Do you see what I see? How social differences influence mindreading

Disagreeing with others about how to interpret a social interaction is a common occurrence. We often find ourselves offering divergent interpretations of others’ motives, intentions, beliefs, and emotions. Remarkably, philosophical accounts of how we understand others do not explain, or even attempt to explain such disagreements. I argue these disparities in social interpretation stem, in large part, from the effect of social categorization and our goals in social interactions, phenomena long studied by social psychologists. I argue we ought to expand our accounts of how we understand others in order to accommodate these data and explain how such profound disagreements arise amongst informed, rational, well-meaning individuals.     

Role of theoretical bias in therapeutic interventions: to see or not to see?

Considering the role of theory in child psychosocial treatment, it is important to acknowledge some of its associated problems. Among the shortcomings of theory discussed in this article are its potential for biasing what we see and do clinically, the arbitrary nature of some theoretical explanations, and the way that theory-based jargon can interfere with communication. A bottom-up approach to the development of clinical principles is advocated instead, especially when these principles are derived from the convergence of clinical observation and research findings.     

Do deaf individuals see better?

The possibility that, following early auditory deprivation, the remaining senses such as vision are enhanced has been met with much excitement. However, deaf individuals exhibit both better and worse visual skills than hearing controls. We show that, when deafness is considered to the exclusion of other confounds, enhancements in visual cognition are noted. The changes are not, however, widespread but are selective, limited, as we propose, to those aspects of vision that are attentionally demanding and would normally benefit from auditory-visual convergence. The behavioral changes are accompanied by a reorganization of multisensory areas, ranging from higher-order cortex to early cortical areas, highlighting cross-modal interactions as a fundamental feature of brain organization and cognitive processing.     

Do you see what I see? Co-actor posture modulates visual processing in joint tasks

ABSTRACT

Interacting with other people is a ubiquitous part of daily life. A complex set of processes enable our successful interactions with others. The present research was conducted to investigate how the processing of visual stimuli may be affected by the presence and the hand posture of a co-actor. Experiments conducted with participants acting alone have revealed that the distance from the stimulus to the hand of a participant can alter visual processing. In the main experiment of the present paper, we asked whether this posture-related source of visual bias persists when participants share the task with another person. The effect of personal and co-actor hand-proximity on visual processing was assessed through object-specific benefits to visual recognition in a task performed by two co-actors. Pairs of participants completed a joint visual recognition task and, across different blocks of trials, the position of their own hands and of their partner's hands varied relative to the stimuli. In contrast to control studies conducted with participants acting alone, an object-specific recognition benefit was found across all hand location conditions. These data suggest that visual processing is, in some cases, sensitive to the posture of a co-actor.     

When are nonwords easy to see?

The influences of presentation mode (mixed vs. blocked trials) and target variability on the detection of targets in words and in random letter strings were examined. The results indicated that there was a substantial word superiority effect in mixed lists of words and nonwords, but that this effect was eliminated when pure lists of words and nonwords were compared. Also, target variability affected the shape of the serial position curve. When subjects searched repeatedly for a single target, the serial position curve had only a significant linear component. However, when the identity of the target varied from trial to trial, the serial position curve had a significant quartic component (i.e.. it was M-shaped). These results were interpreted in terms of strategies and feature learning.     

Do you see what I see? Infants’ reasoning about others’ incomplete perceptions

Twelve‐month‐olds realize that when an agent cannot see an object, her incomplete perceptions still guide her goal‐directed actions. What would happen if the agent had incomplete perceptions because she could see only one part of the object, for example one side of a screen? In the present research, 16‐month‐olds were first shown an agent who always pointed to a red object, as opposed to a black or a yellow object, suggesting that she preferred red over the other colours. Next, two screens were introduced while the agent was absent. The screens were (1) red or green on both sides; (2) red on the front (infants’ side) but green on the back (the agent’s side) or vice versa; or (3) only coloured red or green on the front. During test, the agent, who could see only the back of the screens, pointed to one of the two screens. The results revealed that while infants expected the agent to continue acting on her colour preference and point to the red rather than the green screen during test, they did so in accord with the agent’s perception of the screens, rather than their own perceptions: they expected the agent to point to the red screen in (1), but to the green‐front screen in (2), and they had no prediction of which screen the agent should point to in (3). The implications of the present findings for early psychological reasoning research are discussed.     

You can see what ‘I’ means

This paper takes up the question of whether we can visually represent something as having semantic value. Something has semantic value if it represents some property, thing or concept. An argument is offered that we can represent semantic value based on a variety of number-color synesthesia. This argument is shown to withstand several objections that can be lodged against the popular arguments from phenomenal contrast and from the mundane example of reading.     

Do you see what I see? Testing horses’ ability to recognise real-life objects from 2D computer projections

Animal Cognition - The use of 2-dimensional representations (e.g. photographs or digital images) of real-life physical objects has been an important tool in studies of animal cognition. Horses are...     

Cross-gender perceptions of facial attributes and their relation to attractiveness: do we see them differently than they see us?

Examination of perceptions of human facial attributes revealed that individual attributes are similarly perceived by males and females. However, patterns of attribute interrelationships differ as a function of gender of the face. Undergraduate students (N = 280) rated pictures of 40 male or female Caucasians on 12 physical attributes (e.g., nose size, face width) and overall attractiveness. The four sets of attribute ratings (defined by rater gender and picture gender) were submitted to principal components analyses, and five-factor solutions were found for each condition (accounting for about 76% of the variance). Comparisons of the four component solutions using confirmatory factor procedures revealed that male and female raters share one factor structure when rating photographs of female faces and another factor structure when rating photographs of male faces. Multiple regression analyses revealed that the patterns of attribute interrelationships were not "perceptual units" in the perception of attractiveness, and that different "rules" are used to assess the attractiveness of male and female stimuli faces. The importance of these results for models of facial attractiveness and interfacial similarity judgements are discussed.     

Do humans prefer to see their grasping points?

ABSTRACT To grasp an object the digits need to be placed at suitable positions on its surface. The selection of such grasping points depends on several factors. Here the authors examined whether being able to see 1 of the selected grasping points is such a factor. Subjects grasped large cylinders or oriented blocks that would normally be grasped with the thumb continuously visible and the final part of the index finger's trajectory occluded by the object in question. An opaque screen that hid the thumb's usual grasping point was used to examine whether individuals would choose a grip that was oriented differently to maintain vision of the thumb's grasping point. A transparent screen was used as a control. Occluding the thumb's grasping point made subjects move more carefully (adopting a larger grip aperture) and choose a slightly different grip orientation. However, the change in grip orientation was much too small to keep the thumb visible. The authors conclude that humans do not particularly aim for visible grasping points.     

What does second-order vision see in an image?

The human visual system is sensitive to both first-order variations in luminance and second-order variations in local contrast and texture. Although there is some debate about the nature of second-order vision and its relationship to first-order processing, there is now a body of results showing that they are processed separately. However, the amount, and nature, of second-order structure present in the natural environment is unclear. This is an important question because, if natural scenes contain little second-order structure in addition to first-order signals, the notion of a separate second-order system would lack ecological validity. Two models of second-order vision were applied to a number of well-calibrated natural images. Both models consisted of a first stage of oriented spatial filters followed by a rectifying nonlinearity and then a second set of filters. The models differed in terms of the connectivity between first-stage and second-stage filters. Output images taken from the models indicate that natural images do contain useful second-order structure. Specifically, the models reveal variations in texture and features defined by such variations. Areas of high contrast (but not necessarily high luminance) are also highlighted by the models. Second-order structure--as revealed by the models--did not correlate with the first-order profile of the images, suggesting that the two types of image 'content' may be statistically independent.     

Concrete spatial language: see what I mean?

Conveying complex mental scenarios is at the heart of human language. Advances in cognitive linguistics suggest this is mediated by an ability to activate cognitive systems involved in non-linguistic processing of spatial information. In this fMRI-study, we compare sentences with a concrete spatial meaning to sentences with an abstract meaning. Using this contrast, we demonstrate that sentence meaning involving motion in a concrete topographical context, whether linked to animate or inanimate subjects nouns, yield more activation in a bilateral posterior network, including fusiform/parahippocampal, and retrosplenial regions, and the temporal-occipital-parietal junction. These areas have previously been shown to be involved in mental navigation and spatial memory tasks. Sentences with an abstract setting activate an extended largely left-lateralised network in the anterior temporal, and inferior and superior prefrontal cortices, previously found activated by comprehension of complex semantics such as narratives. These findings support a model of language, where the understanding of spatial semantic content emerges from the recruitment of brain regions involved in non-linguistic spatial processing.     

Do you see what I see? The effect of members’ cognitive styles on team processes and errors in task execution

This research investigates the effect of members’ cognitive styles on team processes that affect errors in execution tasks. In two laboratory studies, we investigated how a team’s composition (members’ cognitive styles related to object and spatial visualization) affects the team’s strategic focus and strategic consensus, and how those affect the team’s commission of errors. Study 1, conducted with 70 dyads performing a navigation and identification task, established that teams high in spatial visualization are more process-focused than teams high in object visualization. Process focus, which pertains to a team’s attention to the details of conducting a task, is associated with fewer errors. Study 2, conducted with 64 teams performing a building task, established that heterogeneity in cognitive style is negatively associated with the formation of a strategic consensus, which has a direct and mediating relationship with errors.     

How do you see me? Coming out in counselling

Recent large-scale survey research has raised serious concerns in both the counselling community and the mass media about the ways in which counsellors work with lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) clients. The current questionnaire-based research focused on client experiences of their own, and their counsellor's, self-disclosures of sexuality. Most clients did not require counsellor disclosure. However, failure of the counsellor to disclose could result in problems and assumptions being made by the client. We conclude that LGB awareness is improving, but there is still much need for training in this area to challenge limiting assumptions by some counsellors and to avoid the need for clients to educate them.     

Do 5-month-old infants see humans as material objects?

Infants expect objects to be solid and cohesive, and to move on continuous paths through space. In this study, we examine whether infants understand that human beings are material objects, subject to these same principles. We report that 5-month-old infants apply the constraint of continuous motion to inanimate blocks, but not to people. This suggests that young infants have two separate modes of construal: one for inanimate objects and another for humans.     

Meta-insight: do people really know how others see them?

Although people can accurately guess how others see them, many studies have suggested that this may only be because people generally assume that others see them as they see themselves. These findings raise the question: In their everyday lives, do people understand the distinction between how they see their own personality and how others see their personality? We examined whether people make this distinction, or whether people possess what we call meta-insight. In 3 studies, we assessed meta-insight for a broad range of traits (e.g., Big Five, intelligent, funny) across several naturalistic social contexts (e.g., first impression, friends). Our findings suggest that people can make valid distinctions between how they see themselves and how others see them. Thus, people seem to have some genuine insight into their reputation and do not achieve meta-accuracy only by capitalizing on the fact that others see them similarly to how they see themselves.     

Tell me, what did you see? The stimulus on computers

Most psychology experiments start with a stimulus, and, for an increasing number of studies, the stimulus is presented on a computer monitor. Usually, that monitor is a CRT, although other technologies are becoming available. The monitor is a sampling device; the sampling occurs in four dimensions: spatial, temporal, luminance, and chromatic. This paper reviews some of the important issues in each of these sampling dimensions and gives some recommendations for how to use the monitor effectively to present the stimulus. In general, the position is taken that to understand what the stimulus actually is requires a clear specification of the physical properties of the stimulus, since the actual experience of the stimulus is determined both by the physical variables and by the psychophysical variables of how the stimulus is handled by our sensory systems.