Decoupling the past from the present attenuates inaction inertia

Inaction inertia is the phenomenon that one is not likely to act upon an attractive opportunity after having bypassed an even more attractive opportunity. We investigated the boundary conditions of this inaction inertia effect. Based on the mental accounting literature and the transaction decoupling literature we predicted and found in three experiments that tight coupling of the forgone to the current opportunity is a necessary condition for inaction inertia to occur. Inaction inertia decreased when information about the missed opportunity was ambiguous (Experiment 1), when the past opportunity required an extra step to obtain (Experiment 2) and when the past and present opportunity decreased in comparability (Experiment 3). The theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed in view of the literature on inaction inertia and on judgment and decision-making. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multiple options in the past and the present: The impact on inaction inertia

Inaction inertia is the effect that people do not act on an attractive opportunity only because they previously missed a more attractive opportunity. We investigated the effect of the presence of alternative options on the occurrence of this effect. We hypothesized and found that the likelihood to act on a current opportunity increases when evaluated in the context of another current option compared to when it is presented separately (Experiments 1 and 2). Likelihood of action decreases when the missed opportunity is presented next to another missed opportunity (Experiment 3). We conclude that when multiple options are currently present, the impact of the missed opportunity as a point of reference decreases, and that when multiple options are missed, the impact of these missed opportunities as a point of reference increases. These results are discussed in light of the literatures about inaction inertia and multiple options. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

失望情绪在不作为惯性产生中的作用

以往不作为惯性领域的研究发现, 当个体没有获得先前更优机会是源于他人或外界等不可控因素时, 个体仍会倾向于继续放弃当前次优机会, 且后悔情绪未能对此进行解释。本研究认为失望情绪适用于解释此种情况下的不作为惯性, 或可成为后悔情绪解释的有效补充。本研究通过两个实验首次探讨了失望情绪在不作为惯性产生中的作用。结果发现, 各自变量对失望情绪（体验失望和预期失望）和作为可能性均具有一致的影响力, 且预期失望在不作为惯性的产生中具有中介作用。本研究表明, 失望情绪可能也是导致不作为惯性的一个重要因素。     

先前错失选项的数量对不作为惯性的调节机制

在以往涉及不作为惯性的研究中,个体通常只是错失了1个先前选项.本研究旨在考察当之前错失了多个选项后,不作为惯性是否仍会出现,并深入探讨估价和后悔因素在不作为惯性产生或消失中的作用.结果发现,先前错失选项的数量对不作为惯性具有调节作用:当先前只错失了1个选项时,出现了不作为惯性,当先前已错失了两个选项时,不作为惯性消失了.中介分析发现,这一调节作用可被预期后悔所中介.结果表明,预期后悔是导致个体在错失多个选项后不作为惯性消失的主要原因.     

做会后悔还是不做会后悔?——自我调节模式对不作为惯性的影响

从消费者的不作为惯性反应差异出发,探讨运动模式和评估模式的消费者在错过第一次合意机会、面对第二次次优机会时购买可能性的差异及原因。通过3个研究发现,相比评估模式的消费者而言,运动模式的消费者具有更高的二次购买可能性。在自我调节模式影响次优购买可能性的过程中,预期后悔起到重要的中介作用。此外,研究还发现,当第二次次优机会中提供了与第一次机会中的产品类似但不同的替代产品时,运动模式和评估模式消费者之间的购买可能性差异消失了。     

Inaction inertia in retirement saving

In retirement saving, many people miss out on early opportunities to save and subsequently fail to take adequate actions for a long time thereafter. We examined whether these two observations—the initial failure to act and the subsequent inertia—could be related through the phenomenon of inaction inertia. In Experiment 1 (N = 180), participants were less likely to save for retirement when the difference in annual return between the current opportunity and the missed opportunity was large versus small. In Experiment 2 (N = 180), participants were less likely to start saving for retirement when reminded of a missed opportunity 10 years ago versus 1 year ago. These data constitute the first demonstration of inaction inertia in retirement saving: People's reluctance to act on attractive saving opportunities may be induced by their previous inaction. In Experiment 3 (N = 340) and Experiment 4 (N = 628), we find that the observed inertia is the product of a tendency to underestimate exponential growth combined with a focus on past opportunities. Building on this mechanism, Experiment 5 (N = 916) provided evidence for a potential remedy; the inaction inertia effect completely disappeared when focus was shifted from required contributions to future outcomes.     

How consumers respond to the behavior of missing a free gift promotion: inaction inertia effect on products offered as free gifts

Inaction inertia describes the phenomenon that an individual is unlikely to act on an attractive opportunity after having bypassed an even more attractive one. The results of two experiments indicate that after missing an initial opportunity to obtain a product as a free gift during a promotional period, the inaction inertia effect reduces the likelihood of consumers buying the product at a discounted price (second, inferior opportunity), particularly if the free gift has a high regular price. Additionally, according to the results of Experiment 2, those consumers are less likely to buy a product that has been offered previously as a free gift when a greater total quantity of the free gift is offered during a promotional period. Moreover, the mediation analysis results indicate that anticipated regret and valuation significantly impact the mediating role of inaction inertia.     

Inaction inertia,regret, and valuation: A closer look

Inaction inertia is the phenomenon that one is not likely to act on an attractive opportunity after having bypassed an even more attractive opportunity. So far, all published work has assumed a causal role for the emotion regret in this effect. In a series of 5 experiments we found no support for this regret explanation. In these experiments factors that influenced regret did not influence inaction inertia, and factors that influenced inaction inertia did not influence regret. In addition, in two experiments we found evidence that missing the initial opportunity leads to a devaluation of the later offer. We propose that, in some cases, regret may be a by-product of this devaluation, rather than a cause of inaction inertia.     

Regret, Valuation, and Inaction Inertia

In three experiments we sought to determine the cause of the “inaction inertia” effect, which occurs when bypassing an initial opportunity decreases the likelihood that a subsequent similar action will be taken. Experiment 1 required some participants to estimate their likelihood of buying shoes as a function of the magnitude and geographical location of an earlier forsaken bargain; others estimated their amount of regret over failing to take advantage of the bargain. The inverse relation between regret and propensity to buy strongly implicated regret as the cause of inaction inertia. In Experiment 2 we found evidence that experienced regret over having missed an earlier bargain rather than anticipated regret over paying too much for the subsequent purchase was the source of our participants' inaction inertia. In Experiment 3 we demonstrated through a mediational analysis that those who had missed a large bargain placed a significantly lower value on the subsequent purchase opportunity than those who earlier had missed a more modest bargain. This difference in valuation, along with experienced regret, are two factors which play a significant mediational role in the inaction inertia effect.     

The impact of different product formats on inaction inertia

ABSTRACT

The inaction inertia effect describes situations in which a person rejects an opportunity after having forgone a relatively superior opportunity. This study explores whether product format (hedonic vs. utilitarian) affects the inaction inertia effect. The authors build on previous findings that show comparisons of utilitarian benefits are easier than hedonic benefits, and hedonic consumption (vs. utilitarian consumption) usually generates greater pleasure. The authors propose that people show higher inaction inertia after they have missed a superior utilitarian consumption opportunity than after they have missed a superior hedonic consumption opportunity. This prediction was tested and supported in three different experiments. Moreover, the authors found that differences in comparability between products, rather than the hedonic pleasure, explain differences in inaction inertia effects. These findings contribute to the inaction inertia literature and marketing practice.     

Inaction inertia

Inaction inertia occurs when bypassing an initial action opportunity has the effect of decreasing the likelihood that subsequent similar action opportunities will be taken. This overview of the inaction inertia literature demonstrates the impact of inaction inertia on decision making. Based on research on the causes of inaction inertia, we show that it is a multi-determined phenomenon, explained by both valuation and regret considerations. Moreover, we demonstrate how a sour grapes explanation of inaction inertia might integrate these two accounts. Furthermore, we explain when inaction inertia is most likely to occur and how it can be prevented. We conclude that the inaction inertia literature does not only add to our understanding of this intriguing phenomenon, but also contributes to related social psychological phenomena, such as the sunk cost effect, sequential decision making, decision avoidance (e.g., choice deferral, status quo bias, decisional conflict), and procrastination.     

The dark side of “doing the right thing”: regulatory mode predicts the inaction inertia effect

The inaction inertia effect refers to the idea that when people miss out on an initial opportunity, they are prone to stay inactive afterward. However, little is known about how personality relates to inaction inertia. The purpose of this research is to investigate the role of regulatory mode in the inaction inertia effect. Study 1 found that an assessment mode positively predicts inaction inertia while a locomotion mode is not related to inaction inertia. Study 2 replicated this finding in a different scenario. Study 3 found that priming assessment mode (compared with locomotion mode) predicts inaction inertia. Implications of how regulatory mode influences inaction inertia are discussed.     

The effects of social comparison on inaction inertia

In this paper, we examine inaction inertia in a social context where the decision-maker is among others who are faced with similar current and past opportunities. We specifically investigate whether the likelihood of taking advantage of a current opportunity after having missed a previous, relatively superior opportunity depends on whether a referent other did or did not take advantage of the previous opportunity. We report results from three studies that provide evidence for the interplay between the past actions and inactions of a referent other and the extent of inaction inertia displayed by a focal decision-maker. We also show that the proximity of the other and the valence of the relationship between the decision-maker and the other influence the extent to which the decision of the other impacts the likelihood to take action. And, finally, we show that regret mediates the relationship between the decision of the other with respect to the past opportunity and the decision-maker's likelihood of taking advantage of the current opportunity.     

Inaction inertia, the sunk cost effect, and handedness: Avoiding the losses of past decisions

Strength of handedness, or the degree to which an individual prefers to use a single hand to perform various tasks, is a neurological marker for brain organization and has been shown to be linked to episodic memory, attribute framing, and anchoring, as well as other domains and tasks. The present work explores the relationship of handedness to both inaction inertia (the inclination to resist an action after previously bypassing a similar action) as well as to the sunk cost effect (the tendency to continue to engage in a behavior after an initial investment of time or money has been made). In Experiment 1, mixed-handers displayed a larger inaction inertia effect than strong-handers. In Experiment 2, they displayed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the sunk cost finding into a different domain and explored how mixed- and strong-handers react to additional information designed to increase the comparative advantage of terminating, rather than continuing, a failed project. Overall, we found that mixed-handers were more likely to show inertia effects because of an increased aversion to losses. The results of Experiment 4 suggest that, when provided with additional information that made it clear that continuing a project would be a greater loss than terminating it, mixed-handers no longer showed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers, highlighting the importance of carefully considering exactly how sunk cost scenarios are worded and providing additional information on how mixed- and strong-handers differ in belief updating.     

不作为惯性产生的原因、条件及应用

不作为惯性指如果个体先前已错过了一个更优的机会, 当次一些的类似机会再出现时(但仍好于一般情况), 个体会倾向于继续放弃这一机会。本文首先简要介绍了不作为惯性的概念、操作定义和基本研究方法; 然后着重探讨了导致不作为惯性的原因及相关实证研究, 目前研究者普遍认为后悔情绪和估价是导致不作为惯性的两个主要原因; 随后探讨了不作为惯性产生的条件及在市场营销及股票市场中的应用研究; 最后未来研究需要更加注重研究方法上的改进以及对不作为惰性的原因探讨。     

The inaction effect in the psychology of regret

Previous research showed that decisions to act (i.e., actions) produce more regret than decisions not to act (i.e., inactions). This previous research focused on decisions made in isolation and ignored that decisions are often made in response to earlier outcomes. The authors show in 4 experiments that these prior outcomes may promote action and hence make inaction more abnormal. They manipulated information about a prior outcome. As hypothesized, when prior outcomes were positive or absent, people attributed more regret to action than to inaction. However, as predicted and counter to previous research, following negative prior outcomes, more regret was attributed to inaction, a finding that the authors label the inaction effect. Experiment 4, showing differential effects for regret and disappointment, demonstrates the need for emotion-specific predictions.     

To accept or not to accept a job offer: Examining inaction inertia in an organizational context

The purpose of this research was to investigate inaction inertia in a job offer context. Across two studies, we examined the influence of two situational factors (Study 1) and one dispositional factor (Study 2) on inaction inertia in a job offer context. Participants were asked to imagine they had to pass up an initial offer in which they were interested, but that they received a similar but less attractive offer (lower salary) later. Study 1 findings revealed participants in the loss‐framed condition were more likely to accept the second offer than participants in the neutral condition only when they were asked to imagine they were switching careers, versus being laid off. Study 2 results showed that maximizing tendency significantly and negatively predicted the likelihood to accept the second job offer. Exploratory analyses revealed that anticipated regret did not mediate the relationships between any of the factors and inaction inertia, suggesting that anticipated regret was not the causal mechanism underlying the occurrence of inaction inertia in the current research. Overall, this research shed light on the ways inaction inertia may be experienced in a job offer context.     

Positive mood + action = negative mood + inaction: effects of general action and inaction concepts on decisions and performance as a function of affect

General action and inaction concepts have been shown to produce broad, goal-mediated effects on cognitive and motor activity irrespective of the type of activity. The current research tested a model in which action and inaction goals interact with the valence of incidental moods to guide behavior. Over four experiments, participants' moods were manipulated to be positive (happy), neutral, or negative (angry or sad), and then general action, inaction, and neutral concepts were primed. In Experiment 1, action primes increased intellectual performance when participants experienced a positive (happy) or neutral mood, whereas inaction primes increased performance when participants experienced a negative (angry) mood. Including a control-prime condition, Experiments 2 and 3 replicated these results measuring the number of general interest articles participants were willing to read and participants' memory for pictures of celebrities. Experiment 4 replicated the results comparing happiness with sadness and suggested that the effect of the prime's adoption was automatic. Overall, the findings supported an interactive model by which action concepts and positive affect produce the same increases in active behavior as inaction concepts and negative affect.     

Is regret for inaction relatively self‐enhancing?

Previous accounts of regret suggest that people report greater regret for inaction than for action because the former is longer lasting and more painful than the latter. We suggest instead that the tendency for people's greatest regrets to concern inaction more than action may be due to the relatively self‐enhancing nature of regrets for inaction. In Study 1 we asked people to think about their greatest recent regret and to code it as being due to action or inaction. In Study 2 participants described their greatest regret from across their entire life. In both studies we observed an inaction effect only amongst individuals high in self‐esteem (HSE). In Study 2 we found that the inaction effect was confined to HSE people whose greatest regret was personal in nature. These results support the claim that regret for inaction is relatively self‐enhancing and suggest that the inaction effect found in real‐life regrets may be due, in part at least, to the self‐enhancement goals of HSE individuals. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Not all missed opportunities cast the same shadow: Voluntary inaction reduces the “sting” of missed sales promotions

How do consumers who miss extremely attractive sales promotions respond to merely attractive opportunities they later encounter when prices return to higher levels? The literature on inaction inertia suggests that the more attractive the missed opportunity, the less likely a consumer is to accept the subsequently encountered inferior opportunity, indicating that consumers may stay undecided. Thus, consumers are believed to be negatively influenced by the shadow of the attractive opportunities they missed. This has adverse consequences for both consumer and firm welfare. Yet, we sometimes do see consumers buying even after missing a sale. We draw from the literature on regret and personal responsibility to hypothesize the conditions that would allow the consumer to remain uninfluenced by the attractiveness of the missed opportunity. In three studies, we find support for the idea that personal responsibility for missing the first opportunity allows consumers to be less influenced by its attractiveness when they see a second inferior opportunity compared to conditions in which they were not personally responsible for missing the first opportunity; this bodes well both for consumer and marketer welfare.