Perfectionism is multidimensional: a reply to Shafran,Cooper and Fairburn

provided a cognitive-behavioural analysis of perfectionism that focused primarily on self-oriented perfectionism. They argued against studying perfectionism from a multidimensional perspective that they regard as inconsistent with prior work on perfectionism as a self-oriented phenomenon. We respond to by offering historical, empirical, and theoretical support for the usefulness and the importance of a multidimensional model of perfectionism involving both intrapersonal processes and interpersonal dynamics. It is concluded that a multidimensional approach to the study of perfectionism is still warranted.     

Personal standards and evaluative concerns dimensions of "clinical" perfectionism: a reply to Shafran et al. (2002, 2003) and Hewitt et al. (2003)

Shafran, Cooper, and Fairburn (2002, 2003) provided a cognitive-behavioral analysis of "clinical" perfectionism, a construct they considered to involve both the determined pursuit of self-imposed standards and extremely vulnerable self-evaluation. They argued against a multidimensional perspective to studying perfectionism. We respond to Shafran et al. (2002, 2003) and Hewitt, Flett, Besser, Sherry, and McGee's (2003) reply to Shafran et al. (2002) by considering the theoretical, empirical, and clinical implications of findings identifying two higher-order dimensions of perfectionism reflecting personal standards (PS) and self-critical evaluative concerns. Analyses of data from two diverse study groups, a college student sample (N = 527) and a clinical sample of patients with binge eating disorder (N = 236), revealed that self-criticism accounts for the relation between perfectionism measures and depressive, anxious, and eating disorder symptoms. We conclude that possessing high PS is not by itself maladaptive. Rather, self-critical evaluative tendencies are more relevant than PS to the critical processes Shafran et al. (2002) suggested contribute to the maintenance of clinical perfectionism.     

Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg

According to Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT. Several critics have argued that the possibility of so-called targetless HOTs—that is, HOTs that represent one as being in a state that does not exist—undermines the theory. Recently, Wilberg (2010) has argued that HOT theory can offer a straightforward account of such cases: since consciousness is a property of mental state tokens, and since there are no states to exhibit consciousness, one is not in conscious states in virtue of targetless HOTs. In this paper, I argue that Wilberg's account is problematic and that Rosenthal's version of HOT theory, according to which a suitable HOT is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness, is to be preferred to Wilberg's account. I then argue that Rosenthal's account can comfortably accommodate targetless HOTs because consciousness is best understood as a property of individuals, not a property of states.     

Imagination inflation is a fact, not an artifact: A reply to Pezdek and Eddy

Pezdek and Eddy (2001) claim to prove that imagination inflation is a spurious effect caused by regression to the mean (RTM). They make four predictions about what patterns of data would demonstrate a genuine effect for imagination versus those that would be explainable by RTM. We review each of those predictions, and demonstrate significant problems with them. We conclude that imagination inflation is a genuine effect, and that Pezdek and Eddy’s work has contributed to the growing research showing that when people imagine fictitious events from long ago, they become more confident that those false events were genuine experiences.     

The Holtzman Inkblot Technique is not the Rorschach: a reply to Lockwood, Roll, and Mathews

A previous article by Lockwood, Roll, and Matthews (1981) reported dramatic differences between the Movement scores obtained by 6-year-old children on the Holtzman Inkblot Technique (HIT) and previously reported normative data for this variable. The Lockwood et al. data were rescored by experienced HIT scorers; their findings-and other possible reasons for the high HIT Movement scores reported by Lockwood et al.-are described and discussed. Finally, the practice of using the HIT in the manner of the Rorschach is criticized.     

Detection,not perception: A reply to Glazer

This article responds to Glazer’s claim that signals must be perceptible as well as his purported counterexample to my conditions for signaling. I defend a broader sense of signal detection that allows for imperceptible signals. While we disagree over the belief-signaling thesis, Glazer and I have great agreement over the social functions of belief.     

Learning to walk is still an "old" problem: a reply to Zelazo (1983)

Zelazo (1983) proposes that two cognitive prerequisites are necessary for the development of locomotion: The conversion of neo-natal reflexive stepping into instrumental behavior and a shift from stereotypical to relational play. I argue that these cognitive assumptions are unnecessary. The disappearance of neo-natal stepping can be explained as a result of increasing leg mass, and the retention of this reflex with practice may be simply an exercise effect. Comparative and evolutionary evidence suggests that locomotion is not associated with abstract reasoning ability. Learning to walk is a complex, gradual process of maturation of motivation, the integration of subcortical pattern-generating centers with the neural substrate for control of posture and balance, and important changes in body proportions and bone and muscle strength. The control of walking is likely the province of mechanism phylogenetically more primitive than the human cerebral cortex. There is no need to invoke cortical explanations when more simple ones are sufficient.     

Language lateralization in bilinguals: more not less is needed: a reply to Paradis (1990).

Paradis (1990) took an extremely pessimistic view of research to date looking at the lateralization of cerebral function in bilingual subjects. We, however, argue that some of his conclusions are, in fact, incorrect, while others speak more to the youth of the field. The problems in the latter body of work are now acknowledged and are being overcome. That the shortcomings are recognized seems to be more a case for satisfaction than of despair.     

Accounts for the N170 face-effect: a reply to Rossion,Curran, & Gauthier

In their commentary, Rossion, Curran, and Gauthier (Rossion, B., Curran, T., Gauthier, I. (2002). A defense of the subordinate-level expertise account for the N170 component. Cognition, 85, 197-202) (RC&G) raise a series of arguments against the domain-specificity account for the N170 face-effect (Carmel, D., & Bentin, S. (2002). Domain specificity versus expertise: factors influencing distinct processing of faces. Cognition, 83, 1-29). This effect consists of a large difference (always significant) observed in the amplitude of a negative component peaking at the lower posterior-temporal sites in response to human faces relative to many other stimulus categories. As an alternative to domain specificity, RC&G advocate a "subordinate-level expertise" account, by which the N170 effect can be obtained for any type of stimulus for the individual identification of which the perceiver is an expert. While considering some of their arguments well taken and interesting, we believe that, overall, RC&G's interpretation of our current data (as well as some of theirs) and of our position ignores several important aspects and, therefore, their critique is not persuasive.     

Process, not representation: reply to Radvansky (1999).

The size of fan effects is determined by processes at retrieval, not by whether or not information is represented as situations. Evidence contradicts G. A. Radvansky's (1999) claim that time to retrieve information from a situation does not depend on the number of elements in the situation. Moreover, Radvansky's principles for ascribing situational models to experiments appear to be post hoc ways of redescribing the data. On the other hand, the evidence does support the Adaptive Control of Thought--Rational (ACT-R) assumption that participants can adjust their attentional weightings and so produce differential fan effects. Moreover, the ACT-R theory of the fan effect is consistent with many other findings.     

Time capsules are not a panacea: A reply to Vernon

Vernon (1986) and I do not disagree on much. The main point of my critique—that there is much more to intelligence than mental speed—holds.     

Orthogonality is not a panacea: backpropagation and "catastrophic interference"

Connectionist models with the backpropagation learning rule are said to exhibit catastrophic interference (or forgetting) with sequential training. Subsequent works showed that interference can be reduced by using orthogonal inputs. This study investigated, with a more rigorous assessment method, whether all orthogonal inputs lead to comparable extent of interference using three coding schemes. The results revealed large differences between the coding schemes. With larger networks, dense inputs led to severer interference compared with sparse inputs. With smaller networks, all the three schemes led to comparable extent of interference. Therefore, this study proved that not all the orthogonal inputs cause the same extent of interference, and that severity of interference depends on the interaction of the input coding scheme and the network size.