The place of appraisal in emotion

Abstract

The concept of “appraisal” has been used in the literature in a dual way: to refer to the content of emotional experience, as well as to the cognitive antecedents of emotions. I argue that appraisal in the former sense is what is contained in information in self-reports and that this information is of limited use for making inferences on emotion antecedents. This is so because emotional experience may contain appraisals that are part of the emotional response rather than belonging to its causes. They often result from elaboration of the experience after it has begun to be generated. Although in most or all emotions some cognitive appraisal processes are essential antecedents, these processes may be much simpler than self-reports (and the semantics of emotion words) may suggest. The appraisal processes that account for emotion elicitation can be assumed to be of a quite elementary kind.     

Getting from situations to emotions: appraisal and other routes

Comments on the original article by S. Siemer and R. Reisenzein regarding the process of emotion inference. When processing situational information, people can reach emotional conclusions without explicitly registering corresponding appraisals. Does this mean that appraisal cues must be guiding inference in less obvious ways? If one assumes that the emotional meaning of any situation depends on the protagonist's relation to what is happening, then emotion inference can never entirely bypass relational information. However, not all relational information is specifically appraisal-based. Further, actual emotion causation, like emotion inference, can involve explicit or implicit appraisals or even no appraisals at all. Indeed, humans do not first learn to associate emotions with situations by extracting appraisal information.     

AN ESSAY ON DREAMING,PSYCHICAL WORKING OUT AND WORKING THROUGH2

In this paper the author attempts to expand the idea put forward by Freud who considered dreams as a special form of unconscious thinking. It is the author's contention that the psychical working‐out function performed by dreams is a form of unconscious thinking, which transforms affects into memories and mental structures. He also attempts to clarify the way in which meaning is built and transformed in mental life. In that respect the unconscious internal world is seen as a form of unconscious thinking, a private theatre where meaning is generated and transformed. He focuses on what happens to feelings in dreams in connection with the meanings as a result of and an expression of the several stages of working through. The dream world is described as the setting where the mind gives expressive pictorial representation to the emotions involved in a conflict: a first step towards thinkability. The dreamwork also constitutes a process through which meaning is apprehended, built on and transformed at an expressive non‐discursive level, based on representation through figurative/pictorial images. The author draws on Meltzer's formulation to conjecture that the working‐through function of dreams, mainly in response to interpretations, is performed by a process of progression in formal qualities of the representations made available by dreaming in the form he has called affective pictograms. It is through progression in formal qualities of the representation that the thinking capabilities of the affective life develop and become part of the process of what is called metaphorically the metabolisation of emotional life. This process takes place through migration of meaning across various levels of mental process. In this perspective the analyst'sinterpretations of dreams effect what linguists call transmutation of the symbolic basis, a process that is necessary to help the mind to improve its capacity to think. Something expressed on the evocative plane and condensed into a pictographic image is then transformed into verbal language that expresses meaning. These conceptions are illustrated by a detailed clinical case.     

A multiple‐method analysis of appraisal–emotion relationships: The case of the prosocial intergroup emotions

Despite its status as a prominent set of theories for explaining the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, much appraisal theory and research offer little indication of the nature of the relationship expected between appraisals and emotions. Here, we present a three‐study, multiple‐method analysis in which we examine numerous ways of testing appraisal–emotion relationships using the “prosocial” intergroup emotions—sympathy, anger, and guilt—as an example. Results show that the set of appraisal dimensions that appears strongly characteristic of an emotion varies depending on the kind of appraisal—emotion relationship hypothesised and the experimental methodology/statistical analysis used. These findings demonstrate the utility of explicit theorising about the nature of the relationship between emotions and appraisals, and show how the hypothesised appraisal–emotion relationship and choice of methodology can affect the structure of appraisal theories. We recommend an analysis across multiple methods to provide a more complete picture of a given set of appraisal–emotion relationships.     

Early antecedents of emotion differentiation and regulation: Experience tunes the appraisal thresholds of emotional development in infancy

In this review, we synthesize evidence to highlight cognitive appraisal as an important developmental antecedent of individual differences in emotion differentiation and adept emotion regulation. Emotion differentiation is the degree to which emotions are experienced in a nuanced or “granular” way—as specific and separable phenomena. More extensive differentiation is related to positive wellbeing and has emerged as a correlate of emotion regulation skill among adults. We argue that the cognitive appraisal processes that underlie these facets of emotional development are instantiated early in the first year of life and tuned by environmental input and experience. Powerful socializing input in the form of caregivers’ contingent and selective responding to infants’ emotional signals carves and calibrates the infant’s appraisal thresholds for what in their world ought to be noticed, deemed as important or personally meaningful, and responded to (whether and how). These appraisal thresholds are thus unique to the individual child despite the ubiquity of the appraisal process in emotional responding. This appraisal infrastructure, while plastic and continually informed by experience across the lifespan, likely tunes subsequent emotion differentiation, with implications for children’s emotion regulatory choices and skills. We end with recommendations for future research in this area, including the urgent need for developmental emotion science to investigate the diverse sociocultural contexts in which children’s cognitive appraisals, differentiation of emotions, and regulatory responses are being built across childhood.     

Differentiation of 13 positive emotions by appraisals

This research examined how strongly appraisals can differentiate positive emotions and how they differentiate positive emotions. Thirteen positive emotions were examined, namely, amusement, awe, challenge, compassion, contentment, gratitude, hope, interest, joy, pride, relief, romantic love and serenity. Participants from Singapore and the USA recalled an experience of each emotion and thereafter rated their appraisals of the experience. In general, the appraisals accurately classified the positive emotions at rates above chance levels, and the appraisal–emotion relationships conformed to predictions. Also, the appraisals were largely judged by participants as relevant to their positive emotion experiences, and the appraisal–emotion relationships were largely consistent across the two countries.     

The sufficiency and necessity of appraisals for negative emotions

Past appraisal studies have shown that single appraisals are neither sufficient nor necessary for emotions but no study has examined the same issue with appraisal configurations (combinations of different single appraisals). Undergraduate participants repeatedly indicated their negative emotions (anger, sadness, fear, and guilt) and relevant appraisals as they occurred, or immediately after, in their everyday environments. The results not only replicated past findings on single appraisals but also suggested that appraisal configurations are neither sufficient nor necessary for these negative emotions.     

Space for emotion in the spaces of activism

This paper explores the role of emotions in activism. Although, increasingly, researchers have examined what emotions inspire or deter different forms of political and social movement activism, this paper takes a new direction by considering what spaces, practices and emotional stances are necessary to sustain individual and collective resistance in the long-term. We argue that we need to sustain activism through emotional reflexivity, building sustaining spaces to create space for emotion in activism. Using empirical examples from different forms of autonomous (anti-capitalist) activism in Britain, the role and importance of emotions to the sustainability of activism is explored. In particular, we consider the role of different spaces in sustaining activists through the cycles of protest, what spaces of activism can be opened up by a closer attention to emotions, and how the spaces in which protest and other activist practices take place shape the emotional and affective engagements of participants. As autonomous forms of activism attempt to prefiguratively enact new post-capitalist social relations in the here and now, we suggest there is still some way to go in changing affective relationships within many of these groups.     

Ekman's basic emotions: Why not love and jealousy?

Paul Ekman's view of the emotions is, we argue, pervasive in psychology and is explicitly shaped to be compatible with evolutionary thinking. Yet, strangely, jealousy and parental love, two emotions that figure prominently in evolutionary psychology, are absent from Ekman's list of the emotions. In this paper we examine why Ekman believes this exclusion is necessary, and what this implies about the limits of his conception of emotion. We propose an alternative way of thinking about emotion that does not exclude jealousy and parental love.     

Is there a "special relationship" between unconscious emotions and visual imagery? Evidence from a mental rotation test

There is an increasing interest in the relationship between imagery and emotion (e.g., Holmes & Mathews, 2005). The present research examined whether unconscious emotions affect visual imagery. In particular, participants were invited to perform a mental rotation test following subliminal presentation of happy, sad and neutral expressions. This study revealed an increase in mental rotation abilities after unconscious visual processing of emotional expressions. Altogether, these findings support the hypothesis of a bidirectional relationship between imagery and emotions.     

Interacting Minds: A Framework for Combining Process- and Accuracy-Oriented Social Cognitive Research

A number of problems posed by cognitive-mediational theories of emotion offer major challenges for theory and research. I address five problems that seem particularly important and vexing, and I offer some possible solutions. My purpose is to stimulate additional thought and interdisciplinary discussion. The problems include unconscious appraising; confusions about the bares of emotional variations across cultures; irrationality in our emotional life; research demands imposed by the transactional nature of emotion; and the potential for tautology when we treat appraisal as a cause of emotions. Although these problems are widely recognized, they have not been thoroughly dealt with, and they call for renewed efforts to seek solutions in the design of our research.     

Exploring coping reactions to work‐stress: Application of an appraisal theory

Previous research has focused on influences of coping on emotional and behavioural outcomes. Less is known about why people cope in the way they do. Drawing on an appraisal theory of emotion, it was expected that secondary appraisal components would be related to coping. Information on appraisal components, emotions, and coping in relation to a recent work stressor was provided by 107 female nurses. Appraisals were associated with coping in theoretically interpretable ways (e.g. active coping and behavioural disengagement with optimistic and pessimistic appraisals of problem‐focused coping potential, respectively). The study highlighted emotion theory as useful for exploring possible coping antecedents in a conceptually integrated way.     

Subjective impact, meaning making, and current and recalled emotions for self-defining memories

Two studies examined the impact of self-defining events on individuals (i.e., subjective impact), meaning making with regard to these events, and how subjective impact may account for the pattern of current and recalled emotions for these self-defining memories (Singer & Moffitt, 1991-1992). In Study 1, participants recalled self-defining memories, indicating how much impact the recalled events have had on them and described meaning making for these events. Subjective impact was shown to be a good marker for meaning making. Participants in Study 2 each recalled five self-defining memories, reporting their current emotions about the events, the emotions they recalled feeling at the time, and the impact the events have had on them. As expected, for negative memories, people reported less negative emotion (e.g., sadness) and more positive emotion (e.g., pride) compared to how they recalled feeling at the time. For positive memories, people reported equally intense positive emotion (e.g., love) and less negative emotion (e.g., fear) compared to how they recalled feeling at the time. These patterns of current and recalled emotions were accounted for by impact ratings.     

情绪的确定性评价对信息加工的影响

检验了情绪的效价和确定性评价对个体的信息加工策略选择的影响及其心理机制。结果表明,情绪效价对个体的信息加工方式的影响会受到情绪确定性评价的调节。高确定评价的情绪中,积极情绪的被试更倾向于采用启发式加工,消极情绪的被试更倾向于采用系统式加工。积极情绪中,高确定评价情绪的被试更倾向于采用启发式加工,低确定评价情绪的被试更倾向于采用系统式加工。当个体对自己产生情绪的原因进行合理归因后,情绪效价和确定性评价对个体信息加工方式的影响效应都消失了,说明情绪的效价和确定性评价均以信息的方式对对个体信息加工策略的选择产生影响。     

The Emotional Citizen: Emotion as a Function of Political Sophistication

Scholars and popular commentators have often stereotyped emotion as a tool that citizens use to reason about politics in place of hard fact and critical thought. Indeed, critics have often seen emotion as a potentially dangerous force that can sway the unsophisticated masses to undesirable ends. This article challenges the view that emotion is an outgrowth of low sophistication, arguing that high sophisticates are more likely to experience emotion in reaction to politics and that emotions are more influential on the political behavior of high sophisticates. Drawing upon appraisal theory, this article develops a theory of how political engagement elicits emotionality about politics, and how emotion interacts with understanding and motivation to produce its greatest impact on the behavior of those citizens who are the most politically sophisticated. Behavioral effects are examined in the contexts of presidential voting behavior and Iraq War policy attitudes. Hypotheses are tested on pooled American National Election Studies (ANES) data and an original web‐based survey of undergraduates.     

Personality Influences in Appraisal–Emotion Relationships: The Role of Neuroticism

ABSTRACT Although appraisal theorists have pointed out that appraisal–emotion relationships should vary as a function of personality traits, evidence demonstrating this is limited and inconsistent. To examine this issue, Ecological Momentary Assessment was employed in which undergraduates indicated their negative emotions and appraisals at regular intervals for 2 days in natural contexts. The results revealed that individuals higher in Neuroticism showed more negative appraisal styles than those lower in Neuroticism. More important, higher Neuroticism was associated with stronger appraisal–emotion relationships of 4 negative emotions (anger, sadness, fear, and guilt). These findings imply that Neuroticism affects not only how people appraise their environments but also the reactivity of their negative emotions to appraisals.     

Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion

The 2 main tasks of this article are 1st, to examine what a theory of emotion must do and basic issues that it must address. These include definitional issues, whether or not physiological activity should be a defining attribute, categorical versus dimensional strategies, the reconciliation of biological universals with sociocultural sources of variability, and a classification of the emotions. The 2nd main task is to apply an analysis of appraisal patterns and the core relational themes that they produce to a number of commonly identified emotions. Anger, anxiety, sadness, and pride (to include 1 positive emotion) are used as illustrations. The purpose is to show the capability of a cognitive-motivational-relational theory to explain and predict the emotions. The role of coping in emotion is also discussed, and the article ends with a response to criticisms of a phenomenological, folk-theory outlook.