Mental playmates: Siblings,executive functioning and theory of mind

This study assessed the theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning (EF) abilities of 124 typically developing preschool children aged 3 to 5 years in relation to whether or not they had a child‐aged sibling (i.e. a child aged 1 to 12 years) at home with whom to play and converse. On a ToM battery that included tests of false belief, appearance‐reality (AR) and pretend representation, children who had at least 1 child‐aged sibling scored significantly higher than both only children and those whose only siblings were infants or adults. The numbers of child‐aged siblings in preschoolers' families positively predicted their scores on both a ToM battery (4 tasks) and an EF battery (2 tasks), and these associations remained significant with language ability partialled out. Results of a hierarchical multiple regression analysis revealed that independent contributions to individual differences in ToM were made by language ability, EF skill and having a child‐aged sibling. However, even though some conditions for mediation were met, there was no statistically reliable evidence that EF skills mediated the advantage of presence of child‐aged siblings for ToM performance. While consistent with the theory that distinctively childish interaction among siblings accelerates the growth of both ToM and EF capacities, alternative evidence and alternative theoretical interpretations for the findings were also considered.     

A longitudinal study of child siblings and theory of mind development

This study tested a sample of 63 children twice in a longitudinal design over 14 months to examine their theory-of-mind (ToM) understanding in relation to their number of child-aged siblings (1–12 years). Age-appropriate batteries of ToM tests emphasising false belief were given at the start of the study, when children had a mean age of 4–2 (range: 3–3 to 5–6), and at the end, when mean age was 5–4 (range: 4–3 to 6–9). Irrespective of chronological age, children with 2 or more child siblings scored significantly higher on both the earlier and the later battery than those with no child-aged siblings. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses revealed that, over and above chronological age and verbal intelligence, having more child siblings predicted higher ToM scores at Times 1 and 2. Furthermore, at Time 2, the participant's number of child-aged siblings continued to predict higher ToM scores even after controlling for age, verbal intelligence, and Time 1 ToM scores. Results were considered in relation to the kinds of family-based social and conversational experiences that might foster ToM growth throughout the period from toddlerhood to the threshold of primary school.     

Infant shy temperament predicts preschoolers Theory of Mind

The aim of this longitudinal study was to investigate the relation between infant temperament at 18 months and early Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities at 3 years of age. Temperament was assessed with the Early Childhood Behavior Questionnaire (ECBQ) and ToM by assessing children's understanding of divergent desires and beliefs, and of knowledge access. Our results are in line with a social-emotional reactivity perspective postulating more sophisticated ToM abilities for children with less reactive more observant temperament. Children with shy temperament at 18 months and at 3 years were better in reasoning about others’ mental states at age 3. Language, siblings and parental education had no effect on ToM. Findings indicate that temperament is related to ToM earlier in development than previously found, and that this relation is thus not unique to false-belief understanding.     

The More the Merrier? Sibling Composition and Early Manifestations of Theory of Mind in Toddlers

Sibling relationships are argued to offer a rich social context for the development of young children’s theory of mind (ToM). There is evidence that the presence of siblings, particularly older siblings, may promote preschoolers’ ToM, but it has not been investigated among toddlers. This study evaluated differences in early manifestations of ToM between toddlers in different sibling compositions: 1) without a sibling, 2) with younger siblings only, and 3) with older siblings only. The sample included 227 toddlers who completed 2 tasks assessing their understanding of discrepant desires and visual perspectives. Results indicated that only children and those who had older siblings did not differ from each other on either task. However, on both tasks, toddlers with younger siblings performed significantly more poorly compared with those with older siblings. Moreover, children with younger siblings demonstrated poorer visual-perspective understanding compared with only children. It may be critical to take siblings’ birth order into account when investigating their respective effects on each other’s ToM, especially in toddlerhood.     

同伴接纳、家庭因素与儿童心理理论的关系

以56名幼儿园大班儿童为被试,考察了同伴接纳和家庭因素与儿童心理理论的关系。结果发现:(1)6～7岁儿童的同伴接纳类型、家庭功能和其心理理论能力之间存在显著相关。同伴接纳程度高的儿童和家庭功能类型属于平衡型的儿童,心理理论能力较高。(2)家庭亲密度与儿童心理理论能力存在显著相关;(3)母亲的文化水平对儿童心理理论能力存在显著影响;(4)儿童性别、同伴接纳类型、家庭亲密度和母亲文化程度可以预测儿童心理理论发展水平。     

Indexical and symbolic referencing: what role do they play in children's success on theory of mind tasks?

Numerous measures have been employed in the last 17 years to assess theory of mind (ToM). The literature reports marked variability in the age at which children succeed on these measures. To account for this variability, researchers have provided explanations ranging from cognitive shifts and voids to the inability to understand the language of the tasks or to social/pragmatic considerations, all of which tell us little if anything about the internal mechanism underlying ToM. The main purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive theoretical account of children's success and the discrepancies found across different ToM tasks. We test the hypothesis that children's understanding of ToM is sensitive to the basic elements of language, that is, to whether the language is indexical or symbolic. Support for this account was found in the analysis of selected test protocols in four published studies of ToM, and new data collected from 53 children (4--6 years) which showed that a higher percentage of children succeeded on tasks with a high ratio of indexical to symbolic references than on tasks with a high ratio of symbolic to indexical references. There was also a main effect of age with older children succeeding at higher rates on both tasks than younger children. Our findings suggest that indexical representation can afford ToM understanding in 4-year-olds, but is not sufficient for a more mature ToM. The latter requires symbolic representation that was demonstrated by the majority of 5--6-year-olds.     

Oxytocin Receptor Gene Relates to Theory of Mind and Prosocial Behavior in Children

Individual social differences have been addressed in recent studies, and the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) is the major candidate in explaining various social phenotypes. To study the association between a well-known haplotype (rs53576) of OXTR and children's prosocial behavior and its relationship with theory of mind (ToM) ability, 87 children (aged 3 to 5 years old) participated in 3 prosocial tasks and ToM performance experiments. Participants who were homozygous for the G allele (GG) exhibited more prosocial behaviors than did those with 1 or 2 copies of the A allele (AA), and GG carriers also displayed better ToM ability than did AA individuals. Further tests showed differences between genotypes in helping and comforting, albeit not in sharing. The results demonstrated that OXTR rs53576 was related to individual differences in ToM and was associated with prosocial behavior.     

4、5岁儿童一般语言能力和心理理论关系的纵向研究

为探明汉语儿童语言和心理理论的发展, 追踪二者的动态关系及相互作用的方向, 本研究以80名4、5岁儿童为研究对象, 纵向探查了前后相隔6个月的儿童的一般语言能力和心理理论的发展状况, 并运用交叉-滞后组相关分析初步探查了二者是否存在因果关系及可能的作用方向。结果表明：4~5岁是汉语儿童心理理论发展的重要时期, 语言在这一阶段也得到快速发展。交叉-滞后组相关分析发现了4岁儿童语言和心理理论因果关系的证据, 但随着年龄的增长, 语言对心理理论的前提基础作用有所减弱, 5岁儿童没有表现出这种因果关系。     

An assessment of age differences in theory of mind using the virtual assessment of mentalizing ability

ABSTRACT

Prior research has shown that older adults perform more poorly than young on tasks that assess theory of mind (ToM). However, these studies have used tasks that are performed “offline” (i.e., requiring a second-person perspective) as opposed to “online” (i.e., requiring a first-person perspective). Therefore, the present study was designed to establish whether age-related ToM difficulties are also evident when an “online” measure of ToM is used. Forty younger and 40 older adults completed the Virtual Assessment of Mentalizing Ability (VAMA) along with two conventional ToM tasks. No age differences were evident on the conventional measures, but older adults had lower accuracy on the VAMA relative to their younger counterparts. The overall pattern of errors did not differ between the groups. These data provide no evidence that age effects are reduced when stimuli are used that are more likely to engage the mentalizing processes elicited in real life social interactions.     

Development of predictive responses in theory of mind brain regions

When we watch movies, we consider the characters’ mental states in order to understand and predict the narrative. Recent work in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) uses movie‐viewing paradigms to measure functional responses in brain regions recruited for such mental state reasoning (the theory of mind [“ToM”] network). Here, two groups of young children (n = 30 3–4 years old, n = 26 6–7 years old) viewed a short animated movie twice while undergoing fMRI. As children get older, ToM brain regions were recruited earlier in time during the second presentation of the movie. This “narrative anticipation” effect is specific: there was no such effect in a control network of brain regions that responds just as robustly to the movie (the “Pain Matrix”). These results complement prior studies in adults that suggest that ToM brain regions play a role not just in inferring, but in actively predicting, other people's thoughts and feelings, and provide novel evidence that as children get older, their ToM brain regions increasingly make such predictions.     

A teacher‐centered exploration of the relevance of social factors to theory of mind development

Many accounts of children's Theory of Mind (ToM) development favor a cognitive explanation, for example, in terms of mental representational improvements at or before 4 years. Here, we investigated whether social factors as rated by a child's teacher, are related to ToM development. We tested 82 children of 3–6 years on each of four ToM tasks, and their class teacher completed a social questionnaire about each child's playing behavior, sharing, talkativeness, confidence, aggressiveness and outgoingness. A measure of task memory and the child's gender were also recorded. Here, children generally passed ToM tasks after 5 years‐old, but no one gender performed reliably better than the other. Teacher‐rated confidence and playing behavior were correlated to ToM. But in a regression analysis, these were replaced by teacher‐rated talkativeness; with age and memory given primacy in both sets of analyses. It is concluded that maturation and cognitive factors may well have primacy but social factors, facilitated during early primary education, must also be given a role in ToM development.     

Spirituality as a Basic Aspect of Personality: A Cross-Cultural Verification of Piedmont's Model

Theory of mind (ToM) research has been carried out in relation to a variety of human and nonhuman agents such as parents, friends, God, Mayan forest spirits, and animals. The present study adds a new agent to the list—the imaginary/invisible friend. Three types of ToM tasks were administered to 36 children, ages 2 to 8, who had invisible friends at the time of the tasks: occluded picture, background knowledge, and surprising contents tasks. The knowledge attributed to imaginary companions was compared to the knowledge attributed to God, as well as to a human and to a dog. Results showed that younger children tended to attribute knowledge to all agents, including imaginary friends. Older children treated God differently from all other agents, but the invisible friend was also treated differently from the human and the dog. Implications regarding cognitive development and anthropomorphism are considered, as well as for the in-between character of invisible friends.     

Are Infants’ Theory-of-Mind Abilities Well Integrated? Implicit Understanding of Intentions,Desires, and Beliefs

The development of theory of mind (ToM) in infancy has been mainly documented through studies conducted on a single age group with a single task. Very few studies have examined ToM abilities other than false belief, and very few studies have used a within-subjects design. During 2 testing sessions, infants aged 14 and 18 months old were administered ToM tasks based on the violation-of-expectation paradigm which measured intention, true belief, desire, and false-belief understanding. Infants’ looking times at the congruent and incongruent test trials of each task were compared, and results revealed that both groups of infants looked significantly longer at the incongruent trial on the intention and true-belief tasks. In contrast, only 18-month-olds looked significantly longer at the incongruent trial of the desire task and neither age group looked significantly longer at the incongruent trial on the false-belief task. Additionally, intertask comparisons revealed only a significant relation between performance on the false-belief and intention task. These findings suggest that implicit intention and true-belief understanding emerge earlier than desire and false-belief understanding and that ToM constructs do not appear to be integrated, as is the case for explicit ToM.     

Theory of Mind and Executive Functions in Young Bilingual Children

Few studies have explored the relationship between theory of mind (ToM), executive function (EF), and bilingualism at the same time. In this study 14 young bilingual children were compared with monolingual children on a test battery composed of 5 ToM tests, 5 EF tests, and 1 test of general language ability. The result showed that despite significantly lower verbal ability, the bilingual children outperformed the monolingual ones on tests of EF. There were no differences in ToM performance. The authors argue that there is a strong relationship between bilingualism and EF, but, contrary to results from earlier studies, they could not find any relationship between bilingualism and ToM. EF did not predict ToM performance. Lack of a significant relationship could be due to the children's young age and consequently their low scores on the ToM tasks.     

From fancy to reason: Scaling deaf and hearing children's understanding of theory of mind and pretence

We examined deaf and hearing children's progression of steps in theory of mind (ToM) development including their understanding of social pretending. Ninety‐three children (33 deaf; 60 hearing) aged 3–13 years were tested on a set of six closely matched ToM tasks. Results showed that deaf children were delayed substantially behind hearing children in understanding pretending, false belief (FB) and other ToM concepts, in line with their delayed uptake of social pretend (SP) play. By using a scaling methodology, we confirmed previous evidence of a consistent five‐step developmental progression for both groups. Moreover, by including social pretence understanding, both deaf and hearing children's ToM sequences were shown to extend reliably to six sequential developmental steps. Finally and focally, even though both groups' sequences were six steps long, the placement of pretence relative to other ToM milestones varied with hearing status. Deaf children understood social pretending at an earlier step in the ToM sequence than hearing children, albeit at a later chronological age. Theoretically, the findings are relevant to questions about how universal developmental progressions come together along with culturally distinctive inputs and biological factors (such as hearing loss) to set the pace for ToM development.     

A Bayesian framework for the development of belief-desire reasoning: Estimating inhibitory power

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - A robust empirical finding in theory-of-mind (ToM) reasoning, as measured by standard false-belief tasks, is that children four years old or older succeed...     

Early bilingualism enhances mechanisms of false‐belief reasoning

In their first years, children's understanding of mental states seems to improve dramatically, but the mechanisms underlying these changes are still unclear. Such ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) abilities may arise during development, or have an innate basis, developmental changes reflecting limitations of other abilities involved in ToM tasks (e.g. inhibition). Special circumstances such as early bilingualism may enhance ToM development or other capacities required by ToM tasks. Here we compare 3‐year‐old bilinguals and monolinguals on a standard ToM task, a modified ToM task and a control task involving physical reasoning. The modified ToM task mimicked a language‐switch situation that bilinguals often encounter and that could influence their ToM abilities. If such experience contributes to an early consolidation of ToM in bilinguals, they should be selectively enhanced in the modified task. In contrast, if bilinguals have an advantage due to better executive inhibitory abilities involved in ToM tasks, they should outperform monolinguals on both ToM tasks, inhibitory demands being similar. Bilingual children showed an advantage on the two ToM tasks but not on the control task. The precocious success of bilinguals may be associated with their well‐developed control functions formed during monitoring and selecting languages.     

7~9岁儿童二级错误信念和失言理解的发展

采用二级错误信念任务、失言理解任务分别考察了90名7-9岁学龄儿童心理理论的发展。结果表明,7岁组儿童在二级错误信念和失言理解任务上的成绩与8岁组、9岁组存在显著差异,但8岁组和9岁组儿童之间没有显著差异,提示8岁可能是个体心理理论发展的又一个转折点。三组被试在二级错误信念理解上的成绩显著高于失言理解任务上的成绩,在控制年龄后,他们在两种心理理论任务上的成绩显著相关。另外,失言任务中三种心理状态理解的得分两两相关。综合以上结果,在学龄期,心理理论仍有质的发展,且心理理论的信念、情绪和意图等核心概念仍然相互关联。     

Testing the Role of Verbal Narration in Implicit Theory of Mind Tasks

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to agents, has usually been measured with explicit verbal tasks and found to develop slowly during the preschool years. New implicit ToM measures have lately revolutionized the field by suggesting that ToM may be present much earlier in development. However, recent replication studies of implicit ToM present a complex pattern of failed, partial and successful attempts. The big challenge is to identify an underlying system to this pattern that can explain why some tasks replicate while others do not. The rationale of the present study was to address this challenge by investigating one potential factor that may explain patterns of (non-)replications of implicit measures, namely elements of verbal narration in anticipatory looking tasks. Sixty-seven 4- to 5-year-old children completed modified versions of two different anticipatory looking implicit false belief tasks which recently proved difficult to replicate. The main modification was that verbal narration was added to the original stimulus videos. Results revealed that original looking patterns could still not be replicated. There was no improvement in one task, while a slight improvement was observed in the other task. In conclusion, adding verbal narration does not necessarily improve the replicability of anticipatory ToM tasks, suggesting either that these measures might not be sufficiently sensitive to tap implicit ToM, or that other factors are crucial for successful replications.     

从假装到心理表征理论:假装认识训练的影响

研究探究假装情境及假装认识对幼儿心理理论(Theory of mind)发展的影响。实验一考察60名3~4岁幼儿在假装情境下的信念认识任务中的表现,发现幼儿对假装的早期认识的出现要早于对信念的认识的出现,假装情境对幼儿的信念认识没有直接促进作用。实验二对42名在信念认识任务上表现不佳的幼儿进行假装认识训练,结果发现假装认识训练促进了幼儿的信念认识,促进效应须经历一段时间才显现。研究支持假装认识在心理理论发展中具有重要作用的假设,但潜在作用机制仍有待进一步探究。