The teleological/deontological distinction

Conclusion In almost every introductory ethics course the student is taught that there are two basic kinds of moral theories: teleological and deontological. If the conclusions of this paper are correct, this practice must stop. As a minimum, discussion of the teleological/deontological distinction should be replaced by discussions of the axiological/deontological distinction. In addition, the student should be introduced to various of the other fundamental classificatory distinctions. This, I believe, will result in more penetrating theory criticism, and more creative theory construction. The hegemony of the teleological/deontological distinction must end.

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The deontological conception of epistemic justification: a reassessment

This paper undertakes two projects: Firstly, it offers a new account of the so-called deontological conception of epistemic justification (DCEJ). Secondly, it brings out the basic weaknesses of DCEJ, thus accounted for. It concludes that strong reasons speak against its acceptance. The new account takes it departure from William Alston’s influential work. Section 1 argues that a fair account of DCEJ is only achieved by modifying Alston’s account and brings out the crucial difference between DCEJ and the less radical position of epistemic deontologism. Section 2 starts by setting up two fundamental problems for proponents of DCEJ to solve. It argues further that proponents of DCEJ may not convincingly solve those problems by appeal to a notion of permissible belief. Section 3 investigates, whether an appeal to the notion of blameless belief may help DCEJ overcome its central problems. It argues that, even if an appeal to the notion of blameless belief has advantages over an appeal to the notion of permissible belief, DCEJ cannot convincingly overcome the problems set up for it. Further, it is brought out that DCEJ commits its proponents to a problematic non-standard view regarding the intrinsic value of epistemic justification. Section 4 concludes that DCEJ is not the natural conception of epistemic justification, that Alston takes it to be. However, its problems do not leave a scratch on epistemic deontologism, properly conceived.     

The teleological stance: Past,present, and future

We review the support for, and criticisms of, the teleological stance theory, often described as a foundation for goal‐directed action understanding early in life. A major point of contention in the literature has been how teleological processes and assumptions of rationality are represented and understood in infancy, and this debate has been largely centered on three paradigms. Visual habituation studies assess infant's abilities to retrospectively assess teleological processes; the presence of such processes is supported by the literature. Rational imitation is a phenomenon that has been questioned both theoretically and empirically, and there is currently little support for this concept in the literature. The involvement of teleological processes in action prediction is unclear. To date, the ontology of teleological processes remains unspecified. To remedy this, we present a new action‐based theory of teleological processes (here referred to as the embodied account of teleological processes), based on the development of goal‐directed reaching with its origin during the fetal period and continuous development over the first few months of life.     

Death and design: The terror management function of teleological beliefs

Humans have a tendency to endorse teleological beliefs about the world. According to terror management theory, teleological or purposeful beliefs about the world help people cope with the awareness of mortality. Though research is generally consistent with this assertion, it has not been directly tested. Three studies tested and supported the notion that teleological beliefs about the world serve a terror management function. In “Study 1”, experimentally elevated teleological beliefs reduced death-thought accessibility. In “Studies 2 and 3”, mortality salience increased teleological beliefs, even if this resulted in judgment errors. Alternative explanations were tested and did not account for the findings.     

The teleological origins of mentalistic action explanations: A developmental hypothesis

In this paper we shall argue that mentalistic action explanations, which form an essential component of a mature theory of mind, are conceptually and developmentally derived from an earlier and purely teleological interpretational system present in infancy. First we summarize our evidence demonstrating teleological action explanations in one-year-olds. Then we shall briefly contrast the structure of teleological vs. causal mentalistic action explanations and outline four logical possibilities concerning the nature of the developmental relationship between them. We shall argue for the view that causal mentalistic action explanations are constructed as useful theoretical extensions of the earlier, purely teleological, nonmentalistic interpretational stance.     

The scope of teleological thinking in preschool children

These studies explore the scope of young children's teleological tendency to view entities as ‘designed for purposes'. One view (‘Selective Teleology') argues that teleology is an innate, basic mode of thinking that, throughout development, is selectively applied by children and adults to artifacts and biological properties. An alternative proposal (‘Promiscuous Teleology') argues that teleological reasoning derives from children's knowledge of intentionality and is not restricted to any particular category of phenomena until later in development. Two studies explored the predictions of these two hypotheses regarding the scope of children's functional intuitions. Using different methods, both studies found that, unlike adults, preschoolers tend to attribute functions to all kinds of objects – clocks, tigers, clouds and their parts. A third study then explored this finding further by examining whether the developmental effect was due to differences in children's and adults' concept of function. It found that both children and adults predominantly view an object's function as the activity it was designed to perform. Possible explanations for the developmental differences found in the first two studies, and implications for notions of a teleological stance are discussed.     

Function, goals and intention: children's teleological reasoning about objects

A fundamental aspect of adult thought is the 'teleological' tendency to assume that objects exist for a purpose. When seeing an unfamiliar artifact or strange anatomical part on an animal, the first question an adult will usually ask is 'what's that for?' - a query that assumes that the object can be teleologically explained in terms of its function. Current debate focuses on the origin and scope of teleological thought, and its role in children's emerging theories of the biological world. The bias to view objects as 'designed for a purpose' probably derives from children's privileged understanding of intentional behavior and artifacts. This makes children prone to a 'promiscuous teleology' in which artifacts and natural objects of all types are viewed as existing for a function. Because of this, I argue that we should be cautious about taking the existence of an early teleological bias as evidence that there is biological understanding that exists independently of a psychological construal of living things.     

Logical learning theory: A teleological alternative in the field of personality

Logical learning theory (LLT) is presented as a teleological alternative to most current explanations of human behavior An organism construed as intentional is more suitable to many personality/personological accounts than is an organism construed as mechanical It is first established that LLT is a predicational rather than a mechanical explanation of behavior The concept of telosponsivity is then presented as an alternative to the predominant view of behavior as a supposed response to antecedent stimulation Telosponsivity rests on the assumption of dialectical human cognition A review of the early work on affective assessments in human cognition follows Affection is a special case of telosponsivity, and not a physical feeling or emotion per se Evidence drawn from empirical research outside of the strict LLT literature is also adduced in support of its tenets The presentation closes with a survey of current research being conducted on LLT It IS concluded that human agency is a viable theoretical outlook, and that a view resting on such assumptions can be shown to have empirical validity     

Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism

A teleological and behavioral view is presented of the concept of free will. Free will is not something people essentially have or do not have. Instead, the following question is asked: Why does society find it useful to label some actions free and some actions not free? It is argued that the function of such labels is to aid in assigning responsibility to people for their actions. Responsibility in turn is useful in assigning rewards and punishments. The sort of actions that are typically seen as free are the same as those seen as self-controlled. Such actions are responsive to environmental contingencies of relatively wide temporal extent. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Doing,allowing, and disabling: Some principles governing deontological restrictions

Special thanks to Sara Worley, David Finkelstein, David Boonin-Vail, George Panichas, David Gauthier, Michael Thompson, John McDowell, and the referee fromPhilosophical Studies for their insightful comments on earlier drafts.     

The role of frequency information and teleological reasoning in infants' and adults' action prediction

This study investigates the contribution of frequency learning and teleological reasoning to action prediction in 9-month-old infants and adults. Participants observed how an agent repeatedly walked to a goal while taking the longer of 2 possible paths, as the shorter and more efficient path was impassable. In the subsequent test phase, both paths were passable. In the 1st test trial, infants and adults anticipated the agent to take the longer path. Unlike adults, infants kept anticipating movements to the longer path even after observing that the agent now took the more efficient path, indicating that the frequency of previous observations dominates action prediction. These results provide evidence, contrary to existing claims in the developmental literature, that frequency learning underlies action prediction in infancy, whereas teleological reasoning might gain importance later on in life.