Field and observer viewpoint in remember-know memories of personal childhood events

This experiment examined the viewpoint and other phenomenal characteristics of childhood memories based on both personal recollections and self-knowledge. Participants were asked to provide examples of remember, know, and uncertain memories, and to rate each memory on a number of dimensions. Remembered events were generally viewed from a field perspective, while known-about events were generally viewed from an observer perspective. In line with earlier research, remembered events received the highest ratings for sensory and contextual detail, emotional content, and memory accuracy, while known-about events were given the lowest ratings. The results are discussed with reference to their possible implications for memory recovery or enhancement techniques that ask people to adopt a different viewpoint. Consideration is given as to whether a switch to a field perspective might encourage the acceptance of suggested details or events.     

When personal history repeats itself: Decomposing memories for recurring events

Retrospective reports of personal events constitute the principal data source for much applied social science research. Such reports are known to be subject to biases and errors of inference. In health surveys, for example, events associated with chronic conditions are particularly likely to be under-reported (Jabine, 1987). In this series of studies we apply perspectives and tools from psychological studies of memory to the problem of understanding and improving reports of past untilization of health care. In two studies we found that subjects report using different strategies to answer questions about how often they have seen a doctor over the past 12 months, depending on the type of doctor's visit and its frequency. A third study, in which subjects' recall was checked against medical records, provided evidence that individual health events within a group of recurring, similar events are much less likely than non-recurring events to be recalled. In Experiment 4 we tested the efficacy of cognitively oriented intervention techniques designed to (1) help subjects decompose their molar memories of groups of similar events into individual events and (2) place all remembered health events into a personal timeline. The intervention more than doubled the proportion of recurring events on the medical record that was recalled. In addition, the proportion of events that could be dated, and the accuracy of dates provided, both rose.     

On the transition from childhood amnesia to the recall of personal memories

When adults are asked to report and date personal memories of their pasts, they show childhood amnesia, that is, diminished recall of experiences over the childhood years. This way of demonstrating the phenomenon was supplemented in the present study with a more direct approach: Participants reported events of early childhood that they knew they had experienced (because of family stories, photographs, etc.) but did not actually remember. The resulting cumulative relative frequency distributions produced by the two methods were substantially different, with the median age of remembered events being 6.07 years and of known events, 3.20 years. We suggest that the mean of these two ages, 4.64 years, gives a good indication of when childhood amnesia is eclipsed by personal memories in adults' recall of their personal pasts.     

Point of view in personal memories

A structural aspect of personal memories was examined in four studies. In some memories, one has the perspective of an observer, seeing oneself “from the outside.” In other memories, one sees the scene from one's own perspective; the field of view in such memories corresponds to that of the original situation. The existence of “observer” and “field” memories was confirmed in Study 1, using a recall questionnaire. In Study 2, the similarity structure of a specified set of eight to-be-recalled situations was established: the significant dimensions were “emotionality” and “self-awareness.” Study 3 related these dimensions to the observer-field distinction; situations involving a high degree of emotion and selfawareness were most likely to be recalled with an observer perspective. Recall set was varied in Study 4: a focus on feelings (as opposed to objective circumstances) produced relatively more field memories. Studies 3 and 4 also showed that events reported as more recent tend to be recalled in the field mode. Thus a qualitative characteristic of personal memories—the perspective from which they are experienced—is apparently related to characteristics of the original event, to the individual's purpose in recalling that event, and to the reported recall interval.     

Affect and retrieval of personal memories

The relationship of pleasantness and intensity of affect to retrieval of reallife experiences was investigated in three experiments. Subjects reported the first specific personal experience that came to mind for a series of prompt words. Latency of report was regarded as a measure of memory accessibility. The first study compared retrieval time for prompts that sampled affects varying in pleasantness and intensity. Experiments II and III assessed the possible contributions of demand characteristics and implicit inferential processes to retrospective judgments of feelings. Judgments of the intensity of feeling engendered when the events occurred were inversely related to report latency. Results support the conclusion that intensity ratings were reliable indices of memory information rather than inferences or reconstructions mediated by report latency. Other characteristics of recollections such as pleasantness, recency, or relative frequency of the specific affects were not correlated with report latency. Two explanations of the findings are considered: an arousal hypothesis and an extent-of-processing hypothesis. The latter provides the most adequate account and relates the present findings to a more general theory of memory processes. The results are also relevant to investigations of mood-dependent retrieval.This is an expanded version of a paper presented in the Symposium on Naturally Occurring Memories, at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, August 1978.     

Judgement of confidence in childhood memories

Memory judgement processes, based on the characteristics and associations of retrieved memories such as sensory details and supporting memories, are considered as important as retrieval in several autobiographical memory models. Judgement processes have received less research attention than memory characteristics themselves. The present studies examined memory judgement using qualitative analysis of the reasons participants gave for confidence in retrieved childhood memories. For memories they were confident of, participants cited memory phenomenology, especially sensory and affective details, much more frequently than consistency with other autobiographical knowledge. For memories they were not confident of, participants reported lack of consistency with autobiographical knowledge or with others' memories more often than memory phenomenology as reasons for their uncertainty. Participants' comments also revealed several metacognitive beliefs about the relationship between memory characteristics and accuracy. These data are consistent with two‐process models of memory judgement associated with true versus false memories. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

False memories of childhood experiences

We conducted two experiments to investigate if college students would create false memories of childhood experiences in response to misleading information and repeated interviews. In both experiments we contacted parents to obtain information about events that happened to the students during childhood. In a series of interviews we asked the students to recall the parent-reported events and one experimenter-created false event. In the second experiment we varied the age at which we claimed the false event occurred. In both experiments we found that some individuals created false memories in these circumstances and in the second experiment we found no effect of age of attempted incorporation. In the second experiment we also found that those who discussed related background knowledge during the early interviews were more likely to create a false recall. Generalizations to therapy contexts are discussed.     

Creating false memories for events that occurred before versus after the offset of childhood amnesia

We examined whether false images and memories for childhood events are more likely when the event supposedly took place during the period of childhood amnesia. Over three interviews, participants recalled six events: five true and one false. Some participants were told that the false event happened when they were 2 years old (Age 2 group), while others were told that it happened when they were 10 years old (Age 10 group). We compared participants’ reports of the false event to their reports of a true event from the same age. Consistent with prior research on childhood amnesia, participants in the Age 10 group were more likely than participants in the Age 2 group to remember their true event and they reported more information about it. Participants in the Age 2 group, on the other hand, were more likely to develop false images and memories than participants in the Age 10 group. Furthermore, once a false image or memory developed, there were no age-related differences in the amount of information participants reported about the false event. We conclude that childhood amnesia increases our susceptibility to false suggestion, thus our results have implications for court cases where early memories are at issue.     

Sex differences in gender-related childhood memories

Based on theories of gender development, especially the one proposed by Nancy Chodorow, it was predicted that boys' gender-related childhood memories will be different from girls' on five dimensions related to activity, emotionality, and sex appropriateness. Forty-five men and 45 women were asked to describe their earliest gender-related childhood memories. The memories were analyzed by two judges. The data document a significant sex difference in the activity and emotionality of the memories. Men's memories were more active and women's more emotional. The predictions that men's memories of sex-appropriate behavior will be more positive, will have fewer deviations from sex-appropriate behavior, and when such deviations occur, they will be associated with more negative emotions were not confirmed. It is suggested that childhood memories can be seen as reflecting actual differences between the sexes in childhood experiences, or as the result of a process of memory selection that reflects men's and women's different gender-related experiences as adults.The author would like to thank Beni Feinholtz and Naftali Menashe, both students at Tel Aviv University, for their help in the data collection.     

Creating false memories for events that occurred before versus after the offset of childhood amnesia

We examined whether false images and memories for childhood events are more likely when the event supposedly took place during the period of childhood amnesia. Over three interviews, participants recalled six events: five true and one false. Some participants were told that the false event happened when they were 2 years old (Age 2 group), while others were told that it happened when they were 10 years old (Age 10 group). We compared participants' reports of the false event to their reports of a true event from the same age. Consistent with prior research on childhood amnesia, participants in the Age 10 group were more likely than participants in the Age 2 group to remember their true event and they reported more information about it. Participants in the Age 2 group, on the other hand, were more likely to develop false images and memories than participants in the Age 10 group. Furthermore, once a false image or memory developed, there were no age-related differences in the amount of information participants reported about the false event. We conclude that childhood amnesia increases our susceptibility to false suggestion, thus our results have implications for court cases where early memories are at issue.     

Public events and flashbulb memories in Parkinson's disease

Public events and Flashbulb memories were investigated in 12 non-demented patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) and 12 controls. Knowledge of public events and flashbulbs memories were assessed using a Famous Events Test (EVE 30). Contributions of semantic, episodic, as well as executive functioning and anterograde memory were examined. Results primarily showed that the performances of patients with PD were lower than these of controls in 4 tasks: free recall, specific questions, dating events and date recognition. They also had difficulties in finding the temporal order of 8 events. In contrast, the PD group benefited from events recognition themselves to the same extent as the controls. Secondly, the recall of flashbulb memories (FBM) was lower in the PD group than in the controls. Finally, correlations appeared in PD between the detailed recall of the events with the "recall" abilities of the MATTIS scale, possibly reflect an impairment in rebuilding memories. A positive correlation is also observed with the initiation score of the MATTIS (executive component), suggesting that the difficulties of rebuilding can be related to a dysfunction in accessing information because of a certain degree of frontal amnesia.     

False memories of fabricated political events

In the largest false memory study to date, 5,269 participants were asked about their memories for three true and one of five fabricated political events. Each fabricated event was accompanied by a photographic image purportedly depicting that event. Approximately half the participants falsely remembered that the false event happened, with 27% remembering that they saw the events happen on the news. Political orientation appeared to influence the formation of false memories, with conservatives more likely to falsely remember seeing Barack Obama shaking hands with the president of Iran, and liberals more likely to remember George W. Bush vacationing with a baseball celebrity during the Hurricane Katrina disaster. A follow-up study supported the explanation that events are more easily implanted in memory when they are congruent with a person's preexisting attitudes and evaluations, in part because attitude-congruent false events promote feelings of recognition and familiarity, which in turn interfere with source attributions.     

The distribution of early childhood memories

The quantitative distribution of autobiographical memories for the first decade of life is described. The distribution, based on over 11,000 autobiographical memories from age 10 and younger from published studies, is nearly identical for males and females, for participants of different ages, and for different methods of collecting data, including using words to cue memories from anywhere in the lifespan or from just the childhood years, exhaustive listing of all early memories, and interviews.     

The distribution of early childhood memories

The quantitative distribution of autobiographical memories for the first decade of life is described. The distribution, based on over 11,000 autobiographical memories from age 10 and younger from published studies, is nearly identical for males and females, for participants of different ages, and for different methods of collecting data, including using words to cue memories from anywhere in the lifespan or from just the childhood years, exhaustive listing of all early memories, and interviews.     

Field and observer modes of remembering

Abstract

Nigro and Neisser (1983) contrasted two ways of remembering personal experiences: the rememberer may ‘see’ the event from his or her perspective as in normal perception, or ‘see’ the self engaged in the event as an observer would. Several factors contribute to the determination of perspective, but Nigro and Neisser also reported that many subjects claimed they could change to another perspective at will. We sampled personal memories from several life periods and assessed ability to change the initially reported perspective. Changing was easier for recent or vividly recalled events, harder for older and less vividly recalled events. Memory perspectives may differ in other aspects than their imagery. A second study was conducted to determine whether affective experience is altered when perspectives are changed. The affect experienced decreased when shifting from a field to an observer perspective, but did not change with the converse shift. These studies provide further evidence that remembering is more than retrieval. The information that enters awareness is determined by the information sources in memory and the organisational scheme adopted for recollection.     

Biased retellings of events yield biased memories

When people retell events, they take different perspectives for different audiences and purposes. In four experiments, we examined the effects of this postevent reorganization of events on memory for the original events. In each experiment, participants read a story, wrote a biased letter about one of the story characters, and later remembered the original story. Participants' letters contained more story details and more elaborations relevant to the purpose of their retellings. More importantly, the letter perspective affected the amount of information recalled (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) and the direction of the errors in recall (Experiments 1 and 3) and recognition (Experiment 2). Selective rehearsal plays an important role in these bias effects: retelling involves selectively retrieving and using story information, with consequent differences in memory. However, biased memory occurred even when the biased letters contained little, if any, specific information (Experiment 4) or contained the same amount and kinds of story information as a neutral control condition (Experiment 3). Biased memory is a consequence of the reorganizing schema guiding the retelling perspective, in addition to the effects of rehearsing specific information in retelling.     

Flashbulb memories of personal events of 9/11 and the day after for a sample of New York City residents

The present study assessed consistency of recollections of personal circumstances of the 9/11 World Trade Center attack and events of the day before (9/10), and the day after (9/12), in a sample of 100 New York City college students. The day before 9/11 represented an ordinary event. A questionnaire was administered twice, 1 wk. and 1 yr. after the 9/11 attack. Students were asked to describe their personal circumstances when hearing about the news of the World Trade Center attack and for the same time of day for 9/10 and 9/12. 18 students returned the follow-up questionnaire. Consistency of initial and follow-up responses for the central categories for both 9/11 and 9/12 of where, who, and activity was very high (9/11: "Where"--100%, "Who"--100%, "What"--94%; 9/12: "Where"--100%, "Who"--100%, "What"--80%). Recollections of 9/10 were significantly less consistent ("Where"--79%, "Who"--71%, "What"--71%). Analysis indicated that students formed vivid, consistent recollections during the events of both 9/11 and 9/12. It is likely that the events of 9/12 also became flashbulb memories, vivid recollections of traumatic events, because the emotional impact of the stressful events, i.e., police and military presence, disrupted schedules, relating to the 9/11 attack endured beyond the day of the attack.     

The reality of recovered memories: corroborating continuous and discontinuous memories of childhood sexual abuse

Although controversy surrounds the relative authenticity of discontinuous versus continuous memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA), little is known about whether such memories differ in their likelihood of corroborative evidence. Individuals reporting CSA memories were interviewed, and two independent raters attempted to find corroborative information for the allegations. Continuous CSA memories and discontinuous memories that were unexpectedly recalled outside therapy were more likely to be corroborated than anticipated discontinuous memories recovered in therapy. Evidence that suggestion during therapy possibly mediates these differences comes from the additional finding that individuals who recalled the memories outside therapy were markedly more surprised at the existence of their memories than were individuals who initially recalled the memories in therapy. These results indicate that discontinuous CSA memories spontaneously retrieved outside of therapy may be accurate, while implicating expectations arising from suggestions during therapy in producing false CSA memories.