Culture and self: are there within-culture differences in self between metropolitan areas and regional cities?

Although differences in self-conception across cultures have been well researched, regional differences within a culture have escaped attention. The present study examined individual, relational, and collective selves, which capture people's conceptions of themselves in relation to their goals, significant others, and in groups, comparing Australians and Japanese participants living in regional cities and metropolitan areas. Culture, gender, and urbanism were found to be related to individual, relational, and collective selves, respectively. Australians emphasized individual self more than Japanese, women stressed relational self more than men, and residents in regional cities regarded collective self as more important than their counterparts in metropolitan areas. These findings provide support for the tripartite division of the self and suggest a need to construct a culture theory that links self and societal processes.     

Is there a special association between self judgements and conscious recollection?

Dual‐process models of recognition memory posit a rapid retrieval process that produces a general sense of familiarity and a slower retrieval process that produces conscious recollections of prior experience. The Remember–Know paradigm has been used to study the subjective correlates of these two processes with Remember judgements assumed to index conscious recollection and Know judgements assumed to index familiarity. In this paper we examine Conway and Dewhurst's recent finding that judgements of self during encoding produce more Remember responses than alternative semantic judgements. While one might interpret this result to suggest a special association between self judgement and conscious recollection, we consider the possibility that it occurs because of greater discriminability in this condition. The results of four experiments demonstrate that a self judgement condition produces more, fewer, or an equal number of Remember responses relative to a control condition depending on whether overall discriminability in the self judgement condition is greater than, less than, or equal to that in the control condition. The implications of these results for conceptions of self judgement and the use of the Remember–Know paradigm are detailed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Randomness,Contingency, and Faith: Is there a Science of Subjectivity?

Materialists argue that there is no place for God in the universe. Chance and contingency are all that structure our world. However, the materialists’ dismissal of subjectivity manifests a flawed metaphysics that invalidates their arguments against God. In this essay I explore the following: (1) How does personal metaphysics affect one's ability to do science? (2) Are the materialist arguments about contingency used to dismiss the importance of our place in the universe valid? (3) What are the implications of subjectivity on belief and science? To answer the first question, I examine the later years of Sir Alfred Russel Wallace, one of the cofounders of evolution through natural selection with Darwin. His belief in nineteenth–century spiritualism profoundly affected his standing in the scientific community. I describe the effect of spiritualism on Wallace's science. To answer the second question, I use my own work in mathematical modeling of evolutionary processes to show that randomness, and contingency at one level, can actually be nearly deterministic at another. I demonstrate how arguments about chance and contingency do not imply anything relevant about whether there is a designer behind the universe. To answer the third question I begin by exploring a paradox of consciousness and show how the existence of subjective truths may provide a paradigm for sustaining a rational belief in God. These questions form the framework of a structured belief in a creator while yet embracing what science has to offer about the development of life on our planet.     

What,After All,Is the Work of Culture?

This paper offers an overview of Joseph Margolis’s philosophy of culture, highlighting how Margolis’s radical historicism is not inconsistent with our realistic intuitions regrading facts and objectivity. While Margolis identifies interpretation as the work of culture, the paper suggests that a much more basic sense of human labor needs to be thematized more fully than Margolis does in any defensible account of culture. Margolis of course appreciates work in this sense, but he does not consistently make it integral to his conception of culture. Even so, what he so forcefully defends is, as one commentator has put it, “beautiful. It’s also erudite, elegant, and insightful (and frightfully, dialectically intricate).”     

Culture and Testing Practices: Is the World Flat?

There has been much speculation regarding the influence of cultural norms on the acceptance and use of personnel selection testing. This study examined the cross‐level direct effects of four societal cultural variables (performance orientation, future orientation, uncertainty avoidance, and tightness–looseness) on selection practices of organisations in 23 countries. A total of 1,153 HR professionals responded to a survey regarding testing practices in hiring contexts. Overall, little evidence of a connection between cultural practices and selection practices emerged. Implications of these findings for personnel selection and cross‐cultural research as well as directions for future work in this area are described.     

Functioning of cognitive codes in autobiographical memory and the self—Is the self visual?

The main goal was to test the relationship between types of cognitive codes (perceptual–imaginative and verbal–propositional) and autobiographical memory. The purpose of this research was to evaluate whether there are independent processes serving the self, depending on separate cognitive codes. Sixty adult participants completed the NEO-FFI inventory using two kinds of procedure: perceptual–imaginative code or verbal–propositional code. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used for analysis. The study has shown the dynamic of the self, depending on two cognitive perspectives. The results indicate that the reflection of the self in autobiographical memory brings different knowledge about the self and its motives.     

Is there a direct relation between the development of vocabulary and grammar?

Previous studies of individual differences have revealed strong correlations between children's vocabulary and grammatical abilities, and these data have been used to support theoretical accounts positing direct developmental relations between these two areas of language. However, between‐person differences do not necessarily reflect intra‐individual dynamics. Thus, in the present study, we analysed longitudinal data from three annual assessments of vocabulary and grammar in 217 children (M_age = 4 years and 3 months at first assessment) using a modelling strategy with some utility in distinguishing relations at the between‐ and within‐person levels. The results revealed strong correlations between grammar and vocabulary at the between‐person level, but the evidence of direct dependencies between the variables at the within‐person level was rather limited. Specifically, we found a small direct contribution from grammar to vocabulary for children between the ages of 4 and 5, but there was no evidence of any direct contributions from vocabulary to grammar. Further analyses suggested that the home literacy environment may represent a common source of individual differences in children's vocabulary and grammatical skills. In light of these results, we argue that the evidence of direct relations between vocabulary and grammatical development in preschool‐aged children may not be as strong as previously assumed.     

Psychopathic traits from the perspective of self and informant reports: is there evidence for a lack of insight?

It has been suggested that psychopathic individuals are incapable of providing valid reports on their own personality functioning because they are either unwilling (i.e., pathologically lie) or unable (i.e. lack insight) to do so. Despite the long-standing nature of this suggestion, almost no empirical research exists on this topic. In the current study, the authors examined the issue of psychopathy and insight by testing self and informant convergence and mean level differences across 3 indices of psychopathy in a community sample (N=64). Self- and informant-report psychopathy scores were also examined in relation to self and informant reports on traits from the Five-Factor Model (FFM). Convergence was strong across the 3 psychopathy indices and their respective factors (i.e., median r=.64), and there was only modest evidence that individuals rated themselves as less psychopathic than did informants. In addition, the same FFM domains-low Agreeableness and Conscientiousness-characterized individuals with psychopathic traits regardless of reporter. Psychopathic individuals appear capable of reporting accurately on psychopathic traits when there are no direct consequences to accurate reporting (i.e., sentencing). It may be that the lack of concern for the consequences of these traits has been mistaken for a lack of insight into them.     

Is there a logic of incoherence?

What should we do when we discover that our assessment of probabilities is incoherent? I explore the hypothesis that there is a logic of incoherence—a set of universally valid rules that specify how incoherent probability assessments are to be repaired. I examine a pair of candidate‐rules of incoherence logic that have been employed in philosophical reconstructions of scientific arguments. Despite their intuitive plausibility, both rules turn out to be invalid. There are presently no viable candidate‐rules for an incoherence logic on the table. Other ways of dealing with incoherence are surveyed, and found either to be unsatisfactory or to rely on a logic of incoherence in the end. The resolution of these antagonistic conclusions is left to future researchers.     

Is there a profession of engineering?

This article examines three common arguments for the claim that engineering is not a profession: 1) that engineering lacks an ideal internal to its practice; 2) that engineering’s ideal, whether internal or not, is merely technical; and 3) that engineering lacks the social arrangements characteristic of a true profession. All three arguments are shown to rely on one or another definition of profession, each of which is inadequate. An alternative to these definition is offered. It has at least two advantages. On the one hand, it emphasizes the importance of professional community, the role of occupation in defining profession, the centrality of a moral ideal, and the necessity for morally binding standards (beyond ordinary morality). On the other hand, the alternative definition is in part independent both of moral theory and sociology. This article concludes by considering what light the alternative definition can throw on the professional status of engineers serving the Nazis.     

Post-cueing after erasure of the icon: Is there a set effect?

Recognition accuracy in a tachistoscopic identification task typically declines as the size of the set from which the target was selected increases. To determine whether this effect is due to selective encoding from iconic store, a masking stimulus, intended to erase the icon, was presented following the stimulus. Information about the set was then presented. It was found that subjects' performance in this post-cueing situation did not differ from performance in a pre-cueing condition, where the set was presented prior to the stimulus. It was concluded that set size does not have its effect through selective encoding from iconic store. Results were discussed in terms of the fragment theory.     

No‐self,real self,ignorance and self‐deception: Does self‐deception require a self?

In this paper I dispute Eliot Deutsch's claim [See Deutsch, Eliot (1996) Self‐deception: a comparative study, in: Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds) Self and Deception: a cross‐cultural enquiry (Albany, State University of New York Press), pp. 315–326] that examining self‐deception from the perspective of non‐Western traditions (i.e. how it is understood in those cultures) can help us to better understand the nature of the phenomenon in one's own culture. Although the claim appears to be uncontrover‐sial and perhaps even self‐evident, I shall argue that it is fundamentally mistaken. What is important about both the claim and my critical assessment of it is not what it tells us about self‐deception. I shall show that it tells us little about self‐deception; that Deutsch confuses ignorance with self‐deception; and that he straightforwardly equivocates on the concept. Instead, what is interesting is what Deutsch's treatment of self‐deception in comparative perspective can tell us about comparative philosophy. The significance of what follows in this paper is less about self‐deception than it is about comparative philosophy.     

Decision‐making styles and physiological correlates of negative stress: Is there a relation?

There are 5 independent, although not mutually exclusive, styles used by military officers when making decisions: rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant, and spontaneous (Scott & Bruce, 1995). The rational and intuitive styles are part of the cognitive style concept, whereas the conceptual foundation of the remaining 3 styles is less clear. The dependent and the avoidant styles were expected to be accompanied by increased levels of negative stress, while this was not expected of the remaining 3 styles. This hypothesis was put to test. Twenty-three male Swedish Army majors were asked to make decisions in 2 different military situations. Their decision styles were measured by the General Decision Making Style inventory (GDMS; Scott & Bruce, 1995). Saliva cortisol release indicated negative stress and was measured on 4 occasions: twice before, after the first decision, and after the second decision. The avoidant style was related to negative stress, as predicted. There was, however, no difference between the base-line measurements and the after-decision measurements, suggesting that officers with an avoidant decision style may, in general, have higher levels of cortisol secretion (i.e., being more of the worrying kind).     

Population density and pathology: Is there a relationship?

The relationship between population density and pathology is assessed in New York City. Although there are substantial simple correlations between density and various pathologies, controlling for income and ethnicity causes all relationships to disappear except for a slight correlation between density and psychiatric terminations. It is concluded that density, measured as people per acre and persons per room, has little or no independent effect on pathology.     

Behaviorism and mentalism: Is there a third alternative?

Behaviorism and mentalism are commonly considered to be mutually exclusive and conjunctively exhaustive options for the psychological explanation of behavior. Behaviorism and mentalism do differ in their characterization of inner causes of behavior. However, I argue that they are not mutually exclusive on the grounds that they share important foundational assumptions, two of which are the notion of an innerouter split and the notion of control. I go on to argue that mentalism and behaviorism are not conjunctively exhaustive either, on the grounds that dropping these common foundational assumptions results in a distinctively different framework for the explanation of behavior. This third alternative, which is briefly described, is a version of non-individualism.     

Elephants painting? Selfness and the emergence of self states as illustrated in conceptual art

Abstract :  The traditional view of the self is that of a singular entity whose ground is an inherent function of the mind. The more recent conception of the self is moving toward the social constructionist concept that its ground is the discourses of the particular culture into which one is born. These two divergent views have created an irresolvable binary of inner/outer that limits their explanatory power. To resolve this dilemma I suggest that the abstract noun 'selfness', indicating a  general  state, should replace the representational noun 'self', that indicates a  specific  state. I will propose that 'selfness' is indeed the 'ground' from which our unique self states emerge. I will illustrate this with examples from conceptual art and will discuss its relevance to analytic theory and treatment.