Behavioral routines in decision making: the effects of novelty in task presentation and time pressure on routine maintenance and deviation

This article examines the role of behavioral routines in decision making. In order to induce routines, participants were confronted with recurrent route decisions in a computer-controlled trucking game, which allows for manipulation of routine acquisition and strength. During the final round of the game, time pressure and novelty in task presentation were varied as between-factors. It was hypothesized that time pressure would increase the likelihood of routine maintenance and novelty would increase the likelihood of deviation. Besides individual choices, response latencies and self-reports were additionally assessed to measure the amount of deliberation during decision making. Results show that time pressure strongly increased the probability of routine maintenance, even though the situation indicated the inadequacy of the routine. In contrast, novelty in task presentation provoked routine deviation and increased deliberation, as evident from response latencies and self-reports. Copyright © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decision making in a dynamic situation: The effect of false alarms and time pressure

An experiment was conducted to investigate the effect of a priori probability of false alarms and time pressure on decision-making behaviour in a dynamic task environment. In order to assess whether strategy selection in a dynamic task environment would be adaptive, we modelled the task mathematically, and compared actual decision strategies to the optimal ones. In addition to the selected strategy, we also studied decision-making behaviour at a lower operational level, reflecting the amount of effort subjects are willing to spend on the decision process. Subjects were required to monitor the fitness level of a simulated athlete, who was running a race, and had to provide treatments whenever the athlete's fitness level suggested a real physiological problem. When a decline of the athlete's fitness was caused by a false alarm, a spontaneous recovery would occur after some time, without any need for intervention. Time pressure was manipulated by the rate at which the athlete's fitness level declined. Overall, subjects did not select the most efficient strategy: they dominantly selected information before applying an action, even though it would have been more profitable, and less effortful, just to apply actions. At the operational level, subjects appeared to invest less effort when the probability of false alarms increased and to invest more effort when time pressure increased. However, in contrast to the outcomes of our mathematical model, subjects adjusted the amount of intervention to the a priori probability of false alarms and not to time pressure. Together, the results indicate that the selection of a decision strategy in a dynamic task is less adaptive then is generally concluded from studies with static tasks.     

Information selectivity in decision making by younger and older adults

Past research has demonstrated that older adults are more likely than younger adults to exhibit information selectivity in decision making. Two alternative explanations have been proposed to account for this age difference. One explanation attributes the increase in information selectivity to older adults' reliance on prior knowledge, whereas the other explanation suggests that it reflects reduced information processing capacity. The aim of this research was to explore the latter explanation by controlling for experiential factors and varying the cognitive demands involved in decision making. Specifically, participants were faced with unfamiliar decision problems, and had to base their decisions on the available information in order to reach a desired goal. In Experiment 1 younger and older participants were required to play a game involving chance. The outcome payoff was varied between three conditions (approach, avoidance, and control). The results indicated that both the younger and the older participants based their decisions on payoff, though the older participants did so to a lesser extent. In Experiment 2 younger and older participants performed a similar decision task but with higher cognitive demands. Specifically, the decision‐making task included two dimensions of information, outcome probability and outcome payoff. The results showed that the younger participants based their decisions on probability and payoff whereas the older participants based their decisions on probability alone. In Experiment 3 younger and older participants made decisions in a sale context and received instructional cue to incorporate payoff information in their decisions. As before, the younger participants utilized probability and payoff, whereas the older participants based their decisions only on probability information. The findings are discussed in terms of age differences in information‐processing capacity, metacognition, motivation, and goal‐setting.     

A re‐examination of probability matching and rational choice

In a typical probability learning task participants are presented with a repeated choice between two response alternatives, one of which has a higher payoff probability than the other. Rational choice theory requires that participants should eventually allocate all their responses to the high‐payoff alternative, but previous research has found that people fail to maximize their payoffs. Instead, it is commonly observed that people match their response probabilities to the payoff probabilities. We report three experiments on this choice anomaly using a simple probability learning task in which participants were provided with (i) large financial incentives, (ii) meaningful and regular feedback, and (iii) extensive training. In each experiment large proportions of participants adopted the optimal response strategy and all three of the factors mentioned above contributed to this. The results are supportive of rational choice theory. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of routine strength on adaptation and information search in recurrent decision making

The strength of decision routines was manipulated within a computer-controlled micro world simulation involving recurrent decision making. During a learning phase, participants were led to prefer a certain brand of an industrial good either about 15 times in a weak routine or about 30 times in a strong routine condition. In the test phase of Experiment 1, participants were confronted with changes in the microworld that rendered the routine obsolete. Routine maintenance over a series of repeated acquisition decisions was assessed as the major dependent variable. Although new information clearly suggested that a deviation from the routine would be beneficial, strong routine participants were more likely to maintain the routine compared to weak routine participants and a control group in which a comparable option (same outcome probabilities as the routine) carried an unfamiliar brand label. Experiment 2 investigated the effects of routine strength on information search. After having learned the routine, participants were asked to make one final decision involving the routine. The task was either framed as being similar to the learning task or as being novel. Before making the final decision, participants were asked to consider new information about the alternatives. Strong routine participants in the familiar task condition preferred information that favored the routine and avoided unfavorable information. If the task was framed as being novel, such confirmation biases disappeared completely. In contrast, weak routine participants exhibited a moderate confirmation bias in their searches independent from task framing.     

On the generality of optimal versus objective classifier feedback effects on decision criterion learning in perceptual categorization

Biased category payoff matrices engender separate reward- and accuracy-maximizing decision criteria Although instructed to maximize reward, observers use suboptimal decision criteria that place greater emphasis on accuracy than is optimal. In this study, objective classifier feedback (the objectively correct response) was compared with optimal classifier feedback (the optimal classifier's response) at two levels of category discriminability when zero or negative costs accompanied incorrect responses for two payoff matrix multiplication factors. Performance was superior for optimal classifier feedback relative to objective classifier feedback for both zero- and negative-cost conditions, especially when category discriminability was low, but the magnitude of the optimal classifier advantage was approximately equal for zero- and negative-cost conditions. The optimal classifier feedback performance advantage did not interact with the payoff matrix multiplication factor. Model-based analyses suggested that the weight placed on accuracy was reduced for optimal classifier feedback relative to objective classifier feedback and for high category discriminability relative to low category discriminability. In addition, the weight placed on accuracy declined with training when feedback was based on the optimal classifier and remained relatively stable when feedback was based on the objective classifier. These results suggest that feedback based on the optimal classifier leads to superior decision criterion learning across a wide range of experimental conditions.     

Gambling primates: reactions to a modified Iowa Gambling Task in humans,chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys

Humans will, at times, act against their own economic self-interest, for example, in gambling situations. To explore the evolutionary roots of this behavior, we modified a traditional human gambling task, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), for use with chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys and humans. We expanded the traditional task to include two additional payoff structures to fully elucidate the ways in which these primate species respond to differing reward distributions versus overall quantities of rewards, a component often missing in the existing literature. We found that while all three species respond as typical humans do in the standard IGT payoff structure, species and individual differences emerge in our new payoff structures. Specifically, when variance avoidance and reward maximization conflicted, roughly equivalent numbers of apes maximized their rewards and avoided variance, indicating that the traditional payoff structure of the IGT is insufficient to disentangle these competing strategies. Capuchin monkeys showed little consistency in their choices. To determine whether this was a true species difference or an effect of task presentation, we replicated the experiment but increased the intertrial interval. In this case, several capuchin monkeys followed a reward maximization strategy, while chimpanzees retained the same strategy they had used previously. This suggests that individual differences in strategies for interacting with variance and reward maximization are present in apes, but not in capuchin monkeys. The primate gambling task presented here is a useful methodology for disentangling strategies of variance avoidance and reward maximization.     

Relinquishment of control and the type A behavior pattern: the role of performance evaluation

We investigated the role of information processing in the control relinquishment decisions of Type As and Bs. Pairs of subjects worked independently on a task and received feedback indicating that their partner had performed at a comparable or superior level. On a second task, subjects combined their efforts and made decisions concerning who would work on different parts of that task. One third of the subjects made this decision before completing an evaluation of the initial performances. Another third completed the evaluation without knowing that they would subsequently make a control decision. The final third of the subjects completed their evaluations knowing that a control decision would follow. Results indicated that when the evaluations were completed last, or when the evaluations were completed first but without knowledge of the impending decision, Type As relinquished less control to a superior partner than did Type Bs. When the evaluations were completed with knowledge of an impending control decision, Type As and Bs did not differ in their decisions. These results suggest that under certain conditions, Type As use an automatic or mindless decision style with potentially maladaptive consequences.     

Do people learn option or strategy routines in multi-attribute decisions? The answer depends on subtle factors

Various studies have shown that established decision routines may become detrimental in changing environments. Routines can be formed at the level of options or at the level of strategies which has been demonstrated in different lines of research. It is unclear, however, which routinization level is spontaneously preferred if both are possible and equally successful. The first experiment demonstrates that a typical multi-attribute decision task using the MouseLab procedure clearly invites strategy routinization. However, the second experiment shows that this level of routinization is massively context-dependent and will be shifted in line with subtle context cues that direct attention to different aspects of the feedback during learning. Theoretical implications for learning models of decision making are discussed.     

前景理论能否解释花生瓣形效应

为了探讨前景理论能否解释花生瓣形效应(一种风险倾向随决策所涉金额大小而发生变化的效应),研究构建了4个风险概率结构相同但金额大小不同的一系列决策任务,并同时设计两种不同角度的参照点探测任务,以考察博弈活动所花时间的价值或获得情境下对获得的一般期望值能否作为前景理论的参照点,进而使得花生瓣形效应为前景理论所解释。结果发现,以一般期望值为参照点时,前景理论可以对花生瓣形效应作出比较好的解释,但博弈活动所花时间价值不可。     

The executive control of mnemonic activity

The present study focused on the executive monitoring of a rehearsal strategy by sixth (11 years 5 months), tenth (15 years 8 months), and twelfth (17 years 9 months) graders and adults (27 years 4 months). The results showed that all of the adults spontaneously adopted an “optimal” strategy and generalized it to a second task. However, none of the sixth graders and only two tenth and three twelfth graders did so. All of the school subjects subsequently trained to rehearse, maintained the strategy without prompting, and showed evidence of transfer. In comparison to adults, the trained subjects' generalized routines became more similar to the adults' as grade increased. This study supports the notion that efficient executive functioning includes the case where continued use of a mnemonic routine is a reasonable response to an objective change in an information-processing task.     

Dividing Attention Between Tasks: Testing Whether Explicit Payoff Functions Elicit Optimal Dual‐Task Performance

We test people's ability to optimize performance across two concurrent tasks. Participants performed a number entry task while controlling a randomly moving cursor with a joystick. Participants received explicit feedback on their performance on these tasks in the form of a single combined score. This payoff function was varied between conditions to change the value of one task relative to the other. We found that participants adapted their strategy for interleaving the two tasks, by varying how long they spent on one task before switching to the other, in order to achieve the near maximum payoff available in each condition. In a second experiment, we show that this behavior is learned quickly (within 2–3 min over several discrete trials) and remained stable for as long as the payoff function did not change. The results of this work show that people are adaptive and flexible in how they prioritize and allocate attention in a dual‐task setting. However, it also demonstrates some of the limits regarding people's ability to optimize payoff functions.     

Effects of decision criterion on response latencies of binary decisions

The effects of decision criterion on response latencies of binary decisions were examined. The stimuli comprised two, partly overlapping, “normal” distributions of either two-digit numbers or tonal frequencies. Individual stimuli were randomly sampled from the distributions, and subjects had to decide from which distribution the stimulus was sampled. The decision goal was to maximize the expected gain using three different payoff matrices. Decision latencies with and without prior knowledge of optimal decision criteria were measured. In a control task, subjects were asked only to label stimuli as being either above or below the optimal criteria (without regard for a posteriori probabilities or expected gain). The relation between criterion and latency was examined by means of a trial-by-trial analysis of the stimuli and the responses. Response latency was inversely related both to the distance between the stimulus and the decision criterion and to the probability of the response elicited by the stimulus. Response latencies showed a maximum at the criterion in all conditions. These results were obtained with different stimulus modalities (tones or numbers), different discriminability levels within the auditory modality, and ifferent decision tasks. It is proposed that the decision criterion is the primary determinant of response latencies of binary decisions.     

任务重要性对决策策略有效性的影响

研究以选择决策中决策任务的主观性为关注点,通过现场和实验室两项实验考察决策任务重要性对启发式和分析式策略有效性的影响。结果发现,在感知任务重要的情况下,采用分析式策略的被试决策后满意度高于采用启发式策略的被试;在感知任务不重要情况下,采用启发式策略的被试决策后满意度高于采用分析式策略的被试。研究表明,决策者感知到的任务重要与否会影响启发式和分析式两种决策策略的效果。     

Decision making with the "adaptive toolbox": influence of environmental structure,intelligence, and working memory load

In 2 experiments with a total of 220 participants, the tendency to use simple heuristics such as the take the best heuristic in an adaptive manner was investigated. In a simulated stock market paradigm, the payoff structure of environments was varied, favoring either compensatory or noncompensatory decision strategies in terms of expected long-term payoff. In both experiments, the majority of participants were classified as using strategies that were adequate for the environment, supporting the notion of adaptive strategy selection. These strategy shifts were moderated by intelligence, as measured with common tests. Neither an additional learning phase (Experiment 1) nor working memory load or working memory capacity (Experiment 2) had additional effects on strategy selection.     

Allocation of effort as a function of payoffs for individual tasks in a multitasking environment

SYNWORK1 software allows the examination of how payoffs affect the allocation of effort by people when they perform four different tasks (memory search, arithmetic, visual monitoring, and auditory monitoring). In a previous study (Wang, Proctor, & Pick, 2007), we showed that participants adopted multitasking strategies allocating relative effort appropriate to payoff differences between the arithmetic and memory tasks, but that they exhibited residual effects of prior payoffs when the payoffs were switched. In the present study, we varied the payoff in two different experiments for only one of these tasks, the memory task in Experiment 1 and the arithmetic task in Experiment 2. Doing this allowed consideration of performance for both the task for which payoff changed explicitly and the other cognitive task, for which the payoff difference was implicit (i.e., relative to the explicit payoff that was manipulated). Although participants adjusted performance on the task for which the payoff explicitly varied, the payoff manipulation had less effect than did the explicit payoff manipulations for both tasks used previously. Also, the change in effort on a task resulting from explicitly increasing its payoff was less than that from decreasing the payoff. SYNWORK1 is a good environment for studying multitasking, but has several limitations that need to be addressed to provide a synthetic work environment that allows investigation of a wider range of theoretically relevant issues.     

Understanding cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game

In the standard one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants often choose to cooperate, when the optimal strategy is to defect. This puzzling finding has attracted considerable interest both in terms of possible computational frameworks for modeling human judgment, but also regarding the more general debate of human altruism. In this research, we ask how much of human behavior in this task can be explained by a putative bias for cooperative behavior and whether this, in turn, is influenced by personality. We compared performance on the standard task with performance on a matched neutral one; we manipulated the optimal strategy (defect or cooperate); and we manipulated the amount of payoff for responding optimally. Results revealed little evidence for a bias for cooperative behavior, but significant associations with the personality factors of Behavioural Activation System (BAS) Reward Responsivity and Agreeableness were found. These findings are discussed in terms of the attempt to explain judgment in one-shot, Prisoner’s Dilemma tasks with statistical or probabilistic models.     

Probability matching, accuracy maximization, and a test of the optimal classifier's independence assumption in perceptual categorization

Observers completed perceptual categorization tasks that included 25 base-rate/payoff conditions constructed from the factorial combination of five base-rate ratios (1:3, 1:2, 1:1, 2:1, and 3:1) with five payoff ratios (1:3, 1:2, 1:1, 2:1, and 3:1). This large database allowed an initial comparison of the competition between reward and accuracy maximization (COBRA) hypothesis with a competition between reward maximization and probability matching (COBRM) hypothesis, and an extensive and critical comparison of the flat-maxima hypothesis with the independence assumption of the optimal classifier. Model-based instantiations of the COBRA and COBRM hypotheses provided good accounts of the data, but there was a consistent advantage for the COBRM instantiation early in learning and for the COBRA instantiation later in learning. This pattern held in the present study and in a reanalysis of Bohil and Maddox (2003). Strong support was obtained for the flat-maxima hypothesis over the independence assumption, especially as the observers gained experience with the task. Model parameters indicated that observers' reward-maximizing decision criterion rapidly approaches the optimal value and that more weight is placed on accuracy maximization in separate base-rate/payoff conditions than in simultaneous base-rate/payoff conditions. The superiority of the flat-maxima hypothesis suggests that violations of the independence assumption are to be expected, and are well captured by the flat-maxima hypothesis, with no need for any additional assumptions.     

Decisions from experience: How groups and individuals adapt to change

Whether groups make better judgments and decisions than individuals has been studied extensively, but most of this research has focused on static tasks. How do groups and individuals compare in settings where the decision environment changes unexpectedly and without notification? This article examines group and individual behavior in decisions from experience where the underlying probabilities change after some trials. Consistent with the previous literature, the results showed that groups performed better than the average individual while the decision task was stable. However, group performance was no longer superior after a change in the decision environment. Group performance was closer to the benchmark of Bayesian updating, which assumed perfect memory. Findings suggest that groups did not adopt decision routines that might have delayed their adaption to change in the environment. Rather, they seem to have coordinated their responses, which led them to behave as if they had better memory and subsequently delayed adaptation.     

Temporal Discounting Mechanisms of Future‐oriented Coping: Evidence from Delay Discounting and Task Prioritization Paradigms

Four studies were conducted to examine the relationship between future‐oriented coping and temporal discounting under different situational conditions. In Study 1, 138 participants were primed with either stressful or neutral stimuli, followed by a delay‐discounting task. In Study 2, 118 participants were primed with either stressful or neutral stimuli, followed by a task‐prioritization activity. The results of both studies indicated that future‐oriented coping had a significant negative association with temporal discounting or the number of rational choices in the neutral‐priming condition, but the relationship was not significant in the stress‐priming condition. In Study 3, qualitative data revealed that the major reason for shifting choices from larger but later payoffs to smaller but sooner rewards in a stressful condition was to reduce the stressful mood, create a positive mood, and promote a sense of accomplishment. This explanation was corroborated by Study 4, in which one group was allowed to choose an immediate payoff and the other group was blocked from choosing that immediate payoff. We confirmed that post‐test anxiety was significantly lower in the immediate payoff group compared with the delayed‐payoff group in proactive and preventive coping, using pre‐test anxiety as a covariate. Preventive coping helped to reduce anxiety levels in a stressful condition only when there was a choice to obtain an immediate payoff. These findings underscore the relationship between future‐oriented coping and temporal discounting, as well as the flexibility of discounting in the face of stress. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.