Domain specificity and mental chronometry in empirical aesthetics

This article is a commentary on ‘Ten years of a model of aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic judgments: The aesthetic episode – developments and challenges in empirical aesthetics’ (Leder & Nadal, 2014, this issue). It focuses on domain specificity and mental chronometry in empirical aesthetics.     

Cognitive neuroscience: the biology of the mind and findings and current opinion in cognitive neuroscience

Cognitive Neuroscience: The Biology of the Mind by Michael Gazzaniga, Richard Ivry and George Mangun, W.W. Norton, 1998. ￡24.95 (xv+587 pages) ISBN 0 393 97219 4 Findings and Current Opinion in Cognitive Neuroscience by Larry Squire and Stephen Kosslyn, MIT Press, 1998. $35.00 (vii+381 pages) ISBN 0 262 69204 X.     

Developmental cognitive neuroscience: progress and potential

Developmental cognitive neuroscience is an evolving field that investigates the relations between neural and cognitive development. Lying at the intersection of diverse disciplines, work in this area promises to shed light on classic developmental questions, mechanisms subserving developmental change, diagnosis and treatment of developmental disorders, and cognitive and neuroscientific topics traditionally considered outside the domain of development. Fundamental questions include: What are the interrelations between developmental changes in the brain (e.g. in connectivity, chemistry, morphology) and developmental changes in children's behavior and cognitive abilities (e.g. representational complexity, ability to sustain selective attention, speed of processing)? Why, and how, is learning enhanced during certain periods in development? How is our knowledge organized, and how does this change with development? We discuss preliminary investigations of such questions and directions for future work.     

Facial affect processing and depression susceptibility: cognitive biases and cognitive neuroscience

Facial affect processing is essential to social development and functioning and is particularly relevant to models of depression. Although cognitive and interpersonal theories have long described different pathways to depression, cognitive-interpersonal and evolutionary social risk models of depression focus on the interrelation of interpersonal experience, cognition, and social behavior. We therefore review the burgeoning depressive facial affect processing literature and examine its potential for integrating disciplines, theories, and research. In particular, we evaluate studies in which information processing or cognitive neuroscience paradigms were used to assess facial affect processing in depressed and depression-susceptible populations. Most studies have assessed and supported cognitive models. This research suggests that depressed and depression-vulnerable groups show abnormal facial affect interpretation, attention, and memory, although findings vary based on depression severity, comorbid anxiety, or length of time faces are viewed. Facial affect processing biases appear to correspond with distinct neural activity patterns and increased depressive emotion and thought. Biases typically emerge in depressed moods but are occasionally found in the absence of such moods. Indirect evidence suggests that childhood neglect might cultivate abnormal facial affect processing, which can impede social functioning in ways consistent with cognitive-interpersonal and interpersonal models. However, reviewed studies provide mixed support for the social risk model prediction that depressive states prompt cognitive hypervigilance to social threat information. We recommend prospective interdisciplinary research examining whether facial affect processing abnormalities promote-or are promoted by-depressogenic attachment experiences, negative thinking, and social dysfunction.     

Bridges over troubled waters: education and cognitive neuroscience

Recently there has been growing interest in and debate about the relation between cognitive neuroscience and education. Our goal is to advance the debate beyond both recitation of potentially education-related cognitive neuroscience findings and the claim that a bridge between fields is chimerical. In an attempt to begin a dialogue about mechanisms among students, educators, researchers and practitioner-scientists, we propose that multiple bridges can be built to make connections between education and cognitive neuroscience, including teacher training, researcher training and collaboration. These bridges--concrete mechanisms that can advance the study of mind, brain and education--will benefit both educators and cognitive neuroscientists, who will gain new perspectives for posing and answering crucial questions about the learning brain.     

Attitudes and evaluations: a social cognitive neuroscience perspective

Automatic evaluations are crucial for survival, but conscious self-reflection enables the formulation of nuanced evaluations to serve long-term goals. To operate effectively, both automatic and reflective evaluative processes need to integrate stored representations from previous experience (attitudes) with current contexts and goals, but contexts and goals have a more prominent role in reflective evaluation. Recent neuroimaging data provide new insights into the structure and function of evaluation and the dynamic ways that attitudes and reflective processing contribute to evaluation. In this paper, we propose a new iterative-reprocessing (IR) model of the neural bases of evaluation that highlights the role of the prefrontal cortex in the reprocessing of evaluative information. This model makes predictions that inform social-cognitive and cognitive-neuroscientific accounts of evaluation.     

价值观的稳定性与可变性：基于认知神经科学的视角

价值观的稳定性和可变性一直是该领域争论的焦点所在。近些年来, 研究者开始从认知神经科学的角度来探讨导致价值观稳定性差异的机制问题。已有的神经反应证据表明, 当某种价值观是基于道义主义的绝对规则来进行认知建构的, 或与自我概念在表征上存在一致性时, 其更倾向于保持稳定的状态; 若非如此, 便可能会在外界影响(如他人劝说)下发生重要程度上的改变。未来需要进一步丰富和完善认识价值观稳定性与可变性关系的认知神经加工模型, 并探索价值观长效改变背后的认知神经机制, 以促进理论研究在价值观教育中的实践和应用。     

Dreaming and the brain: toward a cognitive neuroscience of conscious states

Sleep researchers in different disciplines disagree about how fully dreaming can be explained in terms of brain physiology. Debate has focused on whether REM sleep dreaming is qualitatively different from nonREM (NREM) sleep and waking. A review of psychophysiological studies shows clear quantitative differences between REM and NREM mentation and between REM and waking mentation. Recent neuroimaging and neurophysiological studies also differentiate REM, NREM, and waking in features with phenomenological implications. Both evidence and theory suggest that there are isomorphisms between the phenomenology and the physiology of dreams. We present a three-dimensional model with specific examples from normally and abnormally changing conscious states.     

Facial expressions of emotion: a cognitive neuroscience perspective

Facial expressions are one example of emotional behavior that illustrate the importance of emotions to both basic survival and social interaction. Basic facial responses to stimuli such as sweet and bitter taste are important for species fitness and governed by simple rules. Even at this basic level, facial responses have communicative value to other species members. During evolution simple facial responses were extended for use in more complex nonverbal communications; the responses are labile. The perception and production of facial expressions are cognitive processes and numerous subcortical and cortical areas contribute to these operations. We suggest that no specific emotion center exists over and above cognitive systems in the brain, and that emotion should not be divorced from cognition.     

Computational analyses in cognitive neuroscience: in defense of biological implausibility

Because cognitive neuroscience researchers attempt to understand the human mind by bridging behavior and brain, they expect computational analyses to be biologically plausible. In this paper, biologicallyimplausible computational analyses are shown to have critical and essential roles in the various stages and domains of cognitive neuroscience research. Specifically, biologically implausible computational analyses can contribute to (1) understanding and characterizing the problem that is being studied, (2) examining the availability of information and its representation, and (3) evaluating and understanding the neuronal solution. In the context of the distinct types of contributions made by certain computational analyses, the biological plausibility of those analyses is altogether irrelevant. These biologically implausible models are nevertheless relevant and important for biologically driven research.     

Issues surrounding the cognitive neuroscience of obsessive-compulsive disorder

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) has been studied extensively in recent years, with increased emphasis on understanding OCD’s biological substrates. There has been significant progress in documenting abnormal brain function in OCD patients, particularly in the orbitofrontal cortex, basal ganglia, and thalamus. Similar progress has broadened our understanding of the cognitive and behavioral manifestations of the disorder, including deficits in set shifting, hyperattention, and visuospatial construction abilities. Unfortunately, these results have not been replicated consistently. This report comprises a review of previous attempts to characterize the neurobiology and neuropsychology of OCD, and a discussion of several factors in OCD research that can help to explain previous inconsistencies.     

Mind the gap: bridging economic and naturalistic risk-taking with cognitive neuroscience

Economists define risk in terms of the variability of possible outcomes, whereas clinicians and laypeople generally view risk as exposure to possible loss or harm. Neuroeconomic studies using relatively simple behavioral tasks have identified a network of brain regions that respond to economic risk, but these studies have had limited success predicting naturalistic risk-taking. By contrast, more complex behavioral tasks developed by clinicians (e.g. Balloon Analogue Risk Task and Iowa Gambling Task) correlate with naturalistic risk-taking but resist decomposition into distinct cognitive constructs. We propose here that to bridge this gap and better understand neural substrates of naturalistic risk-taking, new tasks are needed that: are decomposable into basic cognitive and/or economic constructs; predict naturalistic risk-taking; and engender dynamic, affective engagement.     

The phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience of experienced temporality

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - We discuss the three dominant models of the phenomenological literature pertaining to temporal consciousness, namely the cinematic, the retentional, and...     

The development of reading impairment: a cognitive neuroscience model

This review discusses recent cognitive neuroscience investigations into the biological bases of developmental dyslexia, a common disorder impacting approximately 5 to 17 percent of the population. Our aim is to summarize central findings from several lines of evidence that converge on pivotal aspects of the brain bases of developmental dyslexia. We highlight ways in which the approaches and methodologies of developmental cognitive neuroscience that are addressed in this special issue-including neuroimaging, human genetics, refinement of cognitive and biological phenotypes, neural plasticity and computational model-can be employed in uncovering the biological bases of this disorder. Taking a developmental perspective on the biological bases of dyslexia, we propose a simple cascading model for the developmental progression of this disorder, in which individual differences in brain areas associated with phonological processing might influence the specialization of visual areas involved in the rapid processing of written words. We also discuss recent efforts to understand the impact of successful reading interventions in terms of changes within cortical circuits associated with reading ability.     

For a cognitive neuroscience of concepts: Moving beyond the grounding issue

Cognitive neuroscience research on conceptual knowledge often is discussed with respect to “embodiment” or “grounding.” We tried to disentangle at least three distinct claims made using these terms. One of these, the view that concepts are entirely reducible to sensory-motor representations, is untenable and diminishing in the literature. A second is the view that concepts and sensory-motor representations “interact,” and a third view addresses the question of how concepts are neurally organized—the neural partitions among concepts of different kinds, and where these partitions are localized in cortex. We argue that towards the second and third issues, much fruitful research can be pursued, but that no position on them is specifically related to “grounding.” Furthermore, to move forward on them, it is important to precisely distinguish different kinds of representations—conceptual vs. sensory-motor—from each other theoretically and empirically. Neuroimaging evidence often lacks such specificity. We take an approach that distinguishes conceptual from sensory-motor representations by virtue of two properties: broad generality and tolerance to the absence of sensory-motor associations. We review three of our recent experiments that employ these criteria in order to localize neural representations of several specific kinds of nonsensory attributes: functions, intentions, and belief traits. Building on past work, we find that neuroimaging evidence can be used fruitfully to distinguish interesting hypotheses about neural organization. On the other hand, most such evidence does not speak to any clear notion of “grounding” or “embodiment,” because these terms do not make clear, specific, empirical predictions. We argue that cognitive neuroscience will proceed most fruitfully by relinquishing these terms.