Adaptive and maladaptive ruminative self-focus during emotional processing

Ruminative self-focus on mood, problems and other aspects of self-experience can have both mal adaptive consequences, perpetuating depression, and, adaptive consequences, promoting recovery from upsetting events. Increasing evidence suggests that these contrasting effects may be explained by distinct varieties of ruminative self-focus, each with distinct functional properties. This study tested the prediction (Emotional processing, three modes of mind and the prevention of relapse in depression. Behav. Res. Therapy, 37 (1999) S53) that an experiential mode of self-focused attention would facilitate recovery from an upsetting event in comparison to a conceptual-evaluative mode of self-focused attention. To test these contrasting effects experimentally, 69 participants wrote about an induced failure experience in either a conceptual-evaluative condition (e.g. "Why did you feel this way?"), or an experiential condition ("How did you feel moment-by-moment?"). Consistent with the hypothesis, higher levels of trait disposition to ruminate were associated with relatively greater increases in negative mood 12 h after the failure in the conceptual-evaluative condition compared to the experiential condition. Furthermore, the conceptual-evaluative condition resulted in more intrusions about the failure than the experiential condition. These results support the differentiation of rumination into distinct modes of self-focused attention with distinct functional effects; a conceptual-evaluative mode that is maladaptive and an experiential mode that is adaptive.     

Compound cue processing within the fast and frugal heuristics approach in nonlinearly separable environments

Three experiments investigated whether participants used Take The Best (TTB) Configural, a fast and frugal heuristic that processes configurations of cues when making inferences concerning which of two alternatives has a higher criterion value. Participants were presented with a compound cue that was nonlinearly separable from its elements. The compound was highly valid in Experiments 1 and 2, but invalid in Experiment 3. Participants’ causal mental models were manipulated via instructions: participants were either told that cues acted through the same causal mechanism (configural causal model), through different causal mechanisms (elemental causal model), or the causal mechanisms were not specified (neutral causal model). A high percentage of participants used TTB-Configural when they had a configural causal model and a highly valid compound existed, suggesting that causal knowledge can be incorporated in otherwise very basic cognitive mechanisms to allow fine-grained adaptation to complex task structures.     

Psychological plausibility of the theory of probabilistic mental models and the fast and frugal heuristics

The theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM; G. Gigerenzer, U. Hoffrage, & H. Kleinb?lting, 1991) has had a major influence on the field of judgment and decision making, with the most recent important modifications to PMM theory being the identification of several fast and frugal heuristics (G. Gigerenzer & D. G. Goldstein, 1996). These heuristics were purported to provide psychologically plausible cognitive process models that describe a variety of judgment behavior. In this article, the authors evaluate the psychological plausibility of the assumptions upon which PMM were built and, consequently, the psychological plausibility of several of the fast and frugal heuristics. The authors argue that many of PMM theory's assumptions are questionable, given available data, and that fast and frugal heuristics are, in fact, psychologically implausible.     

Adaptive regression and types of cognitive flexibility

The relationship between adaptive regression and cognitive flexibility was explored in a group of 42 college students. Adaptive regression was measured with the Holt scoring system for the Rorschach. One type of cognitive flexibility was measured by Guilford's tests of divergent production (Word Fluency, Associational Fluency, and Alternate Uses) and a second type by Mednick's Remote Associates Test. Adaptive regression was found to be significantly positively related to the Remote Associates Test in males but not in females. Adaptive regression was found to be unrelated to divergent production tests. These relationships were not found to be mediated by Rorschach productivity or verbal intelligence. A two-stage process was proposed to account for the cognitive operations underlying adaptive regression and the Remote Associates Test. The first stage is seen as a generative (primary process) stage, while the second stage is seen as an evaluative (secondary process) stage. Possible reasons for sex differences were also discussed.     

Fast and frugal heuristics and naturalistic decision making: a review of their commonalities and differences

Both the fast and frugal heuristics (FFHs) and the naturalistic decision making (NDM) research programmes have identified important areas of inquiry previously neglected in the traditional study of human judgment and decision making, and have greatly contributed to the understanding of people's real-world decision making under environmental constraints. The two programmes share similar theoretical arguments regarding the rationality, optimality, and role of experience in decision making. Their commonalities have made them appealing to each other, and efforts have been made, by their leading academics, to promote synergy and integration. However, there has been little progress towards this during the last decade. This paper seeks to address this gap by seeking to better understand their commonalities and differences. To do so, literature relating to the two programmes is reviewed. The findings of the review indicated that an integration of the two could enhance FFHs' field research in applied settings, facilitate its investigation on boundary conditions of people's decision strategy selection, enable NDM to embrace emerging research opportunities in the age of big data, as well as permit each programme to enlighten the research topics and to validate the research findings of the other.     

Not so fast! (and not so frugal!): rethinking the recognition heuristic

The 'fast and frugal' approach to reasoning (Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. New York: Oxford University Press) claims that individuals use non-compensatory strategies in judgment--the idea that only one cue is taken into account in reasoning. The simplest and most important of these heuristics postulates that judgment sometimes relies solely on recognition. However, the studies that have investigated usage of the recognition heuristic have confounded recognition with other cues that could also lead to similar judgments. This paper tests whether mere recognition is actually driving the findings in support of the recognition heuristic. Two studies provide evidence that judgments do not conform to the recognition heuristic when these confounds are accounted for. Implications for the study of simple heuristics are discussed.     

When one cue is not enough: Combining fast and frugal heuristics with compound cue processing

One-reason decision-making heuristics as proposed by Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999) Gigerenzer, G. and Todd, P. M. 1999. “Fast and frugal heuristics: The adaptive toolbox”. In Simple heuristics that make us smart, Edited by: Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M. and the ABC Research Group. 3–34. New York: Oxford University Press.  [Google Scholar] have been shown to perform accurately. However, such strategies cannot deal with compound cues. We propose the Take The Best Configural Cue (TTB-Configural) as a fast and frugal heuristic that processes compound cues. In a series of three experiments, we analysed whether participants used this heuristic when making cue-based inferences on which of two alternatives had a higher criterion value. In two of the experiments, two cues were amalgamated into a valid compound cue by applying the AND or the OR logical rule, respectively. In the third experiment, there was no valid compound cue. Within each experiment, we also manipulated causal mental models through instructions. In the configural causal model, cues were said to act through the same causal mechanism. In the elemental causal model, cues were said to act through different causal mechanisms. In the neutral causal model, the causal mechanism was not specified. When a highly valid compound existed, and participants had a configural causal model, for the majority of them the strategy that could best account for their choices was TTB-Configural. Otherwise, the strategy that best predicted their choices was the Take The Best (TTB) heuristic.     

When one cue is not enough: combining fast and frugal heuristics with compound cue processing

One-reason decision-making heuristics as proposed by Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999) have been shown to perform accurately. However, such strategies cannot deal with compound cues. We propose the Take The Best Configural Cue (TTB-Configural) as a fast and frugal heuristic that processes compound cues. In a series of three experiments, we analysed whether participants used this heuristic when making cue-based inferences on which of two alternatives had a higher criterion value. In two of the experiments, two cues were amalgamated into a valid compound cue by applying the AND or the OR logical rule, respectively. In the third experiment, there was no valid compound cue. Within each experiment, we also manipulated causal mental models through instructions. In the configural causal model, cues were said to act through the same causal mechanism. In the elemental causal model, cues were said to act through different causal mechanisms. In the neutral causal model, the causal mechanism was not specified. When a highly valid compound existed, and participants had a configural causal model, for the majority of them the strategy that could best account for their choices was TTB-Configural. Otherwise, the strategy that best predicted their choices was the Take The Best (TTB) heuristic.     

Interplay of biomechanical constraints and kinematic strategies in selecting arm postures

In this study, the authors examined the interplay between biomechanics and control strategies in the resolution of excess degrees of freedom at the joint level. Seven participants made aimed arm movements from 30 starting points and several starting postures to targets. Final arm postures for movements to a target exhibited substantial joint angle variation. Through regression modeling and by comparing observed final arm postures with biomechanically plausible postures, the authors identified 3 kinematic strategies: (a) Maintain deviations from the average angle at the starting point to the joint's final posture; (b) make torso rotations that are a fixed proportion of shoulder rotations; and (c) adopt a characteristic combination of 4 wrist-positioning approaches. The results demonstrated that kinematic strategies can account for substantial variance in final arm postures, if one takes into account 2 types of individual differences-those that arise inevitably from biomechanical constraints and those that reflect choices in movement strategy.     

Adaptive and maladaptive narcissism among university faculty, clergy, politicians, and librarians

Some adaptive narcissistic characteristics may be prevalent in individuals in occupa-tions that involve leadership or authority, provide social attention and prestige, or require a confident social presentation. The present study investigated the expectation that narcissistic characteristics would be more prevalent in higher status occupations involving frequent opportunities for attention and admiration from others. Of four occupations sampled, politicians scored highest in total narcissism, as well as in leadership and authority; university faculty and librarians did not score particularly high or low on any narcissism indices; and clergy were lowest in exploitativeness and entitlement, which represent the more maladaptive aspects of narcissism. The results were discussed with respect to Holland's (1985) classification of vocational personali-ties.     

Reading strategies of fast and slow readers

In three subject-paced experiments we evaluated reading patterns at the word, line, and sentence level for fast and slow readers. A moving-window method was used to collect word reading times for natural texts. At the word level, reading times of word N were influenced by features of word N-1 for fast readers but not for slow readers. The lag effect exhibited by fast readers indicates that they continue to process a word when it is no longer in view, thus limiting the notion of immediate processing. Contrary to our initial expectation that fast readers would process only a single new argument from a sentence, whereas slow readers would process several new arguments, we found that both reader groups adopted a many-argument strategy. However, fast and slow readers differed in terms of the text units (lines vs. sentences) defining the new-argument effects: Fast readers exhibited greater new-argument effects relative to lines, whereas slow readers exhibited greater new-argument effects relative to sentences. Specifically, slow readers integrated the new arguments primarily at the end of the sentence, whereas fast readers did so at line boundaries. These results are discussed in terms of a buffer-and-integrate model of reading comprehension.     

Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making

Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral relevance to choices, (2) how moral judgment is subject to task constraints that shift evaluative focus (to moral rules vs. to consequences), and (3) how differences in the propensity to rely on intuitive reactions affect judgment. In Study 1, judgments were affected by rated agreement with moral rules proscribing harm, whether the dilemma under consideration made moral rules versus consequences of choice salient, and by thinking styles (intuitive vs. deliberative). In Studies 2 and 3, participants evaluated policy decisions to knowingly do harm to a resource to mitigate greater harm or to merely allow the greater harm to happen. When evaluated in isolation, approval for decisions to harm was affected by endorsement of moral rules and by thinking style. When both choices were evaluated simultaneously, total harm -- but not the do/allow distinction -- influenced rated approval. These studies suggest that moral rules play an important, but context-sensitive role in moral cognition, and offer an account of when emotional reactions to perceived moral violations receive less weight than consideration of costs and benefits in moral judgment and decision making.     

Perceptual encoding and decision strategies for integral dimensions

These three experiments employed rectangles in stimulus identification tasks. Consistent with the stimulus set used by Weintraub, the rectangles were generated by modifying a square. Across experiments, the number of stimulus/response alternatives was varied (two-, three-, and four-choice tasks). In the two-choice task, redundancy gain for the positively correlated set was just as large as for the negatively correlated set. In contrast, reaction time ws faster for the negatively correlated set than for the positively correlated set in the three-choice task (after extended practice) and in the four-choice task. Considered in the context of previous research, the data support two conclusions. First, the initial perceptual processing of rectangles is accomplished by separate dimensional analyzers operating in parallel. Second, observers adopt a different decision strategy for the negatively correlated set than for the positively correlated and the single dimension sets when the number of stimulus/response alternatives is increased.     

Take-the-best in expert-novice decision strategies for residential burglary

We examined the decision strategies and cue use of experts and novices in a consequential domain: crime. Three participant groups decided which of two residential properties was more likely to be burgled, on the basis of eight cues such as location of the property. The two expert groups were experienced burglars and police officers, and the novice group was composed of graduate students. We found that experts’ choices were best predicted by a lexicographic heuristic strategy called take-the-best that implies noncompensatory information processing, whereas novices’ choices were best predicted by a weighted additive linear strategy that implies compensatory processing. The two expert groups, however, differed in the cues they considered important in making their choices, and the police officers were actually more similar to novices in this regard. These findings extend the literature on judgment, decision making, and expertise, and have implications for criminal justice policy.     

Conflicting strategies and hemispheric suppression in a lexical decision task

The research tests the prediction of the inhibitory-interaction hypothesis that experience with a task accentuates the functional imbalance between the hemispheres. Right-handed males who were experienced readers were presented a letter string to the centre visual field for lexical decision. The string was or was not accompanied by a blinking light to the left or right visual field. It was predicted that asymmetry would be greatest for strings that spelled words, less for strings that were orthographically correct (pseudowords) and least for strings that were orthographically incorrect (nonwords) because efficient adult readers have more experience with letter strings that do than do not spell a word, and have more experience with orthographically correct than incorrect letter strings. The analysis of response times supported the prediction. Moreover, in the nonword and in early trials of the pseudoword conditions, response times were faster when one or other hemisphere was distracted than when both were engaged suggesting the hemispheres use strategies that conflict when suppression has not been accentuated by practice. As well, as the trials progressed in the pseudoword condition, asymmetry reversed before increasing suggesting that the hemispheres reduce conflict by competing for and then strengthening suppression.     

Concurrency benefits in the attentional blink: Attentional flexibility and shifts of decision criteria

Fundamental limitations in performing multiple tasks concurrently are well illustrated by the attentional blink (AB) deficit, which refers to the difficulty in reporting a second target (T2) when it is presented shortly after a first target (T1). Surprisingly, recent studies have shown that the AB, which is often thought of as a manifestation of capacity limitations in central processing, can be reduced when the AB task is performed simultaneously with concurrent distracting activities. In the present study, we sought to investigate whether such concurrency benefits would also be observed when the AB task was performed concurrently with a central demanding timing task. The AB was reduced under concurrent-task conditions, as compared with single-AB-task conditions, even though T1 performance was unaffected by the concurrent task. Moreover, shifts in decision criteria were found to be associated with the concurrency benefit effect.     

Adaptive versus veridical decision making and the frontal lobes

Adaptive decision making and veridical decision making are based on different mechanisms. Veridical decision making is based on the identification of the correct response, which is intrinsic to the external situation and is actor-independent. Adaptive decision making is actor-centered and is guided by the actor's priorities. The prefrontal cortex is particularly critical for adaptive decision making and less so for veridical decision making. However, most experimental procedures used in cognitive psychology and neuropsychology focus on veridical decision making and ignore adaptive decision making. Innovative experimental procedures are required to characterize the contribution of the prefrontal cortex to adaptive decision making. We have designed a prototype for such procedures, the Cognitive Bias Task, and present the novel findings generated by this task.     

The aging decision maker: cognitive aging and the adaptive selection of decision strategies

Are older adults' decision abilities fundamentally compromised by age-related cognitive decline? Or can they adaptively select decision strategies? One study (N = 163) investigated the impact of cognitive aging on the ability to select decision strategies as a function of environment structure. Participants made decisions in either an environment that favored the use of information-intensive strategies or one favoring the use of simple, information-frugal strategies. Older adults tended to (a) look up less information and take longer to process it and (b) use simpler, less cognitively demanding strategies. In accordance with the idea that age-related cognitive decline leads to reliance on simpler strategies, measures of fluid intelligence explained age-related differences in information search and strategy selection. Nevertheless, both young and older adults seem to be equally adapted decision makers in that they adjust their information search and strategy selection as a function of environment structure, suggesting that the aging decision maker is an adaptive one.     

Effects of stereotypes on decision making and information-processing strategies

In two experiments we investigated the effects of stereotyping on (a) reactions to a behavioral transgression and (b) the recall of information bearing on it. Subjects read a case file describing a transgression committed by a target (in Experiment 1, a job-related infraction; in Experiment 2, a criminal act). In some cases, the target's transgression was stereotypic of the target's ethnic group (conveyed through his name), and in other cases it was not. After reading the case file, subjects judged the likelihood that the transgression would recur and recommended punishment for the offense. These judgment data supported the hypothesis that stereotypes function as judgmental heuristics. Specifically, subjects used a stereotype of the target to infer the reasons for his transgression, and then based their punishment decisions on the implications of these inferences, considering other relevant information only when a stereotype-based explanation of the behavior was not available. However, recall data suggested that once a stereotype-based impression of the crime and its determinants was formed, subjects reviewed other available information in an attempt to confirm the implications of this impression. This led to differential recall of presented information, depending on whether its implications were consistent with, inconsistent with, or irrelevant to those of the stereotype.