Wittgenstein and the Dream Hypothesis

The paper deals with Wittgenstein’s treatment of radical skepticism. He holds from his earliest work to his last that skepticism is senseless and therefore no rebuttal, such as G.E. Moore offered, is necessary.     

Wittgenstein and Scepticism Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Books reviewed:
Wittgenstein and Scepticism , Denis McManus (ed.). London & New York: Routledge, 2004. xi, 305 pp. $50 hb. Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS , Erich Ammereller and Eugen Fischer (eds.). London & New York: Routledge, 2004. xxix, 263 pp. $50 hb. Reviewed by William H. Brenner, Old Dominion University Philosophy Department Old Dominion University Norfolk, VA 23529-0083, USA wbrenner@odu.edu     

Wittgenstein and the Real Numbers

When it comes to Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, even sympathetic admirers are cowed into submission by the many criticisms of influential authors in that field. They say something to the effect that Wittgenstein does not know enough about or have enough respect for mathematics, to take him as a serious philosopher of mathematics. They claim to catch Wittgenstein pooh-poohing the modern set-theoretic extensional conception of a real number. This article, however, will show that Wittgenstein's criticism is well grounded. A real number, as an ‘extension’, is a homeless fiction; ‘homeless’ in that it neither is supported by anything nor supports anything. The picture of a real number as an ‘extension’ is not supported by actual practice in calculus; calculus has nothing to do with ‘extensions’. The extensional, set-theoretic conception of a real number does not give a foundation for real analysis, either. The so-called complete theory of real numbers, which is essentially an extensional approach, does not define (in any sense of the word) the set of real numbers so as to justify their completeness, despite the common belief to the contrary. The only correct foundation of real analysis consists in its being ‘existential axiomatics’. And in real analysis, as existential axiomatics, a point on the real line need not be an ‘extension’.     

Wittgenstein and the naming relation

The thesis of this paper is that the Tractatus and the Investigations can be related as follows. Wittgenstein attempted in the Tractatus to avoid the conceptual realism of Frege and Russell with respect to propositions. He solved his problem by developing the picture‐theory of language. This solution assumed that the units of language are words which arc names of simple objects. Because of this assumption the solution has the undesirable consequence that examples oi genuine names, atomic facts and atomic propositions cannot be given although their existence is logically required by the solution. Wittgenstein had, therefore, eventually to examine the idea of a name. Thus the Philosophical Investigations in which this examination is conducted.     

Wittgenstein and the memory debate

In this paper, I survey the impact on neuropsychology of Wittgenstein's elucidations of memory. Wittgenstein discredited the storage and imprint models of memory, dissolved the conceptual link between memory and mental images or representations and, upholding the context-sensitivity of memory, made room for a family resemblance concept of memory, where remembering can also amount to doing or saying something. While neuropsychology is still generally under the spell of archival and physiological notions of memory, Wittgenstein's reconceptions can be seen at work in its leading-edge practitioners. However, neuroscientists, generally, are finding memory difficult to demarcate from other cognitive and noncognitive processes, and I suggest this is largely due to their considering automatic responses as part of memory, termed nondeclarative or implicit memory. Taking my lead from Wittgenstein's On Certainty, I argue that there is only remembering where there is also some kind of mnemonic effort or attention, and, therefore, that so-called implicit memory is not memory at all, but a basic, noncognitive certainty.     

维特根斯坦和传统

维特根斯坦在奥地利-维也纳传统中长大,并坚定地植根于这一传统之中。任何理解他的人格的尝试都必须设法把他置于这一背景中加以考察。但维特根斯坦作为哲学家的工作,几乎完全是在他并不分享其文化传统、并且对他本人是非常不相宜的环境中完成的。     

Wittgenstein and criteria

An essay to develop some of Wittgenstein's remarks about the notion of ‘criteria’ and to give the concept clarity even at the expense of some features Wittgenstein claimed for it. This effort was made because of the important role ‘criteria’ plays in Wittgenstein's discussions of feelings and mental states, and it is hoped that a defense of ‘criteria’ will make those discussions more coherent. An attempt is made to relate this notion of ‘criteria’ to the definition and expression of mental states, following some of Wittgenstein's suggestions, and to rebut skepticism about other minds.     

Wittgenstein and Ebersole

Frank B. Ebersole died recently. Here I remind philosophers of the thinking of this reclusive philosopher who brought out the value of Wittgenstein's dictum that philosophers should “bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” I illustrate Ebersole's singular thinking by focusing on his philosophical investigation of Wittgenstein's family resemblance metaphor.