论基础公理与反基础公理

"循环并不可恶"。本文在此基础上讨论基础公理和反基础公理。首先指出基础公理原本就是一条有争议的公理;第二,说明基础公理的局限性;第三,详细论述反基础公理家族中的三个成员,并给出它们两两不相容的一个证明;第四,分析反基础公理导致集合论域在V=WF上不断扩张的方法,并指出这种扩张的方法与数系扩张的方法相同;最后结论:良基集合理论(ZFC)与非良基集合理论(ZFC~-+AFA(或者ZFC和ZFC~-+FAFA或者ZFC和ZFC~-+SAFA))之间的关系类似于欧几里得几何学与非欧几何学之间的关系。     

The Graph Conception of Set

The non-well-founded set theories described by Aczel (1988) have received attention from category theorists and computer scientists, but have been largely ignored by philosophers. At the root of this neglect might lie the impression that these theories do not embody a conception of set, but are rather of mere technical interest. This paper attempts to dispel this impression. I present a conception of set which may be taken as lying behind a non-well-founded set theory. I argue that the axiom AFA is justified on the conception, which provides, contra Rieger (Mind 109:241–253, 2000), a rationale for restricting attention to the system based on this axiom. By making use of formal and informal considerations, I then make a case that most of the other axioms of this system are also justified on the conception. I conclude by commenting on the significance of the conception for the debate about the justification of the Axiom of Foundation.     

Mathematical foundations of consciousness

We employ the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms that characterize sets as mathematical primitives. The Anti-foundation Axiom plays a significant role in our development, since among other of its features, its replacement for the Axiom of Foundation in the Zermelo–Fränkel Axioms motivates Platonic interpretations. These interpretations also depend on such allied notions for sets as pictures, graphs, decorations, labelings and various mappings that we use. A syntax and semantics of operators acting on sets is developed. Such features enable construction of a theory of non-well-founded sets that we use to frame mathematical foundations of consciousness. To do this we introduce a supplementary axiomatic system that characterizes experience and consciousness as primitives. The new axioms proceed through characterization of so-called consciousness operators. The Russell operator plays a central role and is shown to be one example of a consciousness operator. Neural networks supply striking examples of non-well-founded graphs the decorations of which generate associated sets, each with a Platonic aspect. Employing our foundations, we show how the supervening of consciousness on its neural correlates in the brain enables the framing of a theory of consciousness by applying appropriate consciousness operators to the generated sets in question.     

非良基集合的外延公理

近年来,由于非良基集合在人工智能、认知科学及哲学等领域都有很重要的应用,它的研究越来越受到人们的关注。判断两个对象的同一性是集合论中最基本的问题,然而,与良基集合不同的是,非良基集合难以找到其最基本的组成成分,这样通常的外延公理就无法判断两个非良基集合（例如x={x}和y={y}）相等。为了找到判断两个非良基集合相等的标准,我们必须强化通常的外延公理。利用Aczel四种非良基公理（AFA,SAFA,FAFA和BAFA）,我们推出了四种判断两个非良基集合相等的标准,并且举例说明对于给定的两个非良基集合,如何判断它们相等,从而解决“循环集合”相等的问题。此外,笔者进一步论证判断这四种非良基集合相等的标准是通常外延公理的扩张,而不是替代。为此,本文首先给出了集合和图的一些基本定义和结果;其次讨论了由四种非良基公理AFA,SAFA,FAFA和BAFA分别确定的四种集合全域A,S,F和B;最后,讨论了外延公理的扩张。     

Hume’s Principle and Axiom V Reconsidered: Critical Reflections on Frege and His Interpreters

In this paper, I shall discuss several topics related to Frege’s paradigms of second-order abstraction principles and his logicism. The discussion includes a critical examination of some controversial views put forward mainly by Robin Jeshion, Tyler Burge, Crispin Wright, Richard Heck and John MacFarlane. In the introductory section, I try to shed light on the connection between logical abstraction and logical objects. The second section contains a critical appraisal of Frege’s notion of evidence and its interpretation by Jeshion, the introduction of the course-of-values operator and Frege’s attitude towards Axiom V, in the expression of which this operator occurs as the key primitive term. Axiom V says that the course-of-values of the function f is identical with the course-of-values of the function g if and only if f and g are coextensional. In the third section, I intend to show that in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) Frege hardly could have construed Hume’s Principle (HP) as a primitive truth of logic and used it as an axiom governing the cardinality operator as a primitive sign. HP expresses that the number of Fs is identical with the number of Gs if and only if F and G are equinumerous. In the fourth section, I argue that Wright falls short of making a convincing case for the alleged analyticity of HP. In the final section, I canvass Heck’s arguments for his contention that Frege knew he could deduce the simplest laws of arithmetic from HP without invoking Axiom V. I argue that they do not carry conviction. I conclude this section by rejecting an interpretation concerning HP suggested by MacFarlane.     

Discrete dynamic choice: An extension of the choice models of thurstone and luce

The present paper deals with the extension of two well-known static discrete choice theories to the dynamic situation in which individuals make choices at several points in (continuous) time. A dynamic version of Luce's Axiom, “independence from irrelevant alternatives”, is proposed and some of its implications are derived. In the static case Yellott (J. Math. Psych. 1977, 15, 109–146) and others have demonstrated that an independent random utility model generated from the extreme value distribution exp(?e^?ax?b) becomes equivalent to Luce's Axiom. Yellott also introduced an axiom called “invariance under uniform expansions of the choice set”, and he proved that within the class of random utility models with independent identically distributed utilities (apart from a location shift) this axiom is equivalent to Luce's Axiom. These results are extended to the dynamic situation and it is shown that if the utility processes are expressed by so-called extremal processes the corresponding choice model is Markovian. A nonstationary generalization is proposed which is a substantial interest in applications where the parameters of the choice process are influenced by previous choice experience or by time-varying exogenous variables. In particular, it is demonstrated that the nonstationary model is Markovian if and only if the joint choice probabilities at two points in time have a particular form. Thus, the paper provides a rationale for applying a specific class of Markov models as the point of departure when modelling mobility processes that involve individual discrete decisions over time.     

Amending Frege’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Grundgesetze der Arithmetik</Emphasis>

Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent. This system is, except for minor differences, second-order logic together with an abstraction operator governed by Frege’s Axiom V. A few years ago, Richard Heck showed that the ramified predicative second-order fragment of the Grundgesetze is consistent. In this paper, we show that the above fragment augmented with the axiom of reducibility for concepts true of only finitely many individuals is still consistent, and that elementary Peano arithmetic (and more) is interpretable in this extended system.     

一个含有原子的自然模型∑（A）

1989年A.Blass和A.Scedrov构造了含有原子的模型V（A）（A是所有原子的集合,参见文献[1]）并证明了V（A）是ZFA（ZFA=ZF＋A,公理A断言：存在所有原子的集合）的模型。由于集合论的公理系统GB是ZF的一个保守扩充,因此,集合论的公理系统GBA（GBA=GB＋A,其中GB是集合论的含有集合和类的哥德尔－贝奈斯公理系统）也是ZFA的一个保守扩充。本文的目的是在集合论的含有原子和集合的公理系统ZFA的自然模型V（A）的基础上,为集合论的含有原子、集合和类的公理系统GBA建立模型。因此,我们首先介绍了A.Blass和A.Scedrov的含有原子的模型V（A）;第二,给出并证明V（A）具有的一些基本性质;第三,扩充了集合论的公理系统ZFA的形式语言LZFA并定义含有原子和集合的类C;第四,构造含有原子、集合和类的模型∑（A）,称它为自然模型,最后,证明了∑（A）是GBA的模型。     

The Problem of Foundation in Early Nyāya and in Navya-Nyāya

The evaluation of arguments was not the sole concern of logicians in ancient India. Early Nyāya and the later Navya-Nyāya provide an interesting example of the interaction between logic and ontology. In their attempt to develop a kind of property-location logic (Navya-)Naiyāyikas had to consider what kind of restrictions they should impose on the residence relation between a property and its locus (which might again be a property). Can we admit circular residence relations or infinitely descending chains of properties, each depending on its successor as its locus? Early Naiyāyikas and to some extent also Navya-Naiyāyikas regard these phenomena as a kind of absurdity and they want to rule them out. Their intuitions about properties are close to well-founded systems of set theory, whereas the author of the Navya-Nyāya work Upādhidarpa?a is a proponent of a non-well-founded property concept. Despite certain similarities with sets properties are still regarded as intensional objects in Navya-Nyāya. In the present article I demonstrate that a Quine/Morse-style extension of George Bealer's property calculus T1 (with or without a property adaptation of the axiom of regularity) may serve as a formal system which adequately mirrors the Navya-Nyāya property-location logic.     

A model of type theory in simplicial sets: A brief introduction to Voevodsky's homotopy type theory

We describe how to interpret constructive type theory in the topos of simplicial sets where types appear as Kan complexes and families of types as Kan fibrations. Since Kan complexes may be understood as weak higher-dimensional groupoids this model generalizes and extends the (ordinary) groupoid model which was introduced by M. Hofmann and the author about 20 years ago. Finally, we discuss Voevodsky's Univalence Axiom which has been shown to hold in this model. This axiom roughly states that isomorphic types are equal. The type theoretic notion of isomorphism provided by this model coincides with homotopy equivalence of Kan complexes. For this reason it has become common to refer to it as Homotopy Type Theory.     

A Piagetian perspective on mathematical construction

In this paper, we offer a Piagetian perspective on the construction of the logico-mathematical schemas which embody our knowledge of logic and mathematics. Logico-mathematical entities are tied to the subject's activities, yet are so constructed by reflective abstraction that they result from sensorimotor experience only via the construction of intermediate schemas of increasing abstraction. The ‘axiom set’ does not exhaust the cognitive structure (schema network) which the mathematician thus acquires. We thus view ‘truth’ not as something to be defined within the closed ‘world’ of a formal system but rather in terms of the schema network within which the formal system is embedded. We differ from Piaget in that we see mathematical knowledge as based on social processes of mutual verification which provide an external drive to any ‘necessary dynamic’ of reflective abstraction within the individual. From this perspective, we argue that axiom schemas tied to a preferred interpretation may provide a necessary intermediate stage of reflective abstraction en route to acquisition of the ability to use formal systems in abstracto.     

The relationship between Luce's Choice Axiom,Thurstone's Theory of Comparative Judgment,and the double exponential distribution

Holman and Marley have shown that Thurstone's Case V model becomes equivalent to the Choice Axiom if its discriminal processes are assumed to be independent double exponential random variables instead of normal ones. It is shown here that for pair comparisons, this representation is not unique; other discriminal process distributions (specifiable only in terms of their characteristic functions) also yield a model equivalent to the Choice Axiom. However, none of these models is equivalent to the Choice Axiom for triple comparisons: There the double exponential representation is unique. It is also shown that within the framework of Thurstone's theory, the double exponential distribution, and hence the Choice Axiom, is implied by a weaker assumption, called “invariance under uniform expansions of the choice set.”     

非良基集合的域和分类

本文介绍正则互模拟理论并比较了正则互模拟的外延性大小,通过对非良基公理之间不相容的条件的讨论,我们进一步比较了由正则互模拟决定的非良基集合域的大小,最后对非良基集合论FAFA、SAFA和AFA中的非良基集合进行了分类。     

论模态逻辑的集合论语义

引入非良基集合可以为模态逻辑提供一种新的语义学。这种语义是在集合上解释模态语言,使用集合中作为元素的集合之间的属于关系解释模态词,并在集合中采用命题变元作为本元,从而解释原子命题的真假。在这种新的语义下,从模型构造的角度看可以引入几种非标准的集合运算：不交并、生成子集合、p-态射、树展开等等,证明模态公式在这些运算下的保持或不变结果。利用这些结果还可以证明一些集合类不是模态可定义的。     

The Simplest Axiom System for Plane Hyperbolic Geometry

We provide a quantifier-free axiom system for plane hyperbolic geometry in a language containing only absolute geometrically meaningful ternary operations (in the sense that they have the same interpretation in Euclidean geometry as well). Each axiom contains at most 4 variables. It is known that there is no axiom system for plane hyperbolic consisting of only prenex 3-variable axioms. Changing one of the axioms, one obtains an axiom system for plane Euclidean geometry, expressed in the same language, all of whose axioms are also at most 4-variable universal sentences. We also provide an axiom system for plane hyperbolic geometry in Tarski's language L _B which might be the simplest possible one in that language.     

PREFERENCE REVERSALS DUE TO MYOPIC DISCOUNTING OF DELAYED REWARD

Abstract— A basic stationarity axiom of economic theory assumes stable preference between two deferred goods separated by a fixed time. To test this assumption, we offered subjects choices between delayed rewards, while manipulating the delays to those rewards. Preferences typically reversed with changes in delay, as predicted by hyperbolic discounting models of impulsiveness. Of 36 subjects, 34 reversed preference from a larger, later reward to a smaller, earlier reward as the delays to both rewards decreased. We conclude that the stationarity axiom is not appropriate in models of human choice.     

Are There Enough Injective Sets?

The axiom of choice ensures precisely that, in ZFC, every set is projective: that is, a projective object in the category of sets. In constructive ZF (CZF) the existence of enough projective sets has been discussed as an additional axiom taken from the interpretation of CZF in Martin-Löf’s intuitionistic type theory. On the other hand, every non-empty set is injective in classical ZF, which argument fails to work in CZF. The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the problem whether there are (enough) injective sets in CZF. We show that no two element set is injective unless the law of excluded middle is admitted for negated formulas, and that the axiom of power set is required for proving that “there are strongly enough injective sets”. The latter notion is abstracted from the singleton embedding into the power set, which ensures enough injectives both in every topos and in IZF. We further show that it is consistent with CZF to assume that the only injective sets are the singletons. In particular, assuming the consistency of CZF one cannot prove in CZF that there are enough injective sets. As a complement we revisit the duality between injective and projective sets from the point of view of intuitionistic type theory.     

The nonequivalence of behavioral and mathematical equivalence.

Sidman and his colleagues derived behavioral tests for stimulus equivalence from the axiom in logic and mathematics that defines a relation of equivalence. The analogy has generated abundant research in which match-to-sample methods have been used almost exclusively to study interesting and complex stimulus control phenomena. It has also stimulated considerable discussion regarding interpretation of the analogy and speculation as to its validity and generality. This article reexamines the Sidman stimulus equivalence analogy in the context of a broader consideration of the mathematical axiom than was included in the original presentation of the analogy and some of the data that have accumulated in the interim. We propose that (a) mathematical and behavioral examples of equivalence relations differ substantially, (b) terminology is being used in ways that can lead to erroneous conclusions about the nature of the stimulus control that develops in stimulus equivalence experiments, and (c) complete analyses of equivalence and other types of stimulus-stimulus relations require more than a simple invocation of the analogy. Implications of our analysis for resolving current issues and prompting new research are discussed.     

To Be is to Be the Object of a Possible Act of Choice

Aim of the paper is to revise Boolos’ reinterpretation of second-order monadic logic in terms of plural quantification ([4], [5]) and expand it to full second order logic. Introducing the idealization of plural acts of choice, performed by a suitable team of agents, we will develop a notion of plural reference. Plural quantification will be then explained in terms of plural reference. As an application, we will sketch a structuralist reconstruction of second-order arithmetic based on the axiom of infinite à la Dedekind, as the unique non-logical axiom. We will also sketch a virtual interpretation of the classical continuum involving no other infinite than a countable plurality of individuals.