For love or money? How activation of relational versus instrumental concerns affects reactions to decision-making procedures

We investigate how the direct activation of relational versus instrumental concerns affects reactions to decisions made by an authority. It is demonstrated that when instrumental concerns are experimentally induced, people’s evaluations of the authority (Studies 1 and 2) as well as their intentions to protest (Study 3) are more strongly affected by how the procedures used by the authority affect anticipated outcomes (i.e., whether procedures are favorably or unfavorably inaccurate) than when relational concerns are activated. By contrast, authority evaluations (Study 2) and protest intentions (Study 3) are more strongly affected by whether procedures used are fair (accurate) or unfair (inaccurate) when relational (versus instrumental) concerns are activated. These findings extend previous research where relational versus instrumental concerns were inferred, but not directly examined, to explain differences in responses to authorities’ decisions.     

理性-经验加工对不公正情绪和行为反应的影响:公正敏感性的调节作用

基于认知-经验理论,采用行为实验法和情境故事法,探讨了不同信息加工方式对不公正情绪和行为反应的影响,以及受害者敏感性对两者关系的调节作用。结果表明,与理性加工相比,经验加工下个体对不公正有更强烈的负性情绪反应,合作意向更低;受害者敏感性调节加工方式与不公正行为反应之间的关系,即受害者敏感性低时,加工方式与人际公正对合作意向交互作用显著,受害者敏感性高时,加工方式与人际公正对合作意向没有交互作用。     

Financial deprivation selectively shifts moral standards and compromises moral decisions

Previous research suggests people firmly value moral standards. However, research has also shown that various factors can compromise moral behavior. Inspired by the recent financial turmoil, we investigate whether financial deprivation might shift people’s moral standards and consequently compromise their moral decisions. Across one pilot survey and five experiments, we find that people believe financial deprivation should not excuse immoral conduct; yet when people actually experience deprivation they seem to apply their moral standards more leniently. Thus, people who feel deprived tend to cheat more for financial gains and judge deprived moral offenders who cheat for financial gains less harshly. These effects are mediated by shifts in people’s moral standards: beliefs in whether deprivation is an acceptable reason for immorality. The effect of deprivation on immoral conduct diminishes when it is explicit that immoral conduct cannot help alleviate imbalances in deprived actors’ financial states, when financial deprivation seems fair or deserved, and when acting immorally seems unfair.     

An enquiry concerning the principles of cultural norms and values: The impact of uncertainty and mortality salience on reactions to violations and bolstering of cultural worldviews

This enquiry concerning the principles of cultural norms and values focuses on the impact of mortality and uncertainty salience on people’s reactions to events that violate or bolster their cultural norms and values. Five experiments show that both mortality and uncertainty salience influence people’s reactions to violations and bolstering of their cultural worldviews, yielding evidence for both terror and uncertainty management theories. Interestingly, the five experiments consistently reveal that uncertainty salience has a bigger impact on people’s reactions than mortality salience, suggesting that the former may be a more important antecedent of reactions to norms and values than the latter. Findings further suggest that uncertainty salience did not instigate death-thoughts whereas reactions to norms and values were stronger among mortality salient participants who thought of uncertainty as a result of the mortality salience manipulation than mortality salient participants who did not think of uncertainty following this manipulation. Implications are discussed.     

Procedural justice and intragroup status: Knowing where we stand in a group enhances reactions to procedures

The current research investigates the role of relative intragroup status as a moderator of people’s reactions to procedural justice. Based on a review of the procedural justice literature, the authors argue that information about intragroup status influences people’s reactions to variations in procedural justice. In correspondence with predictions, two experiments show that reactions of people who have been informed about their intragroup status position (either low, average, or high) are influenced more strongly by voice as opposed to no-voice procedures than people who are not informed about their intragroup status. It is concluded that knowing where we stand in a group enhances reactions to procedural justice.     

Event detail and confidence in gambling: The role of counterfactual thought reactions

Differences in people’s reactions to the same events described with full vs. sketchy information are examined. It is hypothesized that differences in counterfactual thought reactions to varying levels of event detail shape confidence in, and willingness to gamble on similar, future events. In three experiments, participants were presented with different types and levels of event detail about their performances on a trivia test, on several games of blackjack, or on gambling on a professional horse race. Upward counterfactual thoughts were observed more frequently in response to losing events containing high levels of detail and specificity. Importantly, counterfactual thought frequency also mediated the relationships between event detail and the level of confidence in and willingness to gamble on similar, future events. Evidence also indicates that this relationship is based on the hindsight bias that results from counterfactual thinking. Results are discussed in terms of cognitive processes and decision making research.     

Counterfactual comparison modulates fairness consideration in the mini‐ultimatum game: An event‐related potentials study

Existing literature on the mini‐ultimatum game indicates that counterfactual comparison between chosen and unchosen alternatives is of great importance for individual's fairness consideration. However, it is still unclear how counterfactual comparison influences the electrophysiological responses to unfair chosen offers. In conjunction with event‐related potentials’ (ERPs) technique, the current study aimed to explore the issue by employing a modified version of the mini‐ultimatum game where a fixed set of two alternatives (unfair offer vs. fair alternative, unfair vs. hyperfair alternative, unfair offer vs. hyperunfair alternative) was presented before the chosen offer. The behavioral results showed that participants were more likely to accept unfair chosen offers when the unchosen alternative was hyperunfair than when the unchosen alternative was fair or hyperfair. The ERPs results showed that the feedback‐related negativity (FRN) elicited by unfair chosen offers was insensitive to the type of unchosen alternative when correcting for possible overlap with other components. In contrast, unfair chosen offers elicited larger P300 amplitudes when the unchosen alternative was hyperunfair than when the unchosen alternative was fair or hyperfair. These findings suggest that counterfactual comparison may take effect at later stages of fairness consideration as reflected by the P300.     

Self-construal level and voice procedures: The individual self as psychological basis for procedural fairness effects

In the current article, we investigate the influence of self-construal level on procedural fairness effects, that is, the finding that fair versus unfair procedures influence people’s evaluations of their relation with decision-making authorities. In two experiments, we manipulated self-construal level by activating the individual self (“I”) or the social self (“We”), and we induced a control condition. Furthermore, we manipulated procedural fairness by granting versus denying participants an opportunity to voice their opinion in a decision-making process. Results consistently revealed stronger procedural fairness effects if the individual self is activated than if the social self is activated. It is concluded that sometimes the individual self, rather than the social self, constitutes the psychological basis for procedural fairness effects.     

Ruminative and mindful self-focused processing modes and their impact on problem solving in dysphoric individuals

A mindful experiential rather than an analytical ruminative mode of information processing is beneficial in depression. However studies have not taken into account people’s trait mindfulness or trait rumination. This study aimed to examine the effects of state and trait analytical rumination and experiential mindfulness on affect and social problem solving (SPS). Participants filled in the trait mindfulness and trait rumination questionnaires. After mood induction, dysphoric participants with and without a history of depression were assessed for SPS and affect before and after induction of mindful (experiential) or ruminative (analytic) processing modes. Results showed trait mindfulness was negatively correlated with the BDI and trait rumination was positively correlated with the BDI. There was no significant difference between groups after the induced experiential mindful or analytical ruminative processing modes. However, participants who scored high on trait rumination showed significant improvement in SPS after induced mindfulness processing. No such effect was found on trait mindfulness. These findings suggest a useful way to prevent high trait ruminators from developing depressive symptoms or depression. Experiential mindful processing may help reduce the risk of developing depressive symptoms by increasing social problem solving ability in those with low mood and high levels of trait rumination.     

When fairness neither satisfies nor motivates: The role of risk aversion and uncertainty reduction in attenuating and reversing the fair process effect

It is widely acknowledged that procedural justice has many positive effects. However, some evidence suggests that procedural justice may not always have positive effects and may even have negative effects. We present three studies that vary in method and participant populations, including an archival study, a field study, and an experiment, using data provided by the general American population, Indian software engineers, and undergraduate students in the US. We demonstrate that key work-related variables such as people’s job satisfaction and performance depend on procedural justice, perceived uncertainty, and risk aversion such that risk seeking people react less positively and at times negatively to the same fair procedures that appeal to risk averse people. Our results suggest that one possible reason for these effects is that being treated fairly reduces people’s perception of uncertainty in the environment and while risk averse people find low uncertainty desirable and react positively to it, risk seeking people do not. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of procedural justice including the uncertainty management model of fairness, the fair process effect, and fairness heuristic theory.     

Effects of Interpersonal Affect Upon Fairness Judgment

We examined the effect of interpersonal affect on fairness judgment. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to write down fair and unfair behaviors that positive and negative persons performed, giving as many examples as possible within 5 minutes. Participants wrote more fair behaviors for the positive person than for the negative, and wrote more unfair behaviors for the negative person than for the positive. In Experiments 2 and 3, subjects rated the perceived frequency of 60 behaviors (30 fair and 30 unfair). In both experiments, they evaluated fair behaviors by the positive person to be more frequent than those of the negative, and unfair behaviors by the negative person to be more frequent than those of the positive. The results indicate that fairness judgment is influenced by the participant's positive and negative affect toward the judged object. The effects of positive and negative interpersonal affect on fairness judgment are discussed.     

Imagining nice and nasty events in childhood or adulthood: recent positive events show the most imagination inflation

We explored whether event recency and valence affect people’s susceptibility to imagination inflation. Using a three-stage procedure, subjects imagined positive and negative events happening in their distant or recent past. First, subjects rated how confident they were that they had experienced particular positive and negative events in childhood or adulthood using a Life Events Inventory (LEI). Two weeks later, they imagined two positive and two negative events from the LEI. Finally, they rated their confidence on the LEI a second time. For positive events, subjects showed more imagination inflation for adulthood than childhood events. For negative events, they showed no difference in imagination inflation for adulthood and childhood events. We discuss factors that may influence source confusions for memories of the past and highlight directions for future research.     

Victim’s innocence, social categorization, and the threat to the belief in a just world

This research studies people’s reactions to the suffering of victims, examining the hypothesis of the belief in a just world (BJW) (Lerner, 1980) according to which the awareness of innocent victims threatens people’s BJW, and extending the scope of BJW theory to intergroup contexts. An implicit measure of the threat to the BJW (Hafer, 2000a) is used in this research. After participants viewed a videotaped film containing the victimization story they performed an emotional modified Stroop task. Study 1 examined the threat to the BJW as function of the innocence of the victim at an interpersonal level of analysis. Results show that only the innocent victim threatens the observer’s BJW. Study 2 examined the threat to the BJW as function of the victim’s group and of the victim’s innocence. Results show that an ingroup victim threatens the participant’s BJW more than a victim belonging to an outgroup.     

Mood effects on eyewitness memory: Affective influences on susceptibility to misinformation

Does mood influence the accuracy of eyewitness recollections, and people’s susceptibility to misleading information in particular? Based on recent affect-cognition theories and research on eyewitness memory, three experiments predicted and found that positive affect promoted, and negative affect inhibited the incorporation of misleading information into eyewitness memories. This effect was obtained for both positive and negative events (Experiment 1), and for recorded as well as real-life incidents (Experiment 2). Participants had no meta-cognitive awareness of these mood effects, and affect-control instructions were ineffective in preventing them (Experiment 3). The cognitive mechanisms responsible for mood effects on eyewitness memories are discussed, and the implications of these findings for everyday memories, forensic practice and for current affect/cognition theorizing are considered.     

Typical performance measures of emotion regulation and emotion perception and frontal EEG asymmetry in an emotional contagion paradigm

In order to replicate and extend previous observations of validity of the self-reported habitual regulation of one’s affect and the perception of other people’s emotions, prefrontal electroencephalographic (EEG) asymmetry was recorded during and after social-emotional stimulation. After stimulation with other people’s vocal expression of anxiety, individuals with lower scores on emotion regulation did not show recovery of asymmetry changes but even increased changes in the direction that had been adopted during the stimulation. Whether this was to the right or to the left depended on their scores on emotion perception. Participants high on perception showed the expected changes to the right during the anxiety stimulation (indicating increased withdrawal motivation) and to the left during the cheerfulness stimulation (indicating increased approach motivation), whereas individuals low on perception showed the opposite pattern. During the anxiety stimulation, participants low on perception only showed the unexpected change to the left if they were also low on regulation. Individual differences in regulation did not play a role when participants were confronted with other people’s laughter. The findings demonstrate the validity of the self-report measures by using EEG measures, and moreover support the usefulness of differentiated and process-oriented approaches in the field of trait emotional intelligence.     

Is choice a reliable predictor of choice? A comment on Sagarin and Skowronski

In a recent working paper, Chen (2008) argues that a methodology central to the cognitive dissonance literature (the free-choice paradigm) has suffered from an inability to separately measure how much choices affect people’s preferences, and how much they simply reflect those preferences, by failing to fully control for the fact that subjects tend to choose goods they prefer. Although Sagarin and Skowronski concede this, they discount Chen’s argument, claiming that for revealed preferences to completely account for observed choice-effects the relationship between choice and preference would have to be unrealistically high. In this comment, we argue that their critique both misses the crux of Chen’s analysis, and is incorrect. Specifically, to properly test whether choices affect preferences, it is essential that researchers experimentally control for revealed preferences rather than speculate how much of a role they may play. Moreover, Sagarin and Skowronski’s critique rests on two fundamental errors—a misunderstanding of the function of the null-hypothesis and a misunderstanding of preference-measurement psychometrics. These errors leads Sagarin and Skowronski to suggest alternative experimental designs which while a good first step, do not address the problems identified in Chen (2008).     

阶段转移事件对公平稳定性的影响

摘要：目前,组织公平的研究多集中于组织公平与组织结果变量之间关系,较少关注组织公平的稳定性。本文采取4（公平模式：公平控制/初始公平/不公平控制/初始不公平）×2（实验阶段：阶段1/阶段2）混合实验设计,探讨阶段转移事件对被试公平反应稳定性的影响。研究结果显示,公平对待导致积极的公平反应,不公平对待导致消极的公平反应;公平程序向不公平程序的转移导致对实验者信任和组织公民行为意向的评价显著降低;而不公平程序向公平程序的转移并没有导致对实验者信任和组织公民行为意向评价的显著增加,从而说明了公平反应的有限稳定性。     

When do primes prime? The moderating role of the self-concept in individuals’ susceptibility to priming effects on social behavior

Using cooperative behavior in economic decision-making settings, we predicted and found that people’s susceptibility to priming influences is moderated by two factors: people’s chronic accessibility to a behavioral repertoire and people’s self-concept activation. In Experiment 1, we show that individuals highly consistent in their social value orientation (SVO) assimilate their behavior to their dispositions rather than to the primes, whereas the opposite effect is obtained among individuals with a low consistent SVO. In Experiment 2, we show that low consistent SVO individuals become less susceptible to priming influences when their self-concept is activated. These studies shed new light on individuals’ susceptibility to priming influences on social behavior.     

Automatic optimism: Biased use of base rate information for positive and negative events

People generally judge that positive events will occur in their lives and negative events will not, even when both events have the same objective likelihood to occur. In four studies, we examined the possibility that this optimistic bias is the result of people’s automatic affective reactions to future events. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate, in two different contexts, that people are consistently optimistic in their predictions, despite identical base rates for positive and negative events. In Study 2, optimistic bias was not influenced by incentives for motivated reasoning or rewards for accuracy, suggesting that bias was the result of automatic processes. Studies 3 and 4 showed that optimistic bias was more pronounced when predictions were speeded and when participants made predictions after exposure to affectively valenced words. Together, these findings suggest that people optimistically interpret base rates and that this optimism is due to an effortless affective process.     

A standardized list of affect-related life events

In experimental contexts, affect-related word lists have been widely applied when examining how cognitive processes interact with emotional processes. These lists, however, present limitations when studying the relation between emotion and cognitive processes such as time and number processing because affective words do not inherently contain time or quantity information. Live events, in contrast, are experienced by an observer and therefore inherently carry affect information. Unfortunately, existing life-event lists and inventories have been largely applied within clinical contexts as diagnostic tools, and therefore are not suitable for many experimental contexts because they do not contain a balanced number of reliably positive, negative, and neutral life events. In Experiment 1, we create a standardized affect-related life-events list with 171 positive, negative, and neutral affect-related life events. In Experiment 2, we show that strength of affect and significance of the event are integral dimensions, suggesting that these two features are difficult to separate perceptually. The implications of these findings and some potential future applications of the created life-events list are discussed.