The methodology of genuine modal realism

David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses to argue for his thesis, and the paper tries to show that it is guilty of no methodological errors.     

The sad truth about depressive realism

In one form of a contingency judgement task individuals must judge the relationship between an action and an outcome. There are reports that depressed individuals are more accurate than are nondepressed individuals in this task. In particular, nondepressed individuals are influenced by manipulations that affect the salience of the outcome, especially outcome probability. They overestimate a contingency if the probability of an outcome is high—the “outcome-density effect”. In contrast, depressed individuals display little or no outcome-density effect. This apparent knack for depressives not to be misled by outcome density in their contingency judgements has been termed “depressive realism”, and the absence of an outcome-density effect has led to the characterization of depressives as “sadder but wiser”. We present a critical summary of the depressive realism literature and provide a novel interpretation of the phenomenon. We suggest that depressive realism may be understood from a psychophysical analysis of contingency judgements.*     

The question of realism for powers

Synthese - In recent years, a new dispute has risen to prominence: the dispute between realists and anti-realists about causal powers. Albeit sometimes overlooked, the meta-ontological features of...     

The integration problem for naive realism

This paper makes explicit the basic problem perfect hallucinations pose for perceptual naive realists, more fundamental than the well-trodden Screening-off Problem. The deeper problem offers the basis for an overarching classification of the available naive- realist-friendly approaches to perfect hallucinations. In the course of laying out the challenges to the different types of response, the paper makes a case for the superiority of a particular approach to perfect hallucinations, on which they would be understood as a special kind of perceptual anomaly—arising from a secondary mode of perceptual processing.     

Immoral realism

Philosophical Studies - Non-naturalist realists are committed to the belief, famously voiced by Parfit, that if there are no non-natural facts then nothing matters. But it is morally objectionable...     

II. The origin of Frege's realism

An explanation of Frege's change from objective idealism to platonism is offered. Frege had originally thought that numbers are transparent to reason, but the character of his Axiom of Courses of Values undermined this view, and led him to think that numbers exist independently of reason. I then use these results to suggest a view of Frege's mathematical epistemology.     

Performance realism in test-anxious students

Abstract Twenty-four high test-anxious and 24 low test-anxious students completed two cognitive tasks under either high or low performance demand manipulations. Before each task subjects rated anxiety levels and performance expectations, with performance evaluations being conducted following completion of each task. Results revealed lower actual, anticipated and self-evaluated performance scores for high test-anxious students compared to their low test-anxious counterparts. Expected and self-evaluated performance ratings were then compared with actual performance. No difference was found between high and low test-anxious subjects in terms of the discrepancy between expected and actual performance. Both groups of students tended to be overoptimistic in their performance predictions. However, following the first cognitive task the test-anxious group demonstrated accurate self-evaluation, whereas the low test-anxious group were overoptimistic in their self-evaluation. This effect was not found for the second task, on which both groups were accurate in their performance-evaluation. The results are discussed in terms of cognitive theories of anxiety, self-focussed attention and realism amongst test-anxious students.     

Rethinking naive realism

Philosophical Studies - Perceptions are externally-directed—they present us with a mind-independent reality, and thus contribute to our abilities to think about this reality, and to know what...