与现代性批判意蕴

泰勒的"框架诠释学"既注重对现代性理解的前理解条件及其作用的探究,在理论品格上倾向于哲学诠释学;又特别注重通过诠释进行社会批判,其诠释学思想又表现出诠释哲学品格.他的框架理论兼具哲学诠释学与诠释哲学的维度,具有一种明显的居间性,这说明现代诠释学不仅可以在哲学存在论上被理解,亦可以作为一种方法被应用于哲学研究之中.泰勒的...     

论历史分析、文化诠释与比较哲学

比较哲学的研究范式有多种选择。历史分析与文化诠释可以作为比较哲学的重要研究范式,不仅在于历史与文化是思想与智慧的支撑平台和发展基础,而且在于历史主义的方法论、历史分析的逻辑、历史哲学与文化环境中的理解与沟通、翻译与转换注定不能分开。     

重写中国哲学通史的学术尝试

武汉大学中国哲学研究团队历经十余年写成10卷本《中国哲学通史》(学术版),又经过数年的编校,现在终于正式出版.这是我国目前相对最全面、系统、完备的中国哲学通史.全书共10卷,其中8卷为断代哲学史,涵盖从先秦至现代的内容,又特别设置了少数民族哲学史、古代科学哲学史各一卷.作者团队以高度的"文化自觉"与"文化自信",以深厚...     

马克思对"本体思维方式"的历史性变革

传统本论在黑格尔哲学中达到了它的最高形态,同时暴露出严重问题。对此,马克思没有采取与他同时代的其他哲学家（如叔本华、尼采等）仅仅改变“本体论哲学”的某种理论形态的做法,而是从根本上否定了传统本体论借以立立论的那种“绝对化”的基本思想原则和思维方式,使哲学找回了具有双重生命本性的现实的人和由人参与开拓的现实生活世界。即使如此,也不宜把马克思的哲学归结为“实践本体论”。     

"马克思主义实践理论的当代意义"会议综述

2003年12月20—22日,由中山大学马克思主义哲学与现代化研究所和哲学研究杂志社联合主办的全国“马克思主义实践理论的当代意义”研讨会于广州隆重召开。研讨会中,与会代表基本上都认同“实践”是马克思主义哲学中的一个重要内容和视角,在如今西方实践哲学复兴和中国自身现代化进程的双重背景下,应该对马克思主义的实践问题给予重新的审视和探讨。积极的探讨使问题的展开不断深化,和清晰化,会议讨论气氛热烈,思想精彩纷呈现就会议的主要内容从四个方面予以综述。     

"消灭哲学"还是"扬弃哲学"?

在马克思的<黑格尔法哲学批判导言>中,当德语动词aufheben 和德语名词die Philosophie以动宾关系的方式出现时,究竟译为"消灭哲学",还是译为"扬弃哲学"?这不是翻译上的技巧的问题,而是涉及到对马克思哲学思想的准确理解.笔者认为,这一动宾关系应该译为"扬弃哲学",从而既恢复aufheben的本来含义,也准确地传达马克思的本意.     

Riding the Third Wave: T<Emphasis Type="SmallCaps">u</Emphasis> Weiming’s Confucian Axiology

Du Weiming (Tu Weiming) has assisted in defining the New Confucian movement, a philosophical discourse that depends on axiological themes and traits based on an exegesis and defense of the revival and reform of traditional Confucian discourse inherited from the Classical and Neo-Confucian waves in East Asia. Thomas A. Metzger’s discussion of the profound difference between modern Western post-Enlightenment discourse and New Confucian discourse challenges many of Du’s primary assumptions. My conclusion is that Du is both a citizen of the modern Western academy and a Confucian public intellectual dedicated to mediating the great debate that now spans the Pacific ocean between the West and a revived East Asian cultural complex, including New Confucianism as a major dialogue partner at the beginning of the new millennium by continuing the historic Confucian commitment to a theory of values.     

Constructive Dialogical Pluralism: A Context of Interreligious Relations

This article presents current philosophical reflections on religious diversity and concomitant attitudes towards the interreligious situation. The motive behind this presentation is to show that in order to deal more efficiently with the phenomenon of religious plurality, there is a need for a development of the philosophy of religion, where new perspectives are opened up and explored. The very concept of religion as a belief system is put into question, since it has caused philosophical reflections on religious diversity to be confined to certain metaphysical and epistemological concerns. Instead of focusing on the noun ‘religion’, the article suggests a way to understand the adjective ‘religious’ and view religious plurality as a plurality of ways of being religious. This opens up a certain context of interreligious relations and interreligious dialogue, where this very dialogue itself can contribute to the development of philosophical tools, concepts and categories for dealing with the fact of plurality. I call this context constructive dialogical pluralism.     

Towards a New Religious Dialogue: Buddhism and Postmodern Theology

This paper proffers an example of a new form of religious dialogue. It subverts, rather than assumes the philosophical tradition of universal reason, upon which religious dialogue has traditionally proceeded. To this end, I call into question the frequently perceived affinity between Buddhism and radical postmodern a/theology. Whereas the latter works within a framework of oppositions inherited from the modern philosophical tradition, Buddhism is innocent of such a framework, and jettisons its 'either-or' antinomies. In this respect, I argue that there is a striking 'coincidence in outlook' between Buddhism and conservative postmodern theology, which also seeks to subvert the modern philosophical framework which it regards as being essentially secular. I suggest that this 'coincidence in outlook', which contrasts with the modern outlook, opens the way for a religious dialogue based on a mutual affirmation of difference, rather than on the distorting universalist quest for affinity at all costs.     

Naturalising deconstruction

Most contemporary readings of Derrida’s work situate it within a transcendental tradition of philosophical enquiry explicitly critical of naturalistic accounts of knowledge and mind. I argue that Derrida provides the naturalist with some of the philosophical resources needed to rebut transcendental critiques of naturalism, in particular the phenomenological critiques which derive from Husserl’s philosophy. I do this by showing: a) that Derrida’s account of temporality as differance undermines phenomenological accounts of the meaning of naturalistic theories and assumptions; and b) that it is itself both usable and interpretable within the naturalistic framework of current cognitive science.     

Introduction to symposium on Philosophy and the art of writing by Richard Shusterman

This introductory piece provides context for this symposium on Richard Shusterman's new book, Philosophy and the Art of Writing. The piece reflects on the symposium genre from Plato's classic dialogue to its form today. It claims that Shusterman's work asks us to take this kind of philosophical writing more seriously, and for that reason the symposium itself has taken on a different structure. The piece discusses how each of the contributors responding to the book (with Shusterman leading the way), Eli Kramer, Randall Auxier, and Charles Johnson, have engaged in practicing, nurturing, and supporting broad modes of philosophical writing, and in turn why they have chosen to do so in this context.     

FIRST PERSON PLURAL: SELF‐UNITY AND SELF‐MULTIPLICITY IN THEOLOGY'S DIALOGUE WITH PSYCHOLOGY

In contradistinction to the contemporary human sciences, recent theological accounts of the individual‐in‐relation continue to defend the concept of the singular continuous self. Consequently, theological anthropology and the human sciences seem to offer widely divergent accounts of the sense of self‐fragmentation that many believe pervades the modern world. There has been little constructive interdisciplinary conversation in this area. In this essay I address the damaging implications of this oversight and establish the necessary conditions for future dialogue. I have three primary objectives. First, I show how the notion of personal continuity acquires philosophical theological significance through its close association with the concept of personal particularity. Second, through a discussion of contemporary accounts of self‐multiplicity, I clarify the extent of theological anthropology's disagreement with the human sciences. Third, I draw upon narrative accounts of identity to suggest an alternative means of understanding the experiential continuity of personhood that maintains the tension between self‐plurality, unity, and particularity and thereby reconnects philosophical theological concerns with human‐scientific analyses of the human condition. Narrative approaches to personhood are ideally suited to this purpose, and, I suggest, offer an intriguing solution to understanding and resolving the problem of self‐fragmentation that has caused recent theological anthropology so much consternation.     

Erkenntnistheorie der Zahldefinition und philosophische Grundlegung der Arithmetik unter Bezugnahme auf einen Vergleich von Gottlob Freges Logizismus und platonischer Philosophie (Syrian, Theon von Smyrna u.a.)

The epistomology of the definition of number and the philosophical foundation of arithmetic based on a comparison between Gottlob Frege's logicism and Platonic philosophy (Syrianus, Theo Smyrnaeus, and others). The intention of this article is to provide arithmetic with a logically and methodologically valid definition of number for construing a consistent philosophical foundation of arithmetic. The – surely astonishing – main thesis is that instead of the modern and contemporary attempts, especially in Gottlob Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic, such a definition is found in the arithmetic in Euclid's Elements. To draw this conclusion a profound reflection on the role of epistemology for the foundation of mathematics, especially for the method of definition of number, is indispensable; a reflection not to be found in the contemporary debate (the predominate ‘pragmaticformalism’ in current mathematics just shirks from trying to solve the epistemological problems raised by the debate between logicism, intuitionism, and formalism). Frege's definition of number, ‘The number of the concept F is the extension of the concept ‘numerically equal to the concept F”, which is still substantial for contemporary mathematics, does not fulfil the requirements of logical and methodological correctness because the definiens in a double way (in the concepts ‘extension of a concept’ and ‘numerically equal’) implicitly presupposes the definiendum, i.e. number itself. Number itself, on the contrary, is defined adequately by Euclid as ‘multitude composed of units’, a definition which is even, though never mentioned, an implicit presupposition of the modern concept ofset. But Frege rejects this definition and construes his own - for epistemological reasons: Frege's definition exactly fits the needs of modern epistemology, namely that for to know something like the number of a concept one must become conscious of a multitude of acts of producing units of ‘given’ representations under the condition of a 1:1 relationship to obtain between the acts of counting and the counted ‘objects’. According to this view, which has existed at least since the Renaissance stoicism and is maintained not only by Frege but also by Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Dummett, and others, there is no such thing as a number of pure units itself because the intellect or pure reason, by itself empty, must become conscious of different units of representation in order to know a multitude, a condition not fulfilled by Euclid's conception. As this is Frege's main reason to reject Euclid's definition of number (others are discussed in detail), the paper shows that the epistemological reflection in Neoplatonic mathematical philosophy, which agrees with Euclid's definition of number, provides a consistent basement for it. Therefore it is not progress in the history of science which hasled to the a poretic contemporary state of affairs but an arbitrary change of epistemology in early modern times, which is of great influence even today. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

From “ghost in the machine” to “spiritual automaton”: Philosophical meditation in Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Levinas

This essay discusses Stanley Cavell’s remarkable interpretation of Emmanuel Levinas’s thought against the background of his own ongoing engagement with Wittgenstein, Austin, and the problem of other minds. This unlikely debate, the only extensive discussion of Levinas by Cavell in his long philosophical career sofar, focuses on their different reception of Descartes’s idea of the infinite. The essay proposes to read both thinkers against the background of Wittgenstein’s model of philosophical meditation and raises the question as to whether Cavell and Levinas do not indirectly shed light on the early modern motif of the spiritual automaton.     

On the Concept of a Sense

Keeley has recently argued that the philosophical issue of how to analyse the concept of a sense can usefully be addressed by considering how scientists, and more specifically neuroethologists, classify the senses. After briefly outlining his proposal, which is based on the application of an ordered set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for modality differentiation, I argue, by way of two complementary counterexamples, that it fails to account fully for the way the senses are in fact individuated in neuroethology and other relevant sciences. I suggest substantial modifications to Keeley’s account which would both solve the problem cases and make better sense of the actual classifications made by scientists. I conclude by noting some limits to the way of classifying the senses that I suggest. I conclude by suggesting that the problem I identify in Keeley’s account has arisen from a confusion that sometimes arises in the philosophical literature between how we individuate the senses and what constitutes a sense.     

Stanisław Brzozowski on the ideal of the modern man

Stanisław Brzozowski formulated the ideal of modern man in the polemic with the contemporary man, who has ceased to believe in truth and moral values and is devoid of the will to act. For Brzozowski modernity involves the discovery of truth about the human condition: about man as an autonomous subject, a creator of values, who struggles with non-human reality. This truth was formulated in Kant’s idea of autonomy and in Marx’ idea of a collective conquest of the world of nature. For Brzozowski, ideal modern man is “the conscious labourer,” who labours because he wants to proudly impose a human law on the non-human world. At the same time Brzozowski used the term “modernity” to describe life of constant change in the modern world, understood as a set of results of man’s reign over nature. For the sake of human maturity, Brzozowski expected the truly modern man to perceive modern life as an unquestionable value. Undoubtedly, there is an evident tension in Brzozowski’s ideal of modern man between the affirmation of creativity in the world of change and the necessity of disciplined production, including unchangeable moral foundations of labour. There is also a major shift in this ideal, stemming from Brzozowski’s change of attitude towards religion.