新儒学:向儒学原旨的复归和对儒学的发展

<正> 新儒学是两宋文化的主流,其特点是儒家在充分吸收其他学派思想成分后和在新的历史条件下向经典儒学原旨的复归。经典儒学,即以《论》、《孟》、《学》、《庸》、《易传》为代表的先秦儒学是由孔子建立的关于“修己”和“安人”之道的人道学说,这一学说后经孟子、《中庸》、《易传》的发展被奠立在“性与天道”的形而上学     

主体的复归与现象学的先验转向

现象学的先验转向是由意义自在转向先验主体,由完全悬置自我到复归主体,这一方面是由于观念自在论的种种困难所促成,另一方面主体主义哲学惟有通过先验转向才能克服其主观性悖论,先验观念论是主体主义哲学最后和最高的形式,而这种最高形式中也隐藏着先验主体的一些理论困难。     

乡村儒学与乡土信仰重建

传统乡村的人生信仰,是一种由私塾学堂、宗族祠堂和民间道堂复合而成的精神生态系统,为传统乡村大众提供了安身立命之地。这一系统近代以来被摧毁,导致了乡村的价值真空和文化荒漠化,急需在乡村重建新的教化体系加以填补。本文通过对于传统乡土文化的研究,结合当代乡村儒学的实践经验,提出了在目前乡村建构儒学讲堂、公共祠堂和民间道堂三堂合一的教化体系的构想,通过乡土文化的返本开新,为乡土文明重建提供了一条可资借鉴的路径。     

一种自然科学现象学如何可能?——基于先验现象学对自然化的现象学的研究纲领的改造

如果把自然科学看作以一种主体间性的方式显现自然的途径,自然科学现象学研究则是对这种显现的主体性的理解框架、意向性结构以及先验的机制的现象学阐明。本文基于现象学的立场,探讨把对整个自然科学乃至自然作为现象学研究的基本主题何以可能。具体而言是从先验现象学的理论框架出发,结合对科学的前沿经验以及它们的现象学理解,来论证立足于先验现象学立场一般性地研究自然科学与自然的合理性与可能性。在此基础上探讨基于现象学的意向性理论,初步阐述其研究的理论依据和基本主题,如科学理论的意向构成、科学理论的本体论等问题。     

同途而殊归的“家源儒学”与“生活儒学”——评当代中国的两种现象学儒学思想

在当代中国哲学中,张祥龙的"家源儒学"和黄玉顺的"生活儒学"都是从儒学与现象学的比较研究来思考儒学的复兴和重建,但却又同途而殊归。受海德格尔存在论现象学启思,他们都将儒家的仁爱情感作为一切存在者及其理论建构的终极本源。但是,在仁爱情感显现的两个维度中,张祥龙把家庭成员之间的"亲亲之爱"看作儒家的根脉所在,主张建立以传统家族生活为核心的儒家文化保护区来使儒家逃避现代文明世界;而黄玉顺则把"一体之仁"看作儒家的根本精神,并以之为正当性基础来构建现代性的制度规范、推动儒学的现代化转型。前者否定了现代文明的普遍价值,忽视了自由开放的现代政治秩序乃是其文化保护区能够建立的制度前提,将使儒学从现代社会退隐;后者忽视了个体本位的消极意义和家庭生活的积极意义,会使仁爱的推扩难以实现、健全人格的个体难以形成。故更合理的思路是:儒学既要通过构建以个体自由为基础的现代制度规范来完成自身的现代转型,也要充分重视家庭对于仁爱推扩和个体成长的重要意义。     

现象学与生活——胡塞尔的方案

现象学与生活的关系是什么?胡塞尔同时提出两个选项:一个是主张现象学脱离生活,另一个则主张现象学亲近生活。在理解胡塞尔时,任何一个选项都不应该被偏废。这两者并不必然是相互排斥的关系,而是包含调和的可能性,为了充分达到这个目的,仅仅采用超越论的现象学是不足的。虽然胡塞尔本身的哲学最终以彻底的反思作为归宿,而只有超越论的转向可以达到彻底的反思,但为了能够厘清现象学和生活之间的关系,亦即说明现象学和现实世界之间除了对立的关系,还存在非对立的关系,唯有借助于胡塞尔本人也相当重视的现象学心理学才或可竟其功。     

孔子的儒学与基督教的比较研究

儒学体大思精。本文限于篇幅,只研究孔子的儒学。即使就孔子的儒学而论,它也具体而细微地冶宗教、道德与哲学为一炉。世人对孔子儒学的道德和哲学层面的研究已汗牛充栋,但对它的宗教层面的探讨则不多见。本文拟从比较角度研究孔子儒学的宗教层面,并联系它的道德和哲学层面作一完整论析,以豁显孔子儒学的特色。 希勒(Friedrich Heiler)曾经把世界各大宗教分为预示和神秘两大类型,作为比较研究之资。希氏以为凡把信仰建立在神的启示,注重上帝的超越性以及关注道德的价值和戒律的一切宗教都属于前一类型,像犹太教、基督教和回教便是属于这一类型的宗教。至于为冥想上帝和“绝对”(Absolute)而遁世以及自我隐退的一切宗教,则属于后一类型,如兴都教、佛教和道教便是属于这一类型的宗教。     

两宋的《论语》诠释与儒学重建

两宋时期文化界兴起的复兴原始儒学、重建儒家有体有用的圣人之道,导致<论语>诠释的学术热潮兴起.宋儒的<论语>学在经典诠释、本体建构、下学工夫三个方面均作出了创造性的贡献,从而建构了一种理学型的<论语>学,使<论语>学发展到一个新的高峰.     

儒学,传统文化与现代文明

儒学是中华文化的主流。如同任何文化一样,儒学也具有两重性,这决定了我们对儒学乃至整个传统文化必须进行价值选择,目的不是还原历史,再现昔日辉煌,而是对其中蕴含的积极的、进步的、精华的东西,予以新的诠释,转化和改铸,使之上升到普遍理念,以与现时代相适应,与现代文明相衔接,并进而参与构建有中国特色的社会主义新文明。     

家与存在:一项现象学的研究

胡塞尔晚年将两性间的本能和母婴关系等"在家状态"构筑为超越论现象学的新基础,从而实质性地构成了对海德格尔"在世存在"理论的批评:本己性并非"无家可归"的,而是应该显明于与家人关联的"切己性"。同样以"在家"为基础,列维纳斯突破了海德格尔"在世存在"理论的统治,但与胡塞尔强调家的"融合存在"不同,列维纳斯坚持亲子与两性中的他异性的基础地位,主体只能在不可消除的差异性中与他者相互渗透、感发与生成。在对在世、在家之奠基关系的转换中,现象学运动实现了从在世存在到本性存在,再到异质存在的突破。     

儒学的一种缺弱:私德与公德

In a society dominated by Confucian ethics, a spirit of Confucian public morality can be seen in the Confucian debate over publicness and privateness, but it is usually activated in circumstances of large ethical crisis. Confucian theory mainly uses ethical relationships to create self and social identities, causing problems of identification in the public life and hindering the expression of moral feelings and actions, thus revealing a weakness in public morality. This is a space that Confucianism has not yet been able to cover, and also where it has room for growth. Translated by Huang Deyuan from Wen Shi Zhe 文史哲 (Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy), 2006, (1): 30–36     

德性儒学的成就、困境与走向

Beginning with the promotion of morality in Confucianism, a Neo-Confucian movement in modern Chinese philosophy was initiated, in which Confucianism underwent a transition from tradition to modernity. However, Moral Confucianism did not successfully develop the “new kingliness without” from its “sageliness within,” respond to modernization marked by science and democracy, and provide moral impetus for the development of a modern Chinese society or appeal to many beyond the small circle of “elite Confucianists.” The fundamental reason is that it was caught in a web of moral idealism, overemphasizing what ought to be without confronting what actually was. Translated by Huang Deyuan from Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Xuebao 中国人民大学学报 (Journal of Renmin University of China), 2006, (1): 9–15     

孔子新诠——对《论语》作为一个哲学解释学文本的解读

Communicating with Confucius based on our own hermeneutical context, and reading the Analects as a text of philosophical hermeneutics, it can be concluded that as an epochal thinker, the contribution of Confucius’ thought is that it initiated a humanistic moral ideal with cultural upbringing as its core. Based on this consciousness of humanistic moral ideal, Confucius thought and dealt positively with the human existential plight and social political problems that he faced during his own time, and his thought is more creative than conservative. Translated by Mi Li from Guanzi Xuekan 맜子学刊 (Guanzi Jouranl), 2006, (1): 69–74     

《易传》中的语言哲学思想探论--兼论儒、道、《易》的语言哲学思想之异同

本文试图对《易传》中的语言哲学思想,以及以孔子、孟子、荀子为代表的儒家和以老子、庄子为代表的道家的语育哲学思想进行初步分析,对先秦哲学中的语言哲学所关涉到的问题作一点探索性的研究,看先秦部分思想家考察了汉语言的哪些方面的特征,为我们反思现代汉语与现代中国哲学的关系提供某些启示。     

Virtue Ethics, The Analects, and the Problem of Commensurability

In support of the thesis that virtue ethics allows for a more comprehensive and consistent interpretation of the Analects than other possible models, the author uses a structural outline of a virtue ethic (derived from Alasdair MacIntyre's account of the Aristotlelian tradition) to organize a discussion of the text. The resulting interpretation focuses attention on the religious aspects of Confucianism and accounts for aspects of the text that are otherwise difficult to explain. In addition, the author argues that the structural similarities between the Aristotelian and Confucian conceptions of self-cultivation indicate a dimension of commensurability between the two traditions, despite very real variations in specific content. Finally, the author suggests how crosscultural commensurability, in general, can be understood on a theoretical level.     

Two Senses of Justice: Confucianism,Rawls, and Comparative Political Philosophy

This paper argues that a comparative study of the idea of a sense of justice in the work of John Rawls and the early Chinese philosopher Kongzi is mutually beneficial to our understanding of the thought of both figures. It also aims to provide an example of the relevance of moral psychology for basic questions in political philosophy. The paper offers an analysis of Rawls’s account of a sense of justice and its place within his theory of justice, focusing on the features of this capacity and how it develops. It then provides an account of the sense of justice in Kongzi’s thought as it is seen in the Analects. Finally, it shows how examining the similarities and differences between the two accounts can deepen our understanding of both views, as well as our appreciation for the importance of understanding how a sense of justice develops.     

儒家差异思想阐微

Difference is a category of relationship lying between identity and non-identity, and equality and inequality. This concept is both the Confucian reflection of the real relationship between things in the world and the value ideal of Confucianism. The Confucian idea of difference, embodied in the view of human relationships, of world, and of nature, seeks to build a rational order based on difference, so as to reach a harmonious, united and ideal state. Confucians in the past dynasties continually interpreted difference and raised it to the level of ontology, enriching the system of Confucianism. Translated by Yan Xin from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2006, (3): 32–37     

《周易》和儒家人文哲学--从差异比较的视角作重新诠释的尝试

本文以提示<易经>"三才之道"的意蕴为契入点,通过易儒互动、会通过程的考察,探讨儒家人文哲学的宇宙论根据及其有原创意义的思维模式,又采用中西哲学差异比较的方法,概括出"有机人本"、"宗法群体"、"主观能动"、"道德理性"四项观念,剖析和诠释儒家人文哲学的内容特质和精神价值,进而为合理评价儒家哲学人文资源的现代意义提供必要的条件和依据.     

孔子与亚里士多德的朋友观之比较

Before and during the times of Confucius and Aristotle, the concept of friendship had very different implications. This paper compares Confucius’ with Aristotle’s thoughts on friendship from two perspectives: xin 信 (fidelity, faithfulness) and le 乐 (joy). The Analects emphasizes the xin as the basis of friendship. Aristotle holds that there are three kinds of friends and corresponding to them are three types of friendship. In the friendship for the sake of pleasure, there is no xin; in the legal form of friendship for the sake of utility, xin is guaranteed by law; and in the moral form of friendship for the sake of utility, xin is guaranteed by morality; in the friendship for the sake of virtue, xin is an indispensable part. Both thinkers believe friends can bring joy to human life. According to Confucius, it is the joy of rendao 仁道 (benevolence), whereas for Aristotle, it is the joy of Reason. There are many commonalities and differences between the two. The commonalities reveal some inner links between Confucian rendao and Aristotelian Reason. It seems that the differences between rendao and Reason are the differences between moral reason and logical reason. The comparative study is helpful for us to understand the two masters’ ethics, politics and philosophy. Translated from Lunlixue Yanjiu 伦理学研究 (Research in Ethics), 2006, (1): 47–52     

Ideas of justice and reconstructions of Confucian justice

Confucianism tends to play only a marginal role in current theorizing about justice, which is a global pursuit dominated by Western theory and its strong tendency to assume that justice refers to some substantive conception of distributive, socioeconomic justice. This article examines and compares reconstructions of Confucian justice by Joseph Chan, May Sim, and Fan Ruiping. Each reconstruction makes reference to both classical and modern Western justice theory and thus each involves a comparative approach; indeed, each reconstruction seeks ultimately, in its own distinctive fashion, to present a version of Confucian justice that is comparable with modern Western justice theory. In this article we assess, critically and comparatively, the tertium comparationis and the arguments in each reconstruction. While our analysis does not wholly endorse any of the reconstructions, it shows that there is a richness and vitality to Confucian justice theory that merits proper consideration in justice theory conceived as a truly global and cosmopolitan discipline.