In Favor of Being Only Humean

The twin conceptions of (1) natural law as causal structure and (2) explanation as passage from phenomenon to cause, are two sides of a certain philosophical coin, to which I shall offer an alternative – Humean – currency. The Humean alternative yokes together a version of the regularity conception of law and a conception of explanation as passage from one regularity, to another which has it as an instance but of which it is not itself an instance. I will show that the regularity conception of law is the basis of a distinguished branch of physical mechanics; thus the Humean conception of law, like its better-loved rival, enjoys the support of a venerated tradition in mechanical theory – in fact, that strand which culminates in quantum theory. I shall also offer an account of explanatory asymmetry, a natural companion to the Humean conception of explanation as passage from one regularity to another of greater scope, as an alternative to van Fraassen's unsatisfactory account. My account of asymmetry is just as free of reliance on context as it is free of reliance on cause. I shall thus proclaim that explanatory asymmetry is at once a reality deserving of philosophical treatment – one not to be given over to the care of psychology or linguistics – and at the same time susceptible of an account worthy of Hume.     

Chance,Experimental Reproducibility,and Mechanistic Regularity

Examples from the sciences showing that mechanisms do not always succeed in producing the phenomena for which they are responsible have led some authors to conclude that the regularity requirement can be eliminated from characterizations of mechanisms. In this article, I challenge this conclusion and argue that a minimal form of regularity is inextricably embedded in examples of elucidated mechanisms that have been shown to be causally responsible for phenomena. Examples of mechanistic explanations from the sciences involve mechanisms that have been shown to produce phenomena with a reproducible rate of success. By contrast, if phenomena are infrequent to the point that they amount to irreproducible observations and experimental results, they are indistinguishable from the background noise of accidental happenings. The inability to detect or measure the phenomenon of interest against the background noise of accidental correlations makes it impossible to elucidate a mechanism by experimental means, to demonstrate that a proposed mechanism actually produces the phenomenon, and ultimately to justify why a hypothetical scenario involving an irregular mechanism should be preferred over attributing irreproducible happenings to chance.     

“Cannot” Implies “Not Ought”

I argue for a version of “ought” implies “can”. In particular, I argue that it is necessarily true that if an agent, S, ultima facie ought to do A at T’, then there is a time T* such that S can at T* do A at T’. In support of this principle, I have argued that without it, we cannot explain how it is that, in cases where agents cannot do the best thing, they often ought to do some alternative action – such as get help or do the promised action later; nor can we explain the phenomenon of necessary enablers or the phenomenon of more stringent prima facie obligations overriding less stringent ones in cases where the agent cannot fulfill both.     

The Ontology of Musical Versions: Introducing the Hypothesis of Nested Types

This article explores the ontological nature of musical versions. I assume the widespread view that type/token ontologies offer the best explanation of the repeatable nature of works of music. However, I show that traditional type/token theories, which distinguish only between two levels of objects, face two problems when applied to the phenomenon of musical versions. First, they are not able to accommodate the familiar intuition of our musical practices that the work versioned is repeated in its versions’ performances. Second, they are not able to distinguish between two different phenomena of our practices: the phenomenon of a work's versions and the phenomenon of works inspired by, or derived from, other works. These undesirable consequences are entailed, under traditional two‐level type/token theories, by the nature of types as ontologically thin entities. I defend that the hypothesis of nested types, a multiple‐level type/token theory, can avoid these two problems while preserving the theoretical virtues of traditional two‐level type/token theories and structural monism—the most widely shared view about the individuation of musical works, according to which musical works are individuated by one, and only one, sound structure.     

Unexpected a posteriori necessary laws of nature

In this paper I argue that it is not a priori that all the laws of nature are contingent. I assume that the fundamental laws are contingent and show that some non-trivial, a posteriori, non-basic laws may nonetheless be necessary in the sense of having no counterinstances in any possible world. I consider a law L_S (such as ‘salt dissolves in water’) that concerns a substance S. Kripke's arguments concerning constitution show that the existence of S requires that a certain deeper level law or variants thereof hold. At the same time, that law and its variants may each entail the truth of L_S. Thus the existence of S entails L_S. Consequently there is no world in which S exists and fails to obey L_S. I consider the conditions concerning the fundamental laws that would make this phenomenon ubiquitous. I conclude with some consequences for metaphysics.     

The Disappearing (or Ghost) Mother Transference: In Search of the Available Mother Within

As analysts, we speak of maternal transference as if it were a unitary phenomenon. We are trained to expect intense, powerful transference reactions. Yet there is a group of female patients who have a specific type of transference that lacks intensity. These patients often present by not presenting. I term this phenomenon the disappearing (or ghost) mother transference. This transference is quiet and does not create much stress. Using a case example, I will define this particular type of object relationship and discuss an alternative technique in treating these patients. It is my premise that these women must discover for themselves, at their own time and in their own way, the caring, living, available mother in the analyst.     

Operationism in psychology: what the debate is about, what the debate should be about

I offer an analysis of operationism in psychology, which is rooted in an historical study of the investigative practices of two of its early proponents (S. S. Stevens and E. C. Tolman). According to this analysis, early psychological operationists emphasized the importance of experimental operations and called for scientists to specify what kinds of operations were to count as empirical indicators for the referents of their concepts. While such specifications were referred to as "definitions," I show that such definitions were not taken to constitute a priori knowledge or be analytically true. Rather, they served the pragmatic function of enabling scientists to do research on a purported phenomenon. I argue that historical and philosophical discussions of problems with operationism have conflated it, both conceptually and historically, with positivism, and I raise the question of what are the "real" issues behind the debate about operationism.     

The case for regularity in mechanistic causal explanation

How regular do mechanisms need to be, in order to count as mechanisms? This paper addresses two arguments for dropping the requirement of regularity from the definition of a mechanism, one motivated by examples from the sciences and the other motivated by metaphysical considerations regarding causation. I defend a broadened regularity requirement on mechanisms that takes the form of a taxonomy of kinds of regularity that mechanisms may exhibit. This taxonomy allows precise explication of the degree and location of regular operation within a mechanism, and highlights the role that various kinds of regularity play in scientific explanation. I defend this regularity requirement in terms of regularity??s role in individuating mechanisms against a background of other causal processes, and by prioritizing mechanisms?? ability to serve as a model of scientific explanation, rather than as a metaphysical account of causation. It is because mechanisms are regular, in the expanded sense described here, that they are capable of supporting the kinds of generalizations that figure prominently in scientific explanations.     

Fictional Models and Fictional Representations

Scientific models consist of fictitious elements and assumptions. Various attempts have been made to answer the question of how a model, which is sometimes viewed as a fiction, can explain or predict the target phenomenon adequately. I examine two accounts (the counterfactual dependency view and the idealization view) of models-as-fictions which are aiming at disentangling the myth of representing the reality by fictional models. I argue that both views have their own weaknesses in spite of many virtues. I propose to re-evaluate the problems of representation from a novel perspective in which some of the model representations can be regarded as fictional representations. I argue that this type of model representation is credible despite being a fictional representation of the reality.     

Regularity as a Form of Constraint

Regularity theories of causation are guided by the idea that causes are collectively sufficient for their effects. Following Mackie [1974], that idea is typically refined to distinguish collections that include redundant members from those that do not. Causes must be collectively sufficient for their effects without redundancy. While Mackie was surely right that the regularity theory must distinguish collections that are in some sense minimally sufficient for an effect from those that include unnecessary hangers-on, I believe that redundancy is the wrong mark of that distinction. I propose a way to develop the regularity theory without it. Instead of distinguishing minimal from mere sufficiency in terms of redundancy, we should look to the influence that events have in the world. Causes, so construed, must have just enough collective influence to ensure that an effect occurs. I argue that such an account provides a uniform solution to the problem of epiphenomena and to a pair of related problems that arise for prior iterations of the regularity theory.     

Genuine Violations of Laws

Could laws of nature be violated, in the sense that some proposition is both a law and false? I argue that opponents of regularity theories of laws should accept the metaphysical possibility of such genuine violations. I begin with a clarification of this claim. The main argument is then developed in three steps. I first argue that opponents of regularity theory should endorse the modal-essence view: certain modal principles are essential to the laws of nature. Second, I argue that the modal-essence view entails sophisticated modal primitivism. Third, I argue from sophisticated primitivism to the metaphysical possibility of genuine violations of laws.     

The Relative Influence of Husbands and Wives on the Choice and Use of Oral Contraception,a Diaphragm,and Condoms1

Little empirical research has tested the traditional assumption that contraceptive behavior in the U.S. lies principally within the wife's sphere of influence. We use a decision-making framework and data collected from 401 married couples to examine the relative influence of husbands and wives over the decisions to discontinue a current contraceptive method and then to select a new one and the decisions that govern regularity of use of an already chosen method. We focus on the specific methods of oral contraception, a diaphragm, and condoms, examining their similarities and differences according to the gender of the user. The results indicate that spouse influence varies according to the type of contraceptive decision being made and the specific method of contraception being used or chosen.     

Ordinary Unconscious Communication in the Therapist/Patient Relationship

ABSTRACT

In this article, I consider the ways in which unconscious communication between therapist and patient is omnipresent in psychoanalytic work. To consider unconscious communication between therapist and patient is to consider psychoanalysis, at its core. The phenomenon of unconscious communication between patient and therapist is a quotidian event. It defines its essential listening stance, with variations associated with different theoretical perspectives. I present several clinical vignettes to illustrate the phenomenon and consider some different theoretical perspectives that bear on the therapist’s uses of self in engaging the ways that one unconscious informs another.     

The Structure of Causal Evidence Based on Eliminative Induction

It is argued that in deterministic contexts evidence for causal relations states whether a boundary condition makes a difference or not to a phenomenon. In order to substantiate the analysis, I show that this difference/indifference making is the basic type of evidence required for eliminative induction in the tradition of Francis Bacon and John Stuart Mill. To this purpose, an account of eliminative induction is proposed with two distinguishing features: it includes a method to establish the causal irrelevance of boundary conditions by means of indifference making, which is called strict method of agreement, and it introduces the notion of a background against which causal statements are evaluated. Causal statements thus become three-place-relations postulating the relevance or irrelevance of a circumstance C to the examined phenomenon P with respect to a background B of further conditions. To underline the importance of evidence in terms of difference/indifference making, I sketch two areas, in which eliminative induction is extensively used in natural and engineering sciences. One concerns exploratory experiments, the other engineering design methods. Given that a method is discussed that has been used for centuries, I make no claims to novelty in this paper, but hope that the combined discussion of several topics that are still somewhat underrepresented in the philosophy of science literature is of some merit.     

On visual access to letter case and lexical/semantic information

Four experiments were designed to investigate automatic processing of letter case and lexical/ semantic information under forward and backward masking conditions that disallowed a visible image. Stimulus displays were letter string pairs; the letter case for each pair matched or mismatched, and the relationship between the two strings within pairs varied. Experiment I required direct Same-Different responses to stimulus pairs, and the results indicate that tasks requiring direct responses to stimulus inputs cannot distinguish between conscious response biases and unconscious use of information. Experiments 2 and 3 employed an indirect index of automatic prerecognition analyses of verbal-linguistic parameters and showed that, with 30-msec pre- and postmasked presentations, letter case, orthographic regularity, and lexical/semantic information are all analyzed in unconscious operations. Experiment 4 demonstrated that, under the viewing conditions of Experiments 2 and 3, subjects had no awareness of the stimulus input.     

Children's Ideas About What Can Really Happen: The Impact of Age and Religious Background

Five- to 11-year-old U.S. children, from either a religious or secular background, judged whether story events could really happen. There were four different types of stories: magical stories violating ordinary causal regularities; religious stories also violating ordinary causal regularities but via a divine agent; unusual stories not violating ordinary causal regularities but with an improbable event; and realistic stories not violating ordinary causal regularities and with no improbable event. Overall, children were less likely to judge that religious and magical stories could really happen than unusual and realistic stories although religious children were more likely than secular children to judge that religious stories could really happen. Irrespective of background, children frequently invoked causal regularities in justifying their judgments. Thus, in justifying their conclusion that a story could really happen, children often invoked a causal regularity, whereas in justifying their conclusion that a story could not really happen, they often pointed to the violation of causal regularity. Overall, the findings show that children appraise the likelihood of story events actually happening in light of their beliefs about causal regularities. A religious upbringing does not impact the frequency with which children invoke causal regularities in judging what can happen, even if it does impact the type of causal factors that children endorse.     

Specious causal attributions in the social sciences: the reformulated stepping-stone theory of heroin use as exemplar

The claims based on causal models employing either statistical or experimental controls are examined and found to be excessive when applied to social or behavioral science data. An exemplary case, in which strong causal claims are made on the basis of a weak version of the regularity model of cause, is critiqued. O'Donnell and Clayton claim that in order to establish that marijuana use is a cause of heroin use (their "reformulated stepping-stone" hypothesis), it is necessary and sufficient to demonstrate that marijuana use precedes heroin use and that the statistically significant association between the two does not vanish when the effects of other variables deemed to be prior to both of them are removed. I argue that O'Donnell and Clayton's version of the regularity model is not sufficient to establish cause and that the planning of social interventions both presumes and requires a generative rather than a regularity causal model. Causal modeling using statistical controls is of value when it compels the investigator to make explicit and to justify a causal explanation but not when it is offered as a substitute for a generative analysis of causal connection.     

Cyberbullying: The right value of the phenomenon. Comments on the paper “Cyberbullying: An overrated phenomenon?”

This comment will try to discuss the point raised by Olweus: is cyberbullying just one type of bullying or a distinct phenomenon and how much does it need a specific approach to be investigated? Specifically I will try to support my perspective taking into consideration five areas of investigation: definition, measurement, association between traditional bullying and cyberbullying, possible consequences and interventions.     

Distributional Stress Regularity: A Corpus Study

The regularity of stress patterns in a language depends on distributional stress regularity, which arises from the pattern of stressed and unstressed syllables, and durational stress regularity, which arises from the timing of syllables. Here we focus on distributional regularity, which depends on three factors. Lexical stress patterning refers to normal stress patterns within words; interlexical stress patterning refers to patterns that arise from word combinations; and contextual stress patterning refers to adjustments in normal lexical stress patterns (such as the well-known phenomenon of “stress clash avoidance”). A corpus study was done to assess the effect of these three factors on distributional stress regularity in conversational and formal spoken English, by comparing the degree of stress regularity in stress-annotated corpus data to randomly manipulated versions of the data and to “citation-form” stress patterns drawn from a phonetic dictionary. The results show that both lexical and interlexical patterning contribute significantly to stress regularity in English; contextual stress patterning does not, and in fact significantly reduces regularity in comparison to citation-form stress patterns.