The early Yogācāra theory of no-self

ABSTRACT

I reconstruct early Yogācāra theory of no-self based on works by Asa?ga and Vasubandhu. I introduce the idea of the cognitive schema (CS) of the self, a conception borrowed from the developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget. A fundamental CS is a psychological function that guides the formation of perceptions. I propose that Manas can be understood in terms of being the CS of the self, a psychological mechanism from which perceptions of external objects are formed. In addition, I argue that non-imaginative wisdom can be regarded as an experience during which the CS of the self does not function, such that one only possesses pure sensations without perceptions of external objects. After the repeated experience of non-imaginative wisdom, the CS of the self is changed to the purified CS of no-self. It still supports interactions with the external world, but in a way that does not allow the four afflictions (self-delusion, self-belief, self-conceit, and self-love) to arise.

Abbreviations: MS: Mahāyānasa?graha; TS: Tri??ikā-kārikā; TSN: Trisvabhāvanirde?a; VVS: Vi??atikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi     

Whitehead's doctrine of objectification and Yogācāra Buddhism's theory of the three natures

IntroductionNa¯ga¯rjuna, the most well-known Buddhist thinker after the Buddha himself, points out in his famous Mu¯lamadhyamakaka¯rika¯ that ‘The Buddha's teachings of the Dharma is based on the two truths: a truth of worldly conventions and an ultimate truth’ (XXIV:8). This doctrine of the two truths does indeed lie at the very heart of Buddhism. More particularly, the phenomenological and soteriological discourses in the Ma¯dhyamika tradition revolve around ideas concerning the two truths. Central to the doctrine is the concept that all phenomena possess dual characteristics—conventional and ultimate. The former, defined as the mode of phenomenal appearance, is the conventional truth; while the latter, defined as the ultimate mode of being, is the ultimate truth. This paper examines the ways in which these two truths are related from the Tibetan Pra¯sangika Ma¯dhyamika perspective, and argues that there are two radically distinct Tibetan ways of reading and interpreting the issues surrounding them. It does so by comparing the ccounts of Tsong khapa Blo bzang Grags pa (hereafter Tsong khapa, 1357–1423 A.D.) and Go rampa bSod nams Senge's (hereafter Go rampa 1429-1489 A.D.), and focuses on the way in which the two truths are related. It will be argued that, for Tsong khapa, the two truths constitute a ‘single ontological identity’ (ngo bo gcig) with ‘different conceptual identities’ (ldog pa tha dad), whereas for Go rampa, the truths are separate in a way that is ‘incompatible with their unity’ (gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad) or identity.     

From Yogācāra to Philosophical Tantra in Kashmir and Tibet

This paper outlines a shift in the role of self-awareness from Yogācāra to tantra and connects some of the dots between Yogācāra, Pratyabhijñā, and Buddhist tantric traditions in Tibet. As is the case with Yogācāra, the Pratyabhijñā tradition of Utpaladeva (10th c.) maintains that awareness is self-illuminating and constitutive of objects. Utpaladeva’s commentator and influential successor, Abhinavagupta (10th–11th c.), in fact quotes Dharmakīrti’s (7th c.) argument from the Pramā?avini?caya that objects are necessarily perceived objects (sahopalambhaniyama). That is, everything known is known in consciousness; there is nothing that can be known outside or separate from consciousness. This aspect of Pratyabhijñā thought is shared with Yogācāra. While Utpaladeva drew upon Yogācāra epistemology to formulate a differential construction of objects (via apoha), he departed from this theory to develop a distinctive monistic framework for the interpretation of subjectivity. By appealing to the ultimate reality of a singularly nonconceptual, transcendental subject rather than a plurality of (non)conceptual particulars, Utpaladeva appropriated Dharmakīrti’s epistemological model while turning it on its head. That is, Utpaladeva critiqued Dharmakīrti in one context (his external realism) while he is indebted to him in another (his epistemic idealism) to establish the framework for his own absolute idealism, where everything happens in and through the absolute self that is ?iva. Utpaladeva extended (or made explicit) the place of self-awareness in Yogācāra to formulate an absolute idealism that is the theoretic foundation for philosophical tantra. In this paper, I will chart a trajectory of this development, from Yogācāra to Pratyabhijñā, and show how a parallel development took place in tantric assimilations of Yogācāra in Tibet.     

From criticism to approval: A reconsideration of Ji’s Yogācāra position on Madhyamaka

Madhyamaka and Yogācāra are two Mahāyāna schools which have distinct systems. In the seventh century East Asia, the doctrinal distinction between the two schools was received as doctrinal contrast in the polemic circumstance of Emptiness-Existence (C. kongyou 空有) controversy. In this context, Ji 基 (632–682), the putative founder of East Asian Yogācāra school, has been normally considered by scholars to have advocated ‘Existence’ (viz., Yogācāra) in opposition to ‘Emptiness’ (viz., Madhyamaka). It is problematic, however, to brand Ji’s Yogācāra position simply as anti-Madhyamaka. Although Ji evidently expresses evident criticism on such a Madhyamaka exegete as Bhāvaviveka (ca. 500–570) in some of his works, he also describes Bhāvaviveka in an amicable or even respective way in other works. By analyzing Ji’s extant works, this article argues that Ji’s scholastic attitude toward Madhyamaka changed from criticism to approval.     

Anthropocentric Obsession: The Perfuming Effects of vāsanā (Habit-energy) in ālayavijñāna in the Lan˙kāvatāra Sūtra

Many traditional Western ethical perspectives are anthropocentric or human-centred in that they assign intrinsic value to human beings alone. It is often said that anthropocentrism is responsible for the destruction of the environment. I intend to explain how Western anthropocentrism can be seen as a form of obsession deriving from the working function of vāsanā (habit-energy) in ālayavijñāna, based on the teachings in the Lan˙kāvatāra Sūtra. All of one's karmic bījas (seeds), stored in the ālayavijñāna, are preserved in a form of energy called vāsanā with the power of perfuming or causing habitual tendency in the lives of sentient beings. This perfuming of energy is known as sowing seeds of karma and seeds of language. Since beginningless time, sentient beings have created habitual energy through inappropriate dualistic discrimination. The habitual power of vāsanā is of great importance to understanding how anthropocentrism works. What we should be worried about is our habitual thinking patterns, which might be harmful to our relationship with the natural environment.     

The Presence of the Real: Jalarāmkathā and the Experience of the Transcendent

International Journal of Hindu Studies - Rarely is the presence of the Gujarati saint Jalarām Bāpā (1799–1881) felt more immediately, and indeed collectively, by his devotees...     

Rādhātantram: Rādhā as Guru in the Service of the Great Goddess

International Journal of Hindu Studies - The Rādhātantram can serve as a tool with which to examine textual and doctrinal appropriations that took place between Vai??avas and...     

Vernacularizing Jñāndev: Hagiography and the Process of Vernacularization

The process of vernacularization involves more than literary language, but also invokes social ethics and an investment in the idioms of everyday life. Vernacularization can reach beyond texts to enact its force upon biographies as well, altering the ethics and quotidian memory of sacred figures. The paper examines how texts and biographical memory identified with the medieval Marathi “saint” (sant) Jñāndev (about thirteenth century) underwent a process of vernacularization that altered the social ethics of texts associated with Jñāndev and with the public memory of the saint himself. In particular, issues of caste and gender as subjects of the process of vernacularization are discussed, and especially in the context of producing bhakti publics—social spheres of devotion—that merge with the Vārkarī religious tradition in Maharashtra.     

Mettābhāvanā in Traditional and Popular Buddhist Contexts

Some have referred to relatively recent forms of popular Buddhism as an ‘engaged’ Buddhism that has revived or redirected traditional Buddhist ideas and practices found in meditation texts to reflect a greater social or worldly emphasis than suggested in earlier historical moments. One of these ideas is the quadripartite framework of the ‘immeasurable states’ (aprameya/appameya) or ‘divine abidings’ (brahmavihāra), the most prominent of which in popular Buddhism is mettā (friendliness/loving-kindness). This article traces the philosophy of the ‘immeasurable states’ found in meditation texts from various Indic traditions (Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu) and then presents the ways in which these traditional ideas (especially mettā) have informed popular Buddhist movements in the twentieth century. Points of discussion include: ‘engaged’ Buddhism's relationship with traditional Buddhist ethics; arguments concerning the coalescence of monastic-centred meditation practices with popular Buddhist notions of social service; and the distinct utilization of mettā in contemporary Buddhist societies in contrast to the mobilizing impulses of comparable religious communities (Hindu and Jain) with a similar heritage of mettā discourse in South Asia.     

Prāmāṇyavāda in the Text Tātparyaṭīkā and Pariśuddhi

In the thirteenth century, Gaṅgeśapādhyāya of Mithilā wrote his magnum opus Tattvacintāmaṇi which marked the inception of the Navya- Nyāya School. It was from this time that the works of the Nyāya beginning with the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, and ending with Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamanjarī as well as Udayana’s Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparyaṭīkāpariśuddhi came to be designated as Prācīna-nyāya. We have elaborated the arguments of Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana in order to support and prove the extrinsic nature of pramāṇa. In this paper, we have also shown that they have added extra strength to the views of the former Māsters—their predecessors by declaring that the inference (which is advanced by Bhāṣyakāra) is purged of fallacies of all sorts in the field of the validity of pramāṇa.

     

Vedic and devotional waters: The Jalabheda of vallabhācārya

Summary Bhāvas, or comprehensive states of mental and emotional awareness, manifest different guṇas, or attributes, of the Lord. These attributes are wholly composed of saccidānanda, but due to variations in their bearers (ādhāra), which is to say in the antaḥkaraṇa of different speakers and listeners, they are affected, expressed, and experienced differently. In this way, bhāvas cannot exist without the Lord’s divine attributes, nor can they exist in the absence of the individual jīva. They are eternal because they belong to the Lord but become meaningful only because the individual through the senses can realize them. They thus serve as a fulcrum between the human and divine, and it is at this delicate point of balance that līlā is played out.     

Degrees of Interpretive Autonomy: Ijtihād and the constraints of competence and context in late medieval Tilimsan

The social standing and religious legitimacy of learned Muslims ('ulamā') were founded on their access to a sacred body of knowledge and on their ability to remain integral and vital to their immediate communities. This duality in their roles and functions implies that the 'ulamā' were not exclusively concerned with the preservation and reproduction of an immutable dogma, but were continuously engaged in interpretive contextualizations and adaptations of religious tenets in order acceptably to fulfill their legal and social obligations. In the following paper, I briefly describe the influence of social and intellectual constraints in moderating the extent of the 'ulamā's engagement in interpretive contextualizations and adaptations of Islamic maxims. I will refer to Ibn Maryam's sixteenth-century biographical dictionary of ' ulam # ' from the city of Tilimsan to define prevailing attitudes towards socio-cultural continuity and change, legal consensus and autonomous interpretation.     

Duty and Sacrifice: A Logical Analysis of the Mīmāṃsā Theory of Vedic Injunctions

The Mīmā?sā school of Indian philosophy has for its main purpose the interpretation of injunctions that are found in a set of sacred texts, the Vedas. In their works, Mīmā?sā authors provide some of the most detailed and systematic examinations available anywhere of statements with a deontic force; however, their considerations have generally not been registered outside of Indological scholarship. In the present article we analyze the Mīmā?sā theory of Vedic injunctions from a logical and philosophical point of view. The theory at issue can be regarded as a system of reasoning based on certain fundamental principles, such as the distinction between strong and weak duties, and on a taxonomy of ritual actions. We start by reconstructing the conceptual framework of the theory and then move to a formalization of its core aspects. Our contribution represents a new perspective to study Mīmā?sā and outlines its relevance, in general, for deontic reasoning.     

Review of Gareth Sparham (tr.), Abhisamayālaṃ kāra with Vṛ tti and Ālokā

The following article reviews a partial translation of the first chapter of two commentaries on Maitreyanātha’s Abhisamayāla?kāra - the Abhisamayāla?kārav?tti by ārya Vimuktisena, and the Abhisamayālakārālokā by Haribhadra. The publication of these two important commentaries in a single volume is useful in that it allows the reader to compare the similar views of the two commentators (known to Tibetans as the ārya-Hari tradition), yet explore the differences between the longer and shorter versions of Prajñāpāramitā sūtras that they explain. Sparham’s translation style is quite literal, and more technically accurate than that of Edward Conze, the well-known earlier translator of numerous Prajñāpāramitā sūtras. Although increased use of subdivision headings from the Abhisamayāla?kāra would have helped readers navigate their way through some of the longer sections, Sparham has nevertheless provided English readers with perhaps the most important contribution to Prajñāpāramitā studies since Conze’s The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, published over 30 years ago.     

Jñānagarbha and the “God's‐eye view”

In trying to define the difference between conventional and ultimate truth, the Mādhyamika Buddhist author Jñānagarbha ends up in paradoxical formulations. Putnam's discussion of Nietzsche's remark that “as the circle of science grows larger it touches paradox at more places” is presented as an illustration for Jñānagarbha's case. No comparison of Putnam and Jñānagarbha is intended as regards the contents of their presentations, the focus being only on the logical form of their argumentation. The paradoxical nature of Jñānagarbha's doctrinal system is explained to derive from the logical incompleteness of formal systems. The paradox is also explained to work as a direction arrow pointing to what can only be realised in a mystical experience.     

Thinking with,against, and beyond the Pratyabhijñā philosophy—and back again

We argue that the pratyabhijñā (recognition) system of Ka?mir ?aivism holds an inconsistent position. On the one hand, the Pratyabhijñā regards ?iva as an impersonal mechanism and the universe, including persons, as not having agency; call this the Impersonal Component. On the other hand, it considers ?iva himself as a person, and individual persons as having agency sufficient to respond to ?iva; call this the Personal Component. We maintain that the Personal Component should be affirmed and the Impersonal Component rejected. The Impersonal Component’s claim that ?iva is unaware of and unaffected by his manifestation should be rejected, and the doctrine of satkāryavāda should be modified. The universe is ?iva’s manifestation, in the first instance, but it also has a relative autonomy from him. Moreover, humans have agency and freedom. Their actions effect ?iva. He grows and develops in response to his manifestation.