The big picture: Writing psychology into the history of the human sciences

The grand narratives which once gave order and readability to histories, of science and of the human sciences are widely rejected in current historiography, and historians focus on detailed studies of scientific knowledge and activity in particular contexts. How, then, are synthetic general histories, accessible to the non-specialist, to be written? This paper, designed as an open-ended discussion, reflects on the business of writing about psychology in a general history of the human sciences. It considers three large topics: reflexivity, and the situation in the human sciences where “man” is both subject and object; the boundary-less identity of the human sciences and hence the need to express values in delimiting the content of the field; and the long-standing debate about what sort of “science” is appropriate for knowledge of human beings. The conclusion turns to “the quest” as a narrative form. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Understanding in the social sciences and history

Understanding in its widest sense is the aim of all rational knowledge. A distinction can be made between interpretation (leading to the understanding of meanings) and explanation (leading to the understanding of facts). The view that in the social sciences facts and meanings are the same is criticized. In respect of the specific understanding of human and social facts empathetic and rational understanding are distinguished and some of the difficulties pointed out inherent in both, in particular with regard to testability. On the other hand, it is found that a purely behaviouristic approach, although possible, would not be completely satisfactory, so that in spite of all difficulties the social sciences (history included) cannot do without specific understanding, as a heuristic device as well as an aim.     

Toward a transnational history of the social sciences

Historical accounts of the social sciences have too often accepted local or national institutions as a self-evident framework of analysis, instead of considering them as being embedded in transnational relations of various kinds. Evolving patterns of transnational mobility and exchange cut through the neat distinction between the local, the national, and the inter-national, and thus represent an essential component in the dynamics of the social sciences, as well as a fruitful perspective for rethinking their historical development. In this programmatic outline, it is argued that a transnational history of the social sciences may be fruitfully understood on the basis of three general mechanisms, which have structured the transnational flows of people and ideas in decisive ways: (a) the functioning of international scholarly institutions, (b) the transnational mobility of scholars, and (c) the politics of trans-national exchange of nonacademic institutions. The article subsequently examines and illustrates each of these mechanisms.     

Some recurrent issues in the history of behavioral sciences

Many issues seem to have appeared, disappeared, and reappeared in the behavioral sciences during the 20th century. Salient examples discussed in the present paper are consciousness, including the concept itself and consciousness in nonhuman animals; the method of introspection; and cognition, including the interpretation of mental imagery and the role of language in thinking. One possible explanation of the apparent cycles is consistent with a suggestion by John B. Watson: Important issues are found to be intractable and are abandoned, but they recur when newer theories and methods emerge.     

Disciplining social psychology: a case study of boundary relations in the history of the human sciences

This paper explores the disciplinary status of social psychology through an analysis of the history of the boundary relations of psychology, sociology, and social psychology. After outlining some research on the nature of scientific disciplines, on the role of rhetoric in the constitution of disciplines, and on "boundary work," I consider the singular importance of social psychology as a discipline for the analysis of boundary relations, examining its units of analysis and its "disciplining." The boundaries of the disciplines of social psychology were seen as fluid, contingent, local, and contestable, reflecting the thematic preoccupations, disciplinary origins, and meta-theoretical commitments of social psychologists, of the parent disciplines, and of those who represent disciplinary practices.     

The crisis of the human sciences

Continental Philosophy Review -     

Popper's metaphysical research program for the human sciences 1

Popper has provided a model for the scientific explanation of human actions and a metaphysical theory of man which can guide scientific research. In this paper I discuss the problems of the empirical content and nomicity of the Rationality Principle and extend the method of situational analysis to the problem of explaining beliefs. The domain of applicability of the Rationality Principle is bounded on one side by cases in which behavior is determined by processes which can not be influenced by criticism and on the other side by the phenomenon of substantive creativity. However, a large part of human activity lies within its scope.     

Phenomenological methodology in the human sciences

The author suggests that phenomenological methodology differs from traditional methodologies both in purpose and procedure. The task of a phenomenological researcher is to see the logic or meaning of an experience, for any subject, rather than to discover causal connections or patterns of correlation. The nature of the task demands extensive study of a small sample, allowing the subjects to speak for themselves and to reveal the logic of their experience as lived. The author reviews verification procedures relevant to phenomenological studies and discusses the limitations inherent in phenomenological research.