WHAT ARE DESIRES GOOD FOR? TOWARDS A COHERENT ENDORSEMENT THEORY

Desire‐based theories of well‐being are often said to accept (G), x is good for a person just in case he wants it, and (B), x is better for a person than y just in case he prefers x to y. I shall argue that (G) and (B) are inconsistent, and this inconsistency resists any plausible refinement of these principles. The inconsistency is brought out by cases in which our wants and preferences for certain life‐options are contingent on which life‐option we realize. My argument can be generalized to endorsement theories that define a person’s good as the right combination of some kind of objective desirability and subjective endorsement, and allow preferences to be tie‐breakers when the compared objects are equally desirable (or incommensurable). My conclusions will not just be negative. I shall argue that if the choice is between (G) and (B), the most attractive option is to keep (G), slightly refined, and drop (B). 1     

WHAT IS A FEMINIST?

This article outlines the evaluation and stereotype of feminists, based on responses to closed-ended semantic differential traits as well as openended, projective responses to a hypothetical male or female feminist. Consistent across both methodologies, undergraduate respondents (Study 1: N = 210; Study 2: N = 135) viewed feminists as politically liberal, assertive/career oriented, and more likely to be heterosexual than lesbian. Most evaluations were neutral to slightly positive, with a few negative areas. However, feminists were seen in less positive terms than the typical woman and were described as much more assertive and politically liberal. Gender, race, birth cohort, gender of target, and feminist-attitude differences are presented. Despite the neutral to slightly positive evaluation, most respondents did not personally identify as feminists, possibly because they misperceive others' attitudes toward feminists as more negative than they actually are.     

WHAT CAN PIAGET OFFER LONERGAN'S PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY?

In Insight, Bernard Lonergan provides, albeit schematically, a unique philosophy of biology which he takes as having “profound differences” with the world view presented by Darwin. These turn on Lonergan's idea of “schemes of recurrence” and of organisms as “solutions to the problem of living in an environment.” His lapidary prose requires some deciphering. I present the broad lines of his philosophy of biology and argue that Jean Piaget's structuralism can shed light on Lonergan's intentions in virtue of his use of cybernetics and the isomorphism between biology and knowledge. In turn, Piaget draws on Waddington's restatement of epigenesis and I suggest that the result, “process structuralism,” is a viable alternative to the modern Darwinian synthesis.     

IS SOCIAL VALIDITY WHAT WE ARE INTERESTED IN? ARGUMENT FOR A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

It is argued that neither the term social nor the term validity is best to identify the processes used or the results obtained in questioning consumers about the goals set, procedures employed, or outcomes achieved in habilitative programming. The term consumer satisfaction acknowledges the fact that it is essentially a collection of consumer opinions. The underlying intent of the process might be called habilitative validation, a name that seems to better guide our validation efforts. More important, in carefully considering consumer satisfaction assessment, it becomes clear that not only does consumer satisfaction itself need to be validated, but also that more objective methods can be used for assessing habilitative validity. However, legitimate uses still remain for consumer satisfaction measurement, as long as we do not mistake it for strong evidence of the habilitative validity of our goals, procedures, or outcomes.     

PERFORMANCE TESTING: A ROSE AMONG THORNS?

Data on 21 performance tests, entry level and promotional, motor and verbal, were evaluated for 263 applicants for city government jobs over a 17-month period. The heterogeneity in applicants was matched by a similar heterogeneity in raters. Thorough training of raters, clear performance standards, and content valid tests resulted in average inter-rater reliabilities of .93 (promotional), .87 (entry level), .91 (motor) and .89 (verbal) for the different types and levels of tests. There was no evidence of adverse impact, and turnover decreased from 40 percent to less than 3 percent in the 9-26 months following the introduction of performance testing. In comparison to paper and pencil tests, performance tests were more cost effective, more face valid, and more acceptable to applicants in this situation. Considering the growing problems in public sector management, performance testing may be viewed as a rose among thorns.     

A CULTURAL EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO MODERNITY: WHAT MIGHT IT MEAN FOR CHRISTIAN FAITH?

This essay introduces, for theological consideration, some recent work in the field of cultural evolutionary theory, specifically the kin-influence hypothesis. This theory holds that, following the beginnings of industrialization and economic growth, a nation's fertility rate commences a decline, which is further abetted by the consequent and increasing imbalance in the relative influence of kin versus nonkin influences on individuals in favor of the latter. It is further proposed that this process is itself a major independent factor in the emergence of many of the features of what is called modernity, among which is that of secularization. Extending further this work, I argue that, given the historic alignment of family and religious values in Christian nations, a loss of religious belief and practice is, at least in part, the spill over effect of the opposing influence of values emerging from ever more dominant nonfamily social interaction. I conclude with some reflections on possible theological implications.     

WHAT DOES A PIGEON SEE IN A PICASSO?

The present paper is primarily a response to Watanabe, Sakamoto, and Wakita's 1995 paper “Pigeons' Discrimination of Paintings by Monet and Picasso.” Our main criticism is that the key term concept, and in particular the way in which a class of stimuli is specified, remains equivocal. We argue that it is only useful to study categorization if the organism in question can be expected to have access to the information that is used in defining the classes, and that evidence for categorization requires selective responses that cannot be attributed to similarity in features that are not essential to the classification.     

WHAT IS CLIMATE CHANGE DOING TO US AND FOR US?

What are we doing to our climate? Emissions from fossil fuel burning have raised carbon dioxide concentrations 35 percent higher than in the past millions of years. This increase is warming our planet via the greenhouse effect. What is climate change doing to and for us ? Dry regions are drier and wet ones wetter. Wildfires have increased threefold, hurricanes more violent, floods setting record heights, glaciers melting, and seas rising. Parts of Earth are increasingly uninhabitable. Climate change requires us to act as a global community. Climate justice enjoins emitters to pay the social‐environmental costs of fossil fuel burning. This would expedite green solar, wind, and next‐generation nuclear energy sources. Individuals should conserve resources, waste less food, and eat a plant‐rich diet.     

CAN GROUPS HAVE CONCEPTS? SEMANTICS FOR COLLECTIVE INTENTIONS

A substantial literature supports the attribution of intentional states such as beliefs and desires to groups. But within this literature, there is no substantial account of group concepts. Since on many views, one cannot have an intentional state without having concepts, such a gap undermines the cogency of accounts of group intentionality. In this paper I aim to provide an account of group concepts. First I argue that to fix the semantics of the sentences groups use to make their decisions or express their beliefs, we need to appeal to a conventional semantics like that of Lewis. I then argue that the same reasons we have for taking group intentional states to be irreducible to the intentional states of their members apply also to the terms fixed by a conventional semantics. It follows that the meanings of terms in the sentences expressing a group's intentional states are also fixed by facts about the group, not its members. And recognizing this, I argue, amounts to attributing concepts to groups. Finally, I discuss a real‐life example of a group concept—the meaning of ‘meter’ as fixed by the International Bureau of Weights and Measurements—and I discuss the upshot of these considerations for the question of social externalism about concepts.     

WHAT EPISTEMIC VALUES SHOULD WE RECLAIM FOR RELIGION AND SCIENCE? A RESPONSE TO J. WESLEY ROBBINS

Abstract. Postmodernism in science rejects and deconstructs the cultural dominance of especially the natural sciences in our time. Although it presents the debate between religion and science with a promising epistemological holism, it also seriously challenges attempts to develop a meaningful relationship between science and religion. A neopragmatist perspective on religion and science is part of this important challenge and eminently reveals the problems and reduction that arise when pragmatist criteria alone are used to construct a holism that renounces any demarcation between different areas of rationality. In this pragmatist vision for a holist culture, the cognitive resources of rationality are bypassed in such a way that a meaningful interaction between theology and science becomes impossible.     

WHAT KIND OF PERSON COULD BE A TORTURER?

What kind of persons could engage in political torture? Not only the morally impaired who lack empathy or compassion, or even the merely obedient, but also the righteous who struggle with conscience, and the realists who set morality aside.     

WHAT IF THE HUMAN MIND EVOLVED FOR NONRATIONAL THOUGHT? AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Our knowledge of the evolution of human thought is limited not only by the nature of the evidence, but also by the values we bring to the authoritative scientific study of our ancestors. The tendency to see human thought as linear progress in rational (i.e., problem‐solving) capacities has been popular since the Enlightenment, and in the wake of Darwinism has been extended to other species as well. Human communication (language) can be used to transmit useful information, but is rooted in symbolic processes that are nonrational—that is, they involve choosing among functionally equivalent alternatives, any of which is as good an option as any other. The evolution of human thought cannot be realistically isolated from the evolution of human society or human communication, neither of which is rooted in obvious rationality.     

CAN THERE BE A KANTIAN CONSEQUENTIALISM?

In On What Matters Derek Parfit argues that we need to make a significant reassessment of the relationship between some central positions in moral philosophy, because, contrary to received opinion, Kantians, contractualists and consequentialists are all 'climbing the same mountain on different sides'. In Parfit's view Kant's own attempt to outline an account of moral obligation fails, but when it is modified in ways entirely congenial to his thinking, a defensible Kantian contractualism can be produced, which survives the objections which are fatal for Kant's own theory. This form of contractualism would then lead rational agents to choose consequentialist moral principles. I argue that Parfit significantly misrepresents Kant's project in moral philosophy, and that no genuinely Kantian moral theory could issue in a form of consequentialism.