Comments on cognitive science in the experimental analysis of behavior

Arguments are increasingly being made for the inclusion of cognitive science in the experimental analysis of behavior (TEAB). These arguments are described, and a critical analysis of them is presented, especially in regards to the logic of objective inference and the renewed use of cognitive intervening variables. In addition, one particular defining feature of cognitive processes (i.e., the absence of an immediate controlling stimulus) is described, along with alternative points of view stressing molar-molecular levels of analysis and historical causation. Finally, comments are made on the use of cognitive concepts and language in the behavioral sciences. On all of these issues, counter-arguments are based on available material in behavior analysis metatheory, concepts, and experimental practices.     

Multidisciplinarity and cognitive science

The aim of Schunn, Crowley and Okada's (1998) study is to address the question of whether the current state of cognitive science, as represented by Cognitive Science and the Cognitive Science Society, “reflects the multidisciplinary ideals of its foundation.” To properly interpret and respond to their results, we need to ask a prior question: What is cognitive science's multidisciplinary ideal? There are at least two conceptions—a “localist” conception, which seems to be implicit in Schunn, Crowley and Okada's discussion, and a “holist” conception. I argue that while both have been endorsed by some cognitive scientists, there are reasons for preferring the holist conception. I then consider what Schunn, Crowley and Okada's findings tell us about the state of cognitive science in light of a holist approach and report on an analysis of the journal's contents which looks at the domain, subdomain, and cognitive capacity investigated.     

Representation and cognitive science

‘Representation’ is a concept which occurs both in cognitive science and philosophy. It has common features in both settings in that it concerns the explanation of behaviour in terms of the way the subject categorizes and systematizes responses to its environment. The prevailing model sees representations as causally structured entities correlated on the one hand with elements in a natural language and on the other with clearly identifiable items in the world. This leads to an analysis of representation and cognition in terms of formal symbols and their relations. But human perception and cognition use multiple informational constraints and deal with unsystematic and messy input in a way best explained by Parallel Distributed Processing models. This undermines the claim that a formal representational theory of mind is ‘the only game in town’. In particular it suggests a radically different model of brain function and its relation to epistemology from that found in current representational theories.     

Innateness in cognitive science

Innateness is one of the central concepts of cognitive science; but it is also a source of considerable confusion. In this article, I survey recent attempts to understand the notion of innateness as it figures in cognitive science and indicate which is likely to prove most fruitful. One approach draws directly on our "commonsense" views about innate traits. Another aims to characterize innateness in terms of concepts drawn from biology, such as genetic determination. Yet neither strategy has met with much success. This could indicate that a satisfactory account of innateness needs to make use of the conceptual resources of cognitive science itself. A proposal that takes this suggestion seriously is outlined, and an appeal is made for a more systematic assessment of the role and significance of the notion of innateness to cognitive science.     

Formal modeling and analysis of cognitive agent behavior

From an external perspective, cognitive agent behavior can be described by specifying (temporal) correlations of a certain complexity between stimuli (input states) and (re)actions (output states) of the agent. From an internal perspective the agent's dynamics can be characterized by direct (causal) temporal relations between internal and mental states of the agent. The latter type of specifications can be represented in a relatively simple, executable format, which enables different types of analysis of the agent's behavior. In particular, simulations of the agent's behavior under different (environmental) circumstances can be explored. Furthermore, by applying verification techniques, automated analysis of the consequences of the agent's behavior can be carried out. To enable such types of analysis when only given an external behavioral specification, this has to be transformed first into some type of executable format. An automated procedure for such a transformation is proposed in this paper. The application of the transformation procedure is demonstrated for a number of cases, showing examples of the types of analysis as mentioned for different forms of behavior.     

Explanatory pluralism in cognitive science

This brief commentary has three goals. The first is to argue that "framework debate" in cognitive science is unresolvable. The idea that one theory or framework can singly account for the vast complexity and variety of cognitive processes seems unlikely if not impossible. The second goal is a consequence of this: We should consider how the various theories on offer work together in diverse contexts of investigation. A final goal is to supply a brief review for readers who are compelled by these points to explore existing literature on the topic. Despite this literature, pluralism has garnered very little attention from broader cognitive science. We end by briefly considering what it might mean for theoretical cognitive science.     

Non-representationalist cognitive science and realism

Embodied and extended cognition is a relatively new paradigm within cognitive science that challenges the basic tenet of classical cognitive science, viz. cognition consists in building and manipulating internal representations. Some of the pioneers of embodied cognitive science have claimed that this new way of conceptualizing cognition puts pressure on epistemological and ontological realism. In this paper I will argue that such anti-realist conclusions do not follow from the basic assumptions of radical embodied cognitive science. Furthermore I will show that one can develop a form of realism that reflects rather than just accommodates the core principles of non-representationalist embodied cognitive science.     

Sources for Skinner's pragmatic selectionism in 1945

Skinner's pragmatic selectionism shows up strongly in his 1945 publication, "The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms," in which he introduced a probabilistic three-term contingency for verbal behavior. This probabilism was accompanied by an expanded contextualism and an increased emphasis on consequences with a clear alignment to pragmatism. In total, these changes represent Skinner's most striking shift from mechanistic and necessitarian values to pragmatic selectionism, and these changes may be indebted more to the conceptual contributions of others than Skinner acknowledged. Before 1945, Skinner made at least some positive associations with the views of Watson, Russell, and Carnap. From 1945 and afterwards, he strongly disassociated his views on verbal behavior from theirs. Before 1945, Skinner did not associate his views with those of Darwin or Peirce. After 1945, he strongly associated his views with those of Darwin and Peirce (in one published interview). No sources for his pragmatic selectionism, however, were referred to in 1945.     

Emergence and reduction in dynamical cognitive science

This paper examines the widespread intuition that the dynamical approach to cognitive science is importantly related to emergentism about the mind. The explanatory practices adopted by dynamical cognitive science rule out some conceptions of emergence; covering law explanations require a deducibility relationship between explanans and explanandum, whereas canonical theories of emergence require the absence of such deducibility. A response to this problem - one which would save the intuition that dynamics and emergence are related - is to reconstrue the concept of emergence as a relationship between laws. I call this “nomological emergence” and comment on the extent to which dynamicists would find it acceptable. Alternatively, dynamical cognitive science might be viewed as fitting better with the kind of “functional reductionism” which has recently been developed by authors such as Jaegwon Kim. Which of these two alternatives is preferable remains an open question pending the further development of dynamical cognitive science, particularly in its “non-classical” forms.     

Technology vs. science: The cognitive fallacy

There are fundamental differences between the explanation of scientific change and the explanation of technological change. The differences arise from fundamental differences between scientific and technological knowledge and basic disanalogies between technological advance and scientific progress. Given the influence of economic markets and industrial and institutional structures on the development of technology, it is more plausible to regard technological change as a continuous and incremental process, rather than as a process of Kuhnian crises and revolutions.     

Tolerant enactivist cognitive science

Enactivist (Embodied, Embedded, etc.) approaches in cognitive science and philosophy of mind are sometimes, though not always, conjoined with an anti-representational commitment. A weaker anti-representational claim is that ascribing representational content to internal/sub-personal processes is not compulsory when giving psychological explanations. A stronger anti-representational claim is that the very idea of ascribing representational content to internal, sub-personal processes is a theoretical confusion. This paper criticises some of the arguments made by Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) for the stronger anti-representational claim and suggests that the default Enactivist view should be the weaker non-representational position.     

心理治疗领域的本质论与社会建构论

本质论与社会建构论是心理治疗领域中两种对立倾向。本质论坚持了经验实证主义的传统,代表着心理治疗领域中的现代主义取向;这一取向把病理心理作为行为问题的本质,从个体的内部寻找产生病理心理的原因。社会建构论挑战经验实证主义科学观,认为病理心理并非一种“精神实在”,而是一种文化建构。它代表了心理治疗领域的后现代主义取向。作者认为,两种取向的对立短时间内难以消解,在目前的条件下,应开放和宽容,互补互惠。     

Relationship between cognitive style and emotional behavior.

In this research we examined the relationships among cognitive styles using the categorization of Bion and styles of modulation of emotional behavior (hostile content) explored with the Gottschalk, et al. method applied to the speech of 20 female and 10 male undergraduate students whose ages ranged from 20 to 35 years. Their verbalization was produced in a standard stimulus situation of 3 minutes duration. Analysis indicated a relationship between hostile attitude and cognitive styles. In particular, those who were relatively less hostile presented higher frequencies of processes classified by Bion as D2, which are characterized by an attitude of expectancy and waiting, with a tendency to defend internal psychological themas.     

Some reciprocal roles between behavior analysis and institutional economics in post-darwinian science

Behavior analysis and institutional economics are viewed as having common origins in the early 20th century effort to benefit from the conceptual revolution spurred by Darwin's synthesis. Institutional economics, initiated by Thorstein Veblen, appears to have failed to develop a progressive scientific technology, while behavior analysis has done so. It is suggested that institutional economics has been held back by lack of a synthesizing scientific mechanism that elucidates the relation between technological and ceremonial processes, the two cultural forces described by Veblen. The theory of institutional economist C. E. Ayres, built on Veblen's distinction, is used to clarify the concepts of technological and ceremonial processes for the reader. An analysis of the behavioral processes that might underlie the cultural processes described by Veblen/Ayres suggests that the experimental analysis of behavior has provided concepts that might function as a synthesizing mechanism for the social sciences and, in particular, institutional economics. The Veblen/Ayres dichotomy, now seen in terms of underlying behavioral processes, is used to examine the field of behavior analysis in terms of its origins, its relation to psychology and its current state. The paper concludes with a few practical suggestions as to how behavior analysts might work to enhance survival.