Visual mental representations supporting object drawing: How naming a novel object with a novel count noun impacts on young children's object drawing

Object drawing can be supported by a number of cognitive resources, each making available visual information about the object being drawn. These resources include perceptual input, short-term visual memory, and long-term visual memory. Each of these resources has the potential to make available distinct forms of visual representation, including viewpoint-specific and viewpoint-independent representations, object-specific and category representations, and separate representations of object colour. We review neuropsychological and developmental evidence supporting these claims, including evidence that the same drawing can reflect the influence of multiple forms of visual representation. Seven experiments are then reported, investigating object drawing by 4- to 6-year-old children, to confirm the support for drawing provided by different forms of visual representation. Young children are selected for investigation because their drawing is relatively unconstrained by culturally determined norms which, in our culture, dictate that objects should be drawn just as they appear from the vantage point of the drawer. To distinguish the support provided by object and category representations, the experiments exploit the privileged links between count nouns as object labels, and representations of object categories. In addition, pre-established representations, visual or otherwise, are precluded from influencing drawing by asking the children to draw novel objects, and by creating novel count nouns with which to label the objects. The results reveal how viewpoint-specific perceptual representations, object-specific representations of shape and of colour, and category representations of shape can each impact on object drawing, and in some circumstances on the same drawing. It appears that simple drawing tasks have the potential to reveal some of the distinct types of representation able to support visual cognition.     

Simplicity versus likelihood in visual perception: from surprisals to precisals

The likelihood principle states that the visual system prefers the most likely interpretation of a stimulus, whereas the simplicity principle states that it prefers the most simple interpretation. This study investigates how close these seemingly very different principles are by combining findings from classical, algorithmic, and structural information theory. It is argued that, in visual perception, the two principles are perhaps very different with respect to the viewpoint-independent aspects of perception but probably very close with respect to the viewpoint-dependent aspects which, moreover, seem decisive in everyday perception. This implies that either principle may have guided the evolution of visual systems and that the simplicity paradigm may provide perception models with the necessary quantitative specifications of the often plausible but also intuitive ideas provided by the likelihood paradigm.     

Multiple views of spatial memory

Recent evidence indicates that mental representations of large (i.e., navigable) spaces are viewpoint dependent when observers are restricted to a single view. The purpose of the present study was to determine whether two views of a space would produce a single viewpoint-independent representation or two viewpoint-dependent representations. Participants learned the locations of objects in a room from two viewpoints and then made judgments of relative direction from imagined headings either aligned or misaligned with the studied views. The results indicated that mental representations of large spaces were viewpoint dependent, and that two views of a spatial layout appeared to produce two viewpoint-dependent representations in memory. Imagined headings aligned with the study views were more accessible than were novel headings in terms of both speed and accuracy of pointing judgments.     

Parameters, Predictions, and Evidence in Computational Modeling: A Statistical View Informed by ACT-R

Model validation in computational cognitive psychology often relies on methods drawn from the testing of theories in experimental physics. However, applications of these methods to computational models in typical cognitive experiments can hide multiple, plausible sources of variation arising from human participants and from stochastic cognitive theories, encouraging a "model fixed, data variable" paradigm that makes it difficult to interpret model predictions and to account for individual differences. This article proposes a likelihood-based, "data fixed, model variable" paradigm in which models are treated as stochastic processes in experiments with participant-to-participant variation that can be applied to a broad range of mechanistic cognitive architectures. This article discusses the implementation and implications of this view in model validation, with a concrete focus on a simple class of ACT-R models of cognition. This article is not intended as a recipe for broad application of these preliminary, proof-of-concept methods, but as a framework for communication between statisticians searching for interesting problems in the cognitive modeling sphere, and cognitive modelers interested in generalizing from deterministic to stochastic model validation, in the face of random variation in human experimental data.     

Aging increases inattentional blindness to the gorilla in our midst

When engaged in an attention-demanding task, people are surprisingly vulnerable to inattentional blindness--the failure to notice an unexpected event. Two theories of cognitive aging, attentional capacity models and inhibitory deficit models, make opposite predictions about age differences in susceptibility to inattentional blindness. We tested these predictions using an inattentional blindness paradigm developed by Simons and Chabris (1999) and found that older adults were more likely to experience inattentional blindness than young adults. These results are compatible with attentional capacity models of cognitive aging but not with current inhibitory deficit models.     

生成认知：理论基础与实践走向

生成认知是具身认知思潮中的一个新取向。它主张认知是通过身体活动“生成的” (enacted)。认知的起点不是一个怎样精确表征世界的信息加工问题, 而是行动者在情境中怎样利用知觉来指导自己的行动。认知不是通过精确的心理表征“恢复”世界, 而是通过知觉引导的行动“生成”或“造就”一个自己的世界。认知是具身的行动, 认知结构形成于经常和反复出现的感觉运动模式, 与身体构造和身体活动具有深刻连续性。梅洛·庞蒂的身体现象学对生成认知具有深刻影响。同时, 詹姆斯、杜威等人的实用主义哲学对于实践行动的强调也深刻影响了生成认知。这种认知观强调了“行动”对心智的意义, 引发许多争议, 也促进了心理学研究范式的转变。     

How cognitive load affects duration judgments: A meta-analytic review

A meta-analysis of 117 experiments evaluated the effects of cognitive load on duration judgments. Cognitive load refers to information-processing (attentional or working-memory) demands. Six types of cognitive load were analyzed to resolve ongoing controversies and to test current duration judgment theories. Duration judgments depend on whether or not participants are informed in advance that they are needed: prospective paradigm (informed) versus retrospective paradigm (not informed). With higher cognitive load, the prospective duration judgment ratio (subjective duration to objective duration) decreases but the retrospective ratio increases. Thus, the duration judgment ratio differs depending on the paradigm and the specific type of cognitive load. As assessed by the coefficient of variation, relative variability of prospective, but not retrospective, judgments increases with cognitive load. The prospective findings support models emphasizing attentional resources, especially executive control. The retrospective findings support models emphasizing memory changes. Alternative theories do not fit with the meta-analytic findings and are rejected.     

特征捆绑机制的理论模型

捆绑问题被认为是认知科学和神经科学的中心问题之一,对心理过程的认知神经机制研究起到了重要推动作用。特征捆绑机制研究有认知和神经科学两大范式。特征整合论在认知理论中最具代表性,形式理论修正了其在错觉性结合测量等方面的不足,双阶段理论突出了前注意捆绑。时间同步性理论是影响最大的捆绑理论,神经网络模型为捆绑机制提出了更具体的结构模型。两大范式的整合及由低级认知过程向高级心理过程的深化可能是今后捆绑机制研究的重点     

Domain generality and domain specificity in aesthetic appreciation

Aesthetic appreciation is looked at with respect to domain generality and domain specificity. Within the classic cognitive paradigm, modality- and domain-specific receptive processes are explored. These are then complemented with central processing structures. These reveal domain-specific as well as domain-general processing. Extending the classic cognitive science approach, the role of emotion in aesthetic appreciation is also explored. While domain-specific models of aesthetic appreciation are clearly called for, there are also numerous domain-general subprocesses and structures.     

Mental models of line drawings.

Mental models are internal representations of world structure, used to accomplish cognitive tasks. I postulate specific representations (of objects and images) and associated context (of world and view) for mental models of line drawings. I then analyze the representations and context to predict specific perceptual modes, including the relative strengths of these modes. The predicted modes are supported by a well-known example [from Rock, 1983 The Logic of Perception (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)] where object perception changes with image orientation.     

A repetition-suppression account of between-trial effects in a modified Stroop paradigm

Theories that postulate cognitive inhibition are very common in psychology and cognitive neuroscience [e.g., Hasher, L., Lustig, C., & Zacks, R. T. (2007). Inhibitory mechanisms and the control of attention. In A. Conway, C. Jarrold, M. Kane, A. Miyake, A. Towse, & J. Towse (Eds.), Variation in working memory (pp. 227-249). New York, NY: Oxford, University Press], although they have recently been severely criticized [e.g., MacLeod, C. M., Dodd, M. D., Sheard, E. D., Wilson, D. E., & Bibi, U. (2003). In opposition to inhibition. In H. Ross (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 43, pp. 163-214). Elsevier Science]. This paper poses and attempts to answer the question whether a research program with cognitive inhibition as its main theoretical assumption is still worth pursuing. We present a set of empirical data from a modified Stroop paradigm that replicates previously reported findings. These findings refer to between-trial effects previously described in the literature on Stroop, negative priming, and inhibition-of-return. Existing theoretical accounts fail to explain all these effects in an integrated way. A repetition-suppression mechanism is proposed in order to account for these data. This mechanism is instantiated as a computational cognitive model. The theoretical implications of this model are discussed.     

Highly reflective reasoners show no signs of belief inhibition

The processes underlying individual differences in reasoning performance are not entirely understood. What do people who do well on reasoning tasks where beliefs and logic conflict do differently from other people? Because abundant evidence shows that even poorer reasoners detect these conflicts, it has been suggested that individual differences in reasoning performance arise from inhibition failures later in the reasoning process. The present paper argues that a minority of highly skilled reasoners may deviate from this general reasoning process from an early stage. Two studies investigated signs of belief inhibition using a lexical access paradigm (Study 1) and a negative priming paradigm (Study 2). Study 1 showed that while other people exhibited signs of belief inhibition following a belief–logic conflict, people with the highest disposition for cognitive reflection did not. In Study 2, this finding was replicated and similar results were also obtained when comparing groups with higher and lower general cognitive ability. Two possible explanations are discussed.     

In defense of representation

The computational paradigm, which has dominated psychology and artificial intelligence since the cognitive revolution, has been a source of intense debate. Recently, several cognitive scientists have argued against this paradigm, not by objecting to computation, but rather by objecting to the notion of representation. Our analysis of these objections reveals that it is not the notion of representation per se that is causing the problem, but rather specific properties of representations as they are used in various psychological theories. Our analysis suggests that all theorists accept the idea that cognitive processing involves internal information-carrying states that mediate cognitive processing. These mediating states are a superordinate category of representations. We discuss five properties that can be added to mediating states and examine their importance in various cognitive models. Finally, three methodological lessons are drawn from our analysis and discussion.     

分类研究中的原型与样例观

该文具体分析了现代认知心理学对分类问题的主要看法,指出了当前分类研究范式存在的问题及今后进一步研究的主要方向。     

Recognizing novel views of three-dimensional objects.

The purpose of the experiments reported was to examine how novel, three-dimensional shapes are represented in long-term memory and how this might be differentially affected by monocular and binocular viewing. Three experiments were conducted. The first experiment established that slide projections of the novel objects could be recognized readily if seen in the same orientation as seen during learning. The second and third experiments examined generalization to novel depth rotations of the objects. The second experiment used slide projections of the objects. The results indicated that the representation of the objects seen during training was quite viewpoint-specific as recognition of objects in novel orientations was relatively poor. In the third experiment subjects were shown the real objects under monocular or binocular viewing. Overall, the results are consistent with a growing body of recent research showing that, at least under certain conditions, the visual system stores viewpoint-specific representations of objects.     

Contribution of lexico-semantic processes to verbal short-term memory tasks: a PET activation study

Recent studies have demonstrated the intervention of long-term memory processes in verbal STM tasks and several cognitive models have been proposed to explain these effects. A PET study was performed in order to determine whether supplementary cerebral areas are involved when subjects have to execute short-term memory tasks for items having representations in long-term memory (in comparison to items without such representations: words vs non-words). Results indicate that verbal STM for words specifically involves the left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) and temporo-parietal junction (BA 39). These areas can be associated with lexical and semantic processes. These results are in agreement with cognitive models that postulate the simultaneous influence of lexical and semantic long-term representations on verbal STM processes and/or a lexico-semantic buffer.     

Cognitive self-instruction for the control of impulsive classroom behavior: Ensuring the treatment package

The practical utility of cognitive self-instruction training in facilitating the work habits and academic performance of impulsive first-graders was assessed in the context of the regular classroom. The training paradigm was modified and environmental conditions were arranged to facilitate the transfer of the cognitive self-instruction strategy to the classroom. Following training, there were no significant increases in on-task behavior or in academic performance within the context of a group design. On the basis of this and other studies, a drastic revision of the cognitive self-instruction paradigm seems indicated. Not only must training become broader based, but models must be developed that take into account the requisite cognitive processes for task completion as well as the cognitive abilities of the youngsters to whom training is addressed. In general, the incorporation of information from the developmental and cognitive process literature would appear to facilitate the development of more effective training models.     

Instance-based learning: integrating sampling and repeated decisions from experience

In decisions from experience, there are 2 experimental paradigms: sampling and repeated-choice. In the sampling paradigm, participants sample between 2 options as many times as they want (i.e., the stopping point is variable), observe the outcome with no real consequences each time, and finally select 1 of the 2 options that cause them to earn or lose money. In the repeated-choice paradigm, participants select 1 of the 2 options for a fixed number of times and receive immediate outcome feedback that affects their earnings. These 2 experimental paradigms have been studied independently, and different cognitive processes have often been assumed to take place in each, as represented in widely diverse computational models. We demonstrate that behavior in these 2 paradigms relies upon common cognitive processes proposed by the instance-based learning theory (IBLT; Gonzalez, Lerch, & Lebiere, 2003) and that the stopping point is the only difference between the 2 paradigms. A single cognitive model based on IBLT (with an added stopping point rule in the sampling paradigm) captures human choices and predicts the sequence of choice selections across both paradigms. We integrate the paradigms through quantitative model comparison, where IBLT outperforms the best models created for each paradigm separately. We discuss the implications for the psychology of decision making.     

Cognitive activity and physiological arousal: Processes that mediate mood-congruent memory

This research proposes that the cognitive activity associated with the experience of an emotional state mediates the occurrence of mood-congruent processing. Two experiments examined the role of cognitive activity in selective processing of words in a mood congruence paradigm. Four induction procedures were used: a depressed-mood induction, a schema induction organized around the theme of writing a paper, an arousal induction, and a control neutral-mood induction. The memory task consisted of recalling a word list composed of negatively associated and thematically organized words. Selective processing was demonstrated in conjunction with the depressed-mood and organizational-schema induction procedures. In contrast, the arousal and neutral induction procedures did not produce selective processing of words from the list. The findings support the thesis that cognitive activity mediates the selective processing typical of mood congruence as distinct from arousal processes per se. The findings are discussed with respect to the resource allocation model and semantic network theory.