共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 140 毫秒
1.
Philosophical Studies - Let cognitivism be the view that moral judgments are cognitive mental states and noncognitivism the view that they are noncognitive mental states. Here I argue for moral... 相似文献
2.
Teemu Toppinen 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2015,96(2):233-255
Many philosophers believe that judgments about propositional attitudes, or about which mental states are expressed by which sentences, are normative judgments. If this is so, then metanormative expressivism must be given expressivist treatment. This might seem to make expressivism self‐defeating or worrisomely circular, or to frustrate the explanatory ambitions central to the view. I argue that recent objections along these lines to giving an expressivist account of expressivism are not successful. I shall also suggest that in order to deal with these worries, Dreier's influential response to the so‐called ‘problem of creeping minimalism’ must be slightly revised. 相似文献
3.
4.
Mark Douglas Warren 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2018,48(3-4):468-488
AbstractExplaining genuine moral disagreement is a challenge for metaethical theories. For expressivists, this challenge comes from the plausibility of agents making seemingly univocal claims while expressing incongruent conative attitudes. I argue that metaethical inferentialism – a deflationary cousin to expressivism, which locates meaning in the inferential import of our moral assertions rather than the attitudes they express – offers a unique solution to this problem. Because inferentialism doesn’t locate the source of moral disagreements in a clash between attitudes, but instead in conflicts between the inferential import of ethical assertions, the traditional problem for expressivism can be avoided. After considering two forms of inferentialism that lead to revenge versions of the problem, I conclude by recommending that we understand the semantics of moral disagreements pragmatically: the source of univocity does not come from moral or semantic facts waiting to be described, but instead from the needs that ethical and semantic discourses answer – a solution to the problems of what we are to do and how we are to talk about it. 相似文献
5.
John Eriksson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2014,17(2):253-267
According to expressivism, moral judgments are desire-like states of mind. It is often argued that this view is made implausible because it isn’t consistent with the conceivability of amoralists, i.e., agents who make moral judgments yet lack motivation. In response, expressivists can invoke the distinction between dispositional and occurrent desires. Strandberg (Am Philos Quart 49:81–91, 2012) has recently argued that this distinction does not save expressivism. Indeed, it can be used to argue that expressivism is false. In this paper I argue that expressivism is a much more complex thesis than Strandberg assumes. Once these complexities are acknowledged, Strandberg’s arguments are rendered ineffective and expressivism rendered more plausible. 相似文献
6.
Sebastian Köhler 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2015,93(1):161-165
Quasi-realists argue that meta-ethical expressivism is fully compatible with the central assumptions underlying ordinary moral practice. In a recent paper, Andy Egan has developed a vexing challenge for this project, arguing that expressivism is incompatible with central assumptions about error in moral judgments. In response, Simon Blackburn has argued that Egan's challenge fails, because Egan reads the expressivist as giving an account of moral error, rather than an account of judgments about moral error. In this paper I argue that the challenge can be reinstated, even if we focus only on the expressivist's account of judgments about moral error. 相似文献
7.
Caj Strandberg 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(4):341-369
One of the most prevalent and influential assumptions in metaethics is that our conception of the relation between moral language
and motivation provides strong support to internalism about moral judgments. In the present paper, I argue that this supposition
is unfounded. Our responses to the type of thought experiments that internalists employ do not lend confirmation to this view
to the extent they are assumed to do. In particular, they are as readily explained by an externalist view according to which
there is a pragmatic and standardized connection between moral utterances and motivation. The pragmatic account I propose
states that a person’s utterance of a sentence according to which she ought to ϕ conveys two things: the sentence expresses,
in virtue of its conventional meaning, the belief that she ought to ϕ, and her utterance carries a generalized conversational
implicature to the effect that she is motivated to ϕ. This view also makes it possible to defend cognitivism against a well-known
internalist argument. 相似文献
8.
9.
10.
Michael Cholbi 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(5):495-510
Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s
paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while
also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’).
I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory.
2. This paradoxicality can be traced to a form of epistemic self-defeat that also explains the paradoxicality of ordinary
Moore-paradoxical statements. 3. Although a simple form of internalism about moral judgment and motivation can explain the
paradoxicality of these moral equivalents, a more plausible explanation can be provided that does not rely on this simple
form of internalism. 4. The paradoxicality of such statements suggests a more credible understanding of the thesis that those
who are not motivated by their moral judgments are irrational. 相似文献
11.
Alfred R. Mele 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(5):463-475
Compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility disagree with one another about the bearing of agents’ histories
on whether or not they are morally responsible for some of their actions. Some stories about manipulated agents prompt such
disagreements. In this article, I call attention to some of the main features of my own “history-sensitive” compatibilist
proposal about moral responsibility, and I argue that arguments advanced by Michael McKenna and Manuel Vargas leave that proposal
unscathed. 相似文献
12.
Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of
a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that
people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition,
and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model
has been forcefully defended by Jonathan Haidt. One important implication of Haidt’s model is that in giving reasons for their
moral judgments people tend to confabulate – the reasons they give in attempting to explain their moral judgments are not
really operative in producing those judgments. Moral reason-giving on Haidt’s view is generally a matter of post hoc confabulation.
Against Haidt, we argue for a version of rationalism that we call ‘morphological rationalism.’ We label our version ‘morphological’
because according to it, the information contained in moral principles is embodied in the standing structure of a typical
individual’s cognitive system, and this morphologically embodied information plays a causal role in the generation of particular
moral judgments. The manner in which the principles play this role is via ‘proceduralization’ – such principles operate automatically.
In contrast to Haidt’s intuitionism, then, our view does not imply that people’s moral reason-giving practices are matters
of confabulation. In defense of our view, we appeal to what we call the ‘nonjarring’ character of the phenomenology of making
moral judgments and of giving reasons for those judgments.
相似文献
Mark TimmonsEmail: |
13.
Justin T. Tiehen 《Synthese》2011,182(3):375-391
In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that Stephen Yablo’s influential account of mental causation is susceptible
to counterexamples involving what I call disproportional mental causation. Second, I argue that similar counterexamples can
be generated for any alternative account of mental causation that is like Yablo’s in that it takes mental states and their
physical realizers to causally compete. Third, I show that there are alternative nonreductive approaches to mental causation
which reject the idea of causal competition, and which thus are able to allow for disproportional mental causation. This,
I argue, is a significant advantage for such noncompetitive accounts. 相似文献
14.
John Bigelow 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(2):379-380
I respond to an argument made by Gunnar Björnsson and Ragnar Francén Olinder against motivational internalism. Björnsson and Olinder present a hypothesis in which all of us are selfishly motivated to act in accordance with our moral judgments. The conceivability of such a possibility, they argue, rules out motivational internalism. I argue that this is not the case, and that, according to one dominant view about moral judgments, the agents in the hypothesis do not make genuine moral judgments. One therefore cannot argue decisively against motivational internalism without arguing against this view about moral judgments. 相似文献
15.
Thomas W. Polger 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(1):109-130
Do facts about water have a priori, transparent, reductive explanations in terms of microphysics? Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker
hold that they do not. David Chalmers and Frank Jackson hold that they do. In this paper I argue that Chalmers’ and Jackson’s
critique of Block and Stalnaker crucially hinges on a reductio argument, and that the reductio can be defused. I conclude
that the counterexamples given by Block and Stalnaker are cogent. If I am right, then we have no reason to accept Chalmers’
and Jackson’s contentions that physicalism requires a priori, transparent, reductive explanations of all facts in terms of
microphysical facts. This conclusion has consequences for C&J’s argument that conceptual analysis is essential to philosophical
methodology. 相似文献
16.
Matthew Talbert 《The Journal of Ethics》2012,16(1):89-109
I argue that wrongdoers may be open to moral blame even if they lacked the capacity to respond to the moral considerations
that counted against their behavior. My initial argument turns on the suggestion that even an agent who cannot respond to
specific moral considerations may still guide her behavior by her judgments about reasons. I argue that this explanation of
a wrongdoer’s behavior can qualify her for blame even if her capacity for moral understanding is impaired. A second argument
is based on the observation that even when a blameworthy wrongdoer could have responded to moral considerations, this is often
not relevant to her blameworthiness. Finally, I argue against the view that because blame communicates moral demands, only
agents who can be reached by such communication are properly blamed. I contend that a person victimized by a wrongdoer with
an impaired capacity for moral understanding may protest her victimization in a way that counts as a form of moral blame even
though it does not primarily express a moral demand or attempt to initiate moral dialogue. 相似文献
17.
Michael Robinson 《Philosophia》2010,38(3):589-594
In a series of recent papers, Saul Smilansky has argued that compatibilists have no principled way of resisting the view that
prepunishment is at least sometimes appropriate, thus revealing compatibilism to be a radical position, out of keeping with
our ordinary moral judgments. Recent attempts to resist this conclusion seem to have overlooked the biggest problem with Smilansky’s
argument, which is this: Smilanksy argues that the most obvious objection to prepunishment—namely, that it is inappropriate
because it involves punishing the innocent for crimes they have not committed—is unavailable to compatibilists. If compatibilism
is true, he says, then if it is causally determined that someone is going to commit a crime, the fact that one has not yet
done so is a mere temporal matter bearing no moral significance. I argue that there is no reason for compatibilists to accept
this point. Compatibilists can (and should) resist Smilansky's claim that one’s not yet having committed a crime is morally
insignificant and so resist the temptation to prepunish. 相似文献
18.
David Merli 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):535-556
Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational
and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation
or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession
of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against
conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding our moral concepts. Conceptual role approaches fail
because they cannot account for shared concepts among speakers with different commitments to the practical and conative ramifications
of moral judgments. Informational atomist views fail because speakers need not be locked on to the same moral properties to
share moral concepts.
相似文献
David MerliEmail: |
19.
20.
Richard Garner 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):499-513
Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral
judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making
statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are
uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first seriously defended by John Mackie. In this paper I explore
a dispute among moral error theorists about how to deal with false moral judgments. The advice of the moral abolitionist is
to stop making moral judgments, but the contrary advice of the moral fictionalist is to retain moral language and moral thinking.
After clarifying the choice that arises for the moral error theorist, I argue that moral abolitionism has much to recommend
it. I discuss Mackie’s defense of moral fictionalism as well as a recent version of the same position offered by Daniel Nolan,
Greg Restall, and Caroline West. Then I second some remarks Ian Hinckfuss made in his defense of moral abolitionism and his
criticism of “the moral society.” One of the worst things about moral fictionalism is that it undermines our epistemology
by promoting a culture of deception. To deal with this problem Richard Joyce offers a “non-assertive” version of moral fictionalism
as perhaps the last option for an error theorist who hopes to avoid moral abolitionism. I discuss some of the problems facing
that form of moral fictionalism, offer some further reasons for adopting moral abolitionism in our personal lives, and conclude
with reasons for thinking that abolishing morality may be an essential step in achieving the goals well-meaning moralists
and moral fictionalists have always cherished.
相似文献
Richard GarnerEmail: |