The Epistemic Integrity of Scientific Research

We live in a world in which scientific expertise and its epistemic authority become more important. On the other hand, the financial interests in research, which could potentially corrupt science, are increasing. Due to these two tendencies, a concern for the integrity of scientific research becomes increasingly vital. This concern is, however, hollow if we do not have a clear account of research integrity. Therefore, it is important that we explicate this concept. Following Rudolf Carnap’s characterization of the task of explication, this means that we should develop a concept that is (1) similar to our common sense notion of research integrity, (2) exact, (3) fruitful, and (4) as simple as possible. Since existing concepts do not meet these four requirements, we develop a new concept in this article. We describe a concept of epistemic integrity that is based on the property of deceptiveness, and argue that this concept does meet Carnap’s four requirements of explication. To illustrate and support our claims we use several examples from scientific practice, mainly from biomedical research.     

Economic Freedom,Income Inequality and Life Satisfaction in OECD Countries

Since Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century in 2014, scientific interest into the impact of income inequality on society has been on the rise. However, little is known about the mediating role of income inequality in the relationship between market institutions and subjective well-being. Using panel analysis on a sample of 21 OECD countries to test the effects of five different types of economic freedom on income inequality, we find that fiscal freedom, free trade and freedom from government regulation increase income inequality, whereas sound money decreases income inequality. Income inequality is found to have a negative effect on life satisfaction. Mediation tests show that income inequality mediates the influence of fiscal freedom, free trade and freedom from government regulation on life satisfaction.     

“Broader Impacts” or “Responsible Research and Innovation”? A Comparison of Two Criteria for Funding Research in Science and Engineering

Our subject is how the experience of Americans with a certain funding criterion, “broader impacts” (and some similar criteria) may help in efforts to turn the European concept of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) into a useful guide to funding Europe’s scientific and technical research. We believe this comparison may also be as enlightening for Americans concerned with revising research policy. We have organized our report around René Von Schomberg’s definition of RRI, since it seems both to cover what the European research group to which we belong is interested in and to be the only widely accepted definition of RRI. According to Von Schomberg, RRI: “… is a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view to the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its marketable products (in order to allow a proper embedding of scientific and technological advances in our society).” While RRI seeks fundamental changes in the way research is conducted, Broader Impacts is more concerned with more peripheral aspects of research: widening participation of disadvantaged groups, recruiting the next generation of scientists, increasing the speed with which results are used, and so on. Nevertheless, an examination of the broadening of funding criteria over the last four decades suggests that National Science Foundation has been moving in the direction of RRI.     

Ensuring Liberties: Understanding State Restrictions on Religious Freedoms

Promises of religious freedoms have become the standard in national constitutions. Yet, despite these assurances, religious freedoms are routinely denied. Combining new data collections with expanded theoretical explanations, this research explores how dimensions of governance and measures of the religious economy contribute to government restrictions on religion. Consistent with recent work on the judicialization of politics, we find that the absence of an independent judiciary is an important predictor of government restrictions on religious freedoms, whereas free elections and government effectiveness are insignificant in our full models. Consistent with the religious economy theory, we find that social restrictions and government favoritism toward a religion(s) are persistent predictors of the government's restrictions. Although the proportion of the population Muslim holds a strong bivariate association with government restrictions (r = .57), the relationship is reduced to insignificance in our full models. We briefly discuss the implications of these findings.     

Rational Choice,Religion, and the Marketplace: Where Does Adam Smith Fit In?

Rational choice theorists of religion have assumed that Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations advocates a free market in religion, which, they argue, leads to increased religious vitality. In fact, while Smith opposed direct government subsidies for religion and argued that a free market was the first-best solution, as a second-best policy he advocated religious regulation, including state-appointed clergy and the reduction of clergy income. Smith's rational choice approach to religion, which springs from his understanding of public goods, externalities and the need for civil peace, and government stability, can still provide direction for social scientific research, but it does not always support a policy of religious free markets.     

Scientist-administrators at the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development as contributors to the scientific enterprise

At the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD), as in other government research supporting agencies, scientist-administrators who are "program staff" work to accomplish their organization's set of research priorities using established mechanisms for supporting research. At the same time, the definition of their work is given to their interpretation, which, in turn, is guided by their understanding of their scientific discipline and their commitment to it. The tension that may arise between the organization-guided role and the science-guided role is more apparent than real because the major responsibility of "program staff" within the Institute is to cultivate a grant portfolio addressing scientific issues relevant to the mission of the Institute and exemplifying the most advanced research concepts and methodologies. When the overlap between the mission of the Institute and the direction of science is small, the push to increase it leads to new and imaginative solutions that benefit both the Institute and the science.     

Evolving research misconduct policies and their significance for physical scientists

Scientific misconduct includes the fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism (FFP) of concepts, data or ideas; some institutions in the United States have expanded this concept to include “other serious deviations (OSD) from accepted research practice.” It is the absence of this OSD clause that distinguishes scientific misconduct policies of the past from the “research misconduct” policies that should be the basis of future federal policy in this area. This paper introduces a standard for judging whether an action should be considered research misconduct as distinguished from scientific misconduct: by this standard, research misconduct must involve activities unique to the practice of science and must have the potential to negatively affect the scientific record. Although the number of cases of scientific misconduct is uncertain (only the NIH and the NSF keep formal records), the costs are high in terms of the integrity of the scientific record, diversions from research to investigate allegations, ruined careers of those eventually exonerated, and erosion of public confidence in science. Existing scientific misconduct policies vary from institution to institution and from government agency to government agency; some have highly developed guidelines that include OSD, others have no guidelines at all. One result has been that the federal False Claims Act has been used to pursue allegations of scientific misconduct. As a consequence, such allegations have been adjudicated in federal courts, rather than judged by scientific peers. The federal government is now establishing a first-ever research misconduct policy that would apply to all research funded by the federal government regardless of which agency funded the research or whether the research was carried out in a government, industrial or university laboratory. Physical scientists, who up to now have only infrequently been the subject of scientific misconduct allegations, must nonetheless become active in the debate over research misconduct policies and how they are implemented since they will now be explicitly covered by this new federal wide policy. Disclaimer: The authors are grateful for the support for conduct of this research provided by the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and were formed and expressed without reference to positions taken by DOE or the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). The views of the authors are not intended either to reflect or imply positions of DOE or PNNL.     

Democracy, Individual Rights and the Regulation of Science

Whether the US Constitution guarantees a right to conduct scientific research is a question that has never been squarely addressed by the United States Supreme Court. Similarly, the extent to which the First Amendment protects the right to communicate the results of scientific research is an issue about which there is scant judicial authority. This article suggests that a crucial guidepost for exploring both these uncharted areas of constitutional law should be whether restrictions on scientific research or communication truly implicate fundamental individual rights or instead primarily concern issues of general social welfare—issues that in a democracy are properly decided by the representative branches of government or their delegates, not by the judiciary.     

From Intentions to Neurons: Social and Neural Consequences of Disbelieving in Free Will

The problem of free will is among the most fascinating and disputed questions throughout the history of philosophy and psychology. Traditionally limited to philosophical and theological debate, in the last decades it has become a matter of scientific investigation. The theoretical and methodological advances in neuroscience allowed very complex psychological functions related to free will (conscious intentions, decision-making, and agency) to be investigated. In parallel, neuroscience is gaining momentum in the media, and various scientific findings are claimed to provide evidence that free will is nothing more than an illusion. Why do neuroscientific findings have such a strong impact on our notion of free will? Does it really matter what neuroscience tells us about free will? Here we critically examine studies in experimental philosophy, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience that attempt to provide an empirical answer to these questions. This overview of the literature demonstrates that inducing disbelief in free will has an impact on folk psychology, social behavior and intentional action.     

Constitutional Restraints on the Regulations of Scientific Speech and Scientific Research

The question of what constitutional constraints should apply to government efforts to regulate scientific speech is frequently contrasted to the question of what constitutional constraints should apply to government efforts to regulate scientific research. This comment argues that neither question is well formulated for constitutional analysis, which should instead turn on the relationship to constitutional values of specific acts of scientific speech and research.     

Freedom of Preference: A Defense of Compatiblism

Harry G. Frankfurt has presented a case of a counterfactual intervener CI with knowledge and power to control an agent so he will do A. He concludes that if the agent prefers to do A and there is no intervention by CI, the agent has acted of his own free will and is morally responsible for doing A, though he lacked an alternative possibility. I consider the consequences for freedom and moral responsibility of CI having a complete plan P for all actions of an agent, Lucky, who luckily has preferences that accord with P, and I extend the argument to all citizens of a land, Luckyland, who are like Lucky. I argue the citizens of Luckyland have free will but lack moral responsibility because of the connection between moral responsibility, reactive attitudes and future action. Furthermore, the presence of CI and his plan P may allow free will but is incompatible with freedom of preference. Preference concerns alternatives excluded by CI. I argue that a special higher order preference for the preference structure, a power preference, ends the regress of higher order preference and explains the first order preference. Causal determinism is compatible with freedom of preference explained by a power preference when a power preference would also explain an alternative preference. The remoteness argument for incompatibility fails because of a lack of transitivity causal explanation. The power preference is the self-explained source of freedom of preference. That basic freedom may be limited by government knowledge of our preferences, even if, like Lucky, our preferences do not provoke intervention and we conform of our own free will.     

解构主义与马克思主义相遇,给我们带来了什么启示?--朱尔斯·汤森《德里达对马克思(主义)的解构》一文评介

英国曼彻斯特大学的政治哲学教授朱尔斯·汤森(Jules Townshend)于2004年4月在英国政治学学会的年度会议上宣读了"德里达对马克思(主义)的解构"一文,该文不仅条理清晰地分析了本来并非清晰的德里达的解构思路,同时在回顾十年反响的基础上,指出了德里达解构的意义和局限性即德里达对"幽灵"的解构有助于我们从坏的"幽灵"那里解放出来;不过德里达在解构幽灵的同时同样被幽灵所困扰.本文通过对汤文的评介指出我们从德里达的解构中能够获得从传统思维方式中难以获得的启示,从而拓宽和深化我们的研究视野,从存在的历史境域中理解事物的发展,在真的追求中研究时代中的马克思主义与马克思主义所面临的时代问题.     

Emotional and deliberative reactions to a public crisis: Mad Cow disease in France

Although most theories of choice are cognitive, recent research has emphasized the role of emotions. We used a novel context--the Mad Cow crisis in France--to investigate how emotions alter choice even when consequences are held constant. A field study showed that individuals reduced beef consumption in months after many newspaper articles featured the emotional label "Mad Cow," but beef consumption was unaffected after articles featured scientific labels for the same disease. The reverse pattern held for the disease-related actions of a government bureaucracy. A lab study showed that the Mad Cow label induces people to make choices based solely on emotional reactions, whereas scientific labels induce people to consider their own probability judgments. Although the Mad Cow label produces less rational behavior than scientific labels, it is two to four times more common in the environment.     

A preferred route for substantive theorizing

Wicker (1989) urges the ecologyically-oriented psychologist to be more cognizant of the decision points implicit in the scientific enterprise. He describes what he calls substantive theorizing and urges us to give greater precedence, conceptually and methodologically, to context-specific phenomena. In this rejoinder, I: (1) underscore the thrust of the choices Wicker has clarified and the p references he has recommended; (2) suggest an alternative route for the ecologically-oriented research process, one in which the conceptual and substantive "paths" have coequal and interdependent importance in determining the nature and direction of the research process; and (3) discuss in greater depth the search for universal laws. Though universal laws per se may be fictional goals, I argue that our principles will have greater generalizability to the degree to which we are successful in redirecting the research enterprise to focus upon structural, as opposed to content, principles.     

Common sense about qualities and senses

There has been some recent optimism that addressing the question of how we distinguish sensory modalities will help us consider whether there are limits on a scientific understanding of perceptual states. For example, Block has suggested that the way we distinguish sensory modalities indicates that perceptual states have qualia which at least resist scientific characterization. At another extreme, Keeley argues that our common-sense way of distinguishing the senses in terms of qualitative properties is misguided, and offers a scientific eliminativism about common-sense modalities which avoids appeal to qualitative properties altogether. I’ll argue contrary to Keeley that qualitative properties are necessary for distinguishing senses, and contrary to Block that our common-sense distinction doesn’t indicate that perceptual states have qualia. A non-qualitative characterization of perceptual states isn’t needed to avoid the potential limit on scientific understanding imposed by qualia.

Enhancing transparency of the research process to increase accuracy of findings: A guide for relationship researchers

The purpose of this paper is to extend to the field of relationship science, recent discussions and suggested changes in open research practises. We demonstrate different ways that greater transparency of the research process in our field will accelerate scientific progress by increasing accuracy of reported research findings. Importantly, we make concrete recommendations for how relationship researchers can transition to greater disclosure of research practices in a manner that is sensitive to the unique design features of methodologies employed by relationship scientists. We discuss how to implement these recommendations for four different research designs regularly used in relationship research and practical limitations regarding implementing our recommendations and provide potential solutions to these problems.     

Wellbeing as a Wicked Problem: Navigating the Arguments for the Role of Government

Governments in a number of countries have shown increasing interest in seeking to elevate happiness or wellbeing as an explicit policy goal. This interest has led to fierce debates both within and, increasingly, beyond academe about the appropriate role for government in this area. It is difficult to adjudicate between the various arguments surrounding the issue as they often take very different starting points, either metatheoretical or disciplinary. In seeking to steer a course through these arguments we take the distinction between ‘wicked’ and ‘tame’ problems as a reference point, arguing that wellbeing should be categorised as the former. The seminal discussion of this distinction (Rittel and Webber in Policy Sci 4:155–169, 1973) resonates sharply with current debates on wellbeing and indeed is located within similar debates in the past. We argue that understanding wellbeing as a wicked problem steers us towards deliberation and scrutiny as central to the agenda and cautions us against expecting to find a panacea. However, this understanding can take us beyond irresolvable disputes by pointing to the need for pragmatic and legitimate government action. In developing our arguments we ground them mainly in relation to empirical research on developments in the UK, where the connection between wellbeing and public policy is seen as relatively advanced. However, we suggest these arguments apply to other contexts where wellbeing is gaining increasing traction as a potential goal of government policy.     

程序公正与权威信任:公共政策可接受性机制

中国正处于深刻的社会转型和社会变迁时期,社会风险加剧。其中一个重要的表征就是群体性事件频发。事件的背后,反映出民众对公共政策的不认可,如果公共政策的制定和执行不能充分考虑民众的接受性,极有可能构成新的社会风险,威胁社会稳定。因此,如何有效地提高民众对公共政策的接受性已经成为我国亟需解决的重大问题。项目欲建立程序公正、结果宜人性和权威信任(认知信任和情感信任)对公共政策可接受性、政府满意度的影响模型,从而有效提升政策可接受性。拟在不同的公共政策情境中通过Scenario、实验室模拟实验和问卷调查,探明程序公正和结果宜人性对政策可接受性、政府满意度的交互作用机制,以及权威信任对此交互作用机制的边界效应,并在此基础上进一步分析认知信任和情感信任对于政策可接受性、政府满意度及其因子关系的调节作用。研究成果可用于提高民众对政策的满意度,为政府制定政策提供科学依据。     

Engaged,Embedded, Enjoined: Science and Technology Studies in the National Science Foundation

Engaged scholarship is an intellectual movement sweeping across higher education, not only in the social and behavioral sciences but also in fields of natural science and engineering. It is predicated on the idea that major advances in knowledge will transpire when scholars, while pursuing their research interests, also consider addressing the core problems confronting society. For a workable engaged agenda in science and technology studies, one that informs scholarship as well as shapes practice and policy, the traditional terms of engagement must be renegotiated to be more open and mutual than has historically characterized the nature of inquiry in this field. At the same time, it is essential to protect individual privacy and preserve government confidentiality. Yet there is a scientific possibility for and benefit to introducing more collaborative and deliberative research approaches between scholar and subject in ways that will not violate these first-order ethics. To make the case, this article discusses the possibilities and perils of engaged science and technology scholarship by drawing on our own recent experiences to conduct and apply STS research while embedded in the National Science Foundation. Brief accounts of these experiences reveal the opportunities as well as the challenges of engaged scholarship. They also provide lessons for those fellow travelers who might follow the authors to this or other like host organizations with ambitions of increasing fundamental knowledge about and applying research to the policies, programs, and decisions of the scientific enterprise.     

The evolution of the language faculty: clarifications and implications

In this response to Pinker and Jackendoff's critique, we extend our previous framework for discussion of language evolution, clarifying certain distinctions and elaborating on a number of points. In the first half of the paper, we reiterate that profitable research into the biology and evolution of language requires fractionation of "language" into component mechanisms and interfaces, a non-trivial endeavor whose results are unlikely to map onto traditional disciplinary boundaries. Our terminological distinction between FLN and FLB is intended to help clarify misunderstandings and aid interdisciplinary rapprochement. By blurring this distinction, Pinker and Jackendoff mischaracterize our hypothesis 3 which concerns only FLN, not "language" as a whole. Many of their arguments and examples are thus irrelevant to this hypothesis. Their critique of the minimalist program is for the most part equally irrelevant, because very few of the arguments in our original paper were tied to this program; in an online appendix we detail the deep inaccuracies in their characterization of this program. Concerning evolution, we believe that Pinker and Jackendoff's emphasis on the past adaptive history of the language faculty is misplaced. Such questions are unlikely to be resolved empirically due to a lack of relevant data, and invite speculation rather than research. Preoccupation with the issue has retarded progress in the field by diverting research away from empirical questions, many of which can be addressed with comparative data. Moreover, offering an adaptive hypothesis as an alternative to our hypothesis concerning mechanisms is a logical error, as questions of function are independent of those concerning mechanism. The second half of our paper consists of a detailed response to the specific data discussed by Pinker and Jackendoff. Although many of their examples are irrelevant to our original paper and arguments, we find several areas of substantive disagreement that could be resolved by future empirical research. We conclude that progress in understanding the evolution of language will require much more empirical research, grounded in modern comparative biology, more interdisciplinary collaboration, and much less of the adaptive storytelling and phylogenetic speculation that has traditionally characterized the field.