A study of the effect of structural information and familiarity in form perception

Two experiments were carried out to investigate the influence of structural information and familiarity on the processing of visual forms. Pairs of “well” structured and nameable and “poorly” structured and non-nameable fragmented forms were employed as stimuli. The effects of structure and familiarity were assessed by manipulating the visual hemifield of presentation and the task. In Experiment 1 stimuli were judged as being either in the same orientation or mirror-reversed, a task that does not require high-level semantic information to be processed. Experiment 2 required physically identical forms to be matched, which may use either physical or name information. In Experiment 1 “same” judgements were equivalent for both types of stimuli, and “different' judgements were longer for the “poorly” structured (non-nameable) forms. In Experiment 2 there was little overall difference between “well” and “poorly” structured forms, though response times to “well” structured (nameable) forms were slowed for right-visual-field presentations. It is suggested that familiarity may not be sufficient to provide a perceptual advantage for nameable forms, as the advantage for nameable stimuli was confined to “same” judgements in Experiment 1 and response times were shorter for non-nameable stimuli in Experiment 2. Rather, performance depends upon factors such as the computation of global shape (due to structural properties of collinearity and closure) and on the use of different kinds or representations (physical versus name) in matching.     

Repetition priming and face processing: Priming occurs within the system that responds to the identity of a face

A familiar stimulus that has recently been recognized will be recognized a second time more quickly and more accurately than if it had not been primed by the earlier encounter. This is the phenomenon of “repetition priming”. Four experiments on repetition priming of face recognition suggest that repetition priming is a consequence of changes within the system that responds to the familiarity of a stimulus. In Experiment 1, classifying familiar faces by occupation facilitated subsequent responses to the same faces in a familiarity decision task (Is this face familiar or unfamiliar?) but not in an expression decision task (Is this face smiling or unsmiling?) or a sex decision task (Is this face male or female?). In Experiment 2, familiar faces showed repetition priming in a familiarity decision task, regardless of whether a familiarity judgment or an expression judgment had been required when the faces were first encountered. Expression decisions to familiar faces again failed to show repetition priming. In Experiment 3, familiar faces showed repetition priming in a familiarity decision task, regardless of whether a familiarity judgment or a sex judgment had been asked for when the faces were first encountered. Sex decisions to familiar faces again failed to show repetition priming. In Experiment 4, familiarity decisions continued to show repetition priming when a brief presentation time with encouragement to respond while the face was displayed reduced response latencies to speeds comparable to those for sex and expression judgments in Experiments 1 to 3. The results are problematic for theories that propose that repetition priming is mediated by episodic records of previous acts of stimulus encoding.     

Exhaustive memory-scanning and familiarity discrimination: Separate mechanisms in recognition memory tasks

Experiment I was a yes-no recognition task with lists of one, two or four items to remember. Each item in the experiment appeared in only one list, and each list was presented only once. One group of subjects performed the task with complex pictures. Their results were incompatible with the hypothesis of exhaustive memory scanning, since the function relating “yes” response latency to list length was not parallel to but steeper than the function for “no” responses. Another group performed the task with words. Their results were consistent with exhaustive memory-scanning. Experiment II was a similar task in which the familiarity was varied of the test items to which the subjects had to respond “no”. That variation affected response latency with pictures but not with words. From these results and from a consideration of relevant neurological data, the hypothesis is advanced that familiarity discrimination and exhaustive memory-scanning are separate mechanisms.     

Repetition Priming Follows Spontaneous but not Prompted Recognition of Familiar Faces

Reaction times to make a familiarity decision to the faces of famous people were measured after recognition of the faces in a pre-training phase had occurred spontaneously or following prompting with a name or other cue. At test, reaction times to familiar faces that had been recognized spontaneously in the pre-training phase were significantly facilitated relative to an unprimed comparison condition. Reaction times to familiar faces recognized only after prompting in the pre-training phase were not significantly facilitated. This was demonstrated both when a name prompt was used (Experiments 1 and 3) and when subjects were cued with brief semantic information (Experiment 2).

Repetition priming was not found to depend on prior spontaneous recognition per se. In Experiment 3, spontaneously recognizing a familiar face did not prime subsequent familiarity judgements when the same face had only been identified following prompting on a prior encounter. In Experiment 4, recognition memory for faces recognized after cueing was found to be over 90% accurate. This indicates that prompted recognition does not yield repetition priming, even though subjects can remember the faces. A fusion of “face recognition unit” and “episodic record” accounts of the repetition priming effect may be more useful than either theory alone in explaining these results.     

The effect of cue-familiarity, cue-distinctiveness, and retention interval on prospective remembering

Five experiments investigated the effects of cue familiarity, cue distinctiveness, and retention interval on prospective remembering. Results showed that (1) performance in a prospective memory task is facilitated when the cue is unfamiliar and/or distinctive; and (2) it is impaired by 3-minutes' delay between the instructions and the task (Experiment 1). A beneficial effect of distinctiveness was also found when perceptual rather than semantic distinctiveness was tested (Experiment 2). Experiments 3 and 4 ruled out the hypotheses that “unfulfilled expectancy” of an event (i.e. non-appearance of the cue during training) (Experiment 3), or some sort of “habituation” in the target context (Experiment 4), may have caused the low performance observed in the delayed conditions. Finally, results from Experiment 5 showed that delay negatively affected prospective remembering when it was filled with either a demanding interpolated activity (practice in a STM task) or an undemanding motoric activity (repetitive hands movements). Unfilled delay and an undemanding verbal activity (counting) were found not to affect prospective memory. Implications for the mechanisms underlying prospective remembering are discussed.     

The effect of inversion on the encoding of normal and “thatcherized” faces

In the “Thatcher illusion” a face, in which the eyes and mouth are inverted relative to the rest of the face, looks grotesque when shown upright but not when inverted. In four experiments we investigated the contribution of local and global processing to this illusion in normal observers. We examined inversion effects (i.e., better performance for upright than for inverted faces) in a task requiring discrimination of whether faces were or were not “thatcherized”. Observers made same/different judgements to isolated face parts (Experiments 1-2) and to whole faces (Experiments 3-4). Face pairs had the same or different identity, allowing for different process- ing strategies using feature-based or configural information, respectively. In Experiment 1, feature-based matching of same-person face parts yielded only a small inversion effect for normal face parts. However, when feature-based matching was prevented by using the face parts of different people on all trials (Experiment 2) an inversion effect occurred for normal but not for thatcherized parts. In Experiments 3 and 4, inversion effects occurred with normal but not with thatcherized whole faces, on both same- and different-person matching tasks. This suggests that a common configural strategy was used with whole (normal) faces. Face context facilitated attention to misoriented parts in same-person but not in different-person matching. The results indicate that (1) face inversion disrupts local configural processing, but not the processing of image features, and (2) thatcherization disrupts local configural processing in upright faces.     

Nonword repetition in lexical decision: Support for two opposing processes

We tested and confirmed the hypothesis that the prior presentation of nonwords in lexical decision is the net result of two opposing processes: (1) a relatively fast inhibitory process based on global familiarity; and (2) a relatively slow facilitatory process based on the retrieval of specific episodic information. In three studies, we manipulated speed-stress to influence the balance between the two processes. Experiment 1 showed item-specific improvement for repeated nonwords in a standard “respond-when-ready” lexical decision task. Experiment 2 used a 400-ms deadline procedure and showed performance for nonwords to be unaffected by up to four prior presentations. In Experiment 3 we used a signal-to-respond procedure with variable time intervals and found negative repetition priming for repeated nonwords. These results can be accounted for by dual-process models of lexical decision (e.g., Balota & Chumbley, 1984; Balota & Spieler, 1999).     

Mental representation of logical connectives

Logical connectives, such as “AND”, “OR”, “IF . . . THEN”, and “IF AND ONLY IF” are ubiquitous in both language and cognition; however, reasoning with logical connectives is error-prone. We argue that some of these errors may stem from people's tendency to minimize the number of possibilities compatible with logical connectives and to construct a “minimalist” one-possibility representation. As a result, connectives denoting a single possibility (e.g., conjunctions) are likely to be represented correctly, whereas connectives denoting multiple possibilities (e.g., disjunctions or conditionals) are likely to be erroneously represented as conjunctions. These predictions were tested and confirmed in three experiments using different paradigms. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a multiple-choice task and asked to select all and only those possibilities that would indicate that compound verbal propositions were true versus false. In Experiment 2, a somewhat similar task was used, except that participants were asked later to perform a cued recall of verbal propositions. Finally, Experiment 3 used an old/new recognition paradigm to examine participants' ability to accurately recognize different logical connectives. The results of the three experiments are discussed in relation to theories of representation of possibilities and theories of reasoning.     

Repetition priming of face recognition

Three experiments investigating the priming of the recognition of familiar faces are reported. In Experiment 1, recognizing the face of a celebrity in an “Is this face familiar?” task was primed by exposure several minutes earlier to a different photograph of the same person, but not by exposure to the person's written name (a partial replication of Bruce and Valentine, 1985). In Experiment 2, recognizing the face of a personal acquaintance was again primed by recognizing a different photograph of their face, but not by recognizing the acquaintance from that person's body shape, clothes etc. Experiment 3 showed that maximum repetition priming is obtained from prior exposure to an identical photograph of a famous face, less from a similar photograph, and least (but still significant) from a dissimilar photograph.

We argue that repetition priming is a function of the degree of physical similarity between two stimuli and that lack of priming between different stimulus types (e.g., written names and faces, or bodies and faces) may be attributable to lack of physical similarity between prime and test stimuli. Repetition priming effects may be best explained by some form of “instance-based” model such as that proposed by McClelland and Rumelhart (1985).     

Visual pattern recognition: Size preprocessing re-examined

Template theories of visual pattern recognition assume the operation of preprocessing routines to deal with irrelevancies such as discrepancies in stimulus size. In three experiments where size was an irrelevant dimension, observers classified pairs of forms as either “same” or “different”. In Experiment I, the classification “different” was required when the stimuli shared the same form but a different orientation, and “same” when the stimuli shared the same form and orientation. Under these conditions RT was an increasing function of the magnitude of the size disparity between stimuli with equal slopes for “same” and “different” judgements. In Experiment II, “different” classifications were made to stimuli that had different forms, and “same” to figures with the same form. This stimulus set produced a size disparity function that interacted with response type; “different” responses had a shallower slope. Experiment III consisted of a mixed stimulus set drawn from both Experiment I and II. Stimuli that produced additive effects of size disparity and response type in Experiment I now produced an interaction between these two factors similar to the one observed in Experiment II. The results of these experiments are interpreted as evidence that previous contradictory results reported in the literature stem from differences in the way the stimulus set is constructed, and that size transformations can not be a necessary operation, at least when “different” judgements are made. The results are problematic for the view that size disparity effects in matching tasks are easily interpretable in terms of a primitive size normalization stage that precedes any comparison operations.     

Inducing a Rule in Wason's 2-4-6 Task: A Test of the Information-Quantity and Goal-Complementarity Hypotheses

In the standard 2-4-6 induction task, subjects are instructed to discover the rule generating sequences of three numbers by inventing number triples for which they receive immediate feedback. The rule is “ascending numbers”. Performance is greatly aided with Dual Goal (DG) instructions that ask subjects to discover two rules, one that generates “Dax” triples (equivalent to “yes” instances with Single Goal [SG] instructions) and another that generates “Med” triples (equivalent to “no” instances). The present study eliminates two explanations for this effect suggested by Wharton, Cheng, and Wickens (1993). Experiment 1 tested their Information-Quantity hypothesis that the effect results simply from the DG subjects testing more triples prior to proposing a rule. Our DG subjects were more likely to solve the problem and produced more “negative” triples than SG subjects when both groups generated exactly 15 triples. Two further groups received feedback only after generating all 15 triples, and again DG subjects were more likely to solve the problem and to generate more “negative” triples. Experiment 2 tested Wharton et al.'s Goal-Complementarity hypothesis that success under DG instructions hinges on preserving the complementary representation of the two rules. We compared SG instructions with three types of DG instructions that suggested different types of triples (Dax, Med, both Dax and Med, neither Dax nor Med). DG instructions were more effective in promoting successful rule discovery regardless of differences in rule complementarity. Our analysis of the heterogeneity of the examplars generated with DG instructions in both experiments suggest that success on the 2-4-6 task is as much a consequence of the breadth of hypotheses that subjects entertain as it is a consequence of the testing strategy.     

Auditory and visual word-stem completion: Separating data-driven and conceptually driven processes

Two experiments investigated the contributions of data-driven and conceptually driven processing on an implicit word-stem completion task. In Experiment 1, individual words were studied either visually or auditorily and were tested using either visual or auditory word-stems. Keeping modality the same from study to test led to more priming than did changing modality, but there was reliable cross-modal priming. In Experiment 2, subjects read sentences like The boat travelled underwater and inferred the subject noun (i.e. “submarine”) or sentences like The submarine travelled underwater and categorized the subject noun (i.e. “boat”). At test, there was reliable priming for both actually read nouns and inferred nouns. In addition, a modality effect was evident for the actually read nouns but not for the inferred nouns. Taken together, these results imply that there is a basic conceptually driven contribution to priming plus an additional contribution of data-driven processing when surface form is the same at study and test.     

Neuropsychological Impairment of Face Recognition Units

Despite the absence of “conscious”, overt identification, some patients with face recognition impairments continue covertly to process information regarding face familiarity. The fact that by no means all patients show these covert effects has led to the suggestion that indirect recogntion tasks may help in identifying different types of face recognition impairment. The present report describes a number of experiments with the patient NR, who, after a closed head injury, has been severely impaired at recognizing familiar faces. Investigations mostly failed to show overt or covert face recognition, but NR performed at an above-chance level in selecting the familiar face on a task requiring a forced-choice between a familiar and an unfamiliar face. This discrepancy between a degree of rudimentary overt recognition and absence of covert effects on most indirect tests was addressed using a cross-domaim identity priming paradigm. This examined separately the possibility of preserved recognition for faces that NR consistently chose correctly in a forced-choice familiarity decision and those on which he performed at chance level. Priming effects were apparent only for the faces that were consistently chosen as “familiar” in forced-choice. We suggest that NR's stored representations of familiar faces are degraded, so that face recognition is possible only via a limited set of relatively preserved representations able to support a rudimentary form of overt recognition and to facilitate performance in matching and priming tasks.     

Judgements of a 2 × 2 contingency table: Sequential processing and the learning curve

Shanks (1985) has used a video game to investigate how subjects estimate the effect of their behaviour in a task defined by a 2×2 contingency table. The subjects were able to distinguish positive and negative contingencies from zero contingencies. In addition, they showed a learning curve and a bias to rate zero contingencies with a high outcome density higher than low-density zero contingencies. He interpreted these data as being consistent with associative models derived from animal learning. In Experiment 1 we replicated these results using a task and instructions similar to his. In a second experiment we showed that the subjects' tendency to overestimate high-density zero contingencies did not arise because the “game” was so difficult that it interfered with processing the events. In this experiment subjects were given tables of the outcome frequencies that had been determined by the earlier subjects. These subjects were, if anything, less accurate in rating the zero contingencies. We point out several logical problems with Shanks's initial task. The task did not represent a true 2×2 contingency, and aspects of it were physically impossible. In Experiment 3 we modified the task to represent a true 2×2 contingency. Using this task, we found a similar pattern of results, except that there was no evidence of the learning curve predicted by the associative models. We conclude that there is little in our data to rule out a “rule-based” analysis of contingency judgements.     

The influence of emotion on face processing

According to the broaden-and-build theory, positive emotions broaden one's thought-action repertoire, which may manifest as a widened attentional scope in cognitive processing. The present study directly tests this hypothesis by examining the influences of induced emotions (positive, neutral and negative) on holistic processing of face (Experiment 1) and face discrimination (Experiment 2). In both experiments, emotions induced with images from the International Affective Picture System significantly interacted with face processing. That is, positive emotions engendered greater holistic face encoding in a composite-face task in Experiment 1 and more accurate face discrimination in Experiment 2, relative to the neutral condition. In contrast, negative emotions impaired holistic face encoding in the composite-face task and reduced face discrimination accuracy. Taken together, these results provide further support for the attentional broadening effect of positive affect by demonstrating that induced positive emotions facilitate holistic/configural processing.     

Effects of visual familiarity on “same” and “different” decision processes

An experiment was conducted in which subjects matched upper and lower case versions of well-known abbreviations, such as BBC and etc, and meaningless controls. “Same” RT showed a familiarity effect for upper case versions of abbreviations such as BBC and GPO, but not for the lower case versions bbc and gpo. The converse did not occur for abbreviations such as etc, which were thought to occur most frequently in lower case. The “different” RT was inhibited by familiarity, with pairs such as IBM GPO being classified less rapidly than their lower case versions or controls. These effects occurred for subjects instructed to report “No” for “same” displays and “Yes” for “different” displays as well as for subjects given a conventional decision-report assignment. Some implications of these results for an account of the manner in which familiarity affects graphemic comparison processes are considered.     

Recognizing melodies: A dynamic interpretation

Two experiments explore hypotheses about rhythm and contour in recognition of simple pitch strings (melodies). Target melodies that differed with respect to pitch relationships (interval and contour pitch differences) and rhythm, were presented to ordinary listeners who were told to learn the melodies (Phase I). In a subsequent recognition test (Phase II), listeners had to recognize these same target melodies although they were transposed to a different musical key. In recognition, target melodies appeared in the original rhythm or in new rhythms that simulated some pause properties of the original rhythm. Target melodies were interspersed with decoy melodies that either preserved the pitch contour of targets or did not; all appeared in the original rhythm and in new rhythms. Results indicated that a new rhythmic context lowered recognizability of target melodies, and that decoys were most confusing when they possessed the same “dynamic shape” (contour-plus-rhythm) as targets (Experiment 1). Also, target recognition improved with Phase I familiarity (Experiment 2), although rhythmic shifts remained detrimental across levels of target familiarity. Confusions based on “dynamic shape” accounted for a relatively high proportion of errors where familiarity with targets is low. Findings were interpreted in terms of a theory of context-sensitive dynamic attending in which remembering is assumed to involve recapitulation of the original rhythmical activities involved in attending to melodies.     

When hearing turns into playing: Movement induction by auditory stimuli in pianists

In this study, pianists were tested for learned associations between actions (movements on the piano) and their perceivable sensory effects (piano tones). Actions were examined that required the playing of two-tone sequences (intervals) in a four-choice paradigm. In Experiment 1, the intervals to be played were denoted by visual note stimuli. Concurrently with these imperative stimuli, task-irrelevant auditory distractor intervals were presented (“potential” action effects, congruent or incongruent). In Experiment 2, imperative stimuli were coloured squares, in order to exclude possible influences of spatial relationships of notes, responses, and auditory stimuli. In both experiments responses in the incongruent conditions were slower than those in the congruent conditions. Also, heard intervals actually “induced” false responses. The reaction time effects were more pronounced in Experiment 2. In nonmusicians (Experiment 3), no evidence for interference could be observed. Thus, our results show that in expert pianists potential action effects are able to induce corresponding actions, which demonstrates the existence of acquired action-effect associations in pianists.     

A philosophical and empirical analysis of subjects' modes of inquiry in wason's 2-4-6 task

Investigations of hypothesis-testing behaviour typically conclude that subjects' methods are characterized by “confirmation bias.” However, these studies (a) relied exclusively upon Karl Popper's philosophy of science, (b) only described subjects' strategies via a falsificationist terminology, and (c) failed to determine subjects' precise intentions in the task situations. Alternative philosophies of science can be used to describe hitherto ignored aspects of rule discovery in Wason's (1960) 2-4-6 task as well as reinterpret findings from previous research. Using Wason's task, Experiment 1 adopted J. S. Mill's inductive methodology in order to assess better the extent of elimination in experimentation. While it was found that subjects did eliminate a large proportion of their hypotheses rather than merely confirm them, Mill's eliminative methods applied to this task failed to account for the entirety of subjects' behaviours. Experiment 2 examined subjects' methods in more depth by asking subjects during the task either to: (1) describe their procedures, (2) select from a list of methodology terms those that best characterized their methods, and (3) state on each learning trial their preferred hypotheses and their subjective assessments that those hypotheses were correct. Although subjects were generally unable to describe their methods of inquiry, they were able to typify them via the methodology terms as if their methods were tacitly held skills. Contrary to presumptions of previous research, analyses indicated that subjects were not testing particular hypotheses on every trial but were often examining possible instances of the rule “at random” or “different from ones examined” to that trial. It is also suggested that subjects' decisions to announce rules and their thematic lines of inquiry be given further consideration by researchers.