Global Distributive Justice

The paper discusses the problem of global distributive justice. It proposes to distinguish between principles for the domestic and for the global or intersocietal distribution of wealth. It is argued that there may be a plurality of partly diverging domestic conceptions of distributive justice, not all of which need to be liberal egalitarian conceptions. It is maintained, however, that principles regulating the intersocietal distribution of wealth have to be egalitarian principles. This claim is defended against Rawls's argument in The Law of Peoples that egalitarian principles of distributive justice should not be applied globally. Moreover, it is explained in detail, why Rawls's "duty of assistance to burdened societies" cannot be an appropriate substitute for a global principle of distributive justice.     

On Reasonableness

This essay argues that the concept of 'reasonableness'plays an important role in Scanlon's, Rawls's, and Barry's theories of justice (or morality). The relationship between moral motivation and reasonableness is critically analysed. Specifically, the paper questions whether it is plausible to impute to the agents of construction the desire 'to justify our actions to others on impartial terms'. It also argues that most of the work is done by the assumption that people are reasonable rather than by the contractarian formulation. Indeed, the paper argues, the argument could proceed entirely by making explicit and arguing for the moral assumptions embedded in the concept of reasonableness [1].     

Intention and Permissibility: Jonathan DancyScanlon's Principles

My first four sections concentrate on the second section of Professor Scanlon's contribution (hereafter IP ), where he lays out his conception of moral principles and of the role they play in theory and practice. I will raise questions on the following issues:
1. Scanlon's initial introduction of the notion of a principle.
2. His rejection of the standard view that principles are concerned with the forbidding, permitting and requiring of actions.
3. His rejection of pro tanto conceptions of principles in favour of a conception of them as conclusive.
4. The resulting account of what it is for a principle to face and survive exceptions.
Scanlon's discussion of these matters here both appeals to and is in some respects more detailed than the relevant section of his recent What We Owe to Each Other (hereafter WWO ). The topic is interesting both for the role played by principles in Scanlon's present discussion of intention and permissibility, and more generally because of his account of wrongness:
an act is wrong iff it is ruled out by principles that nobody could reasonably reject.
The remainder of my contribution is concerned with the ostensible focus of IP , namely the relevance (if any) of agent-intentions to the permissibility of what is done.     

Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice

Many liberals have argued that a cosmopolitan perspective on global justice follows from the basic liberal principles of justice. Yet, increasingly, it is also said that intrinsic to liberalism is a doctrine of nationalism. This raises a potential problem for the liberal defense of cosmopolitan justice as it is commonly believed that nationalism and cosmopolitanism are conflicting ideals. If this is correct, there appears to be a serious tension within liberal philosophy itself, between its cosmopolitan aspiration on the one hand, and its nationalist agenda on the other. I argue, however, that this alleged conflict between liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan liberalism disappears once we get clear on the scope and goals of cosmopolitan justice and the parameters of liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan global justice, properly understood, are mutually compatible ideals.     

Global Justice: Is Interventionalism Desirable?

In 1994, the European Parliament published a resolution on the right of humanitarian intervention. Interestingly, the declaration maintains that such intervention is not in contradiction with international law, although it formulates the concept of right in a way that is translatable into the vocabulary of individual rights. I analyze some implications of the resolution for the mutual duties of states. I thereby focus my attention on two possible applications: by way of Rawls's duty of assistance and by way of the cosmopolitan theory of global distributive justice. I conclude that the latter theory promises better results for protecting individuals' basic rights, but I also show that it is at the cost of a strongly interventionist structure requiring a powerful supranational institution. Finally, I envision the conditions under which such an increase of interventionism in favor of human rights can be acceptable.     

Toward a decolonial global ethics

This paper argues that decolonial theory can offer a distinctive and valuable ethical lens. Decolonial perspectives give rise to an ethics that is fundamentally global but distinct from, and critical of, moral cosmopolitanism. Decolonial ethics shares with cosmopolitanism a refusal to circumscribe normative commitments on the basis of existing political and cultural boundaries. It differs from cosmopolitanism, though, by virtue of its rejection of the individualism and universalism of cosmopolitan thought. Where cosmopolitan approaches tend to articulate abstract principles developed from within a particular Western tradition, decolonial approaches reject abstract global designs in favour of inter-cultural dialogue amongst multiple people(s), including peoples who deem collective and non-human entities to be of fundamental moral importance. In addition, decolonial global ethics rejects universality in favour of ‘pluriversality’.     

The ethical group psychotherapist

Group psychotherapists in their everyday practice confront a series of ethical problems, some of which rise to the level of ethical dilemmas. This two-part special series will address how the group psychotherapist can address these problems and dilemmas in a way that leads to an ethical course of conduct. This article introduces the series by examining ethical principles and decision-making processes that are relevant to the wide range of issues that confront the group psychotherapist. The article also considers the person of the group psychotherapist him or herself and notes that certain personal qualities might create a foundation for ethical thinking and behavior.     

Cosmopolitan ethics and global legalism

This article analyses the legal and ethical dimensions of the wide gap between commitments to universal human rights and the reality of their widespread and systematic abuse, particularly as related to poverty and inequality. The argument put forward is that, properly conceived, global legalism, that is, the quest to apply the rule of law across and among states and societies, and cosmopolitan ethics, both support restricting harms imposed on weak and vulnerable individuals worldwide by an unjust institutional order. Therefore, those who have tended to value either a global rule of law or cosmopolitan ethics independently have good reason to pursue their requirements together. The article also considers the problem of legalism and cosmopolitanism being used by powerful agents in global politics to enhance their prerogatives and their freedoms from legal and ethical restraints.     

Psychoanalysis and Politics by R. E. Money-Kyrle

Abstract

Group psychotherapists in their everyday practice confront a series of ethical problems, some of which rise to the level of ethical dilemmas. This two-part special series will address how the group psychotherapist can address these problems and dilemmas in a way that leads to an ethical course of conduct. This article introduces the series by examining ethical principles and decision-making processes that are relevant to the wide range of issues that confront the group psychotherapist. The article also considers the person of the group psychotherapist him or herself and notes that certain personal qualities might create a foundation for ethical thinking and behavior.     

Civic and Cosmopolitan Friendship

This article draws out two implications for cosmopolitan or global friendship from an examination of a recent work on civic friendship in the domestic sphere: (1) Insofar as it is the case that civic friendship, as defined by Schwarzenbach (On civic friendship: Including women in the state. Columbia University Press, New York, 2009) is necessary for justice in the state, it is also the case that the absence of global justice can be partially explained by the absence of what might be called cosmopolitan friendship. (2) If we consider the practicalities of civic friendship, we find that cosmopolitan friendship is an even more difficult and demanding project than we might have imagined.     

Global Inequality and International Institutions

This article considers the links between international institutions and global economic justice: how international institutions might be morally important; how they have changed; and at what those changes imply for justice. The institutional structure of international society has evolved in ways that help to undercut the arguments of those who take a restrictionist position towards global economic justice. There is now a denser and more integrated network of shared institutions and practices within which social expectations of global justice and injustice have become more securely established. But, at the same time, our major international social institutions continue to constitute a deformed political order. This combination of density and deformity shapes how we should think about international justice in general and has important implications for the scope, character, and modalities of global economic justice. Having laid out a view of normative development and where it leads, the article then examines why international distributive justice remains so marginal to current practice.     

Augustine and Karl Rahner on the Relationship between the Immanent Trinity and the Economic Trinity

Abstract:  Karl Rahner developed his influential axiom concerning the identity of the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity largely as a polemical reaction to their separation in the Western tradition, a tradition heavily shaped by Augustine. An analysis of Augustine's De Trinitate , however, reveals that Augustine was not guilty of most of the charges of which Rahner accuses him. Furthermore, Rahner's outworking of his fundamental axiom leads him into numerous difficulties that he could have avoided had he adhered to Augustine's view of a close but differentiated relationship between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity.     

Freud's letters as a historical source

This article introduces the project of a "concordance of letters to and by Freud". It should make the broadly scattered Freud-correspondence more accessible to the historian. (Since the death of Freud, almost 3200 letters written by him and nearly 1200 letters to him have been published.) At the same time principles of methodology are discussed which have to be observed in using letters as historical source material.     

A Rawlsian Case for Economic Nationalism: Globalisation and Distributional Autonomy in the Law of Peoples

John Rawls’ resistance to any kind of global egalitarian principle has seemed strange and unconvincing to many commentators, including those generally supportive of Rawls’ project. His rejection of a global egalitarian principle seems to rely on an assumption that states are economically bounded and separate from one another, which is not an accurate portrayal of economic relations among states in our globalised world. In this article, I examine the implications of the domestic theory of justice as fairness to argue that Rawls has good reason to insist on economically bounded states. I argue that certain central features of the contemporary global economy, particularly the free movement of capital across borders, undermine the distributional autonomy required for states to realise Rawls’ principles of justice, and the domestic theory thus requires a certain degree of economic separation among states prior to the convening of the international original position. Given this, I defend Rawls’ reluctance to endorse a global egalitarian principle and defend a policy regime of international capital controls, to restore distributional autonomy and make the realisation of the principles of justice as fairness possible.     

Four tasks for forward-looking global ethics

Our challenge for the twenty-first century consists in showing how to construct a global ethics and in trying to discover a rational foundation for it, which may be used as guidance for action and as a norm for the criticism of specific situations. I argue that four tasks must be accomplished to construct a global ethics: (1) Construct that global governance or that world government that makes cosmopolitan citizenship possible. (2) Foster the joint work of bioethics, economic and business ethics, and development ethics – areas of applied ethics, each one of which on its own has reached the global level. (3) Discover a rational basis for a global ethics, which has a universal normative force, but assumes cultural differences. (4) Develop and promote a dilaogical ethics of cordial reason, which renders one capable of compassion and care.     

Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice

Philosophical attention to problems about global justice is flourishing in a way it has not in any time in memory. This paper considers some reasons for the rise of interest in the subject and reflects on some dilemmas about the meaning of the idea of the cosmopolitan in reasoning about social institutions, concentrating on the two principal dimensions of global justice, the economic and the political.Opening address of the Mini-Conference on Global Justice, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division, 2004 Annual Meeting, Pasadena, California, March 27, 2004. I am grateful for comments to Darrel Moellendorf and to my copanelists Michael Blake, Kristen Hessler, Jon Mandle, Mathias Risse and Leif Wenar.     

Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalizing Opportunities

This paper defends a global principle of equality of opportunity, which states that it is unfair if some have worse opportunities because of their national or civic identity. It begins by outlining the reasoning underpinning this principle. It then considers three objections to global equality of opportunity. The first argues that global equality of opportunity is an inappropriate ideal given the great cultural diversity that exists in the world. The second maintains that equality of opportunity applies only to people who are interconnected in some way and infers from this that it should not be implemented at the global level. The third, inspired by Rawls's The Law of Peoples , maintains that it is inappropriate to thrust liberal ideals (like global equality of opportunity) on nonliberal peoples. Each of these challenges, I argue, is unpersuasive.     

From Rechtsphilosophie to Staatsökonomie: Hegel and the philosophical foundations of political economy

Although Hegel is increasingly recognized as an important figure in the history of political economy, his economic views are never strictly economic. In contrast to other modern thinkers, his primary concern is not the economic efficacy of different practices or institutions but the extent to which they enable and promote the development of human freedom. In this article, I argue that Hegel's pioneering critique of modern liberal economy plays out simultaneously at a more empirical level, corresponding to the properly economic dimension of his analysis, and at a deeper, logical level, which grounds and guides his position. Moreover, I argue that the tendency to favour the first of these levels, found in most of the literature on Hegel's economic thought, reduces the Philosophy of Right's main argument to a more or less vigorous plea for economic interventionism. Against this kind of reading, I show that a renewed focus on the text's logical structure reveals a different and more radical philosophical proposition, which has yet to be fully acknowledged. In particular, I argue that Hegel's dialectical logic leads him beyond the liberalism-interventionism debate, towards a qualitatively different conception of social and economic relations     

Indirect cosmopolitan education: on the contribution of national education to attitudes towards foreigners

ABSTRACT

Many rich countries are witnessing the rise of xenophobic political parties. The opposition to immigration and global redistributive policies is high. How can we pursue global justice in such non-ideal circumstances? Whatever the way we want to pursue global justice, it seems that a change in the political ethos of citizens from rich countries will be necessary. They must come to internalize some genuine concern for foreigners and relativize national identities. Can education contribute to the promotion of such cosmopolitan ethos? An overtly cosmopolitan educational agenda is not likely to be endorsed in these societies where national ties and national priority may be considered fully legitimate by the majority. Nevertheless, this paper argues, some more achievable educational aims may have desirable cosmopolitan spillover effects although it is not their primary purpose. Decentration, empathy, critical thinking, understanding of social reality and social mix can be defended as necessary for a better domestic society. Yet these aims also make the widespread development of a cosmopolitan ethos more likely. This paper thus considers the arguments that can be made for these educational aims and their potential effects on citizens’ attitudes towards foreigners. Then, it discusses a possible tension with another aspect of national civic education: national integration.     

Justice, health, and healthcare

Healthcare (including public health) is special because it protects normal functioning, which in turn protects the range of opportunities open to individuals. I extend this account in two ways. First, since the distribution of goods other than healthcare affect population health and its distribution, I claim that Rawls's principles of justice describe a fair distribution of the social determinants of health, giving a partial account of when health inequalities are unjust. Second, I supplement a principled account of justice for health and healthcare with an account of fair process for setting limits of rationing care. This account is provided by three conditions that comprise "accountability for reasonableness."